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


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SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
OF THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO.

WITH AN
ANALYTICAL INDEX,
GIVING REFERENCES TO THE GREEK TEXT OF MODERN
EDITIONS, AND TO THE TRANSLATION IN
BOHN'S CLASSICAL LIBRARY.

BY ALFRED DAY, LL.D.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE writer's aim in the following pages has been to supply in a compendious form the means of reference to the precise paragraphs in which the most noteworthy ideas of Plato have been enunciated and discussed, and to bring together under their several heads those passages in the entire works of the author that bear on the same subject. In addition to this, there has been furnished a concise analysis of each dialogue, in which the contents are set forth in their consecutive order with the number and letter of the paragraph attached, so that the place of each in the Greek text may be instantly found. The volume is thus a Handbook and an English Index of Topics, alike useful for the Greek student or the general reader who would ascertain what has been advanced by Plato on many points that are still as interesting to moralists and metaphysicians as in the time of the early development of Greek thought. It should be distinctly understood that the object is rather to give a bare enumeration of the matters discussed, leaving out the connecting tissue of argument in which they are embraced in very many or most cases. Had the author attempted to do more than furnish a clue to the discovery of particular passages or lines of reasoning, the volume would have been swelled unnecessarily. It partakes therefore largely of the nature of an Index even in the

first or analytical portion, and rather suggests the connected argument than furnishes it in finished detail.

The reader will hardly find within the same compass so thorough an abstract of what is to be met with in Plato. In Ast's Lexicon, or Mitchell's Index, he will doubtless meet with a complete concordance of passages containing a given Greek word or its inflexions. In Mr. Grote's great work, and in Dr. Whewell's paraphrases, he will likewise find all that is necessary to bring him into intimate acquaintance with the speculations and reasonings unfolded in our author. But these are all expensive works, and the two last would require to be read as a whole to extract from them what has been advanced on any single topic. No one, however, who wishes to do justice to the great philosopher of antiquity should stop short of studying Mr. Grote's most masterly analysis, the only drawback to which is, that the author belongs to the sensational school of Mill and Bain rather than to that of Plato, and is not wholly in sympathy with him.

In the present volume, which is a kind of Directory to Plato, the writer has avoided either attacking or defending the opinions contained in his dialogues, or setting them in a framework of his own. Even where he may unconsciously have given a turn to the reasoning which the original may be thought not to require, little harm will be done, as the reference to the numbered paragraph and letter will generally enable the student to correct or verify the rendering. It is not an Index of words, but rather of remarkable or pregnant thoughts, particularly of such as bear on present modes of thinking, or anticipate at the dawn of philosophy the very controversies of our own time. Into the criticisms of the text, or questions of au-

thenticity, the writer has cautiously abstained from entering. Mr. Grote has argued the last with his usual ability, and left to the German critics the further defence of their several hypotheses, and the infusion of fresh vitality into a subject well-nigh worn out.

The collection of passages and parallelisms in this Handbook is the result of a careful perusal of the original Greek, which has been gone over at least three times for this purpose, in addition to the reverification of the several references.

As it was thought desirable that an English Index should be applicable to some entire English Translation of the author, it was resolved to give in each instance the pages of the English version as they occur in the six volumes published in Bohn's Library, and over against them the number and letter forming the marginal register of the complete Greek text as adopted by Ast and Stallbaum, which are those now generally in use.

It is believed that those who already possess the English version will be benefited by being enabled to consult the original more readily, and that those who do not, or who only have access to English or Greek versions, where the same chaptering or subdivision is not employed, will be glad to be referred to a standard register now almost universally employed.

It is fortunate for us that in a general way there is no great difficulty in understanding Plato, despite of occasional obscurity and textual corruptions. Some of the obscurity is undoubtedly due to a want of clear apprehension in our author himself, and the schools of philosophy in which he had been bred. It is only surprising that he should have been master of the logical refinement and

subtlety and accurate discrimination he has shown, almost in the infancy of philosophy and dialectics. That an author should be unequal, or occasionally at variance with himself in a number of independent treatises, or that he should exhibit conflicting theories with a different leaning at different times, according as his interlocutors are changed, is not to be wondered at. Nor is it at all suprising that many of the discussions end without establishing any positive result, seeing that they are only tentative, and aim at showing what is not known with our present apparatus of argument. Plato thought, no doubt justly, that in his time the materials for a complete positive philosophy did not exist, and that at best all these exercises were but *tentamina*, which future disputants would make subservient to the establishment of truth on a more immovable foundation. Had Plato lived to our own time, he would have realised the conviction that he had acted wisely in thus avoiding a too hasty and dogmatic solution of his difficulties. While he has anticipated nearly all the questions that have swelled into importance in the metaphysical and ethical speculations of these later ages, men's minds are still divided into two schools at least, of one of which he may be regarded as the great leader or representative. That is to say, that notwithstanding our greater logical precision, and the enormously greater store of scientific accumulation, one party, and a very powerful one, still recognises in him the mental type, more or less developed, of its own adherents.

It will be obvious at once that in an Index or Directory, or concise Handbook like the present, questions of philosophy could not be handled at large, nor what has been said on various readings, nor what is or is not accordant

with Plato's style or manner of thinking; on all which volumes have been written and will be written. Suggested readings must be left to illustrate or adorn the pages of the successful editor of the several dialogues; they will as a rule add little to the sum of Plato's opinions or detract from his worth. The sceptical critics may be left to settle what is or is not Plato's by setting them in conflict with themselves and with their conservative opponents, and thus demonstrating that there is no such subtle, critical tact, and taste, and smell, as shall infallibly detect what the master-mind has or has not dictated. If Plato is not the author in all cases, some one but little his inferior will have to be conjured up, as Dr. Whewell has said, to fill his empty seat. Not that it is meant hereby to depreciate criticism. All that is proposed is to explain that the present volume claims only to refer the reader to the discussions and leading thoughts that pass under the name of Plato, or are to be found in the collection of writings, genuine or spurious, that are bound up together in Bekker, Ast, or Stallbaum, under his name.

Lastly, it may be mentioned that while the dialogues in the Summary and Analysis are printed in the order of the English translation, they are referred to in the Index in the alphabetic order of their titles.

It is with deep regret that the Publishers have to add that the Editor of this work has not lived to see its publication. Shortly after the revision of the last proof sheets he was attacked by a sudden and severe illness, which terminated fatally in a few days.

The numbers and capital letters in the Summary refer to the register adopted by Ast and Stallbaum.

The letters (Tr.) in the Summary refer to the Translation in Bohn's Classical Library, the number of the volume being indicated at the head of each page of the Summary.

In the Index the number of the volume is given in the *first* reference to that volume.

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

(TRANSLATION. VOL. I.)

UNLIKE most of the other writings of Plato, this is chiefly in the form of harangue rather than dialogue, professing to be the defence of Socrates before his judges. / Its genuineness is universally admitted.

Among the numerous falsehoods alleged by the plaintiff, Socrates is surprised to find himself charged with being a master of seductive eloquence; he denies this, unless eloquence be another name for truth. (Tr. 3; 17 A, B.) The truth will be uttered by him in its simple unsophisticated nakedness, and not as by the adversary in picked phrases and studied ornateness, in a way becoming an old man more than seventy years of age, now brought, for the first time, before a public tribunal. (Tr. 3; 17 C, D.) "The true excellency of a judge is to discern whether the party arraigned says what is just; that of an orator is to say what is true. (Tr. 4; 18 A.) I have often been accused by persons, of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his clique, of prying into celestial things and the mysteries of the lower world, and of making the worse appear the better reason. (Tr. 4; 18 B.) They pretend to assert that those who do these things are atheists, and they have taken occasion to traduce me in my absence, and to prepossess your minds against me, in the credulous period of youth. (Tr. 4;

18 C.) Chief of all is a well-known comic poet, whom I could name, and there are others who will not come openly forward, so that I must fight, as it were, with shadows, and my accusers are thus of two kinds. (Tr. 4; 18 D, E.) With God's approbation, I will proceed to defend myself, though I know the difficulty; and first, let me repeat the unfounded charge of Meletus, that I am impiously curious, making the worse appear the better reason, and teaching others to do the same. (Tr. 5; 19 A, B.) In his play, Aristophanes brings in Socrates treading the air and otherwise playing the fool in a manner utterly unknown to me. I care not for this, but let it not be made to tell against me, till you have heard the evidence of those among you who know my mode of conversation, and that these statements are unfounded. (Tr. 5; 19 C, D.) Nor is it true that I ever took money for my teaching, however reasonable it may be that men like Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias should induce youth to leave the instruction which they can have gratuitously elsewhere, to give them money and thanks for allowing them to become their pupils. (Tr. 5; 19 E.) There is Evenus, the Parian, too, who teaches for five minæ, whom my friend Callias patronizes for his two sons. (Tr. 6; 20 A, B.) But how, Socrates, it may be objected, did you become obnoxious to these charges, if there is no truth in them? I will tell you: it is because I possess a sort of mundane wisdom, not anything superhuman, to which I make no pretence. (Tr. 6, 7; 20 C, D, E.) You know Chærephon, my old associate, an earnest man in all he did. He asked at Delphi whether there was any one wiser than I, and was answered by the priestess in the negative, as his brother can corroborate, for my old friend is dead. (Tr. 7; 21 A.) What can the god mean? I said to myself: he can only speak the truth, and I am wholly unconscious of the fact asserted. I therefore tried to find

a man wiser than myself; but I only found him wise in the opinion of others, and in his own, but not really so, though he was a man of considerable political note. On trying to convince him that he only fancied himself to be wise, I made him my enemy, and as I left him, I mused over the matter, and came to the conclusion that I was wiser than he only because I make no pretence to a knowledge I do not possess. (Tr. 7; 21 B, C, D.) I tried the same repeatedly with others, and found that the best reputed were the most deficient, and that those least thought of were generally more deserving of the name of being wise. (Tr. 8; 21 E, 22 A.) In the same way I searched among the tragic and dithyrambic poets, but I found that almost any one could estimate the meaning and value of what they wrote better than the writers themselves. What they do is only by a sort of inspiration, like that of prophets and diviners who utter many high-flown announcements which they do not comprehend. Thus I was in this respect better than the statesmen and the poets. (Tr. 8; 22 B, C.) I next had recourse to the craftsmen, who possessed some very valuable wisdom among them, but who all failed in assuming that their one particular attainment was a guarantee for the universality of their knowledge. (Tr. 9; 22 D, E.) The result I found to be, that though I did not possess their wisdom, neither did I their ignorance, and with this I was content. Hence my unpopularity, and the notion that I am wise because I expose the folly of others. What the god meant to be inferred is that man's wisdom is of small account, and he used Socrates as a name for one who knows the extent of his own ignorance. I regard this as the service to which I am devoted, viz., to show my fellow men the deficiencies of their boasted wisdom, and thus, by neglecting my own affairs and giving myself to the service of the god, I am reduced to extreme poverty. (Tr. 9; 23

A, B.) Besides this, many young men who take delight in hearing me expose the vain pretensions of others, affect my company and imitate my practice, so that I have got a bad name and am said to corrupt them. The moment, however, you ask those who make this objection, wherein I do so, they fly to the trite general statement in the indictment, but do not tell the real ground of pique, that I have lowered their pretensions. Meletus, on behalf of the poets, Anytus, on that of the statesmen and craftsmen, and Lycon, on that of the orators, have joined the combination against me. Judge, then, men of Athens, if what I allege is not the truth. (Tr. 9, 10; 23 C, D, E; 24 A.) That noble patriot Meletus and his associates charge me with corrupting youth and believing in false gods. But I will prove to you that Meletus never concerned himself with how they were to be made better, or who is the person that takes this upon him. On being cross-questioned by the prisoner, Meletus is made to say, that the laws, the judges, the supreme council, and all who meet in the ecclesia make the youth better, Socrates being the only exception. (Tr. 10, 11; 24 B, C, D, E; 25 A.) Socrates asks, do all men make horses better while one only spoils them, or is the fact exactly the reverse? How lucky is it for youth if only one man corrupts them, and all else set them an example of virtue; but how can Meletus be of the latter class, seeing he never indulged a serious thought about the morals of youth? Again, as all men like to dwell with good citizens, and to be benefited rather than injured by those with whom they associate, does Meletus charge me with corrupting youth designedly? "Yes," replies the party appealed to. "Are you, then, Meletus, so far beyond me in wisdom as to know the results of evil associations while I am entirely ignorant of the harm they inflict? This is incredible. If, therefore, I corrupt youth, I do it

without designing it, and you ought to try and set me right, not to bring me where I shall get punishment, and not instruction. (Tr. 11, 12; 25 B, C, D, E; 26 A.) I corrupt the youth, you say, by teaching them to believe in strange gods. If I do this I am at least not an atheist; but perhaps you mean to say that I do not believe there are any gods, and that I teach this to others?" "Yes, that is what I assert." "Do I not, then, believe in the sun and moon as gods?" "No; for you term the sun a stone, and the moon earth." "No one is so ignorant as not to know, or so poor as not to be able to purchase, the information, that you are talking of Anaxagoras, not Socrates. It is the height of insolence and unrestrained licence to bring such a charge, and you are guilty of the grossest contradiction. (Tr. 12, 13; 26 B, C, D, E; 27 A.) No man believes that there are human affairs, and denies that there are men, nor can a man believe in divine things without at the same time acknowledging the existence of dæmons who are gods, or the offspring of gods." (Tr. 14; 27 B, C, D, E.) Clearly, O Athenians, there is nothing in the accusation of Meletus, and I am merely overborne by the envy of the multitude, which has victimized many good men before me. (Tr. 15; 28 A.) But it may be said, you ought not, Socrates, to have studied what exposes you to the loss of life. This, in my view, is of no consequence. The chances of life or death are not to be weighed one moment with the question whether a man is doing justly or unjustly. Such was not the case with Achilles, who preferred death as the consequence of slaying Hector to an inglorious life. No man should desert the post of duty or danger where he finds himself or he has been placed by his commander, whatever may be his fate. (Tr. 15, 16; 28 B, C, D, E.) If I did not desert my post at Potidæa, Amphipolis, or Delium (*see* Lach. tr. v. iv. 150; 181 A, B; Symp. tr. v. iii. 572; 221

A, B), why should I abandon the study of philosophy because of its dangers? To fear death is to pretend to know that of which we know nothing. Death may be the greatest of blessings, but men ignorantly fear it as if they knew that it was not. I do not pretend to know the secrets of the grave, but I know that to disobey the Deity or my earthly superior is wicked. (Tr. 16; 29 A, B.) Were you to set aside Anytus and his accusations and to free me on condition of abandoning the pursuit of philosophy, threatening me with death if I resumed it, my reply would be, "All honour to my noble countrymen, but I shall obey God rather than you, and with my latest breath shall utter the dictates of philosophy." Are you not, as the occupants of this city so renowned for power and wisdom, ashamed to prefer riches and earthly glory and honour to the welfare of the soul? And if you say that you do study the latter, I shall test you thoroughly to see if you set the highest value on things of worth or those that are worthless. (Tr. 16, 17; 29 C, D, E.) This is the business of my life; and if this is to corrupt youth, I shall persevere, though I should die a thousand deaths. (Tr. 17; 30 A, B.) Should you doom me to die, you will not injure me more than yourselves, nor is it possible for a better man to be injured by a worse. Anytus may get me condemned to death, or banishment, or confiscation of civil privileges, none of which are so bad as the evil he will inflict on himself by his injustice. On your own accounts, not mine, do me not this wrong. You will not easily supply my lack of service. This city, like a noble but lazy horse, wants a gadfly to quicken its motions, and such am I. You may strike me in momentary anger, roused by my sting, and then you may doze away for ever, unless my place is supplied. Had my office not been divinely appointed, I should not have neglected all my personal inter-

ests, so unlike other men, merely to exhort you to virtue. Not a shilling have I ever been profited, and my poverty proves the truth of my assertion. (Tr. 17, 18; 30 C, D, E; 31 A, B.) You will object, perhaps, that I do not appear in your public assemblies to offer my advice. (Tr. 19; 31 C.) But this my dæmon has always opposed, and had I dabbled in politics I know that my life would have terminated long ago. No man is safe who opposes you or any other mob, and who resists what is unjust and illegal in civic affairs. The only security is in withdrawing from the public eye. (Tr. 19; 31 D, E.) Once was I elected as delegate of my deme to be one of the Prytanes, when the condemnation of the generals who did not carry off those who had perished in the naval action was to be resolved on. On that occasion I alone opposed the general voice, and was abused by the orators, but I preferred risking my own life to siding with what I deemed wrong. (Tr. 19; 32 A, B.) This was in the time of the democracy. Under the thirty, I with others was ordered to bring Leon from Salamis, with a view to his being executed. The rest did as they were bidden, but I firmly refused; and had not their government been dissolved soon after, I should probably myself have been put to death. (Tr. 19, 20; 32 A, B, C, D.) Would my life have been spared, think you, if I had engaged more in public business? Through life I have always done, so far as I could, what is just; and though I never constituted myself the teacher of any, I never refused information when asked. I take no fees. I converse alike with rich and poor, good or bad, but for their goodness or badness I am not responsible; nor has there been any concealment or reservation. (Tr. 20; 32 E; 33 A, B.) The reason why I am followed, I have already told you. What I do is by a divine impulse, and if my influence had been so corrupting, why do not those who

have been corrupted bear witness against me, or the friends who are solicitous for their welfare? But here I see Criton, Lysanias, Antiphon, Nicostratus, Paralus, Platon, and Apollodorus. Why are none of them called? Surely if the victims of my bad teaching still take my part, their friends here present, who have not been misled, can have no such reason to keep quiet. (Tr. 20, 21; 33 C, D, E; 34 A, B.) Possibly my judges may think I ought to entreat for my life, and to try and excite their sympathy by an affecting display. But though not sprung from a rock or oak, I too have children and human ties. I will not call in the aid of such an exhibition. It is in no spirit of obstinacy or pride, that I refuse to do this, but neither my age nor character will allow it. It is disgraceful to see men, as I have seen them, with a reputation for courage and firmness, thus crouching at the fear of death, as if they would be immortal were no sentence passed on them. Such bring discredit on the Athenian name, as if those who were chosen to the highest offices were no better than women. Neither should persons of reputation do this, nor should you permit them, or let it be thought that these dramatic displays of grief and terror are of any avail. (Tr. 21, 22; 34 C, D, E; 35 A, B.) Apart from this, it is not right that a judge should exercise pity in place of deciding according to law. You are bound by your oaths, which if I should induce you to break, I should teach you to disown the gods, and prove the case as against myself." (Tr. 23; 35 C, D.) At this stage of the proceedings Socrates is declared guilty by a majority of those present. On this he expresses his surprise, only, that the majority is so trifling. By taking three votes from this, and adding them to the minority, he would have been acquitted; and even this is due to the part that Anytus and Lycon have had in the charge, for Meletus would not have obtained

the fifth part of the votes for his share in the charges, and would, but for the verdict on all the issues, have had to submit to a fine of one thousand drachmæ. (Tr. 23; 35 E; 36 A.) "But what verdict shall I pass on myself for neglecting all the ordinary pursuits of mankind, their petty rivalries and intrigues, and quest of pelf, and bidding you all study how to become as wise and good as possible? You ought to maintain me at the public expense in the Prytaneum, much more than a man who has conquered at Olympia in the chariot race, to whom there is no need of public support; as there is to me. (Tr. 24; 36 B, C, D.) Do not think I say this from presumption. If a trial for life lasted more than a day I should have convinced you of my innocence, but we have been too short time together for me to do this. You would not have me fear the death Meletus condemns me to, of which I say that I know not whether it is an evil. I do not prefer to live in confinement under the will of the magistrates, nor to be fined, having no means of discharging a fine, nor to go into exile with the vain hope that I shall be more popular anywhere than in Athens. I should only undergo the same fate a second time. (Tr. 24, 25; 37 A, B, C, D.) But, says some one, keep quiet. This, however, I cannot do, for this would be to disobey God. Life is not worth living if the right of discoursing about virtue is taken away, though you will hardly believe me. Were I rich I would choose a fine, but I could not pay more than a mina. Plato and Criton, Critobulus and Apollodorus authorize me to say they will be my sureties for thirty, and to this extent I undertake to go." (On this sentence of death is passed, and Socrates resumes.) "You will, men of Athens, be reproached for putting to death Socrates, whom, in order to annoy you, your maligners will term 'the wise.' Had you been content to wait the course of nature, he would soon have died

naturally. As it is, I have been condemned, not for want of arguments but of impudence, and because I would not flatter your love of the agreeable. But I would prefer death to life on these terms. A man may escape death in battle by deserting his arms or suing for mercy. Nothing is so easy as avoiding it, nor so difficult as to shun baseness, which is more fleet than death. I am overtaken, old and feeble as I am, by the slower, while my enemies are outstripped by the fleeter. (Tr. 25, 26; 37 E; 38 A, B, C, D, E; 39 A, B.) Being about to die, I may assume the prophet's privilege, and tell you that when I am gone it will be worse for you. You do not perceive how your accusers have been kept in check by me. Their mouths will not be stopped by any severity exercised towards me, and you will think with regret of the old man under the fiercer attack of younger and less scrupulous assailants. (Tr. 27; 39 C, D.) But I may still converse with you as friends. It is a strange thing, O my judges, that though on almost all other occasions my dæmon has opposed me, often very trifling ones, yet in this greater crisis of my fate, he has uttered no voice of prohibition. The reason I believe to be that death is a blessing in store for me. (Tr. 27, 28; 39 E; 40 A, B.) I draw the inference that this is so, as follows:—Death is either annihilation and loss of sensation, or it is the transference of the soul to another place. If the former, where no dream disturbs the sleeper, it is a great gain. Possibly, no time of a man's period on earth is so entirely pleasant as that which is passed in a dreamless slumber. Even in this case death is a gain, and the future is crowded into the moment in which it takes place. But if, on the other hand, it is a passage from earth to another world, what greater blessing can befall a good man than meeting there such righteous judges as Minos, Rhadamanthus, Æacus, and Triptolemus? What would you not give

for a meeting there with Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer? Gladly would I die again and again if such converse was to be the result. Think of talking over my sufferings with Palamedes and Ajax, and the joy of testing who among departed heroes was or was not wise, or of questioning Ulysses, and Sisyphus, and innumerable others of every age and sex, and all this with no further fear of death and the certainty of immortality before me! (Tr. 28, 29; 40 C, D, E; 41 A, B, C.) You, O judges, should indulge good hope as to death, that to the righteous nothing can be evil, either in life or at its close. It is better that I should depart hence; and neither to you nor my accusers do I bear ill-will, though it may not have been their purpose to do me a kindness. (Tr. 29; 41 D.) All I have to ask is, that if the sons I leave behind me grow up to be avaricious, or to act in any way contrary to what is virtuous, thinking themselves of great importance where they are of none, you will censure them as I have censured you, and make them repent their folly. If this is done, we shall all have experienced justice from you. It only remains that I take my departure, but God only knows which will be best off, you in life or I in death." (Tr. 29; 41 E; 42 A.)

CRITON.

CRITON is a sequel to the *Apology*, and records the efforts made by the person of this name to induce Socrates to escape from the grasp of the executioners of the law. Criton, by virtue of interest with the gaoler, has obtained early entrance into the prison, before his friend is yet awake, whose placid slumbers, on the eve of so sad a fate, he is unwilling to break. Happy must be the temper of the man who can enjoy unbroken repose at such a time!

No sooner is Socrates roused, than he asks why Criton did not waken him at once, and, in reply to his explanation, declares that there is no good ground for a man of his age repining because he must die, though Criton has known others whose age did not reconcile them to their fate. "Well, what made you come so early?" says Socrates. "I have come with heavy tidings," rejoins Criton. "I fear the ship will arrive from Delos before the day is out, for I hear it is already off Sunium, and you will probably die to-morrow." "As God wills," adds Socrates; "but if dreams tell true I shall not die to-morrow, for I have had one in which an exquisitely-beautiful female, clothed in white, called to me and told me that in three days I should be in fertile Phthia." (Tr. vol. i. 31, 32; 43 A, B, C, D; 44 A.) "A remarkable dream certainly," observes Criton; "but nevertheless take my advice and make your escape; for if you do not I shall suffer the irreparable loss of your friendship, and incur the censure of our common associates, for begrudging you the pecuniary means of flight." "Why should we concern ourselves about what people think and say, Criton?" "We are under the compulsion of doing so, for the many have much in their power." "Would they had the power of doing much good! But they cannot make others wise and good, and it is all as it happens." "Be it so," adds Criton. "Do not, in this instance, care about informers, or the loss of money to your friends. All this inconvenience we shall cheerfully bear—and more than this, if you will be guided by us. (Tr. 32, 33; 44 B, C, D, E; 45 A.) All my fortune is yours; and Simmias, the Theban, alone has brought sufficient for the purpose, and Cebes and others are equally ready. I can find you friends in Thessaly where you shall be free from any annoyance. You ought not to sit down passively while you can be placed in safety, and in doing so are as much

your own enemy as are those who persecute you. You are betraying your children and forcing them to become orphans, and displaying a culpable inaction, though you profess to have taught strenuousness and virtue all your life long. Besides, you involve us, your friends, in the imputation of cowardice, who might have thwarted the proceedings at every stage. Rouse yourself, then: there remains only one night for carrying out a plan of escape, and be advised to avail yourself of the opportunity." (Tr. 33, 34; 45 B, C, D, E; 46 A.) "Your earnest appeal, Criton, would be praiseworthy, were it based on what is right. I follow no guidance but that of reason, and a moment's change of fortune does not alter its conclusions. No opinion of the many will weigh with me, however it may bluster or seek to terrify us. We appear to have been jesting, it would seem, when we talked of the validity of opinions. If a conclusion was right when no fear of death existed, how should it be not right when death stares a man in the face? We agreed, when no danger threatened, that some opinions were rightly formed, and others not, and that those of some men were to be accepted, while those of others were to be rejected. We may honour the opinions of the wise and good, but not of the bad. (Tr. 34, 35; 46 B, C, D, E; 47 A.) The man who practises gymnastics looks only to the judgment of his trainer or physician. He does not study the judgments of the crowd, for this would be to incur bodily mischief. So, too, we cannot accept the decisions of the crowd about what is just or unjust without injury to that part of our nature which takes account of these attributes. We can neither enjoy life with a body deeply disordered, nor with a soul demoralized, the soul being of more value than the body. (Tr. 35, 36; 47 B, C, D, E; 48 A.) We ought, then, to set aside the opinion of the many. Even if the multitude can put us to death, our

anxiety should not be for life, so much as for living well, that is to say, justly. The question arises, ought I to try and leave Athens without the assent of the Athenians? It is not an affair of money or other insufficient motives, all which would imply a truckling to popular sentiment. What is to be considered is, is it just that I should do as you propose, for I greatly prefer death to acting against my convictions. (Tr. 37; 48 B, C, D.) If you can shake this conviction, I will obey you, for I honour the kindness of your intention. Let us, however, examine further. Think you that we may sometimes do injustice and at others not, or is it always wrong to commit it? Have all our previous decisions been those of children, or is it never lawful to do wrong or return evil for evil? Well, you agree that it is wrong to do injustice in all cases, even when it is in retaliation for wrong done to us. Yet, as this is far from the belief of the multitude, consider whether you can firmly hold to this view. If you are still agreed, are you of opinion that our promises are always to be kept inviolably? I am. Well, then, are we not doing injustice to those whom we ought least to injure, in running away without permission of the state? Suppose that, when on the point of flight, the Laws should come to us in person, and ask our purpose. 'Are you, Socrates,' they will probably say, 'intent on destroying us and the community so far as you can? Do you imagine that a state can exist, where the enactments are set at naught and made a dead letter?' What an opportunity for oratorical denunciation would such a case furnish! Suppose the Laws to say, 'You agreed, Socrates, to submit to the judicial sentence of the state. You are fond of question and answer; let us in turn interrogate you. Why do you try to destroy us, we who gave you birth, nurture, education, and social ties? Did we not instruct you in music and gymnastics, and are

not you and your progenitors our offspring and servants? Surely we do not stand on the same level, that you may retort on us what we inflict on you. You did not dare return blow for blow when your father punished you, nor ought you to deal so with us. You are wise enough to know that a man's country is more priceless, august, and sacred before gods and men than any ancestry, and that deeper submission and obsequiousness is due to her than to parents. Where you cannot persuade you must submit, either to be flogged or bound, or incur risk of life in battle, and to do all she commands with more awe than you would the behests of father or mother. (Tr. 38 to 41; 48 E, . . . to 51 C.) Furthermòre, after giving you birth and rearing and instruction, we announced to you when you attained to manhood that you might emigrate where you liked with all your chattels, but that if you should deliberately remain, it was a compact which could not be broken, that you should wholly do what we enjoin, unless you can convince us that it is not expedient. (Tr. 41; 51 D, E; 52 A.) All this is more especially applicable to you, Socrates, who so loved the town that you never went abroad but once to the Isthmian games unless on war service. Even at your trial you might have made choice of exile rather than death. Would you now belie your solemn assurances, and break the connexion you are sworn to maintain? You have had seventy years to consider whether you would emigrate or not, during which you never preferred Lacedæmon, Crete, or other Greek and foreign towns, but you have stuck to Athens more than even the halt and blind; and it will be ridiculous that you should now, for the first time, turn round on us. (Tr. 42, 43; 52 B, C, D, E; 53 A.) What good will your breach of compact do you? Will you not expose your friends to the chances of fine, or banishment, or confiscation of goods?

Or if you go to Thebes or Megara, you will come as a dangerous and suspected person, a corrupter of the laws and youth to boot. Will life be worth retaining on these terms? Or suppose you go to Thessaly, to Criton's friends, and tell them how ludicrously you escaped from gaol, catching up as a disguise the first thing that came to hand, as is the way with prison birds when they take to flight, will they not think it unseemly on the part of one tottering on the verge of the grave? What will have become of your preachments about virtue and your other fine doctrines? (Tr. 43, 44; 53 B, C, D, E.) But you say you want to live to educate your children. Do you mean to take them with you to Thessaly, and so make them aliens? Will they not be better trained and taught here, and taken care of by your friends, in any case, whether you go to Thessaly or to Hades? The professions of your friends are but little worth if they will not do so much for you. (Tr. 44; 54 A.) Take our advice, then, and do not set a higher value on life or children than on honour. Have this at least to plead when you get to the other world: neither your interests in time nor in the world beyond will suffer you to hesitate. If die you must, it is not we, the Laws, that have done you wrong, but the men who perverted them. You cannot escape without returning evil for evil, and breaking your most solemn engagements, and incurring our anger. Pay no heed to what Criton urges." (Tr. 44; 54 B, C.) "After this, my dear Criton," says Socrates, "the din of this expostulation so resounds in my ears, like that of the flutes in the mad rites of the Corybantes, that I can listen to nothing further. All your solicitude for my adopting any other course will be utterly in vain." "Well, then," says Criton; "I have done." "Let me, then," adds Socrates, "follow the course the deity points out to me." (Tr. 45; 54 D, E.)

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PHÆDON.

PHÆDON, a favourite dialogue of Plato, about the authorship of which no question seems to exist, rendered further interesting by its treating on the immortality of the soul, though the demonstration can hardly be deemed satisfactory, and as exhibiting the calm and triumphant assurance of a man who contemplates his rapidly approaching end without a cloud upon his spirit, or any internal tumult to mar the bright serenity and repose of his feelings. Socrates is here the heathen saint who has triumphed over the fear of dissolution; and who with clear conscience awaits his doom as a martyr for the cause of truth and justice, being the only one unmoved among the sorrowing and weeping circle of his friends.

Without entering on the machinery of the dialogue, we will recount *currente calamo* a few of the more expressive thoughts. The lawfulness of suicide is denied (Tr. 58, 59; 61 C, D, E; 62 A, B, C.) Death is much better for the good than the bad. (Tr. 61; 63 C.) Grounds of good hope to a man who has spent his life in philosophy. (Tr. 61; 63 E; 64 A.) Death is only the severance of soul and body. (Tr. 62, 66; 64 C; 67 D.) There should be no solicitude about the latter (Tr. 62; 64 E); though the crowd think exactly the reverse. (Tr. 63; 65 A.) Not even sight and hearing, the exactest of our senses, give us true insight into real existence. (Tr. 63; 65 B, C.) The just, and fair, and good exist, but not for the bodily eye. (Tr. 64; 65 D.) Not the senses, but reflection must attain these. (Tr. 64, 65; 65 E; 66 B, C, D, E; 67 A, B.) We cannot realize these in life, but only by the soul after death; it is not granted to the impure to attain the pure. (Tr. 65; 67 A.) It would be ridiculous that the

man who has lived as near death as possible while on earth, should shrink from it when it comes to him. (Tr. 66; 67 D, E.) Death should be least fearful to those who have studied how to die. (Tr. 66; 68 A.) Natural attachment to departed friends has induced many to desire to be with them, and shall the devotees of wisdom and philosophy shrink from doing so? (Ib.) Brave men submit to death from fear of dishonour, but philosophers are not brave from fear. (Tr. 67; 68 D.) Death should not be accepted as an alternative. (Tr. 67, 68; 68 E; 69 A, B, C.) There are in the mysteries many rod-bearers, but few inspired mystics, and these are the true philosophers. (Tr. 68; 69 C, D.)

A collocutor starts a doubt of the soul's immortality. (Tr. 69; 70 A, B.) Allusion to Aristophanes. (Tr. 69; 70 C.) Socrates bases his first argument for the soul's immortality on tradition, and the law of opposition, that life springs from death. (Tr. 69; 70 C, D.) All things that have a contrary originate in this opposite. (Tr. 70; 70 E; 71 A, B.) But death and life are opposites. (Tr. 71; 71 C, D, E.) Were it not for this reciprocity, all things would at last coalesce in one form and cease to be produced; all would fall to sleep, and render meaningless the tale of Endymion, and the dictum of Anaxagoras, "all things into one," would be realized (Tr. 72; 72 B, C); and nothing could prevent universal death. (Tr. 72; 72 D.)

From this analogy of the mutuality of opposites, which is more verbal than real, so far as the point to be proved is concerned, he passes to his favourite theory that learning is nothing but reminiscence, which however striking and attractive is utterly inconsequent as a proof. The province of demonstration and suggestion are here confounded, and it is even probable that by the former Plato himself did not understand what we demand; or he may

have known that no satisfactory proof was possible, and therefore confined himself to an ingenious hypothesis. (Tr. 72; 72 E; see Tr. 89; 85 C, D.)

Here Cebes, who takes up the dialogue, endeavours to show that when men are rightly questioned you discover that correct opinions are latent in them of which they were not aware, and that this is elicited in the case of diagrams. (Tr. 73; 73 A, B.) That they have a notion of *differentia*. (Tr. 73; 73 C.) That ideas by association call up others with which they have formerly been conjoined. (Tr. 74; 73 D.) That, thus, like will suggest unlike, and that abstract ideas and concepts imply a reference to something more than the momentary experience of the individual. (Tr. 74; 74 A.) Equal things are different from equality, and a passing resemblance carries with it the higher attribute of similitude. (Tr. 75; 74 B, C, D, E.) But these concepts are the result of previous knowledge, which no present exertion of sense could furnish. (Tr. 76; 75 A.) If this knowledge was not inherited from an antecedent state, or innate at birth, it must have been at least connate. (Tr. 76, 77; 75 B, C, D, E; 76 A, B.) All this holds as to the beautiful and good and other *entia*, and sense only compares objects with an eternal pattern. (Tr. 78; 76 D.) Such abstracts have a real existence, and thus the soul existed before birth. (Tr. 79; 77 A.)

But it is not yet proved that the soul will exist after death. (Tr. 79; 77 B.) Here the principle of contrariety is again appealed to. (Tr. 79; 77 C, D.) Notwithstanding our boyish fears of the spectral character of death, yet soul is not the kind of substance which admits of change or dissipation. (Tr. 80; 78 B.) It is the compound and complex that is decomposed, not the simple, and this is the case with essential being; the abso-

lutely equal and beautiful, they are permanently the same. (Tr. 80, 81; 78 C, D, E.) Things perceived by sense are the ever changing, not the qualities to which we mentally refer them, which are unseen, and never change. (Tr. 81; 79 A.) But the body is allied to the one, and the soul to the other. (Tr. 82; 79 B, C, D, E.) In the union of soul and body, Nature has ordained that the latter should be subservient to the former, which resembles most a divine principle. (Tr. 82; 80 A.) The one is allied to the mortal, the other to the immortal. (Ib.) Thus soul is akin to the divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, and indissoluble, and is opposed to the body in these respects. (Tr. 83; 80 B.) The soul spurns the body, and philosophy is a studying how to die. (Tr. 83; 80 B, C, D, E.) Soul goes to its like and to be with the gods (Tr. 84; 81 A); is weighed down by its mortal part when impure at death (Tr. 84; 81 B, C); flits about the place of the body's sepulture (Tr. 84; 81 D), such in death as it was in life. (Tr. 85; 81 E.) Gluttons, drunkards, and tyrants undergo a metempsychosis into asses, wolves, hawks. (Ib.) Diversities of character discussed. (Tr. 85, 86, 87; 82 B, C, D, E; 83 B, C.) Danger of the soul's being linked too strongly to the body, which has thus to be always doing an unaccomplished work, and unweaving the web of Penelope. (Tr. 87; 83 D, E; 84 A.)

Socrates does not think his present circumstances calamitous, but is like the dying swan, who sings more sweetly as the hour of blissful departure approaches. (Tr. 88, 89; 84 E; 85 B.) (It is true we cannot wholly know, but we must choose the best reasoning possible to us, and embark on this as a raft.) (Tr. 89; 85 C, D.) Objection raised; the union of soul and body compared to that of harmony and the lyre when strung. (Tr. 89, 90; 85 E; 86 A, B, C, D.) Again, the soul may many times

revive in a different body and yet wear out at last. (Tr. 91, 92 ; 87 C, D, E ; 88 A, B.)

After some pleasant but affecting chit-chat, Socrates is represented as uttering a caution against misology as being on a par with misanthropy. (Tr. 94 ; 89 D.) The good are scarce. (90 A.) Persons much busied in disputations lose faith in everything ; all is whirled confusedly along an eddying Euripus. (Tr. 95 ; 90 C.) Yet the blame is mainly due to the man's own bad reasoning. (Tr. 95 ; 90 D.) We want what is true for ourselves. (Tr. 95 ; 91 A.) But yet the truth is of more weight than the opinion of Socrates, who would not fly away like the bee, leaving his sting behind. (Tr. 96 ; 91 C.) Socrates disputes the resemblance between the soul and the harmony of the lyre ; these comparisons cannot be trusted, being too superficial. (Tr. 97 to 100 ; 92 A, B, C, D, E ; 93 A, B ; 94 C, E.) The soul is the ruling power by controlling the passions. (Tr. 100 ; 94 B.)

Having answered Simmias, he addresses himself to Cebes, and his admissions and objections (Tr. 101 ; 95 A, B, C, D) ; and attacks the materialistic theory. (Tr. 101 ; 95 E.) He recounts his early fondness for the study of Nature. (Tr. 102 ; 96 B.) His speculative doubts. (Tr. 102, 103 ; 96 C, D, E ; 97 A, B.) Finds fault with Anaxagoras. (Tr. 103 to 105 ; 97 C, D, E ; 98 A, B, C, D, E ; 99 A.) Difference between cause and necessary concomitant. (Tr. 105 ; 99 B.) Pre-eminence of the volitional and disposing power of mind. (Tr. 105, 106 ; 99 C, D, E.)

He now returns to the much-ventilated subject of ideal forms, the absolutely good, great, and beautiful. If these exist, then the soul is immortal. (Tr. 106, 107, 108, 103 ; 100 B, C, D ; 101 A, B, C, D ; 97 A, B.)

We pass over the scholastic discussion, which occupies down to (Tr. 113 ; 105 C), and then the main argument

is resumed. Body becomes living by the presence of soul, but as opposites cannot co-exist, the notion of the soul's death is excluded. Hence it is immortal and indissoluble. (Tr. 114, 115; 105 D, E; 106 A, B.) This is but a flimsy argument, and does not advance the proof, but rather throws us back on the other law of opposition, and Socrates himself admits this, or as much. (Tr. 115; 106 C.) We can only rest on the surmise that divinity and life are incompatible with the notion of death. (Tr. 115; 106 D, E.) Simmias will not question the conclusions further, but still expresses a sense of uncertainty. (Tr. 116; 107 A, B.)

Socrates now turns to the moral lessons deducible, that if the soul is immortal it deserves our anxious care, and we should strive to be as good as possible. Even to the bad man, annihilation would be a blessing, as separating him from his badness. (Tr. 116; 107 C.) The fate of souls pure and impure in Hades is then dwelt on. (Tr. 116, 117; 107 D, E; 108 A, B, C, D.) Then follows an important application of the principle of the sufficient reason to show how the world is sustained in space. (Tr. 117; 108 E; 109 A.) Graphic and poetical account of our mortal condition upon earth, as seen from our residence in its swampy hollows, and in the more radiant portions of the upper earth. (Tr. 118 to 120; 109 B, C, D, E; 110 A, B, C, D, E; 111 A, B, C.) Also of the lower regions and Tartarus. (Tr. 120, 121; 111 D, E; 112 A, B, C, D, E.) The happiness of the blessed. (Tr. 123; 114 A, B, C.) Though this is not proved to be as described, the account is at least probable. (Tr. 124; 114 D, E; 115 A, B.)

Socrates is now questioned as to how he would like to be buried, and replies that his soul will be away, and that his body will be no part of him. (Tr. 125; 115 C, D, E.) The touching courtesy of Socrates to his executioner, and

that of the latter towards him, is described. (Tr. 126; 116 D.) The sun still upon the mountains and not yet sunk. (Tr. 126; 116 E.) The prayer and invocation. (Tr. 127; 117 C.) Expostulation with weeping friends by Socrates, who is alone unmoved. (Tr. 127; 117 D.) "Such," says the narrator, "O Echecrates, was the end of our friend, a man whom we should say was the best and pre-eminently the most wise and just of those who have ever come under our observation." (Tr. 127; 118 A.)

GORGIAS.

GORGIAS, one of the most read and popular of the dialogues of Plato, whose authorship is beyond suspicion. Callicles twits Socrates with being a day after the fair, like those who arrive when the battle has been fought and won (Tr. 136; 447 A); but as Gorgias is his guest, he has only to ask in his own person what it is he professes to teach. Gorgias, on being interrogated, declares that no one has asked him anything new for a very long time past. (Tr. 137; 448 A.) On being pressed to say what is the art in which he is skilled, Gorgias replies that it is in rhetoric (Tr. 138; 449 A), that he is a good rhetorician, and able to make others the same. Socrates hopes that he will reply without prolixity, and be as brief as possible in his answers. (449 B.) This, too, is what Gorgias prides himself on being able to do, though length cannot always be avoided, and Socrates begs that brevity may be now made use of, and the long speeches be deferred. (Tr. 139; 449 C.)

"What then is rhetoric employed about? of what is it the science?" Gorgias says, "That of words;" to which Socrates rejoins, "What words? for many other arts are equally so

employed without being rhetoric." (Tr. 139, 140 ; 449 D, E ; 450 A, B.) Gorgias explains that while other arts are busied with manual exertion, rhetoric is wholly concerned with words. (Tr. 140 ; 450 C.) "But arithmetic and geometry are in this respect on a par with it, though certainly not rhetoric. (450 D, E.) The first has to do with even and odd, the art of computation pursues these relations to their consequences, and astronomy inquires into the velocity of sun, moon, and stars in their orbits. (Tr. 141 ; 451 A, B, C). What are the words which rhetoric is concerned with?" "Those," says Gorgias, "that belong to the highest and best of human interests." "But has he never heard that these are health, beauty, and riches honestly acquired? (Tr. 142 ; 451 D, E.) Seeing that the physician, the gymnastic teacher, and the money-maker, would each declare his own pursuit and teaching to be the highest good, Gorgias must be compelled to show how he substantiates his claim." (Tr. 142, 143 ; 452 A, B, C, D.)

On this he says that his is the power of persuading judges in the law courts, senators in the senate, and the attendants on public meetings, and of making subservient to his purpose all professors of the fore-mentioned arts. (Tr. 143 ; 452 E.) "Rhetoric, then, is the science of persuasion ; yet as both Socrates and Gorgias are earnestly bent on getting a clear idea on every subject, the matter must be further probed. Zeuxis paints animals and so do other artists, but what animals is the question? Is rhetoric the only science of persuasion, or is not this the object of all teaching? (Tr. 143, 144 ; 453 A, B, C, D, E.) What kind of persuasion is peculiar to it?" (454 A.) Gorgias asserts that it is that which is produced in public proceedings relating to what is just and unjust. (Tr. 145 ; 454 B.)

In order that the discussion should not be carried on

captiously, each reasoner is to state his case in his own way. (454 C.) Socrates now asks "whether learning and belief are one and the same or not, whether there is not true and false belief, which cannot be the case with science, so that belief and science are thus not the same, though each is attended by persuasion. (Tr. 145; 454 D, E.) Is the persuasion of rhetoric about the just and unjust in public meetings that which produces belief without science or with it? Manifestly it is the former, and the rhetorician must give up all pretence to teach what is just and unjust, and take his stand on effecting belief. (Tr. 146; 455 A.) If the question is about physic, or building walls and docks, the selection of field marshals, the occupation of posts, will it be the rhetorician who will be called on to decide, or will the pupils of Gorgias be only able to counsel on what is just or unjust?" (Tr. 146, 147; 455 B, C, D.) The latter observes that Themistocles and Pericles were those who advised the building of walls and docks, not the artificers; on which Socrates exclaims that rhetoric must be an art all but divine in its range. (Tr. 147; 455 E; 456 A.)

To confirm this impression of its power, Gorgias adduces the fact that he has often persuaded the sick man to be cut or cauterized where the doctor could not prevail; that the rhetorician would be preferred as a candidate in any city to the medical man by virtue of his power of talking. (Tr. 147, 148; 456 B, C.) Yet it would not be right, because a man is a pugilist or wrestler, that he should display his powers against his father, mother, and friends, or that where one such had done so, these arts should be denounced altogether. (Tr. 148, 149; 456 D, E.) Neither the professors nor their science are to be scouted for a partial abuse of this kind, nor is the rhetorician to depreciate the physician's or other pursuits because of his ability to override them.

We must only despise and banish those who improperly employ their powers. (Tr. 148 ; 457 A, B, C.)

Socrates deprecates being misunderstood or his motives assailed, because he differs from Gorgias. He claims to belong to those who are gladly refuted if they say what is not true. It is a greater good to be delivered oneself from an evil than to deliver another. Gorgias expresses his agreement with what is said, and puts it to the vote whether the discussion shall be protracted. (Tr. 148, 149 ; 457 D, E ; 458 A, B.) All are clamorous for its going on. (Tr. 149, 150 ; 458 C, D.) Socrates asks, "Whether Gorgias professes to make any willing pupil a rhetorician, so that he shall speak persuasively, but not to instruct him really?" This is admitted in reference to the multitude ; but does not this mean the ignorant, among whom alone the rhetorician will do more than the physician when health is the question? (Tr. 150 ; 458 E ; 459 A.) "All that rhetoric will do then is to make the ignorant think that it can accomplish what science cannot. (Tr. 150 ; 459 B, C.) Is the case the same with regard to just and unjust, disgraceful and honourable, good and evil, as it is with health, that rhetoric can only make the ignorant man suppose that its possessor is more competent to advise than he who knows all about them? or must one who comes to Gorgias to be taught bring a knowledge of such subjects from elsewhere? (Tr. 151 ; 459 D, E) or will he only teach him to appear what he is not? What a man has learnt is that which he can teach ; to teach justice the rhetorician should himself be just. It was said just now that we should only punish those who make a bad use of their powers, and the rhetorician ought not to be capable of acting unjustly, if he is to discourse of what is just. But this is opposed to what was previously said, that rhetoric could be employed unjustly, so as to get the better of know-

ledge among the uninstructed." (Tr. 151, 152, 153; 460 A, B, C, D, E; 461 A.)

Polus here claims for Gorgias that he has involved himself in apparent contradiction because he was reluctant to deny to the rhetorician the knowledge of what was just and good and beautiful. (Tr. 153; 461 B, C.) Socrates, in his quiet way, slightly resents this impertinent intrusion of so much younger a man into the discussion between himself and Gorgias, and begs that he will avoid prolixity (461 D.) "Am I not to be allowed to talk as much as I like?" says Polus; to which Socrates replies, "That it would be sad if in Athens, where there is such freedom of speech, Polus alone should be refused indulging it. Yet he must recollect that if he claims this privilege, others may with equal right be allowed to walk away." (Tr. 154; 461 E; 462 A.) Polus now takes up the dialogue. "According to Socrates, rhetoric is not an art but a kind of skill for the procuring of pleasure, just as cookery is; and though he does not wish to pour contempt on the art of Gorgias, he denies that it ranks among things beautiful. (Tr. 154, 155; 462 B, C, D, E.) The sum of it is flattery, and cookery is another department of the same exhibition, which Socrates further classes with personal adornment and sophistry. Rhetoric is a seeming division of politics, which is not beautiful, but the contrary." (Tr. 155, 156; 463 A, B, C, D, E.)

In explaining his meaning, he notes "That there is such a thing as an apparently good habit of body which would not stand the test of a medical man's scrutiny, and this is also true of the soul. (Tr. 156; 464 A.) The art which relates to the soul he terms political; in that of the culture of the body there are physic and gymnastics; the latter analogous to legislation in the department of politics, the former to judicature. But flattery assumes in turn the disguise of each of these, and feigns to be what it is not.

Without concerning itself with what is best, it hoodwinks ignorance and assumes a specious outside. Cookery pretends to judge what is best for the body in place of physic. If a cook and medical man had to be judged by boys as to who was the best provider of nutriment, the latter would starve for want of employment. (Tr. 156, 157; 464 B; C, D.) This is flattery and is disgraceful, because it looks to what is agreeable, not to what is best. (Tr. 157; 464 E.) It is a skill, not an art. (465 A.) The flattery under the semblance of gymnastics is personal adornment, which is base and deceptive and imposing, causing men to assume an outward sleekness and beauty which is foreign to them, making them neglect what is their own, and due to gymnastic training. What personal embellishment is to gymnastics, cookery is to physic, and sophistry to legislation. What cookery is to physic, rhetoric is to justice. Sophists and rhetoricians are made to simulate lawgivers and judges. (Tr. 157; 465 B, C.) Were the soul to relinquish its command of the body, and cookery and physic not to be discriminated, all things would be jumbled together, as Anaxagoras holds." (Tr. 158; 465 D.)

But here Socrates taxes himself with making use of that very prolixity which he has before censured in others. (465 E.) "Are these," Polus asks, "good rhetoricians to be esteemed base flatterers? (466 A.) Socrates says, they are of no esteem, and are powerless, if power is a good to him who possesses it. (466 B.) Do they not, like tyrants, slay whom they like, and banish and plunder where it pleases them?" To this Socrates answers, "That neither tyrants nor rhetoricians do what they wish, though they do what they fancy is best. (Tr. 159; 466 C, D.) If to have power is a good to the possessor, such have no power; nor when a man is destitute of understanding is doing what appears best to him any power in the true sense. Before Socrates

can be confuted, Polus must prove that rhetoricians are men of understanding, and if they are not, the being able to do what they please is an evil, nor can tyrants and rhetoricians have great power or do what they wish." (Tr. 159 ; 466 E ; 467 A.) Polus, however, refuses to see the distinction between doing what they wish and what seems best. (Tr. 160 ; 467 B.) Socrates asks, "Whether men wish what they do or that for the sake of which they do it? Do those who drink medicine wish it, and what is disagreeable in it, or the health that it procures? (467 C.) Those who encounter the dangers of the sea do it for the riches which follow, not what they wish, but only its consequences." (467 D.)

It is now asked whether there is anything existing that is not either good or evil, or intermediate? "Wisdom, health, and riches, are good, and their contraries evil. Intermediate things are such as sitting, walking, running, or mere substances like wood and stone. Do men do or seek these indifferent acts and things for the sake of the good, or *vice versa*? Surely the former. All we do is for some good proposed, not for the sake of the actions themselves. (Tr. 161 ; 467 E ; 468 A, B, C.) If then the tyrant or rhetorician kills or banishes another, he does only what seems better; but if the acts are evil he does not obtain his wish, and has no great power, if by power is meant the ability to acquire good." (468 D.) Polus thinks that Socrates would be envious of a man who could kill or rob with impunity irrespective of justice, while the latter thinks that such a wretch is not a subject for envy. (Tr. 162 ; 468 E ; 469 A.) Socrates asserts, "That he who kills unjustly is wretched, and to be pitied, and that he who does it justly is not to be envied. Moreover, that he who is so slain is less to be pitied than he who commits the deed, whether justly or unjustly. It

is a greater evil to do than to suffer unjustly, though neither may be desirable, nor is tyranny to be chosen on such conditions." (Tr. 162, 163 ; 469 B, C.)

Socrates next supposes that he himself should exhibit a poniard in the full forum as a proof of his power to slay whom the momentary whim may select. "Yet this proves nothing, for all men have a power of mischief, of setting fire to dock-yards and ships. But for this they will be punished, and this is an evil. A man may have power when he can do what he likes for good ; but if only for evil, his power must be rated as small. (Tr. 163 ; 469 D, E ; 470 A.) To kill or imprison is only good when done justly, but otherwise is the reverse." Polus thinks that a child might convince him of the contrary, and Socrates expresses his readiness to be confuted by the child or Polus in his stead. (Tr. 164 ; 470 B, C.) "To come to recent times, was not the tyrant Archelaus happy, and is not the Great King so likewise?" (470 D.) "This can only be decided when it is known how either is situated as to knowledge and justice. Archelaus is miserable if he is unjust," and Polus declares him to have been the latter and relates the story of his cruel career. (Tr. 165 ; 470 E ; 471 A, B. C.)

Socrates now tells Polus that though he is well up in rhetoric he is deficient in dialectics. "The production of a number of false witnesses against one that is true, is no confutation. (471 D, E.) The Athenians and strangers may side with Polus, or Nicias, or Aristocrates, or the whole family of Pericles, but cannot put down Socrates in this way. (Tr. 166 ; 472 A, B.) I, Socrates, must convert you, Polus, to be the one witness on my side or I shall not succeed in refuting you. The points in dispute are not trifles, for it is discreditable not to know who is or is not happy. You think that Archelaus, though unjust, is happy, which I declare to be impossible. How would it

be were he to meet his deserts? But you fancy that he is happy because he escapes punishment. I think him even more miserable because he does not than if he did. (Tr. 166, 167; 472 C, D, E.) Paradoxical as this seems, I maintain this against you and your fancied refutation. Truth, however, can never be refuted." (Tr. 167; 473 A, B.) "Do you assert," says Polus, "that if a man is tortured, mutilated, or has his eyes burnt out, or has first seen his wife and children so treated, and is then smeared with pitch and burnt, that he is more happy than the successful tyrant?" "This," Socrates says, "is trying to scare him, not to refute him. Neither the one nor the other is happy, but the latter is more miserable." Polus at this laughs outright; but neither is this refutation. "True," says Socrates, "I got laughed at when as a senator I had to collect the votes, and I have no wish to gather them now; but this is not what I seek: I must by fair argument get my opponent's vote, for I never hope to succeed with the multitude. I am of opinion that you and I, and all men, believe practically that to do what is unjust is worse than to suffer it." (Tr. 167, 168; 473 C, D, E; 474 A, B.) Polus denies this, but admits that it is more base to perpetrate wrong, though not that it is worse. (Tr. 169; 474 C.) He does not think the beautiful and good, the evil and the disgraceful, the same.

Socrates asks "whether bodies, colours, outlines, sounds, employments, are beautiful *per se* or in relation to something else? Are they not beautiful by virtue of the pleasure they confer or by their utility? (Tr. 169; 474 C, D, E.) So, too, with laws and science?" Polus praises this distinction. "Things are more beautiful and ugly according as they exceed in pleasure and utility, or in pain and evil." (Tr. 170; 475 A.) "You admitted that injustice was more base or ugly, and therefore it must exceed in pain and

evil or in both." While he admits this, Polus denies that to commit injustice exceeds in pain, or in both pain and evil, and therefore it only exceeds in evil, and this being what is worse, the committing injustice is not only more base but worse than undergoing it. (Tr. 170, 171; 475 B, C, D.) Polus admits that he would not prefer what is base and worse to what is less so, nor would any other man. This Socrates claims as a testimony of one true witness on his side against any number of dissentients.

"Now let us come to the question whether it is not a greater evil not to be punished than to suffer wrong. (Tr. 171; 475 E; 476 A.) All things are beautiful so far as they are just. No agent can exist without a thing acted on. The patient suffers what the agent does, and in the same mode and degree. If the agent chastises rightly and justly, the patient is rightly and justly chastised, and what is just is beautiful. (Tr. 172; 476 B, C, D, E.) If it is beautiful then is it good, seeing the beautiful is either what is agreeable or useful. He that is punished rightly — then suffers what is good, and is benefited as to his soul, and is freed from the greatest evil. (Tr. 173; 477 A.) Poverty is the great evil in respect of a man's property; sickness and malformation are evils of body, while injustice, ignorance, and unmanliness are evils of the soul. But is not injustice the most base and the worst of these?" (Tr. 173; 174; 477 B, C.) This is admitted, but Polus will not grant that what is more base and harmful is therefore more painful, though he concedes the greatness of the evil. (Tr. 174; 477 D, E.) "Of the three remedies for poverty, disease, and injustice, justice is the more important and beautiful, and productive of most pleasure. To be under medical treatment may be no ground of rejoicing, though it may be useful, for he that is in perfect

health is happier than he who needs a physician. But of two men possessed by any bodily or mental evil, he is the more wretched who is not under medical treatment than he who is. Now punishment is remedial and justice is the physic for depravity, though he who has no mental defect is the most happy. (Tr. 174, 175; 478 A, B, C, D.) Next, however, is he who is freed from it, who is the person punished and called to account; and last of all is he who is uncured, who is like Archelaus, and the tyrants, and rhetoricians. (Tr. 176; 478 E.) These, like children, fear the knife and cautery; they look to the pain rather than the profit, and know not the misery of a soul that is polluted and unholy, how much worse it is than any bodily suffering." (Tr. 176; 479 A, B.)

It is now agreed by Polus "that to act unjustly is a vast evil, but that to do so and not suffer the penalty is infinitely more so (Tr. 176, 177; 479 C, D); and that this applies to Archelaus, contrary to what was previously asserted." (Tr. 177; 479 E.) "Now if this is so, what is the use of rhetoric unless it does the very reverse of what was supposed, and teaches us to accuse ourselves or friends of wrong-doing?" (Tr. 177, 178; 480 A, B, C, D.) Absurd as this appears, Polus thinks that it cannot be rebutted.

But Socrates further insists that on the principle of doing ill to our enemies, we ought to strive to prevent their being punished for their misdeeds, and that they may be immortal in their crimes, for which purpose rhetoric may be of service. (Tr. 178; 480 E; 481 A, B.) Hereupon Callicles suggests that Socrates is joking, which Chærephon denies, and he then questions Socrates on the point, and whether our lives will not be wholly subverted, if what he says is true? (Tr. 179; 481 C.)

Socrates explains that he can no more refuse to speak

as his favourite philosophy dictates than Callicles can disregard his attached Demus. The son of Clinias, his other flame, says different things at different times; not so philosophy, who is true to one verdict. "Far better that I should disagree with all men than that my lyre should be unstrung and dissonant, and the chorus of which I am conductor." (Tr. 179, 180; 481 D, E; 482 A, B.)

"You are, Socrates, but a mob orator," says Callicles. "You have served Polus as you did Gorgias, and drawn from them admissions which I repudiate. Professing to look for truth, you confound the province of nature and law. Naturally, it is baser and worse to suffer injustice; but legally it is worse to commit it. To submit to wrong is not the part of a man but of a slave. Those who make laws are the feeble and the many, who would terrify the stronger and more acquisitive, themselves content to have only an equal allowance. But nature declares that the more powerful should have more than those less so. In all states this has been agreed on, or why did Xerxes war on Greece, or his father on the Scythians? (Tr. 180, 181; 482 C, D, E; 483 A, B, C, D.) We however tame down the fiercest tempers from youth up, as if subduing lions by charms and tricks; and expatiating on what we term the beautiful and just; but if a man of higher ability is found, he will cast off these limitations and break through them and trample under foot these legal dogmas and restrictions, and become master in lieu of slave. (Tr. 181; 483 E; 484 A.) Pindar, too, speaks of Law as king, where Hercules carried off the oxen of Geryon. However refined a thing philosophy may be, when moderately pursued in youth, it may be ruinous when prolonged too late or followed too exclusively. Recluses of this turn know nothing of business or the active duties of life. They are as ridiculous in these

matters as are politicians who meddle with philosophy. As Euripides says, every man cuts a figure in his own particular walk, and dwells chiefly upon it. What he is deficient in he speaks slightly of, and shuns, and praises his own forte from self-love. (Tr. 182; 484 B, C, D, E; 485 A.) Philosophy may be well in its due place, but is ridiculous when pursued to old age. It is absurd to hear an old man stuttering, or to see him playing, as much so as to see an old head on young shoulders. An old man who has not abandoned philosophy deserves to be whipped. All this I say, Socrates, for your advantage. (Tr. 183; 485 B, C, D, E; 486 A.) If you were to be arrested on a charge of injustice, you would not know what answer to make in court, but would turn giddy and be at a *non plus* at the mercy of the accuser. An art that renders a man incapable of self-defence, or lets him be slapped on the face with impunity, is worthless. Give up these frivolous and elegant subtleties which will only help you to dwell in an empty house, and emulate those who are wealthy and prosperous and renowned." (Tr. 184; 486 B, C.)

"Had I," says Socrates, "a soul made of gold, I should rejoice to find a touchstone fit to test it, and I am fortunate in discovering one in you." (486 D, E.) "How?" "Because you are possessed of knowledge, goodness of heart, and power to express yourself. It is not every one who can test me, either from the lack of wisdom or good intention. Though Gorgias and Polus are wise, yet they are so sensitive to shame that they contradict themselves before a crowd of listeners. You, Callicles, have studied wisdom. If you agree with me, it is a test of my being true. (Tr. 184, 185; 487 A, B, C, D, E.) I err unwillingly when I do err, and through ignorance, not intention. If my future actions do not agree with my previous admissions, call me stupid and worthless.

"Let me however hear again what Pindar says and you. Is it that the stronger should strip the weaker by force, the better rule the worse, and that the superior should have more than the more abject?" "This," says Callicles, "is what I did and still say." (Tr. 185, 186; 488 A, B.) "Do you," asks Socrates, "regard the better and superior as the same, or the stronger one with the better? (488 C.) The many are by nature superior to the one, and prescribe laws binding on individuals. If the superior are better, as you say, so are their laws better and beautiful. But the many think it just to possess the equal, and that it is more disgraceful to do than to suffer wrong. Answer, is it not so?" "It is." "Then law and nature are here agreed, and your previous statement is contradicted." (Tr. 186, 187; 488 D, E; 489 A, B.)

Callicles objects to what he terms trifling, and catching at words, and asserts that superior and better are the same. He does not mean to say that the decisions of slaves or worthless persons are binding as legal, or that two are better than one, or that what is stronger is better. Whom, then, does he mean by the better if not the stronger? Socrates begs him to answer in good temper lest he should take himself off. (Tr. 187; 489 C, D.)

He now declares that he means the more excellent, or, if Socrates will have it, the more wise. (Tr. 188; 489 E.) "Accordingly, one wise man is superior to ten thousand not so, and should rule and have more than they, this being the meaning of Callicles. But by this reasoning, a physician in the midst of abundance and among persons both vigorous and feeble, ought to have more meat than they, because he is better, though, should his constitution be weak, he ought to take less food." (Tr. 188, 189; 490 A, B, C, D, E.)

Callicles objects to this Socratic mode of particularizing or trifling. He thinks the wise better, and that he ought to have more than others, but not more food or clothes. Nor does he think that a shoemaker should have larger shoes, nor a good husbandman more seeds to sow. "By the gods, Socrates," says Callicles, "you are everlastingly talking of shoemakers, and cooks, and doctors. (Tr. vol. iii. 573; see Symp. 221 E; 222 A.) By superiors, I don't mean such as these, but persons skilled in ruling the state and brave to defend it." To this Socrates replies that his shortcomings are different from those of his collocutor, who never says the same thing with himself. At one time better and superior mean stronger, then again wiser, and now braver. This only elicits a reassertion that the better are the wiser and braver politicians, and that the governors should have more than the governed. (Tr. 189; 491 A, B, C.) "Is it," Socrates asks, "as governing themselves or as being themselves subject to rule? We speak of men being masters of themselves and temperate." Callicles, however, declares that the temperate are the silly.

"Of course" (said ironically by Socrates). "The man who lives aright, happily and not servilely, should indulge his desires to the utmost on the grandest scale, with the aid of wisdom and courage. Few men have the talent for this, and therefore the most conspire to hide their own feebleness and to abuse intemperance. (Tr. 190; 491 D, E; 492 A.) What more contemptible in a king's son, or one having the means of advancement, than to abandon the good things of life for the sake of the dicta of the many. Will they not be miserable, if, being in power, they can confer no more on friends than on enemies? The truth is that self-indulgence and license are happiness, and virtue and the rest *nil*." (Tr. 191; 492 B, C.)

"You speak unreservedly, Callicles, what others think but fear to say," observes Socrates; "go on and exhaust what remains. You mean, that those who want nothing are not happy." "I do; for thus stones and dead folks would be happy were it not so." "And, indeed," adds Socrates, "Euripides may be speaking the truth when he says, 'Who can say whether life be not the same as death, and death be not life?' I have heard from one of the sages that we are dead and the body our tomb, and that the soul's desires are always fluctuating up and down, which some poet has worked into a fable, by playing on the Greek words, where a cask seems to be connected with the word for being credulous, and the term 'uninitiated,' applied to fools, may also be taken to mean 'leaking out.' He compares the intemperate habit of a soul to a cask full of holes, and makes the filling such a cask by a sieve to be the punishment of the uninitiated in Hades. The sieve is the emblem of the soul which retains nothing. Fabulous as this may be, I want it to teach you a lesson, and I hope I shall succeed. (Tr. 191, 192; 492 D, E; 493 A, B, C, D.) Suppose, again, that two men have many casks, those of one being full, either of wine, or honey, or milk, &c., which have been procured with infinite toil, and can only be refilled at great cost, but having been once filled do not leak out, while those of the other are full of holes, the waste through which he must labour painfully to replenish. Which is the happier man, the former, who represents the moderate, or the latter, who may be taken as the intemperate man?" (Tr. 192; 493 D, E; 494 A.)

"I am not persuaded," says Callicles, "and I maintain that he who has filled his casks has no more pleasure, but is like the stone; for pleasure consists in the flowing in and out." "Well, this latter is certainly different from the case of the stone. You mean something akin to the pleasure of

eating and drinking when hungry and thirsty?" "I do." "Does this apply to scratching, where a man has the itch, or to persons utterly abandoned to the satisfying infamous desires?" Callicles asks if Socrates is not ashamed to have recourse to such illustrations, and the latter defends himself. (Tr. 193, 194; 494 B, C, D, E; 495 A.) Socrates desires to know whether the pleasant and the good are the same, or whether there is something pleasant not good. Not to contradict himself, his opponent declares them to be the same; but Socrates objects to such a qualification, if made for the sake of argument. (Tr. 194; 495 A.) "If Callicles persists in asserting their identity earnestly, the discussion shall proceed. (495 B.) Science is something. It may be conjoined with courage; but courage and science, and pleasure and science, and courage and pleasure, are not the same. Yet Callicles of Acharne, who says that the pleasant and good are the same, declares that courage and science are different from one another as well as the good."

"And Socrates of Foxland does not concur in this," observes the other. "No, he does not. A man cannot be well and ill at the same time, or distant at the same moment from health and disease, nor is he good and happy, and bad and wretched, coincidently. He cannot possess and part from good and ill at one and the same moment. (Tr. 194, 195; 495 C, D, E; 496 A, B.) This is admitted. To be hungry is painful, though it is pleasant to eat when hungry. All want and desire is painful. Drinking satisfies a want and is a gratification. Therefore, when the thirsty man drinks, pain and pleasure coexist. (Tr. 196; 496 C, D, E.) But as a man cannot fare badly and well at the same time, and a man in pain may rejoice, it is clear that the good and pleasant are not the same."

Callicles thinks this is mere subtlety (Tr. 197; 497 A).

and appeals to Gorgias, who insists that Socrates may be allowed to argue in his own way. (497 B.) Socrates continues, "Do we not at the same instant cease to thirst and to receive pleasure from drinking, and so cease at once to feel pain and pleasure? But we do not at the same moment cease to suffer good and evil. Consequently, good and pleasant, and evil and painful, are not one and the same. (497 C, D.) Good is good from the presence of good, and beautiful from that of beauty. You do not call fools and cowards good men, and boys and men of no understanding you have often seen rejoicing. (497 E.) You have also seen persons of intelligence rejoicing and grieving. But which do both these the most, wise men or fools? Have you seen a coward in battle? Which exulted most at getting rid of the enemy, the coward or the man of valour?" "Why, both," says Callicles. "But who grieves most when an enemy advances?" "Possibly the coward, as well as in the other case he rejoices." (Tr. 198, 199; 498 A, B.) "On the whole, the good and bad feel joy and pain pretty equally. (Tr. 199; 498 C.) But if goodness and pleasure are confounded, the bad man, who is rather the more susceptible of joying and grieving, must become equally good with the good man, or rather more good." (Tr. 199, 200; 498 D, E; 499 A.)

Callicles, who is fast being entangled in the adversary's toils, tries to shift his ground by maintaining that he thinks some pleasures better and others worse, or, in other words, that some pleasures are good and others bad. (Tr. 200; 499 B, C.) "Some pleasures," continues Socrates, "are profitable, others injurious, and these are what we term good and bad. The pleasures of eating and drinking, so far as they produce health and strength, are good, otherwise they are evil. Some pains are advantageous, others the reverse; and we ought in all cases to select the beneficial, the good

being the end of all actions, and everything requiring to be done for its sake, not the reverse. (Tr. 201; 499 D, E.) We must do the pleasant for the sake of the good, not the good for the pleasant; but this needs knowledge, as I said to Gorgias and Polus. Cookery has pleasure for its aim, and physic has the good. Do not think that I jest, when I seek to determine so important a question as how we ought to live, whether as a rhetorician employed in political affairs, or as a philosopher. (Tr. 201, 202; 500 A, B, C.) ✓

“We have decided that there is what is good, and what is pleasant, and that they differ. I spoke disparagingly of cookery as a skill, not an art; but of medicine in far other terms. Supposing this to be conceded, there are analogous principles applicable to the soul; those which consult for its best interests and those which only consider its pleasure, without regard to consequences.” “I concede that the discussion may be brought to an end,” says Callicles; and now he yields his assent to what is further propounded. “By means of flattery, many pursuits effect what is pleasant. There is flute-playing, harping in the public games, the exhibition of choruses, and dithyrambic poetry to gratify the crowd. (Tr. 202, 203; 500 D, E; 501 A, B, C, D, E; 502 A.) What, too, of that ancient and marvellous art of tragic representation—does it avoid what is pernicious? or does it aim solely to gratify the auditors? Clearly the latter, and this is flattery. Were we to take from poetry its melody and rhythm and its metrical march, mere words would remain (Tr. 204; 502 B, C); which being addressed to the multitude is popular speaking, and also rhetorical, addressed to women and boys, and slaves and freedmen, which we regard as flattery. (Tr. 204; 502 D.) Does what is addressed to the Athenian public, and elsewhere in states, appear to you

to aim at what is best for them, or are they talked to as children for mere gratification?" (Tr. 205; 502 E.) "Sometimes their good is regarded, sometimes not," says Callicles.

"But where," asks Socrates, "did you ever see a rhetorician who studied the people's good? if so, name him. Neither Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, or Pericles, was of this class. No good man talks at random; like other good artists, he gives his work a certain form, harmony, and regularity, and this is the case with the gymnast and physician. A good house will be one that is orderly and well disposed, and a bad one the reverse. So, too, in the case of soul and body: in the latter what results from good order is health and vigour; in the former, it is righteousness and moderation. (Tr. 205, 206, 207; 503 A, B, C, D, E; 504 A, B, C, D.) The good rhetorician will likewise strive to banish injustice and intemperance. (504 E.) Physicians only allow the healthy man to eat and drink what he pleases, and so long as a soul is unholy, its desires should be restrained where they do not tend to better it. This restraint is punishment, and it is therefore better for the soul than that it should possess license." (Tr. 207; 505 A, B.)

Callicles declines to grant this, though, as Socrates says, it leaves the discourse without a head, nor will he be induced to argue further. To this Socrates rejoins, that if he is himself to carry it on alone, it will verify the saying of Epicharmus, that a dialogue which was before held by two must be sustained by one alone. (Tr. 208; 505 C, D, E.)

Gorgias now expresses a wish that the reasoning should proceed; and Socrates, though he thinks he has given Callicles a Roland for his Oliver, assents to go forward with the argument "The good and pleasant are not,"

he says, "the same. The pleasant is to be sought for the sake of the good. We are good by the presence of virtue, which is not a thing that comes by chance; but by order, art, and right procedure. These are what make a thing good. It is so with the soul: the orderly and temperate soul is good. (Tr. 208, 209; 506 A, B, C, D, E.) If this be so, what is contrary to temperate is base. The temperate or moderate man will act praiseworthy towards gods and men—that is, righteously and holily—and he will be righteous and holy. He will also be courageous, and shun bad associates and improper pleasures; in short, a good man in all respects oppositely to the evil one. Among individuals or states, happiness is only to be secured by doing what is just, or suffering punishment when wrong has been done. This should be the aim of life, to control and repress all intemperate desires, and that we should not live like robbers, who can have no attachments nor know what friendship means. (Tr. 209, 210; 507 A, B, C, D, E.) The wise men say that heaven and earth and their denizens are held together by community of feeling, and they term this order a Cosmos or Universe. You do not seem to see what a mighty power geometric equality has with gods and men, and prefer that each man should share unequally. If the happy are not so by the possession of righteousness and moderation, what will follow? Why, that we ought to be our own accusers if we do injustice, and we should call rhetoric in to enforce the necessity of punishment, so that the good rhetorician should know and practise what is just, which Polus thought Gorgias admitted from being ashamed to admit the opposite inference. (Tr. 211; 508 A, B, C.) You say any man may strike me on the face, or rob, or kill me, all which I deny to be disgraceful except to him who inflicts these injuries on another.

These are abiding truths, bound up in adamant, which it will take a stronger man than you to tear asunder; and in throwing aside punishment as a means of redress we cast away a chief help. (Tr. 211, 212; 508 D, E; 509 A, B, C.) To do injustice, then, is the greater evil; to undergo it the less one. But how is the first to be avoided and the second averted? Is it by power, or mental determination? Will it be sufficient for a man to wish not to do wrong in order to avoid it, or does he need some external aid? Recollect that no one commits wrong willingly, but against his will, as Polus and I asserted. We need, then, an art and power for prevention of wrong."

The following is the course the reasoning now takes. "A man who is absolute in a city, or the friend of the powers that be, will be safe from injury. Like is friendly to like, and no fierce tyrant will be the friend of the more virtuous man, nor will he be that of one much worse than himself; so that a youth who would wish to be unharmed and to rise in the world, would study the temper of the ruler. (Tr. 212, 213; 509 D, E; 510 A, B, C, D.) But he will not thus be rendered incapable of committing wrong or of avoiding punishment for it, and the worst of evil will be his lot. You say he may kill whom he pleases; but this will be for a bad man to kill one who is good, probably. But this is not the worst evil that can befall a man, nor is the art of rhetoric, which would screen a man in the courts of law, the art most to be cultivated. Swimming saves a man's life, so does the art of the steersman, just as rhetoric does, without claiming to be all-important. The captain does not swagger and boast when he has brought us from Ægina for two obols, or from Egypt or Pontus for two drachmæ; but walks ashore in a quiet and unostentatious manner. Nor does he know whom of his passengers he has done a service to in preventing their being drowned. They are

no better in soul or body than when they embarked. To a man incurably afflicted, escape from death is no benefit; and if the malady is in his soul, possibly the man ought not to live at all. (Tr. 214; 215; 510 E; 511 A, B, C, D, E; 512 A.) Thus the sea captain does not boast of saving life, nor does the engineer or general who saves cities; yet he is as good as your orator, though he hardly extols his art as verbosely as you do, Callicles: and though you would spurn to give your daughter to his son as being but an engineer, or to take his daughter for your son, why I cannot see. (Tr. 215, 216; 512 B, C, D.) To save and be saved are not the chief good. As no man can avoid his day of doom, we ought to strive to pass what remains to us of life in the best manner possible. It is a question whether we should strive to resemble the Athenians as much as we can, without which we shall not be in favour nor possess influence. We must take care lest, like the Thessalian witches who dragged down the moon, we lose our dearest reward by choosing such power and influence. If you would gain and retain the favour of the Athenian people, you must imitate them and the son of Pylilampes, for all love those who adopt their way of thinking and speaking." (Tr. 216; 512 E; 513 A, B, C.)

After this, Callicles says he is not quite persuaded, though shaken in his opinion. To which Socrates rejoins that this is because a popular sentiment has laid too strong a hold on him. (Tr. 217; 513 D.) To resume. "There are, as was said, two principles, pleasure and the aiming at what is best; the first low, and a kind of flattery, the second high in its aspirations. Our fellow-citizens must be prepared for the reception of goodness by being made upright, without which riches and power are worthless. But did we design to carry out great architectural or engineering works, we must first look to our qualifications whether we have had

experience, or possess taste; and if so, we may proceed to work. So if we aspired to the character of physicians, we ought reasonably to ask, whom did we ever cure? It would be as ridiculous to practise in any case of danger as for the potter's apprentice to make his first trial on the costly vase. (Tr. 217, 218; 513 E; 514 A, B, C, D, E.) You, Callicles, call me to account for not concerning myself with state affairs; but what citizen have you yourself bettered, or made good, who was previously foolish and immoderate?"

"This, Socrates, is cavilling." "No, not so. Ought not every politician to ask himself whether he has studied to be as personally perfect as possible; and adopting this test, what shall we say of Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles? (Tr. 218, 219; 515 A, B, C.) If they were good citizens, they made their fellows better instead of worse; but did not Pericles corrupt them and make the Athenians lazy, cowardly, talkative, and greedy, by giving them pay?" Callicles says, "This is said by those who have been bruised as to their ears." Socrates proceeds. "When the Athenians were worse, they found no fault with Pericles; but after he had wrought a change (as you would say for the better), they condemned him for corruption, and all but to death. He is but a poor trainer of asses, horses, and oxen, who has brought them to kick, and butt, and bite, though originally free from these faults. Man is no more than an animal, and Pericles ought to have made his herd more just had he been a good statesman. But he rendered them savage from being gentle, and though his protégés, they ostracised him for ten years. They did the same to Themistocles and Miltiades, the conqueror at Marathon; and had not the Prytaneis interfered, he would have been thrown into the Barathrum. Good drivers do not keep their seats when their horses are un-

broken in, to be pitched out when they are fully trained. (Tr. 219, 220; 515 D, E; 516 A, B, C, D, E.)

“We have therefore had neither good statesmen nor good rhetoricians. I grant that Themistocles and Pericles did more than the men of our day, but hardly in teaching continence and the repression of unbridled desires. They provided ships, and docks, and walls, and thus were more efficient than their successors. (Tr. 221; 517 A, B, C.) We keep, however, going round and round in the same track. Though the care of the body is the object of many arts, medicine and gymnastics preside over these. The soul, too, as you admitted, is under some higher rule; but you quote insufficient examples of men, good and great, in this department, just as you spoke of certain cooks, and confectioners, and innkeepers, as ministering to the body, who only made it gross and ruined its old flesh. The subjects of this pampering, however, will not accuse and blame those who have indulged their tastes, whenever, through high feeding, they have become diseased, but those who warned them of the consequences of excess. You, Callicles, extol those who have thus ministered to intemperance by presenting them with walls, and docks, and doles, as Pericles did, whom you praise; but take care the Athenians do not turn round some day on you and Alcibiades, though you may not be offenders in chief. (Tr. 221, 222, 223; 517 D, E; 518 A, B, C, D, E; 519 A.) When a state punishes its statesmen, the latter loudly complain. But no state ruler can be unjustly deposed by his fellow-citizens any more than the sophist can be treated badly by those to whom he professed to teach virtue; for if he has done what he promised or ought to have done they cannot be unjust. (Tr. 223, 224; 519 B, C, D, E.) It was the ruler’s business to make the citizens good; and if he does not, he suffers for his own defects. (Tr. 224;

520 A.) Sophist and rhetor are pretty much the same, though the art of the former is more beautiful than that of the latter. Get rid of injustice on the part of men, and there is no danger that sophist or rhetorician will be cheated of their fees. It is not discreditable to take fees for a consultation on architecture or other subjects, but it is thought so to refuse advice on the way in which a man can become as good as possible, without a fee is given, for the obvious reason that if the man is made good there is no fear that he will not repay the obligation.

“Will you then urge me to thwart the Athenians for their good or to flatter them to their injury? (Tr. 224, 225; 520 B, C, D, E; 521 A.) If you again say that I expose myself to be killed or plundered, I say that a bad man will kill a good one, and my property will never be of use to the plunderer. I may go to prison or to death, but no man of worth will lead me there. I and a few others alone aim at true statesmanship. I speak not for popular applause, and I may be able to make no reply in a court of justice. I should be judged as a physician would be by boys, where a cook brought an indictment against him. The latter would say that he did not cut, and burn, and drench you with horrid draughts, nor starve you, but that he catered to please your appetite, and a rare outcry would be raised at the doctor. (Tr. 225, 226; 521 B, C, D, E; 522 A.) This would be my case in the law-courts.” “But is not this,” asks the respondent, “to be badly circumstanced, not to be able to assist yourself?” “My notion of self-assistance,” says Socrates, “is not being able to sin against gods or men. If I could do this, I should be ashamed; but were I to die for want of oratorical flattery, I should die calmly, seeing that to descend to the grave with a guilty soul is the crowning ill. (Tr. 226, 227; 522 B, C, D, E.)

“But hear a beautiful fable. The law has existed since the time of Saturn, that the righteous go to the Isles of the Blessed, the wicked to Tartarus. At that period the sentences were badly awarded, owing to the fact that evil souls were often lodged in bodies very beautiful, and that false witnesses were suborned. The judges, too, were veiled in a body of flesh. Zeus ordered Prometheus to rectify this. The time of a man's death is no longer to be known; he is to be judged, naked and dead, before judges who are in like condition. Minos and Rhadamanthus are to be the judges from Asia, Æacus from Europe, and Minos is to be chief arbiter. Death is the severance of soul and body, though each retains its own habit afterwards, whether of bodily peculiarity or mental. (Tr. 227, 228, 229; 523 A, B, C, D, E; 524 A, B, C, D.) Often the soul of some lordly tyrant or the great king is arraigned before the judges. Their souls are found marked with seams and scars, disfigured by pride, and falsehood, and luxury, and lust. On this they are sent to prison as a punishment, by which they will be rendered better, or to serve as a warning to others. (Tr. 229; 524 E; 525 A.) Those who are benefited are such as have committed curable sins, and this only takes place through punishment. Extreme cases there are which are incurable, which are a lasting warning in Hades. Of these, that Archelaus cited by Polus will be one, and tyrants, kings, and despots will be others, who, through irresponsible power, have enacted frightful crimes. Homer attests this in the persons of Tantalus, Sisyphus, and Tityus; while Thersites he regards as curable. (Tr. 229, 230; 525 B, C, D, E.) Notwithstanding, good men have been found among the powerful, and such are pre-eminently deserving of praise, though they are few in number. (Tr. 230; 526 A.) Of these, Aristides was one. When the soul is

brought before Rhadamanthus, he knows only that it is wicked, and he sends it to Tartarus as curable or incurable. That of the philosopher he sends to the Isles of the Blessed, if he has been quiet in life and busied with his own affairs.

“Believing all this, I shall strive to live and die as virtuously as possible, and I invite you and all others to aim at the same. If you do not, it is you that will turn giddy, and be nonplussed when you appear before the judge (*see* above, 486 B, C; also *Theæt.* 174 C, D, E; 175 C, D; *Tr.* 409), and possibly some one will smite you on the face. You may, however, regard this as an old wife’s story, and not wonder if you can find anything more worthy of belief. But now you three, Callicles, Polus, and Gorgias, the cleverest men of your day, are unable to show that the contrary is true. While so much has been refuted, this remains stable: that we ought to avoid inflicting injury more than the suffering it; that we ought to aim to be, not to appear good merely; that next to being good is becoming so; that flattery should be wholly avoided; and that rhetoric should be employed altogether in effecting what is just. Dare, then, and suffer all, for nothing is ever dreadful to the good and virtuous man. When we have attained this condition we will deliberate further; but at present our views are too fluctuating to be of any avail, so ignorant are we. Lastly, let us follow the reasoning which calls on us to live and die in the practice of virtue, and invite others to do the same, not that which you, Callicles, unhesitatingly urged, which is of no worth.” (*Tr.* 230, 231, 232; 526 A, B, C, D, E; 527 A, B, C, D, E.)

PROTAGORAS.

PROTAGORAS, one of the most famous and admired of the canonical dialogues of Plato, in which a considerable number of interlocutors appear. Socrates is twitted by a friend as being still captivated with the mature beauty of Alcibiades, and the former contends that the most attractive age is that when the beard is first appearing. (Tr. 237 ; 309 A.) But he has met what is more beautiful, a very wise man from Abdera (Tr. 237 ; 309 C) ; no less than the famous Protagoras. (Tr. 238 ; 309 D.) Being urged to tell what conversation had taken place between them, Socrates narrates how Hippocrates had roused him very early before dawn to announce the great man's arrival, being anxious to profit by his instruction. (Tr. 239 ; 310 A, B, C, D.) On this Socrates questions him whether he knows to whom and for what he is about to disburse fees, fees which will probably empty both their purses and run them into debt. (Tr. 240 ; 311 A, B, C, D, E.) Doubtless it is to a Sophist with a view to become such, a character, however, in which he would blush to appear. (Tr. 240 ; 312 A.) Yet he does not desire to be a professional sophist, but to reap the instruction which practising the study would communicate. (Tr. 240 ; 312 B.)

But here he is in the dark. What is the wisdom the Sophist will convey? (Tr. 241 ; 312 C, D.) Hippocrates replies that he will teach him the art of public speaking. (Ib.) But about what? and here he frankly confesses that he does not know. (Tr. 241 ; 312 E.) Socrates enlarges on the danger of a man's trusting his body, much more his soul, to an unknown guide (Tr. 241, 242 ; 313 A, B) ; and asks if a Sophist is not a species of trafficker in soul wares, for the soul's nutriment. (Tr. 242 ; 313 C.) Such

nutriment is learning, but it is not to be bought from the huckster or hawker, in ignorance of its value. Food which is deposited in earthen jars may be bought without much risk, but learning must be carried away in the vessel of the soul with great risk of tainting the soul itself. (Tr. 242 ; 313 D, E ; 314 A, B.)

After this the two go in search of the Sophist and experience a rebuff from a saucy janitor, who at last admits them where they see Protagoras walking to and fro, followed by a crowd of disciples attracted from foreign cities by the witchery of his voice, which is said to resemble that of Orpheus, and by many well-known contemporary Athenians and persons of distinction from other places, in addition to groups surrounding Hippias and Prodicus in bed under heaps of skins for blankets. (Tr. 243, 244 ; 314 C, D, E ; 315 A, B, C, D, E.)

Socrates now introduces himself and Hippocrates to the Sophist, and the latter then enlarges on the fact that the earlier Sophists concealed their art under the veil of poetry to avoid unpopularity and jealousy from the leaders in states, not the unthinking herd. But he is of opinion that all subterfuge of this sort is dangerous and silly, and makes a man look like an impostor when found out. (Tr. 244, 245 ; 316 A, B, C, D, E ; 317 A.) He therefore tells all the world what he is, and though old enough to be the father of every one present, he has never suffered any inconvenience from this candour. (Tr. 246 ; 317 B, C.) Arrangements are made for entering on an open conference in presence of Hippias and Prodicus, and our Sophist tells the would-be disciple that every day will bear testimony to his improvement. (Tr. 246 ; 317 D, E ; 318 A.) But Socrates asks, "Improvement in what?" (Tr. 247 ; 318 B, C.) "Not," says Protagoras, with a knowing look at Hippias, "in arithmetic, astronomy, &c., but in showing him how to manage his

private affairs, and to be an effective statesman." (Tr. 247 ; 318 D, E.) "In other words, 'politics,' " says Socrates, "which I fancied was not to be taught." In support of this view he gives a graphic account of popular consultations at Athens, the laughing and hooting at any man who steps out of his own art to advise on practical matters, but on the other hand the complacency felt when any man speaks on politics. Moreover, the great Pericles had ill-success in teaching his sons to be statesmen, and other wise and good men had had no better success in teaching virtue. (Tr. 247 to 249 ; 319 A, B, C, D, E ; 320 A, B.)

On this Protagoras recounts the fable of Prometheus and Epimetheus which declares at its close that Zeus ordered the distribution of modesty and justice to all men in common. (Tr. 249 to 251 ; 320 C, D, E ; 321 A, B, C, D, E ; 322 A, B, C.) This explains all men's right to share in political discussions. (Tr. 251, 252 ; 322 D, E ; 323 A, B.) Protagoras next undertakes to show that virtue does not come naturally, but is the effect of teaching and study. (Tr. 252 ; 323 C.) "When we blame others or punish them, it is because we think they may be taught. We do not punish merely to avenge what is past and cannot be undone, but to better the criminal and to act as an example to others. Your Athenians do this, and therefore think virtue can be taught. (Tr. 252, 253 ; 323 D, E ; 324 A, B, C.) If a city is to exist by virtue of justice, moderation, and holiness, and the absence of these is punishable, your leading men must act strangely if they throw these aside to teach things of no moment, the want of which is not punishable. (Tr. 253, 254 ; 324 D, E ; 325 A, B, C.) From boyhood up, the child is taught what is right, or if refractory, is bent like a gnarled or twisted tree, by flogging or artificial restraint. Children are made to commit poetry to memory, music, gymnastics, and finally laws. Like those who write

by means of lined copy-books, they are compelled to follow prescribed rules, so that the wonder would be if virtue cannot be taught. (Tr. 254, 255; 325 D, E; 326 A, B, C, D.) No doubt much of individual success depends on natural capacity, but yet those who are taught even to play the flute will be better than those who have received no instruction. The most unjust man in an educated community will be preferable to one in a savage condition, and though it may be difficult to find teachers for those who are already experts, it is easy to do so for those wholly unskilled and ignorant. We ought to be satisfied with partial success, however slight, and I, Protagoras, profess to make a man just and good, if not I return the fees paid, or agree to be remunerated according to what my services are admitted to be worth. Your judgment is premature as to youths not yet past hope." (Tr. 255, 256; 326 E; 327 A, B, C, D, E; 328 A, B, C.)

After this long exposition, Socrates observes, "that the popular orators are like books, which answer no questions (Tr. 257; *see* also *Phædr.* 275 D, E), but like smitten gongs utter a prolonged din; and Protagoras, too, can utter long and striking speeches, as well as reply briefly, but he wants to know whether virtue is one thing, and righteousness, moderation, and holiness are parts of it, or are they all the names of one thing in common?" (Tr. 256, 257; 328 D, E; 329 A, B, C.)

Then ensues a long series of questions and replies, in which it is admitted that these qualities are like the parts of a face, particular features, but dissimilar; that justice is just, holiness holy, and so forth. But Socrates goes farther, and says that he thinks that righteousness is holy, and holiness is righteous; about which Protagoras hesitates, though he will concede the point. Socrates, however, will not accept this half and half admission. Protagoras grants that in a

sense they are similar, as black and white are colours, and the parts of the face are features, though this does not justify treating them as strictly resembling. (Tr. 257 to 260; 329 D, E; 330 A, B, C, D, E; 331 A, B, C, D, E.)

The changes are now rung by Socrates on the contrariety of wisdom and folly, the identity of correct and advantageous conduct with wisdom and moderation, and that of wrong action with folly, and so in the case of strength and weakness, swiftness and slowness, beauty and deformity, good and evil, high and low in pitch, each thing has one and not several contraries. (Tr. 260 to 262; 332 A, B, C, D, E.) These admissions, however, prove that wisdom and moderation are the same, if they are both opposed to folly, and Protagoras reluctantly grants this. (Tr. 263; 333 A, B.)

Socrates now asks Protagoras whether he thinks unjust persons to be wise or correct thinkers, and this is admitted where they gain their end. "Is that good which is advantageous?" "Yes, and some things too which are not so;" in which rejoinder Protagoras shows temper. (Tr. 263, 264; 333 C, D, E.) He is pressed to say whether anything is good that is of no use to any one, and replies in the negative, that some things are of use to one and not to another, some are so applied externally, and others internally, and different plants and animals are differently affected by them. This answer elicits great applause from the bystanders. (Tr. 264; 334 A, B, C.)

And now Socrates complains of forgetfulness, and an altercation takes place on the subject of long answers, which causes Socrates to rise up with a view to going away. The parties present support their respective champions, Callias, Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus, and Hippias; but the two last endeavour to mediate, Hippias remarking that it would be intolerable if, on the very hearth and in the Prytaneum of wisdom, and in the proudest

mansion of the city, two disputants so distinguished should thus separate. Socrates concedes his objection, but declines the appointment of an umpire in the further discussion, and will allow Protagoras to question, while himself replies, to which with some reluctance the latter consents. (Tr. 265 to 269 ; 334 D, E to 338 E.)

Protagoras now adduces what he conceives to have been a contradiction on the part of Simonides, where he says it is very difficult to become a good man, and elsewhere blames Pittacus for a similar statement, differing, however, in using *εἶναι* for *γενέσθαι*. Socrates, in reply, points out the difference between "to be" and "to become." (Tr. 269, 270 ; 339 A to 340 C.) Possibly Simonides did not mean by "difficult" what we mean, just as Prodicus repudiates the use of *δεινός* for "clever," insisting on its other meaning of "terrible." Prodicus being appealed to, declares that by "difficult," Simonides meant "evil," and that it is evil to be good ; to which Protagoras will not assent, nor Socrates either. (Tr. 271, 272 ; 340 D, E ; 341 A, B, C, D, E.)

In the teeth of his former protest Socrates now outdoes Protagoras in a long-winded harangue, remarking that philosophy and the Sophists are more at home in Crete and Sparta than elsewhere ; that under a simple exterior they far excel others in brief and expressive wisdom, and that the seven wise men were all admirers of Laconian training, who consecrated their sententious utterances on self-knowledge and non-excess at Delphi. (Tr. 272, 273 ; 342 A, B, C, D, E ; 343 A.) Simonides was ambitious, he says, of disproving the statement of Pittacus that it was difficult to be good, the real difficulty was "in becoming so." After much more on this view of the point at issue, he gets to his favourite thesis, that "no man is willingly evil," as bearing on what Simonides further says. This occupies from Tr. 273 to 277 ; 343 A to 347 A.

Socrates now proposes to have done with poems. "Discussions on poetry are like the drowning conversation by hired musicians at the carouses of uneducated people. At the feasts of the better educated you won't meet with piping and dancing women, even when the drinking is somewhat advanced. We can employ our own mental resources without extraneous aid from the poets, so I challenge Protagoras to go back to where we broke off, and question me if he pleases." (Tr. 277, 278; 347 B, C, D, E; 348 A.) Protagoras is at last prevailed on to respond. (Tr. 278; 348 B, C.) Socrates recalls what Protagoras has said of his own ability as a professor and teacher of virtue, and restates the question, desiring to know whether he still asserts that wisdom, moderation, fortitude, righteousness, and holiness are names for different things, not like parts of gold, but like the different features of the face? (Tr. 279; 348 D, E; 349 A, B, C.) His reply is, "that four of them closely correspond, but that courage or fortitude differs from the rest, because many bad men are conspicuously courageous." (Tr. 280; 349 D.) "Does he mean by this daring? (Tr. 280; 349 E.) Virtue is not partly beautiful and partly not. (Ib.) All persons who are skilled in any art are courageous in proportion to their skill—is this courage compatible with want of skill?"

Protagoras explains "that he does not hold that because the courageous are bold that therefore the bold are courageous. (Tr. 280, 281; 350 A, B, C.) That if in this way wisdom is to be proved one with courage, it would be just as easy to prove that strength is wisdom. I do not assert that the powerful are strong, though insisting that the strong are powerful; seeing that strength is a natural physical endowment. So, too, boldness may spring from skill, or passion, or inspiration, but courage is a natural

bodily and mental quality." (Tr. 281; 350 D, E; 351 A.)

Socrates now asks "whether the pleasant is not, so far as it is pleasant, a good, and the painful evil?" (Tr. 282; 351 B, C.) Protagoras replies cautiously, "that there are some things agreeable that are not good, and some disagreeable ones not evil, while others partake of neither character." (Tr. 282; 351 D.) The question is re-stated. (Tr. 282; 351 E.) Again Socrates asks, "Is knowledge the governing and controlling power in human nature, or do passion and feeling drag knowledge at their chariot wheels?" The reply is, "that wisdom and science are the ruling powers." "Yet it is asserted," says Socrates, "that those who know what is best are still reluctant to do it, even when able, being mastered by pleasure or pain. Join me then, Protagoras, in disabusing men of this misconception about being overcome by pleasure. (Tr. 283; 352 A, B, C, D, E.) Things are baneful, not on account of the momentary pleasure, but for their future consequences, because they issue in pain. (Tr. 283, 284; 353 A, B, C, D, E.) So when we talk of good things as painful, such as physic and gymnastics, we call them so, not for the present feeling, but what is insured by them; they are only good in the long run. Enjoyment is only bad when it leads to the loss of greater pleasure, and pain is a good when it conduces to greater happiness, or frees us from worse pains. It is therefore ridiculous to say that a man does evil knowing it to be evil, or avoids good for the sake of immediate gratification. He does evil knowing it to be so, yet overcome by what has greater present weight with him. If we change the terms our proposition will run, that a man does painful things, knowing them to be such, overcome by pleasant things that ought to have no such force. All we can do is to place pleasures, whether at hand or far off, in the scale, as against pain,

present and future, and make choice of what outweighs, so as to insure the largest amount of happiness and the least of misery. Things near exceed those afar off in apparent size, and we want a standard by which to appreciate their relative worth. This art of measuring will thus be our safeguard. The safety of life will be in the correct estimate of pleasure and pain; in other words, will come to us through knowledge, so that, to recur to our previous argument, pleasure will not get the mastery of knowledge, but only of ignorance.

"We shall thus have established," says Socrates, "that error is the result of defective knowledge, and that the being overcome by pleasure is the issue of gross ignorance, which Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus profess to cure, but you, the crowd, by curtailing these men of their fees, counsel badly for yourselves and your children." (Tr. 285 to 290; 354 A to 358.) Thus it appears to be proved that no one voluntarily engages in what is wicked, or will make choice of a greater evil when he can select a less. (Tr. 290; 358 A, B, C, D.) Neither will a man purposely choose what he dreads. He again recalls the statements of Protagoras, and completes the argument about courage, showing that the difference between the brave and the bold is a difference of knowledge. Cowards are cowardly from ignorance, and daring from the same cause, from not knowing what is or is not dreadful. Protagoras is reluctant to give his assent, but after hesitating, does so. (Tr. 290 to 293; 359 A to 360 E.)

The conclusion is that, if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught, notwithstanding what may have previously been asserted by either of the principal speakers. But Socrates admits the confusion of his ideas, and that he should wish to inquire what virtue is; an investigation which Protagoras promises to proceed with at another time, while he takes

leave of Socrates with an intimation of his expecting to find him one day eminent among the philosophers, and with many commendations of the way in which he conducts a dispute; protesting, at the same time, that he is not touched with envy or want of genuine admiration for an opponent so skilful as he, Socrates, has proved himself to be. (Tr. 293, 294; 361 A to 362 A.) Notwithstanding that there is in this dialogue the usual absence of dogmatic assertion, our author intimates pretty distinctly what are his deliberate convictions on several of the mooted points, and with due allowance for an imperfect ethical theory, there is much in his speculations to command our approbation.

PHÆDRUS.

PHÆDRUS is another of the canonical dialogues of Plato, amongst the best known and read of the whole series. As any attempt to recount the machinery of these dialogues, though often ingenious and highly dramatic, is impossible without going into them at greater length than is convenient, I shall do little more than touch on the leading thoughts or topics discussed, as assisting a more ready reference to their place in the body of the whole. Phædrus tells Socrates that Lysias the orator had written a speech on the subject of a comely youth solicited by one not deeply enamoured (Tr. 301; 227 B); and excuses himself from repeating it memoriter. (Tr. 302; 228 A.) Socrates twits him pleasantly (Tr. 302; 228 B, C), and makes him own that he has the speech in his pocket. (Tr. 303; 228 D, E.) They propose to go towards the Ilissus and select a quiet seat on its banks. (Tr. 303; 229 A.)

Here follows a poetical description of the spot. (Tr. 304; 229 B, C, D.) Socrates touches on the subject of self-inquiry,

whether he himself is a fierce and voluminous Typhon or a tamer animal. (Tr. 304; 230 A.) Description of scenery continued. (Tr. 304; 230 B, C.) Socrates, who usually keeps within the city walls, extols the study of human nature above that of fields and trees. (Tr. 305; 230 D, E.) The speech of Lysias argues that those who do not love are less inconstant and exacting, and given to change their minds, than the unreasoning subjects of passion. (Tr. 305; 231 A, B, C.) After detailing the advantage of making choice of an admirer from among the many who are less selfish and jealous and tyrannical (Tr. 306, 307; 231 D, E; 232 A, B, C, D, E; 233 A, B), Lysias is described as telling the youth, whom he is supposed to address, that if he will give him the preference, he will love him for future advantage, not present gratification, and that the friendship will be lasting and disinterested. (Tr. 307; 233 C). Our kindness and indulgence is not to be bestowed on the rich, but on the poor and deserving (Tr. 308; 233 D, E)—not on those who will be boastful and fickle when they have become satiated. (Tr. 309; 234 A, B, C.) Socrates is pressed to say whether he thinks any man in Greece could have spoken better on the subject (Tr. 309; 234 D, E); and points out that there is a good deal of tautology in the speech of Lysias, and needless display. (Tr. 309; 235 A.) Socrates is under the impression that he has heard better things from Sappho or Anacreon (Tr. 310; 235 C), and is urged by Phædrus to express his views in opposition to Lysias. (Tr. 310, 311; 235 D, E; 236 A, B, C, D, E; 237 A.)

Socrates begins what he has to say by invoking the Muses. (Ib.) The question being whether we should give the preference to one in love or one not in love, we should first define what love is. (Tr. 312; 237 B, C, D.) How shall we draw the line of distinction between one who is in love and one who is not, seeing both desire beautiful things?

(Ib.) There are two principles that have the rule in us—the inborn desire of pleasure, and the love of being animated by a sense of what is best, which alternately fight for the mastery. When one is in the ascendant, we call it moderation, or temperance; when the other, we term it excess (Tr. 312; 237 E), and under the latter of these we must place love. (Tr. 313; 238 B, C.)

Influence of surrounding scene alluded to. (Tr. 313; 238 D.) Resumption of the question. The lover will always strive to lord it over the loved (Tr. 314; 238 E); will debar him from philosophy, and is not a good guardian and associate (Tr. 314; 239 B); will prefer the delicate and effeminate and artificial to the hardy and natural (Tr. 314; 239 C, D); will wish to deprive the object of his love of his best and dearest friends (Tr. 315; 239 E)—of gold, of wife, children, and home. (Tr. 315; 240 A.) In other evils there is a mixture of pleasure, as with the flatterer and mistress; but the lover is not only hurtful, but disagreeable by constant daily intercourse, and this is specially so in the case of an old man's endearments. (Tr. 316; 240 B, C, D, E.) In love he is disgusting, and when he ceases to love, belies his solemn protestations, made when a wooer. Afterwards, ashamed of his broken promises, he takes to flight. (Tr. 316; 241 A, B.) It will be better not to have granted favours to one in love, or, if he does so, he will give himself up to one who is faithless, sour, disagreeable, injurious to property, health, and the soul's training, which is the most precious of all interests. (Tr. 316; 241 C.)

Socrates is now asked to speak on the case of the man not in love, but satisfies himself with declaring that what was the case with the man in love will be quite reversed in the other. (Tr. 317; 241 D, E; 242 A.) Reference to the dæmon signal of Socrates. (Tr. 317;

242 B.) The soul prophetic, and Socrates declares that he has been gaining honour from men at the expense of offending the gods, and sets about a recantation. (Tr. 318; 242 C, D.) If love is a god he cannot be evil, and what has been said must undergo purification and denial, as in the case of Stesichorus. (Tr. 318; 243 A, B.) A generous man would think that he was listening to those whose idea of love had been drawn from our quays and slums. (Tr. 319; 243 C.) Our mouths must be sweetened, and Lysias will have to write another speech. (Tr. 319; 243 D, E.)

The ideal boy is again called up to hear the contrary statement. (Tr. 319; 244 A.) The madness of the lover is no objection, for the priestesses and the prophetesses of Dodona and Delphi have done more for Greece in their frenzied moments than in their right minds, and so of the Sibyl. (Tr. 320; 244 B.) Connexion of *μανία* and *μάντις*, and of augury, with Greek words implying thought. (Tr. 320; 244 C, D.) Madness has led to atonements and pious rites. (Tr. 320; 244 E.) A third madness is that of the Muses. (Tr. 321; 245 A.) Madness is given by the gods for the purpose of causing the greatest happiness. (Tr. 321; 245 B.)

Immortality of the soul, and its self-activity; the source of motion has itself no beginning, and that which moves itself is immortal, and is one with soul. (Tr. 322; 245 C, E; 246 A.) The soul may be compared to a charioteer and a pair of winged horses, of which one is noble and the other the reverse, and this creates a difficulty in driving them. (Tr. 322; 246 B.) While the soul is perfect and winged, it spreads its pinions and soars on high, commanding the universe; but when stripped of its wings, it falls earthward, and assumes a mortal shape and body. (Tr. 322; 246 C.) The immortal is not deduced from any

one reasoned argument, and as we do not see nor sufficiently comprehend the divine nature, we conceive of it as an immortal animal, consisting from all eternity of body and soul. (Tr. 322; 246 C, D.) Cause of the loss of the wings. (Ib.) The natural function of a wing is to bear ponderous bodies to the region of the skies, where the divine and beautiful and good reside. (Tr. 322; 246 D.) These are the sources of nutriment to the wings, while the opposite qualities cause their decay. (Tr. 323; 246 E.) Career of the gods and dæmons described, and their well-balanced chariots and sight of pure essence. (Tr. 323; 247 A, B, C.) Like the soul of deity, every soul that contemplates being is delighted, and beholds righteousness, moderation, pure science, and all other realities, and feasts on them. When the charioteer unyokes his steeds, he sets before them nectar and ambrosia. Such is the case of the gods. (Tr. 324; 247 D, E.)

Failure of other souls to attain the upper empyrean, and the knowledge of being, for which opinion has to be substituted. (Tr. 324; 248 A, B.) If the soul has beheld essential being in any partial degree, it abides another revolution; but if, from being unable to continue the struggle, it has lost its wings and fallen to the earth, it does not in its first generation enter the form of a beast, but, according to its attained knowledge, is first a philosopher, or next in order, king, statesman, gymnast, or physician—prophet, poet, artizan, sophist, tyrant. (Tr. 324; 248 C, D, E.) In ten thousand years the soul recovers its wings; only the philosopher may obtain his in three thousand. The rest, after their first life, are tried and sent to heaven or the lower world for a thousand years, when they choose their second life, and pass into the forms of beasts. (Tr. 325; 249 A, B.) The philosopher only is possessed of wings, and ponders what is divine;

while the multitude think him mad, seeing that he looks aloft newly-fledged, desirous but incapable of rising. (Tr. 326 ; 249 C, D.)

Such is the true inspired lover. Every soul of man has beheld to a certain extent real existences, but the impression has been weakened or effaced. Only a few recognise in the dull images of justice and moderation on earth the representations of those brighter realities. (Tr. 326 ; 249 E ; 250 A, B.) Yet glorious was the sight when with the happy choir of gods we beheld them in their unclouded splendour, freed from the body which surrounds us like the oyster is surrounded by its shell. (Tr. 326 ; 250 C.) The sight of beauty excites the voluptuary to a carnal passion, but he who has been recently initiated is struck with awe and trembling in its presence ; the wings begin to sprout, and the quills to swell, in view of the beautiful object, and the growth to be checked when away from it, but the joy returns with memory (Tr. 327 ; 250 D, E ; 251 A, B, C, D, E) ; he has a physician for all this tumult in the presence of the beautiful object of his love. (Tr. 328 ; 251 E ; 252 A.) The attendants on the several deities chose objects after their own ideal. (Tr. 329, 330 ; 252 B, C, D, E ; 253 A, B, C.)

The winning the loved object takes place thus. The nobler horse of the tripartite soul is pronounced to be good, the other not ; that in the more beautiful condition is erect in form, with joints perfect throughout, lordly-necked, aquiline-nosed, white of aspect, eyes black, a lover of honour, moderation, and modesty, a friend of right opinion, requiring neither whip nor spur, and is driven by a look and word only. The other is crook-limbed, stiff-jointed, with thick, short, strong neck and throat, ape-faced, black in colour, grey-eyed, hot-blooded, the friend of boasting and insolence, shaggy about the

ears, deaf, and scarcely yielding to the whip and goad. (Tr. 330; 253 D, E.)

Exciting struggle described, and subduing of the vicious horse. (Tr. 331; 254 A, B, C, D, E.) The loved object is at last won. (Tr. 331; 255 A.) His wings too begin to sprout, and love fills his soul. (Tr. 332; 255 B, C.) The similar action is described. (Tr. 332; 255 D, E.) The unbridled horse of lover and loved seek unrestrained sensual gratification, but are controlled by the charioteer and better horse. (Tr. 332; 256 A.) If philosophy triumphs, bliss and harmony results, and a truly Olympic victory (Tr. 333; 256 B.) If the coarser and lower principle prevails, an inferior triumph is the result. The soul is without wings, but carries off no paltry prize of madness, and the lover and loved, if ever they become winged, become so together, (Tr. 333; 256 C, D.) The philotimic soul is allowed to carry off no small prize of madness from its unrestrained indulgence of sensual passion, in a way that does not do much credit to the morality of our author, as compared with our better standard.

In a general account of the matter, many of the nicer shades of critical distinction are necessarily passed over. It is difficult to reconcile the view here presented with other parts of the Platonic ethics, excepting that human love is regarded as a kind of initiation into higher mysteries. Plato has here allowed his imagination to run riot and to carry him away.

The intercourse with one not in love issues in a being bandied about the earth and under it for nine thousand years without intelligence. (Tr. 333; 256 E.) Such is the recantation (Tr. 334; 257 A, B), which probably Lysias will not attempt to rival. (Tr. 334; 257 C.) We come next to what has been regarded as the chief subject of the dialogue, viz., the nature of rhetoric.

Fondness of public men for speech-making and composing well. (Tr. 334; 257 C, D, E; 258 A, B, C, D, E.) Story of the grasshoppers and Muses, and propriety of conversing rather than sleeping at midday. (Tr. 334 to 336; 259 A, B, C, D.) The qualifications for correct writing and speaking. (Tr. 336; 259 E.) It has been said that an orator needs not say what is just but what seems so to the people. (Tr. 337; 260 A.) It would be ridiculous to praise an ass as fitter for military purposes than the horse, but it is better to be ridiculous than mischievous. (Tr. 337; 260 B.) The orator who is ignorant, and who persuades a community in the same predicament to do evil instead of good, will get little by his rhetoric. (Tr. 337; 260 C.) Yet Rhetoric asserts that mere art and knowledge are not sufficient without her. (Tr. 338; 260 D.) The Spartan declares that there is no art of speaking without truth. (Tr. 338; 260 E.) Is not rhetoric equally essential in private and trivial matters, as in the law-courts? (Tr. 338; 261 B); it confounds the distinction of just and unjust. Do we not know that Palamedes made his hearers believe contradictory propositions? (Tr. 339; 261 C, D, E). Deception is easier in things that differ slightly, and slight changes escape detection more than violent ones. (Tr. 340; 262 A.) The man who is ignorant of the nature of things will be least able to mislead skilfully by a dexterous shift. (Tr. 340; 262 B.)

Socrates proposes to analyse the speech of Lysias, and show where it is artistic or otherwise. (Tr. 340, 341; 262 C, D, E.) We are not equally agreed in all things; we mean the same by iron and silver, but not by just and unjust. (Tr. 341; 263 A.) The rhetorician should have learnt the meaning of ideal genera, and how to refer objects to their classes. (Tr. 341, 358; 263, 277 A, B.) But love belongs to things doubtful, and Lysias has not

defined love at the outset. ~~He swims on his back~~ with his face up, setting out from the end of his subject (Tr. 341, 342; 263 C, D, E; 264 A); and ~~all the rest is~~ arranged at random. (Tr. 342; 264 B). Every speech should have a middle, head, and feet, like a living whole. (Tr. 343; 264 C.) That of Lysias is like the inscription on the tomb of Midas:

"A virgin made of brass, on Midas' tomb I lie,
 While the lofty trees shall bloom and rivers hasten by,
 Here on the much-wept grave my rigid state I keep—
 To passers-by I tell here Midas rests in sleep."

Where either line may be put first at liberty. (Tr. 343; 264 D.)

Further criticism, and division of madness into prophetic, mystical, poetical, and erotic, of which the last is declared the best. (Tr. 343, 344; 265 A, B.) Two methods set forth—the contemplating and combining together into one idea things widely distributed with a view to definition, and the being able to dissect that more comprehensive idea into its special forms, joint by joint, without mangling them. (Tr. 344; 265 C, D, E.) Socrates declares his love for these divisions and bringings together, and that he follows as he would a god the man who rightly conceives of the one and many in nature, whom he terms a dialectician. (Tr. 345; 266 A, B.)

Technical subdivisions of rhetoric. (Tr. 345; 266 C, D.) The case of Evenus, Tisias, and Gorgias, who discovered that probability was more valuable than truth, and used conciseness as well as prolixity. (Tr. 346; 267 A, B.) But Prodicus contends for moderate speeches, neither short nor long, and there is Hippias also (Ib.), then Polus's duplications and sententiousness, and Protagoras's appeals to pity. (Tr. 346; 267 C.) All agree that recapitulation should be resorted to at the close of a speech. (Tr. 346;

267 D.) Examples of men fancying that because they can do a few things they are therefore physicians, or tragedians, or musicians. This argument is applied to the fancied teachers of rhetoric, who put certain trivialities in place of the true art. (Tr. 347, 348; 268 A, B, C, D, E; 269 A, B, C.) To be a distinguished orator, science and practical experience must be possessed. (Tr. 348; 269 D.) The greatness of Pericles in this art, and his careful study of nature. We cannot rightly understand the nature of soul without knowing that of the universe, nor even of body, according to Hippocrates. (Tr. 349; 270 A, B, C.) It is to soul that speeches make their appeal. (Tr. 350; 270 D, E.) This is not that to which persuasion addresses itself. (Tr. 350, 351; 271 A, B, C.)

There are as many kinds of speech as there are of souls, and no one will be perfect in his art till he can discriminate the character of his hearers, the proper time for speaking, and choose his opportunity, when to be brief, touching, or vehement. (Tr. 351; 271 D, E; 272 A, B.)

Socrates then speaks of the desirableness of a short cut, where it can be had without traversing a long round (Tr. 352; 272 C); and then proceeds to state what he terms the wolf's case, as he has learnt it from others, which is that truth is of no importance in courts of law, but only probability; that even truth must be suppressed if it wears an air of improbability. (Tr. 352; 272 D, E; 273 A.) Tisias says that if a feeble but plucky man has committed an assault on a big cowardly one, and is brought to trial for it, both should tell a lie—the coward declaring that the feebler assailant could not have felled him alone, and the feeble man urging the improbability of his attacking one so much more powerful. (Tr. 353; 273 B, C.) In answer to all this Socrates takes refuge in his previous conclusions. The wise man will speak

what is agreeable to the gods, not to please the crowd, and, if necessary, will do it with prolixity. (Tr. 353 ; 273 D, E ; 274 A.) If a man aims high he will undergo any suffering needful for the attainment.

So much for speech-making, but inelegance in composition still remains to be touched on. (Tr. 354 ; 274 B.) This introduces the fable of Theuth, who, on telling the Egyptian king his invention of letters, as a means of assisting memory and rendering men wise, is met with the objection, that memory will thereby be weakened, or rather the faculty of retention, while only the power of recalling things to mind will be helped by them. (Tr. 354, 355 ; 274 C, D, E ; 275 A, B.) Men in the early ages listened to the words uttered by the oaks of Dodona, and all they needed was truth, whether from oak or rock. (Tr. 355 ; 275 C.) A man is a simpleton who thinks that written words are more than reminders, and is ignorant of the prophetic utterance of Ammon. Writing, like painting, answers no questions, and falls into the hands of those who do and who do not understand it. (Tr. 356 ; 275 D, E.) Contrast with this what is written by knowledge or science in the soul of the learner. (Tr. 356 ; 276 A.) The skilful agriculturist will not sow seeds for pastime in the gardens of Adonis, to see them germinate in eight days, but where they will mature in eight months ; and the man of intellect is not less prudent. He will not write his words in water, with ink and pen, words incapable of replying or enforcing the truth (but cherish convictions indelibly imprinted on the mind by the slower process of memory), while for his diversion he will store up reminders for his old age in written compositions. (Tr. 356, 357 ; 276 B, C, D.)

But a better result will be arrived at by personal scientific discussion which will bear immortal fruits in his own and in other people's minds. (Tr. 357 ; 277 A.) In either speak-

ing or writing, a man should thoroughly understand the principles of definition and analysis, and how to adapt himself to the soul of his hearer or reader, either for persuasion or instruction. (Tr. 358; 277 C. See above Tr. 341, 344, 351, 352; 263 B; 265, 271 D, E; 272 A, B.) The man who cannot distinguish *ὅναρ* and *ἵπαρ* in what is just or otherwise incurs disgrace. (Tr. 358; 277 D, E.) He who writes a discourse in a playful vein, not for persuasion but instruction, to be inscribed in the soul, on subjects just, beautiful, and good, is the father of a legitimate progeny not only in his own intellectual world, but in others' souls, where he has begotten brothers and sisters akin thereto, and such you Phædrus and I Socrates would pray to be. (Tr. 358; 278 A, B.) Neither Lysias, Homer, nor Solon ought to be famous for anything but what they have written earnestly and seriously. (Tr. 359; 278 C.) Wise is not an epithet fit for any but deity, but we may term a man philosophic. (Tr. 359; 278 D.) Socrates praises Isocrates at the expense of Lysias, who he thinks will excel all others, and who displays a natural love of wisdom. (Tr. 359, 360; 278 E; 279 A, B.) And the whole concludes with a prayer to be made inwardly beautiful. (Tr. 360; 279 B, C.)

Professor Thompson would translate *ψυχῇ πᾶσα* (Tr. 321; Phædr. 245 B), and probably *πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ* (Tr. 326; 249 E), by "the universal soul;" and *πᾶσα ἡ ψυχῇ*, "the soul," whether of the world or man, "in its entirety." (Tr. 322; 246 B.) The rest of souls are spoken of. (Tr. 324; 248 A.)

THEÆTETUS.

THEÆTETUS, one of the genuine dialogues of Plato, belonging to the same group as the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, and conducted by the same interlocutors. Theætetus, suffering from dysentery contracted in the camp, is met with on his being borne to Athens in a half-dying state. The meeting puts the narrator in mind of a conversation that took place between Theodorus, Socrates, and Theætetus, which he undertakes to relate, leaving out such links of connexion as are usual in the oblique or indirect narration, and making the parties to the dialogue speak for themselves. (Tr. 370 ; 143 C.) Socrates asks Theodorus what promising students he has in the study of Geometry, and is told of one who is praised not for his beauty, but his resemblance to Socrates, who far excels all that the teacher has met with. Most clever pupils are destitute of ballast, and are too impulsive, while the more sober-minded are apt to be slow in progress. This one moves so noiselessly and smoothly that he is like flowing oil, much resembling his father, who died very rich, as Socrates well remembers.

He is now introduced as Theætetus. (Tr. 372 ; 144 D.) Socrates at once engages him in conversation, and asks, what are the qualifications of a geometrician and astronomer for judging of their personal resemblance, which is rather the office of a painter. (Tr. 372 ; 145 A.) "Yet if he praised our mental endowments, we should think it worth while to examine the truth of his statements; and, as I never heard any one so praised by him as you, it is but fair that I beg you to unbosom yourself to me. (Tr. 372 ; 145 B.) He teaches you geometry, astronomy,

music, and the art of reasoning—all matters that I, too, strive to learn; but I want to know what is meant by learning?" (Tr. 373; 145 D.) "Is not learning the same thing as becoming wiser? and are not wisdom and knowledge, or science, identical?" (Tr. 373; 145 E.) "Yet I have my doubts, and should like to debate the question, according to the usage of the game that for each mistake a forfeit shall be made, and the winner shall be King, and determine what questions shall be further asked." (Tr. 373; 146 A.)

"Well, then, Theætetus, what is science?" "I should say," says the latter, "what Theodorus teaches, and all artizans in their several departments." (Tr. 374; 146 B, C.) "Your answer is comprehensive: you mean that there is a science having reference to all these arts; but that was not asked—how many sciences there are, but—what is science in itself. If this is unknown, it is useless to particularize that of different persons, which leaves us where we were." (Tr. 375; 147 A, B, C.) An example is adduced from geometry respecting areas, which are squares or oblongs, though not very intelligible. (Tr. 376; 148 A, B.) The answer, however, as to science, presents greater difficulty than a practical case of this numerical and linear kind. (Tr. 376; 148 C.) Theætetus modestly disowns his supposed capability, and is assured by Socrates that it is not for want of being pregnant, but only for want of some one to deliver his labouring brain, that he cannot reply. (Tr. 377; 148 D, E.) ✓ "Does not Theætetus know that he, Socrates, has learnt the midwife's art? that, like others who are past bearing, he can assist those who are young enough to bear; can supply stimulants and checks, and play the part of matchmaker with any professor of the art? (Tr. 377, 378; 149 A, B, C, D, E.) Only the art of Socrates goes much beyond this, for he has to distinguish

between phantasms and realities. He assists men, not women; and to bring forth what is born from souls, not from bodies. Barren himself and destitute of wisdom, he yet can make other minds productive, where there is anything latent; though where there is nothing forthcoming, he hands them over to Prodicus and the Sophists." (Tr. 379, 150 A, B, C, D, E.)

Theætetus, on being further pressed, declares that science is perception. (Tr. 381; 151 C, D, E.) "This is much the same as supporting the dictum of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things; that what a thing appears to me, that it is to me, and to you what appears to you. (Tr. 381; 152 A.) A wind is cold to one, or not so to another; or at one time and not at another. We cannot, however, assert that it is both cold and hot. (Tr. 381; 152 B, C.) Perception has regard only to the fact, and not to appearance. Still Protagoras was too wise not to have had some meaning. He asserts that qualities are relative; that there is nothing absolute and unchangeable in the objects of sense; that everything is a question of degree, or movement, or reciprocal action, and that things only become, and do not exist. In this he is one with Heraclitus and Empedocles, Epicharmus and Homer, though we must except Parmenides. Motion causes apparent existence, and rest its opposite. Even fire and heat are but motion or its effects. (Tr. 382; 152 D, E; 153 A.) The body is renewed by motion, and decays in its absence; and the soul in like manner is made to live by mental exercise, or to decay by rest, which is the equivalent of ignorance. The air grows stagnant and corrupt by calms; and were the sun's activity to be suspended, which Homer speaks of under figure of a golden chain, all the world would be subverted. (Tr. 383; 153 B, C, D.) The colour white is not in the eye, nor any thing outside of the eye.

It varies with some movement external to it, coupled with that of the eye itself, and is for ever varying. (Tr. 383; 153 E.) Are you sure that objects appear the same to a dog as they do to you, or even to another man, or to yourself at different times? (Tr. 383; 154 A.) If things were absolutely existent, they could not exist under altered arrangements to the same percipient. (Tr. 384; 154 B.) Six is more than four and less than twelve, and yet a thing cannot become more without being increased. Here the tongue and mind are at variance, as in the verse of Euripides. (Tr. 384; 154 D.) You cannot change from less to greater without addition, nor can a thing exist for the first time without being produced." (Tr. 385; 155 A, B, C.)

Theætetus declares that these speculations often make him giddy; but Socrates observes that amazement is the lot of the philosopher. Natural mystery has been described as the daughter of wonder, not unappropriately. (Tr. 385; 155 D.)

Here Socrates enters on a classification. "There are persons who believe in nothing but what they can see and handle. (Tr. 386; 155 E.) Others hold that the universe is nothing but motion of two sorts, active and passive, and unlimited in amount; that by the reciprocal action of these, perception and the perceived are called into existence together—seeing, hearing, feeling—with what constitutes the thing seen, heard, or felt. (Tr. 386; 156 A, B, C.) Thus whiteness only results from the action and reaction of the organ, and the thing external to it, and ceases the moment either shifts its place out of view of the other. There is no absolute hard or warm; but all these exist only when the active meets with its appropriate passive, and in their due conjunction. (Tr. 386, 387; 156 D, E; 157 A.) We ought to speak of things as produced, not as permanent." (Tr. 387; 157 B.)

Socrates again asks whether the Good and Beautiful are in the same predicament and have no actual existence, but are being ever produced. (Tr. 388; 157 D.) He now brings up the case of dreams, diseased sensation, and mental hallucination, where the impressions have no foundation in fact. "Here clearly false opinions are formed, and perception cannot be one with science. (Tr. 388; 157 E; 158 A, B.) What is the proof we are able to give that we are not awake when we dream, and dreaming when we are awake? (Tr. 389; 158 C.) As we sleep half our time, we at least take for true what is not real during that time, though assured of the contrary. During madness we are equally positive of what has no existence, and it would be absurd to take the same as truth that is only apparently so for a time. (Tr. 389; 158 D, E.) Again, Socrates in health is different from Socrates in sickness. The wine which is sweet to him in the former, is bitter in the latter case. He, as the percipient, must be changed for it to become sweet, and it will be bitter to no one else unless a like change is effected on that person. (Tr. 390, 391; 159 A, B, C, D, E; 160 A.) Thus we can only say that a thing exists of, for, or in relation to another thing, and being relative, it appertains to myself merely. If this be so, Protagoras is right, and so is Theætetus when he says that science and perception are the same. We have thus brought our precious bantling into the world. Let us see if it is worth rearing, or fit to be exposed." (Tr. 392, 393; 160 B, C, D, E; 161 A.)

Socrates, who repudiates all wisdom of his own, and protests against being thought to be a bag of arguments, now tries to argue on the other side. He expresses surprise that Protagoras did not make a pig, or Cynocephalus, the measure of all things, and put himself on the same level as a tadpole. (Tr. 393; 161 B, C.) If what he says is true,

why should he try to teach others, or extract pay from them for teaching what is untrue to them, and which they understand so well and so very differently? (Tr. 394; 161 D, E.) What is the use of this oracular profundity, uttered from the sanctuary of his Book on Truth? (Tr. 394; 162 A.)

Protagoras is supposed to reply that men assume the existence of Gods, and the inferiority of beasts, without any proof, in a way that if done in mathematics would be considered worthless, where probability goes for nothing. (Tr. 394, 395; 162 B, C, D, E.) The question of the identity of science and perception is again resumed. Do we know what we are said to see and hear—for instance, a language we have never learnt? Theætetus properly replies that we do hear and know the pitch of the sounds, but not what the linguist or writer on grammar would have to say. (Tr. 395; 163 B, C.) Does the person who has learnt and remembered a thing, know it? The man who sees, has a scientific knowledge of his object; but if seeing is knowledge, a man with his eyes shut, though he may remember, has no knowledge. If remembering what has been learnt is knowledge, here is a contradiction, and science and perception are not one. (Tr. 397; 164 B.) Thus we have to begin *de novo*, instead of crowing before the victory like dunghill cocks. (Tr. 397; 164 C.)

Socrates now asks whether it is possible for the man who knows a thing not to know it, which will be the case if to see is to know. The man will be trapped in a well, if asked whether he sees an object when one eye is closed. Theætetus replies that he does not see with the shut eye, but with the other. Nevertheless, he sees and does not see at the same time; and if seeing is knowledge, he knows and does not know at the same moment. Then there are all the cases of imperfect vision where things are seen at a distance, which will serve to confute

the identity of perception and knowledge. (Tr. 397, 398; 164 D, E; 165 A, B, C, D.)

Protagoras is now represented as objecting to much that Socrates has advanced. Will Socrates allow that a man who is changed is the same that he was before the change? (Tr. 399; 166 B, C.) It does not follow that a thing exists to him alone who has the impression; nor is it right to talk of pigs and monsters, and act like them in translating his writings. (Tr. 400; 166 D.) The differences between men are infinite, and the way in which things appear to them; but Protagoras avers that he does not deny the existence of wisdom and mental superiority, by which things may be made to change their aspect. To take the case of the man in health, who regards as sweet what is bitter in sickness. In neither case is he ignorant; but this is no reason why we should not make him well; and the argument for better education is equally powerful. Opinions for the time being are always true: we may change our opinions for the better, but we do not thereby make them more true. The clever and wise orator will make what is just appear so to states. So long as the state thinks something else just, it will be so to it, but this does not hinder its being brought to a more healthy conviction. (Tr. 400, 401; 166 E; 167 A, B, C.) So, too, the sophist will teach and earn recompense deservedly. (Tr. 401; 167 D.) It is of no use to burlesque, and misrepresent and carp, but to speak seriously. (Tr. 401; 167 E; 168 A, B.)

Socrates now proposes to follow the advice of Protagoras, by having a serious argument with Theodorus, who thinks Theætetus will conduct it as well as many of the long beards. (Tr. 402; 168 D, E.) Theodorus twits Socrates with wishing to make every man he meets strip and have a tussel. (Tr. 402; 169 A, B.) Socrates admits his weakness for controversy, though he has been brained by innumerable

Herculeses and Theseuses in previous experiments. Theodorus agrees to take a part in the reconsideration of Protagoras's doctrine. (Tr. 403 ; 169, C, D, E ; 170 A.) "There is no one," says Socrates, "who does not think that he has some one strong point in which he is beyond all other men, however superior they may be to him in different respects. Every one, therefore, admits that knowledge and ignorance belong to him. But wisdom is true opinion, and ignorance false opinion. If it is asserted that your opinion is necessarily true, thousands will assert it to be false, and the judgment of the many must decide. (Tr. 404, 405 ; 170 B, C, D, E ; 171 A.) Will he who admits the truth of the opinion of the majority still contend for that of his own, which is at variance with the former? (Tr. 405 ; 171 B.) The truth of Protagoras will not be true either to another or to himself. One man is wiser and also more ignorant than another. It is not every simpleton, woman or child, or inferior animal, that can distinguish between what is wholesome or the reverse, still less between what is expedient or not, in political enactments, though many will insist that just and holy are relative terms, and are only what appear to be such to the particular community." (Tr. 406 ; 171 C, D, E ; 172 A, B.)

This introduces another topic—the awkwardness of men of philosophical pursuits when in the courts of law, and who appear to have been brought up as slaves by the side of more liberally-educated persons. (Tr. 407 ; 172 C.) "These more experienced men of business are always prompt, being limited as to time by the clepsydra, and forced to speak to the point in what is often a contest of life and death, clever in subterfuges and other dishonourable tricks. (Tr. 408 ; 172 C, D, E ; 173 A, B, C.) Your philosopher hardly knows his way to the forum, never canvasses or indulges licence even in a dream. He knows nothing

derogatory of a man's ancestors, any more than he can tell the cups of water in the sea. True his body has its lair in the city, but his mind soars to the heaven above, and penetrates beneath the earth to its inmost recesses. Thales was once rebuked by a pert Thracian damsel, when he tumbled into a well as he was star-gazing, for not looking to his feet. So absorbed is the philosopher in thought, that he does not even notice what sort of man is his next-door neighbour. (Tr. 408, 409; 173 D, E; 174 A, B.) Such a man in the courts causes a laugh not among Thracian damsels only, but the indiscriminate herd. As he cannot slander, he is nonplussed when he should retort. (Tr. 184; Gorg. 486 B, C.) He thinks the praise of tyrants fulsome, and to be like glorifying a cowherd for milking his flock, though the tyrant milks a more refractory and crafty herd. If he hears of vast landed possessions, he thinks them small compared with the measure of the whole earth; or when ancestors are boasted, he pictures to himself the endless succession of kings and beggars that connect every one living with the parent of the race. (Tr. 409, 410; Theæt. 174, C, D, E; 175 A, B.) When, however, mere practical questions of the day and moment are set aside, and those of justice and injury, of happiness and misery, come to be inquired into, your crafty shrewd practitioner is at a discount. Such lofty questions turn his head, and perplex and bewilder him so that he in his turn is a laughing-stock to Thracian damsels and boors. (See also Tr. 230, 231; Gorg. 525 C; 526 A, B.) To the philosopher it is no discredit to be simple and unaffected, and not to be able to flatter. All this the sharp-witted shiftier man can do; but he does not understand a noble carriage, nor the hidden springs of harmony and propriety of language. (Tr. 410, 411; Theæt. 175 C, D, E; 176 A.) Evil will never cease to be. There will be always what is antagonistic to good;

and as this has no place among the Gods, it haunts this mortal sphere.

“ We have then to fly from earth to heaven ; and this is to be accomplished by resembling deity as far as possible, not in appearance merely, which is a sentiment fit for old wives only. (Tr. 411 ; 176 B.) The just man is like God ; and he is nothing, unless so far as he is this. All other seeming excellence is worthless. We must never allow that wickedness can excel, for while it is praised, the perpetrators will never learn to regard themselves as cumberers of the ground. The truth is, that what they think they are not, the more they are, from not thinking so. (Tr. 411 ; 176 C, D. The punishment they receive is not the stripes and death, but the being brought into accordance with the life they have chosen, and the impossibility of sharing the bliss of the good.” (Tr. 412 ; 176 E ; 177 A.)

After this digression, the discourse returns to the proposition previously asserted, that what a state enacts as just, is just so long as it is agreed on and continues in force. “ Few, however, will contend that this is true if we put the word good in place of just, unless by good we mean only a name. (Tr. 412 ; 177 C, D.) But cities aim not at a name merely, but to realize the thing meant, and not only for the present, but for the time to come. (Tr. 413 ; 178 A.) We will ask Protagoras, therefore, whether men are the measure of what is to happen in the future ? If a man thinks differently from his doctor as to whether he is going to have a fever or not, who will be right and who wrong ? (Tr. 413 ; 178 B, C.) Will not the opinion of the husbandman, or musician, or gymnast be preferred in his own province to that of the untutored ? Will not Protagoras know best what reasonings are most likely to avail in courts of law ; or if he does not, why pay so heavily for his teaching ?

(Tr. 414; 178 D, E; 179 A.) Legislation looks to the future, but often misses its aim. So long as one man is wiser than his neighbour, the latter can never be the measure of truth in a given case, and the refutation is complete. (Tr. 414; 179 B.)

“Let us now try and see if we can detect a flaw in the theory of motion as connected with perception. (Tr. 415; 179 C, D.) This doctrine is spreading, and advocated by the disciples of Heraclitus. It is of no use to talk about it with the people of Ephesus, who are mad on the point. They are no more to be kept to their argument than the subject of it. They cannot rest even in a conclusion. If an explanation is demanded as to one phrase, you are knocked down with another, from the same inexhaustible quiver. (Tr. 415; 179 E; 180 A, B.) The doctrine that all things are in motion was cloaked under the myth of Ocean and Tethys; but we are almost forgetting that Parmenides, Melissus, and that school contend that all things are one and motionless, and that there is no such thing as space in which they can be moved. We must be careful not to be dragged against our will over the boundary line of the two hostile camping grounds, but examine each position carefully. (Tr. 416; 180 C, D, E; 181 A, B.) First we want a definition of motion: is it of rotation or transference? (Tr. 417; 181 C.) When a body grows old, or decays, or changes colour, is this a third kind of motion? Are we to say that everything is moved and changed, or sometimes either, without the other? If the last happens, the same will appear to be both at motion and at rest, and we cannot say that all things are in motion more than at rest. (Tr. 417; 181 D, E.) But we have before shown that qualities in body result from the reciprocal action, passive and active, of the percipient and the external object. (Tr. 418; 182 A, B.) If things change

while we speak of them, how can we talk of a given colour, or any other attribute? (Tr. 418; 182 C, D.) If all things are in motion or change, the perception must partake of this change; that is, it is, and is not what it is termed. If perception is science, it is, therefore, also not science.

“Thus a general contradiction results, if all things are correctly said to be in motion. The words ‘so,’ or ‘not so,’ become unmeaning in such a representation, and some expressions must be coined to suit the hypothesis. Thus, then, no man is the measure of things unless he be wise; and science is not perception, if all things are perpetually moving.” (Tr. 419; 183 B, C.) ✓

Socrates declines to go into the theory of Parmenides, as leading too far away from the question, What is science? but wishes to promote the bringing to light the view of Theætetus. (Tr. 420; 183 D, E; 184 A, B.) At the outset of the further discussion, Socrates asks whether it is more proper to speak of perceiving with the sense organs, or by them. “Do we refer the perception to the bodily organ, as an instrument? (Tr. 421; 184 C, D, E.) Has every sense a limitation to its own special sphere, so that the one organ cannot help the other? Sound and colour both exist, and are different, each one unique. How do we recognise any similarity and dissimilarity between them? We could not say of either that they were salt without calling in the assistance of the tongue. What is the faculty by which we note their difference, or existence or non-existence? Clearly no other than that of the soul, whose business it is to note any common characteristic. (Tr. 422; 185 A, B, C, D, E.)

“You are beautiful, Theætetus,” says Socrates, “because you answer beautifully; and I am of the same opinion. The soul only conceives of existence, identity, differ-

ence, the beautiful and good; and these in relation to past, present, and future. By the same bodily sense we get to learn the existence of opposite properties; but it is the soul which discriminates what is in the perception. All that constitutes the simple sensation comes to us immediately on birth, but it requires years of labour and comparison to arrive at the essential character of the same. We cannot apprehend, truly, that whose existence we cannot grasp, nor have a scientific knowledge of it. (Tr. 423; 185 E; 186 A, B, C.) Thus there is no science in sensation, only in what is got out of it by reasoning. Hence perception, so far as it results from sensation; is not one with science; but we want to get beyond this negative conclusion." (Tr. 424; 186 D, E; 187 A.)

Theætetus suggests that science is true judgment. "But the distinction between true and false judgments is one of difficulty. (Tr. 425; 187 B, C, D.) We must retrace our path, it being better not to make more haste than good speed. Do we not say that judgments are sometimes false? We either know a thing or we do not; and he who judges must judge what he does or does not know. We cannot affirm knowledge and ignorance of the same point in the same person. A man does not imagine that what he knows is the same as what he does not know, nor *vice versâ*. How, then, can he judge falsely? Will it not be better to let alone knowing and come to being? It will be true, that one who thinks what has no existence will exercise a false judgment respecting it. Can a person, then, think of a nonentity? He cannot see what is and is not, nor hear the same. Is not judgment, in these respects, on a par with sensation? He who judges what is nothing, does not judge at all, and therefore false judgment is something different from this." (Tr. 426, 427; 188 A, B, C, D, E; 189 A, B.)

Socrates asks, if it would not be preferable to speak of false as mistaken judgments, where one object of thought is improperly put in lieu of another? In the course of the further discussion of this question, he is led to ask whether Theætetus and himself mean the same thing by the term "thinking." In his view, "thought is discourse of the soul with itself; the silent asking and answering questions. When it has decided, the issue is a judgment pronounced secretly. But no man confounds beauty and deformity, nor declares an ox to be a horse. We cannot so replace objects by substitution, and hence the previous suggestion is of no value. We must not be faint with the difficulty of the inquiry, nor be like sea-sick persons, utterly reckless what becomes of us. (Tr. 428 to 430; 189 C, D, E, . . . to 191 A.) It is partly possible that a person may judge that what he knows is a something he does not know; but at all events, it is possible to learn what was unknown to him before. (Tr. 430; 191 B, C.)

"Let it be supposed that in our souls is a *tabula rasa* of wax, differing in size in different persons, and of various degrees of purity and hardness. Assume this tablet to be a gift of Mnemosyne, the mother of the Muses, and that on it we impress as with a ring seal what we desire to remember, which we continue to be cognisant of while the impression remains, but whose image dies out when we forget. (Tr. 430, 433; 191 B, C, D; 193 C.) In such a case, it will be impossible for us to confound this image with that of something we do not know; nor can we suppose that what we do not perceive is something different from that we are said not to perceive. (Tr. 432; 192 A, B, C.) We cannot, therefore, here at least, judge falsely. But we may imagine something we know to be different from what we perceive, whether we know it or not. It is possible that a man may have no perception

of something he knows as well as a perception; or he may not have a perception, as well as have it, of something he does not know. (Tr. 432; 192 D, E.) I may know two persons without seeing them, and cannot confound them; or I may know one of them only, and not see them, in which case I shall not confound them. And I may neither know nor perceive either of them, when I shall not suppose that what I do not know is some other, than it is, of the things unknown to me. (Tr. 433; 193 A, B.) But I may form a false judgment by comparing with the mental impress the figures of two persons seen at a distance, clothing the one with the attributes of the other, putting the right shoe on the left foot, or reversing the resemblance as a mirror does. There may be a want of correspondence between the mental image and the perception, as it should exist; or the absent perception may be compared with the present impression, and thus give rise to deception. We do not make false judgments about things we neither know nor perceive, but only as to what we do, and falsehood thus comes in indirectly. (Tr. 434; 194 A, B.) Where the wax is thick and well manipulated, perceptions are abidingly imprinted on the heart or wax of the mind (a pun on *κῆρ* and *κηρός*), and true judgment is the result. If the seat of sensibility is hairy, or the wax is impure, or too hard or soft, these impressions are indistinct or evanescent, and false judgment ensues. (Tr. 435; 194 C, D, E; 195 A.) Let us suppose that the latter lies in the combination of perception with thought, not in perception alone. As regards numbers, people have but an indistinct idea about them when they are large. If a man mistakes eleven for twelve, it is because he gives a wrong name to the mental impress; but this is a case before regarded as impossible, and false judgment is not a confusion of thought with perception. The fact is, we are in the

dark, not knowing what science is, nor what is meant by 'knowing' and 'not knowing.'"

Science is thereupon declared to be the same as having or possessing knowledge, which are somewhat different. "The man who puts birds into an aviary may be said to have them (Tr. 438; 197 C); but possess would be a better term, for he has still to catch them. (Ib.) Similarly the soul may be compared to an aviary, where ideas or sciences fly in flocks or solitary. This corresponds with knowledge; but to catch any particular science we want a special qualification. Only the arithmetician can seize the science of number. By a misconception of the science he seeks to catch, he may take eleven for twelve, or lay hold of the wrong bird; but if he takes what he strives to take, he is not deceived. (Tr. 441; 199 B, C.) Science can never make us ignorant, any more than blindness can make us see."

Here Theætetus suggests that ignorance of various kinds may be on the wing with the other flying sciences. (Tr. 441; 199 E.) The whole of this investigation is a revolving in the same circle. (Tr. 442; 200 B, C.) We have been wrong in looking to understand false judgments, before knowing what science is. Again, Theætetus proposes to define science as true judgment. Socrates rejoins that, to a man who fords a stream the depth will soon be known, and that we may blunder on a discovery by continued pursuit. (Tr. 443; 201 A.) In the case of rhetoricians and legal practitioners, the only effort is to warp the judgment, not to instruct, for it is inconceivable that those who did not witness a transaction can shed any light on its truth during the flow of the clepsydra. The aim is to persuade; but a just persuasion, when a true opinion is formed without any means of knowing but hearsay, is a judgment without science. (Tr. 443; 201 B.)

Theætetus remembers that he has heard that true judgment, combined with reasoning, is science, and that that is not known for which a good reason cannot be assigned. (Tr. 443; 201 C.) But how are things that may be known to be distinguished from those that may not? Socrates proposes what he calls dream for dream. He has somewhere heard that there is no explanation of primary elements possible. We can predicate nothing whatever about them, and can only speak of them without any qualifying addition or proposition. The same persons aver that compounds may be known, while their elements cannot. The soul may apprehend the truth about a thing without knowing it; only what is capable of explanation can be made matter of science. (Tr. 444; 202 A, B, C.)

Socrates will not, however, admit that compounds can be known, when their elements are unknown, and he appeals to the syllables that compose the words Socrates and Theætetus. (Tr. 445; 203 A, B.) This brings up the question whether a whole is the same as all its parts, or is a specific idea apart from them. (Tr. 446; 204 A.) "Does the whole differ from all, where we speak of number? (Tr. 447, 448; 204 B, C, D, E.) All this turns on whether we can talk of the parts of an indivisible whole, or to speak of the whole as different from the sum of the parts. We first learn our letters before we proceed to spell; and in music we first make the acquaintance of the note before assigning its place in the chord, so that we have a clearer knowledge of elements than of syllables or phrases. (Tr. 449; 206 A, B.) But to estimate the meaning of science being true judgment combined with reason, we must know what λόγος, or reason, is. This has reference first to oral discourse by means of verbs and nouns, and is certainly a concomitant of true judgment. Hesiod tells us that a chariot is made up of a hundred

pieces, which no one would think of enumerating but in a very general way. A man may spell Theætetus without a knowledge of grammar; but he who can give a full scientific account in detail adds λόγος to true judgment, and this means a knowledge of the smallest elements. But there is another kind of λόγος connected with true judgment yet not implying science, and this is a knowledge of the right order in which the syllables of a word are to be arranged. (Tr. 452; 208 A, B.) Here, then, our definition escapes us, as riches fly away in dreams. Let us try a third conception of λόγος. We speak of the sun as the brightest of the heavenly bodies. This idea of *differentia* is one kind of λόγος, as is that of laying hold of a common quality belonging to bodies. According to this, he who combines a knowledge of difference with true judgment, will have science, where he had previously only judgment. But the nearer we look at this, the more the perspective loses its proper effect. It is not true that by seeking the qualities common to Theætetus and other men, I learn to know him better; and if I am to judge him by his snub-nose and goggle-eyes, I shall not thereby know him from myself. I shall only call up the image of Theætetus when the difference is carried so far as to enable me to distinguish between his plain features and those of everybody else. Thus right judgment will be based on knowledge of difference; but the addition of λόγος will be superfluous, for it will add only what we are already supposed to have, which is but a blind procedure and useless iteration. (Tr. 454; 209 B, C, D, E.) I could not know Theætetus from any other man without knowing his difference from that other; and what use will λόγος, as knowledge of difference, be after that? It is nonsensical, when looking for science, to call it true judgment with the science of difference or any other science. Thus neither perception nor right judgment,

either with or without λόγος, is science. (Tr. 455; 210 A, B.) We are still pregnant, or all that has been given birth to is a wind egg, or not deserving of rearing." (Tr. 455; 210 C, D.)

The discussion, as usual, settles nothing, or rather unsettles everything. In some respects the dialogue is less perplexing than the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, or *Statesman*, but is not without its difficulties, from the rapid way in which Socrates takes up a position, and abandons it before you are aware of his intention. We are thus often left in doubt as to his meaning, what is the view he is really supporting, or whether the language is always self-consistent. Accordingly, while debating the precise interpretation, we find that he has already shifted his front and selected some other weak point of attack, or has allowed himself to be lured aside by some tempting digression, whose connexion with the subject is not at once obvious.

EUTHYPHRON.

EUTHYPHRON, a dialogue of Plato on Holiness, held between Socrates and a collocutor of that name. The latter begs to know why he finds Socrates about the entrance of the court of the king Archon, so unusual a thing is it to have him concerned in bringing or defending an action. Socrates replies, that he has been indicted by one Meletus, of the deme of Pithos, a man with a hooked nose and sparse lank hair and beard. (Tr. 458; 2 A, B.) "He accuses me of corrupting youth, a matter in which he would seem to show his acuteness and eminent virtue, if it is as he alleges." (Tr. 459; 2 C, D.) "I wish he were the patriot you suppose," observes Euthyphron; "but I fear it is otherwise, since his attack on you appears to me to be

wounding the state in its most vulnerable point and assaulting it at the heart. (Tr. 459; 3 A.) What has he to bring against you?" "Why, he asserts that I make strange gods and disbelieve in the old divinities." Compare what is said in the Apology. "I suppose," says Euthyphron, "because you talk of your *dæmon*; and you know how sensitive the multitude is about any religious innovation." (Tr. 459; 3 B, C.) "I do not mind their laughing, as they do, where a man pretends to be clever, but they get angry and jealous when he would teach them. I am too fond, perhaps," says Socrates, "of telling others all I know, if I can get them to listen. Their laughing at me I don't mind; but the prophets only know what will become of me if they are seriously angry. (Tr. p. 460; 3 D, E.)

"But what cause brings you here, Euthyphron?" "Well, it may seem a mad procedure, but I am going to prosecute my old father on the charge of murder." "You must indeed be a profound sage to do this rightly. He has killed a near relation, possibly?" "It is," observes Euthyphron, "of no consequence whether it was a friend or foe, but whether he slew him justly or not. It is as great a pollution to sit at the same fireside with a murderer who is akin to you, as with a perfect stranger. My father has killed one of our slaves, by too rigorous confinement without food or warmth. My friends abuse me for taking up the case as against my parent, or troubling myself for the sake of a mere slave, but they overlook the claims of piety and justice." (Tr. 460, 461; 4 A, B, C, D.)

"But," remarks Socrates, "are you so conversant with the rules of holiness, as to have no qualms of conscience when you would bring a parent to trial?" "I should be good for little if I were not." "I must become your scholar," observes Socrates, "and transfer the responsibility of my errors to you, as my teacher, and get you

to make my defence. If Meletus indicts me, Socrates, by Zeus I shall soon get the upper hand of him, and make him defendant in his own case. This I know, Euthyphron, that though he has a keen eye for my shortcomings, he is no match for you. But, tell me, is not holiness always consistent with itself in all actions, and the lack of it the same likewise?" "Certainly, Socrates. What I am now doing is holy, though I seek to bring my father to justice. Zeus is the best of the gods, and yet he put Cronus, his father, in bonds for devouring his own children." (Tr. 461, 462; 4 E; 5 A, B, C, D, E; 6 A.) "You remind me," says Socrates, "of my alleged infidelity. Do you believe there is any truth in this monstrous story? Do the gods fight, and indulge hatreds and sanguinary strife, as represented by the poets and in the tapestry or embroidery of the great Panathenaic peplus, that is borne in solemn procession to the Acropolis?" "Yes, I do believe this and much more besides."

"However," observes Socrates, "we won't pursue this now; but, tell me, what is the special characteristic of holiness—not by which, as you say, it is holy to prosecute a parent, but what common to all actions so termed? (Tr. 463; 6 B, C, D.) Let me have the model form which is applicable to all cases." "What is pleasing to the gods, is what I call holy," says Euthyphron, "and the opposite of it is impiety." (6 E.) "Good, but is this true?" rejoins Socrates. "You say that the man who gratifies the gods is holy, and *vice versa*, and that the gods quarrel and exercise enmity with one another. Now people don't quarrel about what is numerically greater or less, or as to the size of an area, as they have recourse to computation and measurement to settle the point. So, too, as respects weight. When they dispute it is about what is right and wrong, ugly or beautiful, good or bad. If

the gods differ, it must be about the same issues, and there must be different standards of morality and what is or is not pleasing to them. Hence if the holy is what they approve, the same things must be both holy and unholy, according as viewed by them severally. (Tr. 464, 465 ; 7 A, B, C, D, E ; 8 A.) Thus what is pleasing is also hateful. In punishing your father you may gratify Zeus and offend Cronus, or satisfy Hephæstus and disgust Here."

"But," says Euthyphron, "there is no difference of sentiment about the propriety of avenging an unjust murder." "True, but the question always is as to the justice or injustice. People do not doubt the propriety of punishments where merited, however they may strive, as you say, to avoid it, but they deny having acted unjustly. (Tr. 466 ; 8 B, C.) Nor do the gods do so any more than men, but they doubt, if they doubt at all, whether an act has been done properly or not. Admitting this, what proof have you, Euthyphron, that the gods will approve your proceeding against your father?" "I will soon prove it to the satisfaction of the judges, if they will lend an attentive ear," says the latter. (Tr. 466, 467 ; 8 D, E ; 9 A, B.)

He then proposes to amend his definition, and declares the holy to be what all the gods love, and the impious to be what they all hate. (Tr. 467 ; 9 C, D, E.) Socrates now asks: "Is the holy regarded by the gods, because it is so, or is the action holy because it is so regarded? We do not see a thing because it is visible, but it is visible because it is seen. Do the gods love a thing because it is holy, or for some other reason, or is a thing holy because they love it? If the former, then that which is holy, and what is pleasing, are quite distinct. What they love may be pleasing to them, but this is not why they love it. (Tr. 468, 469 ; 10 A, B, C, D, E.) Thus, then, Euthyphron, your defini-

tion will not serve you. We still want to know what holiness is." (11 A.)

"But," says the respondent, "all I propose seems to be unstable, and is soon made to shift place." "Yes," adds Socrates, "like the statues of my progenitor, Dædalus; and had I propounded the definitions, you might have rallied me on the relationship." "Ay," remarks Euthyphron, "but you are the Dædalus that cause them to be so fugitive." "I am, then," adds Socrates, "more clever than my ancestor, for I make not only my own but other people's productions to change their standing ground, though I want them to be fixed as a rock. Suppose I suggest that all which is holy is just (Tr. 469, 470; 11 B, C, D, E); and is all that is just, holy, or only so in part?" "I do not quite catch your meaning," says Euthyphron. (12 A.) "I mean the contrary to what the poet does who wrote," says the respondent—

"But Zeus, the maker and eternal cause
Of all that springs obedient to his laws,
You will not dare pronounce that sacred name,
For where Fear harbours there is likewise shame."

No one blushes except at the fear of imputed disgrace. I admit that where shame is there is fear, but the two are not convertible, any more than the just and holy, seeing the holy is but a part of the just. We want to discover what part it is, and I wish to instruct Meletus that he may withdraw his imputations against me." (Tr. 471, 472; 12 B, C, D, E.) Euthyphron says, "It is the part which relates to our service towards the gods." "But not," remarks Socrates, "that sort of service by which all things that are carefully tended are benefited, for we never employ care with a view to injure. Is holiness an advantage to the gods, or does it make them better?" (Tr. 472,

473; 13 A, B, C.) "No," says Euthyphron. "I thought not," remarks Socrates. "I mean the service which slaves give to a master," says Euthyphron. "But what end will the service of the gods subserve? Surely, with your knowledge of divine matters you can tell?" "I can name many and noble purposes," adds Euthyphron, "though it is difficult to particularize thoroughly. (Tr. 473; 13 D, E; 14 A.) I know that if we serve the gods with prayers and sacrifices, such conduct is holy, and that these acts of homage preserve individual families and communities, while the neglect of them is subversive and ruinous." (Tr. 474; 14 B.) "I think," says Socrates, "you are trying to evade replying. Don't you say that holiness is the science of prayer and sacrifice? Is not sacrifice a giving to the gods, and praying asking a something from them, and thus the science of begging from and giving to them? This being so, we ought to ask what we need, and give them what they want, and so holiness will become a traffic between gods and men." "Call it so if you like." "Well, but I don't like if it is not true. What I would seek to know is, wherein they are helped, or whether it is all one-sided and we reap the whole benefit?" "Their advantage is," says Euthyphron, "the being revered and honoured, and the pleasure derived from our gratitude."

"It is, then," observes Socrates, "what is grateful, but not advantageous to them nor dear to them." "I do not agree," says Euthyphron, "for I think it most dear or acceptable to them." To which Socrates replies, "No wonder we get round in the same mill-track. It is not I that am the Dædalus, but you, who are even more ingenious than he. (Tr. 474, 475; 14 C, D, E; 15 A, B, C.) We are only got back to our starting-point. I shall not let you escape, like a slippery Proteus, till you have enlightened me. You surely could never

have dared to indict your aged parent for murder, unless you had thoroughly known what holiness and impiety are! You would have dreaded the vengeance of the gods and the reproaches of your fellow-men; so that I am convinced you know all about the subject, if you will only tell." "Well, Socrates, I may do this at some other time, but I have an engagement now." "Oh dear!" says Socrates, "why do you run away and thus dash to the ground my hopes of escaping the action of Meletus, by proving to him that I am now better informed through your instrumentality, and have renounced all the errors I committed through ignorance, and have entered on a new mode of life for the time to come?" (Tr. 476; 15 D, E; 16 A.)

LYSIS.

LYSIS is the title of one of Plato's dialogues which the ancients regarded as genuine. Socrates, coming from the Academy, is stopped by Hippothales and Ctesippus and others, who are standing at the door of a palæstra, who induce him to enter. Here he is introduced to Lysis, the favourite of Hippothales, a youth of great beauty and of good family, whose members have, in times past, won prizes at the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemæan games, and who is also a friend of Menexenus. Socrates rebukes Hippothales for flattering his boy love, and enters into conversation with Lysis as a sample of how such conversation should be carried on. He shows that though parents love their children they do not spoil them. (Tr. 487, 488; 207 E; 208 A, B, C, D, E.) A father waits for his son's wisdom to show itself before he entrusts him with his affairs. (Tr. 489; 209 C, D.) When we are wise, all men will repose trust in us, foreigners, Greeks, men, and

women; but not otherwise. (Tr. 490; 210 B, C, D), Men have different tastes. (Tr. 492; 211 D, E.)

Then follows what we have given under the head of lovers and loved. (Tr. 493, 494; 212 D, E; 213 A, B, C.) Though God is said to bring like to like (*Odyss.* xvii. 218), and that like is always friendly to like (Tr. 495; 214, A, B), yet Socrates thinks the evil man is the more hostile to the evil by how much he draws more closely to him; in fact, the evil are never like themselves, but capricious and unstable. (Tr. 495; 214 C.) But how can the good, who are altogether self-sufficient, be the friends of the good, seeing they never desire one another when absent? (Tr. 496; 215 A.) To show at least that like is not always one with like, he quotes the lines of Hesiod, given above (see Index), which shows that similars are full of envy, hatred, and contention with regard to each other. (Tr. 497; 215 C.) The poor man is compelled to be a friend to the rich, and the weak to the strong, and the sick man to his doctor: all things require their contrast: dry needs moist, cold that which is hot, bitter sweet, sharp blunt, empty full, and so on. (Tr. 497; 215 D, E.)

Socrates, too, declares himself giddy with the apparent opposition. (Tr. 498; 216 C.) The difference between the thing itself and its appearance is here brought up: the painting your yellow hair with white lead does not really make it white, though whiteness is present. (Tr. 499; 217 D.) Wise men do not seek wisdom because they have it, nor do ignorant persons; but a third class does seek wisdom, not being either good or bad, nor conceited that they know what they do not. (Tr. 500; 218 A.) The essence of friendship has still to be sought. (Tr. 502; 219 C.) We love what is naturally allied to us. (Tr. 506; 222 A.) Good—is it akin to everything, and evil alien? or is good cognate with good, and evil with evil, or what is neither

with what is indifferent? (Tr. 506 ; 222 C.) If good is friendly to good, we must contradict what was said before. (Tr. 507 ; 222 D, E.)

As a good instance of the fruitlessness of the inquiry, it is added, "What, then, can we have recourse to in the dispute? Manifestly nothing. I am compelled, therefore, like the wise men in the courts of law, to count up all that has been advanced; for if neither the loved nor the loving, neither the similar nor the dissimilar, neither the good nor the things related thereto, nor anything we have enumerated, for I cannot remember them for their multitude—if, I say, that none of these are friendly, I have nothing more to say." (Tr. 507 ; 222 E.)

The dialogue concludes, as might have been expected, with the assertion, "What the friendly is we have not as yet been able to make out." (Tr. 507 ; 223 B.) But we cannot help asking whether there is not here needless mystification, and what is gained by this negative procedure in comparison with the attempt to arrive at a more affirmative conclusion, which could hardly leave the question so little advanced as its substitute? We are not here, however, finding fault with what is tacitly suggested in the way of practical hint, or the moral purpose of the dialogue in moderating any excess of passion or inflated vanity on the part of Hippothales and Lysis, if any such was intended, and all this is anything more than a little scenic accessory.

REPUBLIC.

(TRANSLATION. VOL. II.)

THE Republic is the most famous and deeply studied of the dialogues of Plato. It represents the mind of Plato at its period of greatest vigour, and was its author's greatest work, whether its multifarious contents are regarded, its completeness and systematic design, or the power and subtlety of its discriminations. It is pre-eminently a dialogue of exposition in its later portion rather than of search, according to the very useful classification of Mr. Grote. It will not be possible, however, to dissect it minutely in this article, without, as it were, exhibiting a play within the play. The larger portion of its expositions will have been touched on under other articles—such as Justice, Righteousness, Philosopher, State, Tyranny, Democracy, &c.; see Index—and need not be repeated in detail. It stands in striking contrast with Plato's other great continuous work of the affirmative and expository class, "The Laws," being rather the working-out of an ideal conception of the mind—partly, at least, on its poetic and philosophical side—than a practical code of legal institutes, like its great rival treatise, which is a *corpus juris* and a kind of Blackstone's Commentary to boot, and seldom soars into the regions of fancy and myth, except so far as the recognised traditions of religion are concerned.

Book I.—The First Book is introduced, agreeably enough, with a conversation about the pains and plea-

asures of old age, the right use of riches, and the consolations of piety at the close of life :

“ Sweet hope is his, the solace of his age,
That soothes his heart and cheers his pilgrimage;
True yokefellow, that like a pilot steers
The course of mortal thought that ever veers.”

We are soon involved in an inquiry about righteousness, which is not to be represented by the *δέον, ὠφέλιμον λυσιτελοῦν, κερδαλέον* or *ξυμφέρον*. Whatever it is, it is more precious than gold. (Tr. 7 to 13; 332 B to 336 E.) Thrasy-machus asserts that righteousness is the pleasure of the stronger, and the point is strongly contested. He even goes so far as to put wisdom and virtue in the rank of injustice, and to make righteousness the opposite of wisdom and virtue. (Tr. 26; 348 E.) It is clearly a virtue of soul, without which the latter can do nothing well. The just man will live virtuously, and the unjust basely (Tr. 32; 353 E); but he who lives well is happy, and this surely is more advantageous. (Tr. 32; 354 A.) The argument, however, has travelled too fast, for we have not determined as yet what Justice is. (Tr. 33; 354 C.)

Book II.—In the Second Book it is asked whether there is a good which we prize absolutely for its own sake?—In what class is righteousness? (Tr. 35; 357 C, D, E; 358 A.) If we had the ring of Gyges, or helmet of Pluton, how should we act? (Tr. 38; 359 D, E; 360 A, B.) To estimate the truth rightly, we should strip the righteous man of all the rewards of piety and good opinion, and endow the unjust man with them. (Tr. 39, 40; 360 E; 361 A, B, C, D, E.) The relations of the good man to the gods, and the flexibility of the gods to prayer. (Tr. 45; 365 D, E.) Argument still waged. (Tr. 47; 367 B.) Socrates proposes to discover, first, what righteousness is in States, and then to look

at it in individuals. (Tr. 49 ; 369 A.) Mode of the growth of States, and the place of righteousness in them. (Tr. 52 ; 372 A.) Socrates humorously provides his infant community with figs, pears, beans, myrtle-berries, and beechnuts, which Glaucon thinks would suit a city of pigs. (Tr. 2 ; 372 C, D.) As a further provision, our citizens must be like noble dogs, watchful, and gentle towards foes and friends. (Tr. 56 ; 375 C, D, E ; 376 A, B.) Gymnastics and discourse, as well as checks to be imposed on the fable-maker and poets, occupy us down to Tr. 61 ; 380 B. The poet is not to say, with Æschylus,

“ God makes for men a fatal cause to grow,
When He may wish to lay their houses low.”

The subject is further pursued, and the use of invention in fable partly conceded, where the object is the approach to truth ; but yet the gods are free from falsehood, as they are neither ignorant, nor have they anything to gain by it, and this brings us down to Tr. 64 ; 383 C.

Book III.—In the Third Book the subject of truth and poetical misrepresentation is continued to Tr. 72 ; 391 D, E. The difference between *διήγησις* and *μυμῆσις*, and the admissibility of tragedy and comedy is treated of. (Tr. 75 ; 394 D.) Contrary to the dictum at the end of the Symposium (Tr. iii. 576 ; 223 D), he thinks that the same writer cannot compose tragedy and comedy. (Rep. Tr. ii. 75 ; 394 E ; Tr. 76 ; 395 A.) Restrictions on the poets, and what is lawful in imitation, occupy us to Tr. 79 ; 398 C. What melodies and musical modes are useful in a State, what rhythms and harmonies. (Tr. 83 ; 401 C.) Value of a right musical education. (Tr. 84 ; 401 E.) Moderation will have no connexion with excessive pleasures, but rather insolence will be so allied. (Tr. 85 ; 402 E.) True love not mad nor excessive. (Tr. 85 ;

403 A.) Next comes gymnastics, then abstinence from intoxication on the part of guardians, who are to be sleepless dogs. (Tr. 86; 404 A.) Luxury analogous to redundant measure and rhythm in music (Tr. 87; 404 E.) Doctors in a community a proof of disorder. (Tr. 87; 405 D.) Practice of physicians. (Tr. 91; 408 E.) Qualities of a good judge, and of the crafty man who takes his standard from depraved persons. (Tr. 92; 409 E.) Value of physic, music, gymnastics, the philosophic temper, when not in excess or defect. (Tr. 94; 412 A.) Requisites in good guardians: some have gold, and some silver, some brass and iron, in their composition. (Tr. 99; 415 B, C, D.) The earth shot them up all armed. (Tr. 98, 99; 414 D, E; 415 A, D, E.) They are to be like well-trained dogs, guarding against wolves and not worrying the flocks; to live in common, and possess no gold or silver, which is to be in their minds only, and so on to Tr. 100; 417 A, B. Compare also Tr. 149; 464 C, D.

Book IV.—The Fourth Book deals first with the objection, that guardians will thus be unhappy (Tr. 102, 151, 208; 419 A, B; also 466 A; 519 E); but the State does not exist that one class may be happy. We don't want ploughmen in lawn trousers and bedizened with gold, nor potters to recline on velvet couches (Tr. 104; 421 B, C, D); nor rich artisans, nor soldiers to be plundered in battle. (Tr. 106; 423 B.) The size of the State to be restricted (Tr. 106; 423 C); caution to be used in introducing new music and sports (Tr. 107; 424 B); respect for laws, behaviour to seniors, simplicity in dress, hints on what legislation cannot provide; folly of over-indulgence, of quack medicines, minute and useless legislation. (Tr. 108 to 110; 424 B to 427 A.) Religious institutes are to be referred to the oracle at Delphi. (Tr. 111; 427 B, C.) This brings us again to righteousness and its antagonist,

injustice, the qualification of wisdom and science in the perfect guardians, the smallest class (Tr. 112; 428 E); of courage in the fighting or auxiliary class, whose colours must be fast and not wash out (Tr. 114; 430 A, B); right opinion, explanation of moderation, as controlling the love of pleasure, and the defence of the phrase "superior to oneself." (Tr. 115; 431 B.) All this enables us to realize the third virtue of moderation, after which righteousness or justice alone remains, and which, though lying before our feet, we have overlooked. (Tr. 117; 432 D.) This is either doing our own business or agreement between ruler and ruled, but the first appears to be what is chiefly insisted on. (Tr. 119; 435 B.) And now for these qualities in the individual. A faculty cannot at the same time exert itself in opposite ways; enumeration of opposites, what things are in themselves, and relatively, illustration from thirst. (Tr. 123, 124; 438 B, C, D, E; 439 A, B.) But there is in the soul a power of contradiction opposed, in the shape of reasoning, to a conductive and attractive power, which springs from affections of the lower nature, which is that which loves, hungers and thirsts, and is acted on by other lusts. (Tr. 125; 439 D.) There is also the emotional and thumic, as a third class. (Tr. 125; 439 E.) The mental conflict between reason and desire, in which the feelings sometimes take the part of reason, sometimes of appetite (Tr. 125; 440 B, C, D, E); parallel between the individual and State continued (Tr. 127; 441 D); respective provinces of reason and passion. (Tr. 127; 441 E.) The function of reasoning in man, of courage, of moderation, of righteousness, and characters of the same. (Tr. 129; 443 E.) Parallel between justice and health, and between injustice and disease. (Tr. 130; 444 E.) There now only remains to be considered, whether it is advantageous to be just, independently of its meeting the eye

of our fellow-man, or not? If we do not care to live with a body afflicted and in pain, will it not be ridiculous that a man should care to live with a diseased soul? (Tr. 130; 445 A, B, C.) We now see, as from a commanding watch-tower, that there is one species of virtue and infinite varieties of vice. Four varieties, however, are prominent, corresponding to as many polities, which, if we separated the kingly (or that by one head) from the aristocratic, where the power is shared by more than one, would be five; these are, respectively, the aristocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and tyrannic.

Book V.—The Fifth Book opens, in a lively and agreeable way, by Adimantus and Polemarchus refusing to proceed till Socrates has explained his scheme for a community of wives and children. (Tr. 132, 133; 449 C, D, E; 450 A.) This will prove a delicate matter. (Tr. 134; 450 E.) Female dogs keep watch over flocks; but if females are to do the work of males, they must be fed accordingly, learn gymnastics and music, and strip in the palæstra. (Tr. 135; 452 A.) Fools may laugh at this, but it is not long since there was the same objection to men's exposing themselves in public. (Tr. 136; 452 D, E.) The question is, Is the woman physically capable of camp-exercise? (Tr. 136; 453 A.) Is there any such difference between the sexes as to demand a separate treatment? (Tr. 137; 453 C.) Socrates will look, like Arion, for a dolphin to take him on his back out of a sea of difficulty (Tr. 137; 453 D); and remarks on the insufficiency of those who are caught by mere verbal distinctions, from want of being able to embrace general ideas, and engage rather in strife than argument. (Tr. 137; 454 A.) The main question is followed up. (Tr. 139; 455 B, C.) Notwithstanding the superiority of men, some women are superior to many men, though commonly weaker. (Tr. 139; 455 D.) Allowance

must be made for this, and women appointed to the same duties and supplied with the same education. (Tr. 140; 457 A.) Henceforth their robes must be their virtue, notwithstanding that men may jeer. (Tr. 141; 457 B.)

Having thus encountered one great billow, Socrates advances to meet the next—the communism of wives and children, which may be shown to be useful, if impossible (Tr. 141, 142; 457 E; 458 A.) This scheme is unfolded, and objections met, in what follows, to Tr. 146, 147, 149; 462 A, B, C; 464 A, B, C, D, E. The best thing for States is the absence of faction; there is to be no “mine” or “thine” in the well-ordered society. (Tr. 147, 149; 462 C, D, E; 464 A, B, C, D.) Pleasures and pains to be in common (Ib.); recapitulation of the qualifications of guardians. (Ib. *See back*, Tr. 100; 416 D to 417 B.) Value of fear and shame in a State. (Tr. 150; 465 B.) Evils from which these guardians will be freed, and their triumph more noble than that at Olympia, both in life and death. (Tr. 150; 465 E; 466 A.) Recurs to the objection made (Tr. 102; 419 A, B), that guardians will be unhappy. (Tr. 151; 466 A.) If a guardian is to cherish a personal consideration of this kind, he will soon learn the truth of Hesiod’s remark, that “the half is more than the whole.” (Tr. 151; 466 B, C.) He again asks if the interlocutor is agreed that women are to share the State duties of men, to keep watch and hunt with them, like dogs in couples. (Tr. 151; 466 C, D.) Their children are to go with them into battle, and wait on their fathers and mothers, by way of learning military operations, much rather than artisans’ children should learn their parents’ trade. (Tr. 152; 467 A.) Provisions against danger to the children (Tr. 153; 467 B, C, D, E); regulations for the soldiers in cases of cowardice and bravery—they who return victorious to have the privilege of kissing whom they like, and the

choicest marriage alliances (Tr. 153; 468 C), as well as honours at death. (Tr. 154; 469 A.) Here, however, it is recommended that war should not be savagely conducted against the men of Hellenic origin, and that the bodies of the dead should not be spoiled, nor Grecian lands and houses devastated and burnt (Tr. 155; 470 A). Distinction between war and discord; Greeks not to wage war with Greeks, as with barbarians (Tr. 156; 470 C); and the model State is to be Greek in its institutes. (Tr. 157; 471 B.)

Here the question of the practical possibility is again raised, another of the overwhelming billows that threatens to engulf him who has already escaped two preceding ones. Socrates contends that the painter who strives after an unattainable ideal is still an equally good painter. (Tr. 158; 472 C, D, E.) We cannot in nature attain the truth of words, but we may approach it as nearly as possible. (Tr. 159; 473 A.)

Now comes his greatest billow, which will overwhelm him with derision, when the subject is named. This is, that States will never cease from evil till philosophers are at their head. (Tr. 159, 282; 473 B; 591 D.) But yet we must explain who are the philosophers (Tr. 160; 474 B.) He who loves must love with his whole soul; even the deformities of his loved object, the snub nose or pale skin, will be cherished (Tr. 161; 474 C, D, E); so with the wine-taster. (Tr. 161; 475 A.) So too the lover of wisdom must desire it wholly, and love all instruction—not as the would-be philosopher, who merely lets out his ears for hire, and his eyes for sightseeing. (Tr. 162; 476 A.) The bare love of pretty sounds, sights, and colours is no guarantee that a man can appreciate abstract beauty. The man is a dreamer who mistakes the copy of a thing for the original. (Tr. 163; 476 D.) The distinction between

knowledge, opinion, and ignorance. (Tr. 164 to 166; 476 E; 477 A, B, C, D, E; 478 A, B, C, D.) Knowledge has regard to real existence, ignorance to the nonexistent, but opinion not necessarily so. All concrete beauty will appear sometimes beautiful and at others not, and the just and holy will at times appear unjust and unholy. (Tr. 166; 479 A.) Those who look at objects thus fluctuating only opine, those who contemplate their true abstracts as existing in one invariable form are the men of knowledge; the former are philodoxers, the latter only philosophers. (Tr. 168; 480 A.)

Book VI.—The Sixth Book starts with this as a settled principle: Our interests must not be committed to those who are blind, morally or mentally. Our philosophers must see the real and existent with their whole soul (Tr. 170, 160; 485 B; 474 C)—must love truth; but the desire for it and wisdom must not be drawn into other channels than the right one. There must be no narrowness nor illiberality, but a grandeur of thought, and contempt for life—nothing boastful, cowardly, or ferocious; and they must be quick in acquiring. (Tr. 171; 486 B.) Further enumeration of excellences. (Tr. 172; 487 A.) Adimantus declares that the cumulative effect of the admissions made in this system of question and reply is to shut yourself up in the game, and objects that philosophers are of no use in States. (Tr. 173; 487 B, C, D, E; Tr. 159; see 473 B.) The hardships to which they are exposed. Parallel case to monstrous combinations of goat and stag in painting. Case of the astronomical captain and his mutinous crew. (Tr. 174, 175; 488 B, C, D, E; 489 A, B, C.)

The heaviest reproach on philosophy comes from its own followers; further description of what the philosopher is. (Tr. 176, 177, 183; 490 A, B, C, D, E; 496 B, C.) If he is

rare among men (*see* also 496 B), his pursuits may seduce him, his very endowments may prove a snare. (Tr. 177; 491 C.) Necessity of falling like seed into good ground, otherwise the best growth may be perverted. (Tr. 178; 491 E; 492 A.) The sophists will corrupt him, the populace spoil him with their clamorous praises. (Tr. 179; 492 B, C.) He must study to humour and to understand the great wild beast, the public (Tr. 180; 493 A, B, C), which cannot appreciate abstract truth (Tr. 181, 182; 493 D, E; 494 A); will be led away by the unwise flattery of friends if he is beautiful in person—with a hint at Alcibiades. (Tr. 181; 494 B, C, D, E.) No partial endowments safe, and small talents are, like little learning, a dangerous thing.

Again, when philosophy has been abandoned by its professors, other unfit persons, seeing their seats empty, grasp at its honours, which are still tempting. (Tr. 182; 495 A, B, C, D.) Such are like the hunchback smith, who makes money and aspires to the hand of his impoverished master's daughter. (Tr. 183; 495 E.) But what is the polity most akin to philosophy? (Tr. 184; 497 B.) Alteration in the mode of teaching philosophy is urged. (Tr. 186; 498 D.) This polity will exist when the Muse herself is mistress of the State. (Tr. 187; 499 C, D.) Objectors must be disabused of their prejudice against philosophers. (Tr. 188; 499 E; 500 A, B, C, E.) The crowd must be taught that we speak truth of them. (Tr. 189; 500 D, E.) Parallel with the case of the painter painting on a pure white ground and touching and retouching his sketch. (Tr. 189; 501 B.) The philosopher is such a painter, and will paint a telling picture (Tr. 189; 501 C); till he is at the head of the State evils will never die out. (Tr. 190, 159; 501 E; 473 D.)

He then comes again to the *κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων*.

The only reliable custodians are philosophers. (Tr. 191; 502 E; 503 A, B.) Danger of different temperaments, necessary tests, long and painful study of σοφία and σωφροσύνη requisite. (Tr. 192, 193; 504 A, B, C, D, E.) The search for the good is the highest of all such studies, and the relation of the good to pleasure is misapprehended. Opinion is nothing without science. (Tr. 195; 506 C.) We are not in a condition as yet to estimate good except in its usufruct. (Tr. 196; 507 A.) ~~Explanation of abstract and concrete; the latter is seen—the former is an idea in the mind, and not seen.~~ (Tr. 196; 507 B.) As the sun illumines the eye of sense, the acutest of them all, so the light of truth and real existence enlightens the soul. (Tr. 198; 508 D.) The Good is something higher than science or truth, and is the spring of life and nutriment in the domain of knowledge. (Tr. 199; 509 B.) Analogy from the study of geometry, whose conclusions are not about the lines and diagrams, but the mental conceptions they are employed to represent. (Tr. 200; 510 C, D, E.) Intelligible species and hypotheses. The contemplation of the real and intelligible is rendered clearer by dialectics. There are the following four affections of the soul brought into play, which contribute to the acquisition of truth: νόησις, the highest in rank; διάνοια, understanding, the second; πίστις, belief, the third; and εἰκασία, conjecture, the fourth. (Tr. 201; 511 D, E; 533 E.)

Book VII.—The Seventh Book opens with the famous comparison of the human mind to a dark cavern, and occupies down to Tr. 205; 517 B, C, D. The man who comes from divine contemplations to human ills becomes confused when he looks at these shadows in the dark. In each man's soul there is an inborn power of learning, but a circuit must be made with the whole soul through the mutable, till it can bear the splendour of

the real (Tr. 206 ; 518 C) ; use and abuses of this privilege. Even philosophy is not to be pushed so far that its devotee should already fancy himself in the Isles of the Blest. He must again descend to help his erring fellow-captives in the gloom. (Tr. 207, 208 ; 519 A, B, C, D.) He lives not for himself, but the general good. (Tr. 208, 102, 151 ; 519 E ; 419 A, B ; 466 A.) The State's address to the philosophic guardian who is to be a king-bee among the swarms. (Tr. 208, 209 ; 520 B, C, D, E.) Further requisites. (Tr. 210 ; 521 C.)

What, then, is the scientific doctrine that converts the soul from out of the gloom into reality ? Is it gymnastics, music, or the study of number ? (Tr. 209 to 211 ; 521, 522 D.) This leads to further distinctions between clear sensible impressions and those which appeal wholly to the intellect. We cannot get a clearer idea of a finger than is given by sight ; but general qualities, as greatness or smallness, or softness or hardness, the eye does not see. (Tr. 212 ; 523 E.) There is only one bodily sense for the discrimination of opposite properties in bodies, and intellect only can blend them. (Tr. 213 ; 524 C, D, E.) The study of what oneness is, is conducive to that of reality, and thus that of number is so, not as the huckster's art for buying or selling, but as a means of passing from the transient to the abiding. (Tr. 214 ; 525 B, C.)

✓ Further recommendation of numerical study, also that of geometry, which is not an empirical science, but belongs purely to the cognitive faculty. (Tr. 216 ; 527 A. See Tr. 200 ; 510 C ; D, E.) Thus geometry is the cognition of the ever-existent. (Tr. 216 ; 527 B ; see Art. "Geometry.")
 ✓ Next comes astronomy as a discipline, though solid geometry would seem to follow more naturally. (Tr. 217 to 220 ; 528 A, B, C ; 530 A, B.) ✓ Observations on musical interval and the tuning of strings. (Tr. 221 ; 531 B, C.)

But, however useful all these things, they are but preludes ; nothing but dialectics must be the ultimate resource,¹ by which we are to attack the problem, What things are *per se*, and what is the Good, the full end of the Intelligible? (Tr. 222 ; 532 A, B.) The accessory arts of which we have spoken may help our emerging from the cavern, but it is only the higher dialectic that enables us to soar into the sphere of the Intelligible. (Tr. 222 ; 532 C, D.)

But what is dialectic? First, it takes away all hypotheses, draws the eye of the soul out of the mire, and makes use of the four instruments named above. (Tr. 201, 224 ; 511 D ; 533 C, D, E.) Opinion has regard to γένεσις, intelligence to οὐσία: what essence is to producing, intelligence is to opinion, science to faith, and reflection to conjecture. (Tr. 224 ; 534 A.) He who cannot abstract the idea of the Good is a mere dreamer. (Tr. 224 ; 534 C.) Dialectics are the top-stone and battlement of science. (Tr. 225 ; 534 E.) Further qualifications of the dialectician: his laboriousness and devotion (Tr. 226 ; 535 D, E), his moderation, courage, and genuineness; must be of competent age, have learnt when young and vigorous, not by compulsion but choice, and have undergone careful selection. (Tr. 227 ; 536 E ; 537 A.) This attainment must be deferred till after the wearying exercises of gymnastics; must be pursued after twenty less diffusely, and after thirty a further selection is to be made. (Tr. 228 ; 537 C, D.) Abuse of dialectics. We are reared in dogmas and forms of belief not to be lightly discarded. The taste for disputation makes youth, like young dogs, fond of dragging and tearing, and must be employed with due restriction and caution. (Tr. 230 ; 539 E.) Proper period and duration of dialectical studies. (Tr. 230 ; 540 A, B.) Duties and rewards at death and in the other world. (Tr. 231 ;

540 C.) All that has been said applies to men and women alike. (Ib.) If the ideal state is to be possible, it will be in some such way as this. (Tr. 231; 541 B.)

✓ *Book VIII.*—The Eighth Book opens with claiming for women the same education and functions as those of men. The division of politics into four is again resumed: first, the Cretan and Laconian, or monarchic; secondly, the oligarchic; and then the democratic and tyrannic, the most unwholesome of all. (Tr. 233; 544 C.) The first, and the philosopher who corresponds to it, has already been discussed under the head of "Timarchy" and "Philotimic." We have next to consider the oligarchy, and the man who corresponds to it. (Tr. 234; 545 B, C, D.) Then follows the answer given by the Muses to a supposed invocation. Allusion to the perfect number, the mixture of the metals in human temperament. (Tr. 236; 547 A.) How the transition is made from aristocracy to oligarchy, where a property census is at the basis. (Tr. 239; 550 D, and following.) In an oligarchy the State will be twofold and divided. (Tr. 240; 551 D.) The rich man is a drone in the hive, while the poorer class are stinging-bees. (Tr. 241; 552 C, D.)

Having considered the polity, he comes to treat of the man who resembles it. (Tr. 242; 553 A.) He is occupied with this down to Tr. 244; 555 A, and then takes up the case of the democratic polity, where the stinging-bees begin to make their power of offence felt. (Tr. 245; 555 D.) Good description of the usurer injecting the poison of a loan. (Tr. 245; 555 E.) The fruitless struggles of the pampered, self-indulgent man when in danger. (Tr. 246; 556 C, D, E.) In a democracy the poor get the ascendancy (Tr. 246; 557 A); in it all sorts of men are to be found, and it is a kind of polity-market. (Tr. 247; 557 D.) Office is not compulsory in it; it is very lenient to convicted criminals—

a pleasant, anarchical, fancifully-diversified system of rule. (Tr. 247; 558 C.)

And now for the democrat himself, who is a man under the dominion of pleasures and lusts and non-essentials—who, after he has tasted the honey of the rich drope, undergoes a change, rejects the advice of his oligarchic father and friends, and takes up with a host of low desires that seize the acropolis of his soul. (Tr. 248, 249; 559, 560 B.) Gradual debasement described (Tr. 250; 560 C, D, E; 561 A); or, if he at any time relents, he will be a man of irregular and unsettled tastes. (Tr. 251; 561 B, C, D.) This is the democrat (Tr. 251; 562 A); and next comes what he ironically, or in deference to popular sentiment, calls the noblest polity, the tyrannic (Ib.); its development described as resulting from anarchy and the levelling of all distinctions. (Tr. 252, 253; 562 E; 563 A, B, C, D, E.) Excess is sure to bring about its opposite, and we jump from the extreme of license to that of arbitrary restraint. (Tr. 254; 564 A, B, C.) To aid the enquiry, he divides democracy into three sections (Ib.; D, E.)—the talking orator class; the rich, who are the feeding ground of the drones; and the common herd, who are the most numerous party. (Tr. 254; 565 A.) The latter strive to rob the honey of the drones, and are met by measures of opposition; a President is at length demanded by one or both parties, and is augmented by the people till he becomes great. (Tr. 255; 565 B, C.) Thus the tyrant arises out of the President, who is sharpened by the taste of blood, like the man who had tasted human entrails in the story of the temple of Lycæan Zeus. Such a man, if he would not be killed himself, must promise remission of debts and redistribution of public lands, and become a wolf instead of a man. (Tr. 255; 565 D, E; 566 A.) To protect himself from assassination, he surrounds himself with a bodyguard,

and does not lie a prostrate hulk upon the ground, but ascends the chariot of the State. (Tr. 256; 566 C, D; see back also Tr. 233; 544 C.)

The tyrant's fair promises; he occupies his people with war to divert them (Tr. 257; 566 E; 567 A); represses freedom of advice, makes a clearance of the good and wise and virtuous, strengthens his bodyguard, engages foreign mercenaries, enfranchises the slave-class, takes up with the aspiring and unprincipled younger men, while the poets sing his praises. (Tr. 258; 568 B.)

Here Plato charges Euripides, as also in Theages (125 B), with a panegyric on tyranny which should have been brought against Sophocles, though he calls tyranny "god-like" (Troades, v. 114.) In Iphigenia in Aulis (323), on the contrary, he depicts vividly the evils of tyranny (Tr. 258; 568 A, B.) Bad and seductive influence of the poets, who promote the growth of tyrannies, and take the pay of tyrants. (Tr. 258; 568 C, D.) The tyrant will commit sacrilege as long as he is able, and when these sources of supply fail, he will suck the blood of his parent country. At last he will be cast off as a parricide. The proverb is made good, that the people flying from the smoke of submission under the free, will have fallen into the fire of despotic rule under slaves; and with this remark the exposition of tyranny is concluded. (Tr. 259; 569 B, C, D.)

Book IX.—The Ninth Book commences with the tyrannic man, who would seem to be distinct from the mere head of a tyranny. (Tr. 260; 571 A.) Here follow some speculations on the complexion of a man's dreams taking the hue of his character, when awake. (Tr. 260; 571 C.) The wild license of dreams. (Tr. 261; 571 D.) Opposite case of the moderate man and the harmless fantasy of his dreams. (Tr. 261; 572 A, B.) Gradual corruption of the democratic man, despite the opposition of his father

and relatives. Has within him a passion which, like a great winged drone, takes the lead of his indolent desires. (Tr. 262; 573 A.) Is like a lover, or drunkard, or madman mastered by desires. He has recourse to borrowing money and, when his goods have been seized and all is spent, to plundering others, and robs and beats his old parents, or turns his mother adrift for some worthless mistress. (Tr. 263, 264; 574 A, B, C.) When he can get no more out of his father he engages in midnight robbery, and spoiling temples, or murder. (Tr. 264; 574 E; 575 A.) He and his fellows act as body-guard to the tyrant, bear false witness, take bribes for injustice, and give origin to tyrants. (Tr. 265; 575 C.) Such persons can be friends to none, are unfaithful and unjust, and as being depraved are most miserable. (Tr. 266; 576 C.)

To go back to the State. The tyrannic State is the worst, as the kingly is the best, taken as a whole, and estimated by him who is competent to judge. (Tr. 266; 576 D, E; 577 A.) Both the tyrannic polity and the man who answers to it are full of fear and cries of anguish, and equally wretched. (Tr. 268; 578 B.) Only the tyrant himself can be more wretched. Case supposed of a tyrant in a desert surrounded only by slaves and foes (Tr. 268; 578 E), compelled to fawn on them, or to be shut up a prisoner without ever going abroad (Tr. 269; 579 A, B, C); he will be really poor (Tr. 269; 579 E), envious, wanting friends, unholy, the receptacle and nurse of every evil. (Tr. 270, 580 A.) Decision on the relative happiness of the two classes. (Tr. 270; 580 B, C, D.) This leads to another classification, that of the three natures of the soul—the philomathic or philosophic, the philonicic or philotimic, the philochrematic or philocerdic—and to these three classes of pleasure attach. (Tr. 271; 580 E; 581 A, B, C.) The

pleasure of the philosopher is the highest. (Tr. 273; 583 A. See also Tr. 266 to 273; 577 B to 580 C; and 580 D to 583 A.)

This introduces again the question of pain and pleasure. (Tr. 273, 274; 583 C, D, E; 584 A.) Nothing is true in pleasure but the effect of contrast, so that it is a kind of juggle. (Ib.) Behold, then, a pleasure which does not spring from contrast—that of smell. (Tr. 274; 584 B.) Doctrine of relativity (Tr. 275; 584 E; 585 A), as applied to hunger and thirst (Tr. Ib.; 585 B); greater pleasures are those which partake of uniformity and truth. (Tr. 276; 585 C.) Those that respect the ministry of the body are less in degree (Tr. 276; 585 D, E); bestial pleasures of the unintelligent and vicious. (Tr. 276; 586 A, B, C.) The tyrant, then, is the farthest removed from true pleasure, the king the least. (Tr. 277; 587 A, B, C.) The disparity is as 1 to 729, or the cube of 27. (Tr. 278; 587 E.)

Having first modelled a compound monster dappled with spots, with a circle of heads of wild and tame animals, and added thereto the figures of a lion and man to represent the impulsive and rational nature, he encloses these in an outer casing of humanity. (Tr. 279; 588 B, C, D.) He again proceeds to review some of the paradoxes of Thrasymachus about its being advantageous to do wrong, and applies illustrations from his figure, and the starving reason to nurture passion and appetite. (Tr. 280; 588 E.) The further application is continued, and the evil of fostering the impetuous and lustful part of the compound monster. (Tr. 281; 590 B.) The conclusion is arrived at that it is not advantageous to do wrong or indulge excess. (Tr. 282; 590 E; 591 A, B.) On the contrary, the man of understanding will study to benefit his soul, not caring so much for health or bodily beauty, but for a divine accordance within it. Not wealth nor popular applause will be his

aim, but watchful self-administration. He will reach after all that will make him better, and will be an industrious politician in this ideal city, which exists only on paper. (Tr. 283 ; 592 A, B.) But Socrates suggests whether an example of this ideal is not laid up in heaven for him who wishes to behold it, though this is of no moment if the man aims to be conformed to the proposed standard. (Tr. 283 ; 592 B.)

Book X.—This brings us to the Tenth and concluding Book, which at once resumes the attack on the poets, notwithstanding the awe of Homer's name. (Tr. 284 ; 595 B.) Process of bringing under one name many particulars is a case of abstraction. There are many couches and tables, but only one idea of each. (Tr. 285 ; 596 A.) He divides workmen into three classes : there is the universal sovereign maker, the artisan, the imitator or painter. In one sense a world can be made by holding up a mirror and turning it round, and the painter's is an analogous case. (Tr. 285 ; 596 C, D, E.) He applies this classification to the deity, the cabinet-maker, and the painter of a couch or table. (Tr. 286 ; 597 B, C, D, E.) The imitator is third in order, and so, too, the poet. The painter, however, only paints things as they appear, not as they are, and thus is far from the truth. But if he is clever, he will deceive children and unreflecting persons. Be assured that when you meet with a person who pretends to know everything, you are being imposed on, or that he who tells you about such a person is a simpleton. The poets pretend to this universal knowledge. (Tr. 287 ; 598 B, C, D, E.) It would be hard indeed to ask Homer or the poets whom they have cured of diseases, or what arts they have taught ; but we may ask, What constitutions have been well founded by him, what generals have been made by him, or battles won ? (Tr. 288 ; 599 A,

B, C, D, E.) What pupils has he left, like Thales or Pythagoras, termed after his name? (Tr. 289; 600 A, B.) Would not he have been honoured or enriched, like Protagoras of Abdera, or Prodicus of Ceos, had he merited it? (Tr. 290; 600 D, E.) Just as the painter paints a shoemaker, knowing nothing of the trade, so the verse-maker colours by means of verbs and nouns, which may be admirable in rhythm, but look pallid when stripped of the colours of music and metre. (Tr. 290; 601 A, B.) But neither the painter of horse-furniture, nor the maker, knows anything about its use, which is possessed only by the rider. The value of a thing consists wholly in its adaptedness for use, which is clear only to the man of knowledge; the imitator can only opine. The power that rules in us is that therefore which reckons measures, and weighs, or the rational (Tr. 292; 602 E); imitation is low in its nature, associations, and results. (Tr. 293; 603 A, B.)

This leads on to a discourse on the folly of exhibiting strong emotion in public, which reaches down to 604 E. The imitative poet must consult the crowd, and occupy himself in shadowy representations. (Tr. 295; 605 A, B, C, D, E.) Further remarks on the emotional, and the display of the mournful and comic. (Tr. 296; 606 C, D.) It is admitted that Homer was good, however, in his panegyrics on the gods and good men. Between poetry and philosophy there has always been an old feud. (Tr. 297; 607 A, B, C.) We will, however, hear poetry make her apology, and rejoice if she can establish her innocence, but we cannot sacrifice to our fondness for her our conscientious convictions. (Tr. 298; 607 E; 608 A, B.)

As yet, however, we have said nothing of the great rewards of virtue, of the corrupting effect of evil. (Tr. 298, 299; 608 C, D, E; 609 B, C, D.) Things are only destroyed by their own internal canker, but this cannot be the case

with soul, which is therefore immortal (Tr. 300 : 610 B, C, D, E; 611 A), simple and indestructible (Tr. 301 ; 611 B), and is thoroughly transparent, when freed from the taint of body, and lustrous in beauty. We no more recognise its true character on earth than we do the ancient nature of the marine Glaucus, covered with seaweed, mud, and shells, and beaten about the rocky coast. (Tr. 301 ; 611 C, D, E.) From all that has been said, it is clear that righteousness is the soul's best possession, however the ring of Gyges or the helmet of Pluton might enable it to escape detection. (Tr. 302 ; 612 B.) Righteousness does not escape the notice of the gods, and he who practises it is beloved by them, and all things work for the best so far as he is concerned. (Tr. 303 ; 612 E.) It is otherwise with the unjust : they lose the race, and become the laughingstock of all men, while the tortures assigned by the opponents (Tr. 40 ; 361 E ; 362 A) will fall to their lot. (Tr. 303, 304 ; 613 B, C, D, E.) He now recounts the story of Er, which occupies from Tr. 304, 614 B, to the close, of which a pretty full account has been given elsewhere under "Arts," "Fable of Er," and some others, and need not be again repeated.

The book thus concludes : "This story Glaucon was preserved without loss, and may serve to save us, if we obey its warning, and cross the river of Lethe happily, and are not polluted in soul. But if we do obey, as I recommend, believing the soul to be immortal, able to bear up against all evils, and able to attain to all good, we shall always keep the heavenward road, and practise righteousness with wisdom in every way ; that we may be friends to ourselves and to the gods, both while in this life, and when we carry off its rewards, like victors bearing palms, led round by assembled crowds of friends, and in that other life with its journey of a thousand years already described, in which I pray we may fare well." (Tr. 312 ; 621 C, D.)

TIMÆUS.

TIMÆUS, one of the dialogues of Plato, held to be genuine from early times, is largely occupied with an exposition of physical doctrines. It is supposed to be held between Socrates, Critias, Timæus, the Locrian philosopher, and Hermocrates. The first opening portion is a *résumé* of what has been said in the Republic, that Guardians are to be high-souled and philosophic (Tr. 320; 18 A); are not to regard gold and silver as their own (18 B); that women are to be trained to war and other duties of men (Tr. 320; 18 C), and children to be common property, unknown to their parents (Tr. 320; 18 D); those of virtuous parentage to have special distinctions. (Tr. 321; 19 A.) Socrates has created his Republic, but he wants to see it start into life, and appeals to those present to help him. (Tr. 321; 19 B.) The poets, whom he professes not to dislike, will not serve his turn (Tr. 322; 19 D), still less the Sophists with their verbosity and pretentiousness, and their wandering desultory habits. (Tr. 322; 19 E.) None but the students of philosophy and political science remain, such as Timæus of Locri, Critias, and Hermocrates. "When, then, I witnessed your interest yesterday in the new Republic, I was delighted, because I knew that none (*οὐδέεις*) could better follow out the subject." (Tr. 322; 20 B.)

Critias relates a story which was once told by the wise Solon to an ancestor of his, and takes occasion to praise Solon as a poet, whom he thinks would have rivalled Homer and Hesiod, had not the popular dissensions of the time prevented. (Tr. 324; 21 B, C, D.) The story is about some deed of prowess by the Athenians in very ancient times, of which the record had been lost. (Tr. 324; 21 D.) An old priest of Sais relates to Solon the real meaning of

some of the ancient myths, including that of Deucalion's deluge. (Tr. 325; 22 A.) He then proceeds to speak of that of Phæthon, which embodies the doctrine of the Sun's Declination, or other parallactic change. (Tr. 325; 22 C; D); also of the absence of great alterations in Egypt. (Tr. 326; 22 E.) The temperate portions of the earth are those mostly inhabited. (Ib.) Whatever events have taken place elsewhere, have been recorded in graven characters on the Egyptian temples (Tr. 326; 23 A), while in other countries more perishable histories have been consumed by time and desolating changes, so that the states have, as it were, to begin life afresh. (Tr. 326; 23 B.) There have been many deluges, not one only, and you Athenians have lost all knowledge of your renowned ancestors, once the first people under heaven. (Tr. 326; 23 C.) The Saitic priest goes on to state that, while the records of Sais go back eight thousand years, the origin of the Athenian community is a thousand years earlier. (Tr. 327; 23 D, E, 24 A.) Special local advantages secured to the Athenians their attachment to wisdom and good government, one of which was their temperate climate. (Tr. 328; 24 B, C.) He describes the martial prowess of this early race, and its struggle with the formidable power of the Isle of Atlantis, a sort of premature Great Britain—though it may be hoped its fate is not prophetic—submerged under the ocean, which is now impassable to ships. (Tr. 328, 329; 24 D, E; 25 A, B, C, D.) This story, almost forgotten, the narrator contrives to recall. (26 A.) According to the proverb, that we forget little of what we learnt in childhood, he now recollects it all, though what took place yesterday he should wholly forget. (Tr. 330; 26 B.)

Critias proposes to regard the ideal state of Socrates in the Republic as this ancient Athenian one, and the latter considers the suggestion as a happy one. (Tr. 330;

26 C, D, E.) Timæus, who is the most profound of the party in natural physics, is to begin the discourse with the history of creation, and to bring it down to the birth of mankind, when Critias will make a further application of the story to the ideal Republic. (Tr. 331; 27 A, B.)

Having prefaced his observations, as every wise man will do, with an invocation of the deity, Timæus at once enters on his subject. (Tr. 331; 27 C, D.) "He must first define the *τὸ ὄν αἰεί*, that which is without *γένεσις*, and the *τὸ γιγνόμενον αἰεί*, which is never *ὄν*. (Tr. 331, 332; 27 D.) The former, comprehended by *νοήσις μετὰ λόγου*, as always the same, the latter opined by notion with unreasoning sense presentation, which arises and perishes but never exists. (Tr. 332; 28 A.) Nothing generated exists without a cause; and if the artificer looks to a permanent pattern, his work will be beautiful: otherwise not. (Tr. 332; 28 B.) The world has not always existed, because it is corporeal and visible, and is due to a first cause. (Tr. 332; 28 C.) It is difficult by searching to find out God, and still more to reveal Him when found. (Ib.) He looked to an eternal pattern when He made the world, for it is beautiful and formed by One who is the best. (Tr. 333; 29 A.) It has, then, been created on principles comprehended, as defined above, by intellect with reason, and possessing fixity. (Ib.) True, the world is an image, and our language, speaking of it, should be consistent with the fact. (Tr. 333; 29 B.) What *οὐσία* is to *γένεσις*, truth is to belief. (Tr. 333; 29 C.)

"I cannot make positively clear statements on what is obscure; all that can be expected from our erring human nature is probability. (Tr. 333; 29 D.) The Author of the universe, being good and free from envy, wished it to be a copy of Himself. He brought it from disorder into order, and made it intelligent by placing intelli-

gence in soul, and soul in body. It is thus a rational animal (Tr. 334; 30 A, B), including all other animals in itself, and without any rival; so that it is but one, and will continue to exist. (Tr. 334, 335; 30 C, D; 31 A, B.) It is visible and tangible, held together by its combining elements, water, earth, air, fire, in a solid form, after certain numerical analogies. (Tr. 335, 336; 31 C; 32 A, B, C.)

"These elements each enter it as a whole, so that the combination cannot be solicited to decay by any outstanding portion, as by heat and cold outside bodies. (Tr. 336; 32 D; 33 A.) The spherical form was chosen as the most beautiful and symmetric. (Tr. 336; 33 B.) It needed no organs, nor hands, nor feet, as it had only a motion of rotation, not one of progression, and was self-nourishing. (Tr. 337; 33 C, D; 34 A.) The soul was created prior to the body, as being more excellent." (Tr. 338; 34 B, C.)

What follows on the nature of same, different, and essence, is obscure and mystical, but makes allusion to the orbits of the planets and their motions, contrary to that of the *primum mobile*, while three are made to revolve with equal velocities and the other four with unequal but proportionate rates, divided by double and triple intervals. (Tr. 338, 339; 35 A, B, C; 36 A, B, C, D.) "The invisible soul partakes of the same, the different, and essential being; if it contemplates truth or the mutable, and has to do with difference, right opinions and convictions arise; if it contemplates the rational, and sameness comes into play, intelligence and science are the result, these two being included in essence, which is one with soul. (Tr. 339, 340; 36 E; 37 A, B, C.) When the world was set going, the Creator was delighted with His work and sought to make it perfect. (Compare Genesis, chap. i.)

"He formed Time as an enduring image of Eternity.

Then the natural subdivisions of it were first introduced, and the distinctions of past, present, and future, which are inapplicable to that which exists really and is uncreate, and only belong to generation. (Tr. 341 ; 37 D, E ; 38 A, B.) Born with the world, with the world Time will perish. To keep it in observance, God created sun, moon, and the five other planets, whose revolutions are according to difference : first the moon nearest the central earth, the sun next, then Venus and Mercury, which mutually overtake one another, not constantly progressive like the sun." (Tr. 342 ; 38 C, D, E.)

In what follows there seems to be an allusion to motion in right ascension and declination, or latitude and longitude, where he speaks of the heavenly bodies as moving in an helix (Tr. 342 ; 39 A), and to the great cycle when the eight orbits return to the same point. (Tr. 343 ; 39 B, C, D, E.) Four orders of intellect are created, the gods, also an aërial, an aqueous, and terrestrial race. Two motions were assigned to divine bodies ; one of rotation in one spot, corresponding to the idea of sameness ; the other of progression, answering to that of difference, subordinate to the former. Five other motions referred to (Tr. 337 ; 34 A) are spoken of here also, probably those of the planets, as their dances are immediately introduced, their direct and retrograde movements, conjunctions, oppositions, and eclipses, though a subject too recondite to be here entered on. (Tr. 344 ; 40 A, B, C, D.) The other gods or dæmons can only be known from the statements of tradition. Though not essentially immortal, they are free from death by the will of the Creator.

But to complete the work, three mortal classes remain to be called into existence, and this work is assigned to the dæmons, who are to combine the mortal and immortal natures into one, and to imitate the Divine pro-

cedure in their own formation, for the nobler portion of which the deity will supply the seed. (Tr. 345, 346; 41 A, B, C, D.) The Creator allots a soul to each star. After this comes the formation of man, male and female, of which the first is the more excellent, compound creatures who sustain a conflict between their emotional and concupiscent nature. Of these, those who are victorious over their passions and live justly will return to their assigned stellar abode and there be happy, but they who fail will in a second generation, become women; or, still persisting in wickedness, pass into brute bodies. Not to be the cause of evil, the deity placed some of these souls in earth, moon, and the other periodical bodies, and charged the younger gods to fashion and rule over mortal creatures for their good. (Tr. 346, 347; 41 E; 42 A, B, C, D, E.)

What follows on the *modus operandi* of human creation may be omitted, but the ethical result is the turning out of the soul well or ill. (Tr. 348, 349; 43 A, B, C, D, E; 44 A, B, C.) "The brain has been shut within the spherical skull on the flexile column of the neck, with hands and feet given us for walking and grasping, the front being more honourable than the back and the seat of the chief organs and expression." (Tr. 350; 44 D, E.) He gives a theory of vision which we have noticed, Art. Dreams. (Tr. 350; 45 C, D.) "Darkness cuts off this mutual action of the internal and outer fire of light and becomes *ἐπαγωγὸν ὕπνου*, conducive to sleep. The eyelids preserve the eyes and restrain the flow of the inner fire and calm the organ, so as to produce a dreamless or disturbed repose." Tr. 351; 46 A.) Theory of mirrors based on that of the eye, and the reversal of the image (*see also* Tr. iv. 365; Alcib. I. 132 D, E), as also its inversion by concave specula. (Tr. ii. 351; Tim. 46 C.) "The same body may exist as solid, liquid, or gaseous. Water exists as ice, as steam, or gas. Vapours

condense into fogs and rain, which is again congealed. (Tr. 355 ; 49 C.)

“ We have also to consider whether things have an independent existence *per se*, or whether all that exists is what we perceive through the bodily senses. To talk of the intelligible is mere verbiage. (Tr. 357, 358 ; 51 B, C.) Here *δόξα* is distinguished from *νοῦς*, as arising from perception by the bodily senses opposed to the mental conception of that in which the appearance inheres. If intellect and true sensuous perception both exist, each is really independent, and there are abstract forms not perceived by the senses but only in the mind, *νοούμενα*. If they are one and the same, as some say, there is no true distinction between the phenomenal and intelligible, and our bodily sensations must be fixed on the securest basis. (Tr. 358 ; 51 D.) On the contrary, if one of these is more than a persuasion and is based on true reasoning, not changeable, and akin to a Divine process, we must admit that there is a unity possessing a permanent character, uncreated, indissoluble, that receives into itself no other nature from any quarter, nor ever itself absorbed into any other, invisible, and inappreciable by sense, which it is given only to intellect to cognise. There is, on the other hand, that which is like named and resembles it, which is sensible, created, always in motion, born in one place and perishing in another ; while there is a third existence, that of space, indissoluble and furnishing a seat for all things generated, not itself an object of sense, but apprehended by a sort of pseudo reasoning, to which we trust with effort and which we look on as a sort of dreamy existence, while we assert that whatever is must of necessity be wholly in some spot and occupy space. (Tr. 358, 359 ; 52 A, B, C.)

“ Prior to the ordered universe, there existed real being, space, and generation. By sifting, winnowing, and venti-

lating, the coarser and heavier particles of matter settled into one heap, and the thinner and lighter were deposited elsewhere. (Tr. 360 ; 53 A.) The deity brought order out of confusion (Tr. 360 ; 53 B), by means of forms and numbers, which geometrical principles are known only to deity and god-beloved men. (Tr. 361 ; 53 E.) We must select the most beautiful of the trigons or infinitesimal elements, the equilateral, for our foundation, viz., that formed by two right-angled triangles set together, each of whose short bases is half its longer side. It is that, the square of whose hypotenuse is four-thirds that of the longer side. (Tr. 361 ; 54 B.) An equiangular triangle is also formed by setting six of these, so that the angles, each equal to sixty degrees, shall all unite in one point." And then follows a description of the regular tetrahedron, octohedron, and icosihedron, some of them the principal modifications of the cube of mineralogy. No doubt the equilateral triangle is itself more elementary, though it can be decomposed into these six parts, while the parts cannot be severed into equilaterals. (Tr. 363 ; 55 A, B, C.)

Again, he asserts that it is unreasonable to believe that the number of worlds is infinite. (Tr. 363 ; 55 D.) He makes the pyramidal solid the element of fire, which may possibly serve to connect the great pyramids of Egypt with a system of fire worship. (Tr. 364 ; 56 B.) The molecules of matter are so small as to be invisible unless in the aggregate. (Tr. 364 ; 56 C.) In what follows is contained the germ of the notion that heat and motion are reciprocal ; that atoms penetrate the interstices of bodies ; that homogeneous particles have no tendency to decompose each other's union, while those of different force or quality do produce chemical changes, where we seem to see in embryo the doctrines of chemical affinity and the attraction of aggregation. (Tr. 365 ; 56 D, E.) Motion is

not inherent in smoothness or the homogeneous: it cannot take place without a mover when all is *inequilibrio* (*vis inertiae*). (Tr. 366; 57 E.) The penetrating and decomposing power of fiery and watery molecules is enlarged on (Tr. 366; 58 A, B, C), the difference between flame which burns and that which gives light. (Tr. 367; 58 D. E.) Fire is spoken of as the creator of inequilibrium. (Tr. 367; 59 A.) Theory of liquefaction. (Tr. 370; 60 E.) Nature of the impressions made on our senses by bodies; reference to the antipodes; to up and down; to heavy and light in connection with the latter. (Tr. 372; 62 C; 63 A.) Small bodies more easily set in motion than large and heavy ones, that which resists most being styled the heavier. (Tr. 373; 63 C.)

Pleasure and pain are what are consonant or repugnant to nature. (Tr. 374; 64 D.) Tastes, colours, odours are next considered. (Tr. 378; 67 E.) White is what dilates the sight, and black is its opposite. Yellow is formed by the mixture of red and white with brightness. Blue is made to result from white and black, while a further addition of white gives grey, something as Goëthe's theory requires. (Tr. 379; 68 B, C.) It is not easy nor becoming to put these things to the test of experiment, which God alone can effect by combination. (Tr. 379; 68 D.)

Causes are of two kinds, the necessary and the Divine. (Tr. 379; 68 E.) When the junior gods had received the immortal principle of the soul, they fashioned for it a body, as on a lathe. They constructed a mortal species of soul possessing passionate impulses and low desires, confidence, and terror, and hope, all hard to satisfy; but fearing to pollute the Divine principle, they placed the latter in the head, and the former in the thorax. This inferior soul they again subdivided into two portions by the diaphragm, leaving the higher of the two, the emotional, nearer to the head, in order that it might side with reason against appetite. (Tr.

380, 381; 69 D, E; 70 A.) They set the heart, the origin of the veins and fountain of the blood forcibly propelled through all the members, in an abode defended by a body guard, that at the bidding of reason passion might be stilled. (Tr. 381; 70 B.) Compare Galen, l. c. v. f. 148; also Shakesp. *Coriol.*, act i. sc. i., l. 140, published 1609, nineteen years before Harvey brought out his discovery, of which we do not by this reference mean to deprive him.

The physiology of the lungs is curiously explained by making them pads to check the boundings of the heart under excitement, and spongiose for the purpose of cooling the breath. (Tr. 382; 70 C.) The second and inferior division of the mortal soul is placed below the diaphragm, where it may feed peaceably like an ox in the stall. Here, too, is placed the dark and shining liver, whose function is to reflect images and to mirror the thoughts, enabling us to divine during sleep. (Tr. 382; 70 D.) When human nature loses the more distinguishing gifts of intellect, as in sleep, or disease, or enthusiasm, divination steps in to supply its place. (Tr. 383; 71 E.) But the office of expounding oracles belongs not to the inspired madman, but to the profoundly wise interpreter. (Tr. 384; 72 A.) The use assigned to the intestines is still more strange, its purpose being to protract the process of digestion and extrusion, as no doubt it is, but also to check gormandizing. (Tr. 385; 73 A.)

The part of the medullary system, which was to be the field of the diviner part of our nature, was made globular, and termed the brain. The inferior soul was distributed through the marrow, stretching its ramifications like so many hawsers, closed in and strengthened by a bony envelope. (Tr. 385; 73 C.) There is a ludicrous difference between the old theory of bony development and that which, in our times, makes the skull only a modified

vertebra, or portion of the spinal column. The flesh, too, is merely to moisten and keep the bones flexible and warm. No mention is made of muscles or their mechanical function. (Tr. 386; 73 E.) The most inferior portions of the body were the most deeply imbedded in flesh, though the tongue was the seat of a special sense. (Tr. 387; 75 A.) The mouth was to give admission to food and for mastication, but it possessed a far higher function, as the outlet of speech and reason, the best of streams. (Tr. 388; 75 E.) The use of hair is next touched on. Plants are animals without locomotion. (Tr. 389, 390; 76 C, D; 77 B, C.) The veins water the body and promote the growth of the marrow. (Tr. 391; 77 D.) Inspiration and expiration are compared with the action of the cupping-glass, and the argument against a vacuum is urged, while on the subject of breathing, which is conceived to take place partly through the pores of the skin.

The source of animal heat is also considered (Tr. 393; 79 B, C, D); the attraction of amber, the coincidences in pulsating strings, the nature of hydraulic action, and the fall of thunderbolts are incidentally noticed. (Tr. 394; 80 A.) Then follows the theory of growth and decay and the doctrine of assimilation (Tr. 395; 81 A, B); that of health and disease; the nature of the serum of the blood; bile, tears, sweat, epilepsy, convulsions, fever, ague. (Tr. 396 to 401; 82 A to 86 A.) Then follows soul disease, which is folly, and is of two kinds—madness and want of instruction. We may also term pleasures and pains the greatest of soul diseases. (Tr. 401; 86 B.)

Again the dictum that no man is voluntarily bad is uttered, but only by bad habit of body and defective training. (Tr. 402; 86 D.) "All that is good is beautiful and under the control of measure. We note small symmetries where we overlook greater. A strong soul every

way great in a weak and insignificant body produces an unsymmetric and incommensurable result. (Tr. 403; 87 C.) Or when a vast body is united to a feeble and small intellect, the soul becomes crushed and deadened as though deaf, destitute of memory, and filled with ignorance, the worst of diseases. (Tr. 404; 88 A.) The folly of quick remedies for bodily ailments is seen in making small disorders into great ones. (Tr. 405; 89 C.) But we ought most diligently to cultivate our reason, which can exalt us to kinship with heaven, as being plants of celestial, not terrestrial growth. (Tr. 406; 90 A.) We must ponder immortal and Divine things if we are to attain truth and immortality so far as possible for us, and have within us a dæmon thoroughly adorned with every virtue." (Tr. 406; 90 B.)

Allusion is again made to the change of men into women in the metempsychosis (Tr. 407; 90 E); to the laws of reproduction and gestation (Tr. 407; 91 B); to a second metempsychosis, in which those who have neglected philosophy become brutes, whose heads are misshapen and turned earthwards. (Tr. 408; 91 E.) A fourth class of the silly and ignorant become aquatic, whence fish and oysters, and other water-dwellers have been produced. (Tr. 408; 92 B.) And now Timæus says that his discourse about the universe has reached its end. "For this Cosmos, having comprised and being filled with mortal and immortal animals, is thus a visible animal comprising other visible life, a deity apprehended by sense, the image of the true God, greatest, best, and most perfect, this one heaven, the only one created *μονογενής*." (Tr. 409; 92 C.) Compare Tr. 358; 51 D with what is said on perception (Tr. i. 419, 420; Theæt. 183 B, C, D, E; 184 A, B).

CRITIAS.

CRITIAS is chiefly occupied with a detail of old traditions respecting the gods, about whom it is more easy to discourse than on subjects better known. (Tr. vol. ii. 413; Critias, 107 A, B.) Solon's narrative derived from the Egyptian priests. (Tr. 415; 108 D.) Story of Atlantis, now occupied by a sea of mud. (108 E.) Earth once peopled by gods. (Tr. 416; 109 B.) The ἀνρόχθονες (109 D.) Early states of society. (109 E.) Men and women engaged in war in common, as proved by the armed statue of Pallas. (Tr. 417; 110 B.) Great physical disasters. (Tr. 418; 111 A, B.) Names transferred from the original tongues into other equivalents. (Tr. 420; 113 A.) Description of Atlantis conferred on Neptune. (Tr. 421-425; 113 C; 117 E.) Simplicity and piety of the early races of men. (Tr. 428; 120 E.) Abruptly broken off. (121 C; Tr. 429.)

MENON.

(TRANSLATION. VOL. III.)

MENON is another of the canonical dialogues of the master, supposed to be carried on by Socrates, Menon and his son, and Anytus; and its purport may be gathered from the opening question: "Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can or cannot be taught, or is only acquired by practice, or in neither way, but comes to men naturally?" (Tr. 3; Meno. 70 A.) Socrates begs Menon to tell what virtue is, and to show that he and Gorgias can upset the view of Socrates. (Tr. 4. 5; 71 B, C, D.) Menon declares that a man's virtue is fitness for political business, and causing yourself and friends to do well and your enemies ill; while a woman's virtue is taking care of her household, her husband, and her children. (Tr. 5; 71 E.) Socrates considers himself in luck in having lighted on a swarm of virtues; but what he wants to know is, what is the essence of virtue? (Tr. 6; 72 A, B, C.) He asks, "Is it possible to administer a state or family well, if not doing it wisely and justly?" (Tr. 7; 73 A, D.) He must point out the generic idea, not the concrete example of figure, colour, and limit." (Tr. 8 to 11; 73 E; 74 A, B, C, D, E; 75 A, B, C, D, E.)

Menexenus questions Socrates (Tr. 11; 76 A), and is rallied by him as not willing to tell what Gorgias says about virtue, and on his agreeable outside (Tr. 11; 76 B), while he thinks little of Socrates' personal recom-

mendations. (Ib.) He is asked if he believes in the effluxes and pores of Empedocles, what vision is, hearing and smell, all which Menon professes to be able to explain. (Tr. 12; 76 C, D, E.) Socrates begs him to tell about virtue as a whole. (Tr. 13; 77 A, B.) Menon says it is a joying in beautiful things, and the being able to procure a supply. (Ib.) Socrates asks, Do not all men desire good? Menon thinks not, but that some desire evil. (Tr. 14; 77 C.) Can they do this knowing them to be evil? (Tr. 14; 77 D, E.) Do people wish to be wretched? (Tr. 15; 78 A.)

Again Socrates presses to be told what virtue is as a whole. (Tr. 17; 79 D.) On this, Menon complains that Socrates, as he has before heard, is always doubting and causing others to doubt; that he is befooling, and drugging, and benumbing him like the flat fish, the torpedo and asserts that he has avoided foreign travel with reason. (Tr. 18; 80 A, B.) Socrates, who a second time twits Menon on the score of personal vanity, asserts that he does not make others doubt when himself not in perplexity, but because he is really in doubt and does not know. (Tr. 18; 80 C.) "But how," asks Menon, "will you know, when you light on a result, that this is what you did not know?" (Tr. 19; 80 D.) The danger of this argument is alluded to. (Tr. 19; 80 E.) Socrates declares that he has heard from wise men and women about Divine things (Tr. 19; 81 A), and then introduces the subject of the soul's immortality and his doctrine of reminiscence, explanatory of his desire to investigate with Menon what virtue is. (Tr. 20; 81 B, C, D, E.) Socrates will not be led to contradict himself by any craft of Menon's. (Tr. 20; 82 A.)

Hereupon, he summons one of the attendants of the latter to put his doctrine to the proof. (Tr. 21; 82 B.)

The examination of the boy is continued, and the inferences to be drawn from the latent knowledge elicited, down to Tr. 26; 85 A, B. It is proved that the boy has in him right opinions (84 C); that if he did not gain this knowledge in this life, it was in an antecedent time. (Tr. 28; 86 A.) This remembrance must be stirred in us; we shall be the better for seeking to know what we do not know. (Tr. 28; 86 B, C.) Socrates thinks that before we seek whether virtue can be taught, we should strive to know what it is. (Tr. 29; 86 D.)

Here occurs a geometrical puzzle. (Tr. 30; 87 A, B.) If virtue is knowledge it can be taught. (Tr. 30; 87 C. What other than virtue shall we declare good to be? (Tr. 31; 87 D.) What are the things of use to us—are they not health, strength, beauty, and money? and yet we talk sometimes of these as hurtful. (Tr. 31; 87 E; 88 A.) Is it not the right use of these that is profitable? (Tr. 31; 88 A.) Does not fortitude sometimes become rashness? (Tr. 31; 88 B.) It is *φρόνησις* that makes virtue of advantage. (Tr. 32; 88 C, D.) This being so, men cannot be good by nature. (Tr. 32; 89 A.) If it were so, we should have had connoisseurs of virtue, who would have put a stamp on the genuine article. (Tr. 33; 89 B.) If virtue is to be taught, must there not be teachers? (Tr. 33; 89 D, E.)

Here Anytus drops in. (Tr. 34; 90 A.) Should we not go and fee the sophists? (Tr. 35; 91 B, C.) But Anytus protests against this. (Tr. 35; 91 C.) Socrates asks if he is to believe that Protagoras, who has got together what Phidias and ten of the best statuaries have not earned, cannot teach virtue? and declares it a sham that a man should have been duping people for forty years, where a cobbler or old clothesman would have been detected and punished. (Tr. 36; 91 D, E.) Anytus says that it is not the sophists who are mad, but the fools who give them

money, and is asked by Socrates whether they have ever injured him that he inveighs so against them. (Tr. 36; 92 A, B.) How is he to know if he has had no intercourse with them? (Tr. 37; 92 C.) Any one, Anytus declares, can make a pupil good, better than the sophists. (Tr. 37; 92 E.)

Socrates on this asks whether any of the great and good men referred to are such spontaneously or from teaching. (Ib.) No doubt there have been and still are such in the state. (Tr. 37; 93 A.) But have these men received it from, and can they transmit it to others? (Tr. 38; 93 B.) Take the case of Themistocles: you know he taught his son Cleophantus all that could be taught, but did you ever hear that he was his father's equal or superior? (Tr. 38, 39; 93 C, D, E.) Again, take Aristides, son of Lysimachus (Tr. 39; 94 A), or Paralus and Xanthus, the two sons of Pericles. (Tr. 39; 94 B.) That you may not think the failure was in the case of inferior persons, take the case of Thucydides and his two sons, Melesias and Stephanus. (Tr. 40; 94 C.) Surely Thucydides, with all the advantages of wealth and rank, would have succeeded if any one could; but no—virtue is not to be taught. (Tr. 40; 94 D, E.)

Socrates again turns to Menon, and asks, whether in his city the nobles teach youth virtue? (Tr. 40; 95 A, B.) Menon admires Gorgias because he does not promise to make his pupils virtuous but only smart. (Tr. 41; 95 C.)

Passing on we get to another turn in the discussion, on the value of right opinion, as hardly inferior to knowledge as a ground of action; true opinions, when chained like the runaway statues of Dædalus, becoming permanent, and not differing from knowledge, except in the matter of the chain. (Tr. 43, 44; 97 B, C, D, E.) Right

opinions are good as long as they last, but they run from the soul like fugitive slaves. (Tr. 45; 98 A.) The explanation of true opinion is still carried on (Tr. 46 to 48; 98 D; 99 C, D, E; 99 A, B); but it is still denied that virtue can be taught. (Ib.) Socrates asserts that Themistocles and others did not govern the state as being wise, nor through perfect knowledge, but by correct opinion. They differ nothing from oracle chaunters, but are divinely inspired—gifted men, who, apart from knowledge, direct successfully many and great affairs under a guidance not their own. (Tr. 47; 99 C, D.) Virtue really comes to us by a Divine allotment, not inherited by nature, nor acquired by teaching. A statesman who could make others statesmen would be among the living what Homer says Tiresias was among the dead—a true substance among shadows. (Tr. 47, 48; 99 E; 100 A.) But though virtue comes by Divine allotment, we shall never know how it comes to be present among men till we know what it is absolutely in itself. (Tr. 48; 100 B.) The dialogue concludes with a hint to Anytus to be less irritable. (Tr. 48; 100 C.)

EUTHYDEMUS.

EUTHYDEMUS is one of the most facetious and popular of Plato's dialogues, in which Socrates gives an account of what passed between him and a sophist of this name, as well as Dionysodorus, the other parties present being Clinias, a well-educated promising youth, and his admirers, among whom Ctesippus, somewhat of a puppy, is conspicuous. (Tr. 54; Euthyd. 273 A, B.) The two sophists declare that they have renounced making men generals or clever pleaders, except by way of pastime, and now profess

to teach virtue. (Tr. 54, 55; 273 C, D, E.) Socrates ironically expresses his surprise. (274 A.) After an exhibition of verbal quibbling, Socrates comes to the rescue, and he compares this tripping up to the pulling a chair from under a man about to sit down, and the horse laugh at seeing him prostrate. (Tr. 60, 61; 278 C.) The question is asked, "Can we be happy through present good, if we receive no advantage from it?" (Tr. 63; 280 B.) "It is the knowledge of rightly using things that constitutes their advantage. (Tr. 64; 281 A.) With ignorance at the helm, natural gifts are a curse. (281 D.) Wisdom is the source of happiness and success." (Tr. p. 65; 282 A.) "Wisdom can be taught," Clinias thinks. (282 C.)

After further examples of the reasoning of the sophists; Socrates proposes making trial of re-creating a bad man into a good one, and offers his old worthless slave's body for the process, and Ctesippus joins in the request, provided he is not flayed into a wine-skin, but made virtuous. (Tr. 69; 285 A, B, C, D.) It is argued that the false cannot be asserted, nor is it possible to lie or be ignorant. (Tr. 70, 71, 72; 286 C, D, E; 287 A.) Ctesippus observes that "You men of Thurii, whether Chians, *εἰθ' ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπη*, you glory in being termed, say wonderful things." (Tr. 73; 288 B.) Whereon Socrates, in his ironical way, describes them as only sporting, and pretending to imitate Proteus, and proposes to bring them to declare themselves. (288 C, D.)

There follow some humorous references to the charming of tarantulas and scorpions, and the noisy tumult of popular assemblies, also to catching larks, the being carried away by a great surge, *τρικυμία*. (Tr. 77, 78, 79; 291 B; 293 A.) Further quibbling. (Tr. 80; 293 C.) Boasts of knowledge. (Tr. 82; 294 C.) A test is demanded. (Ib.) Our extracts shall be brought to a close, by the passage,

"Do you not know, Criton, that in all pursuits of life the vile are numerous and of no account, but the earnest few, and invaluable?" (Tr. 99 ; 306 D.) Further references will be found in the Index.

SOPHIST.

SOPHIST is the name of one of the Platonic canonical dialogues, supposed to be held between Socrates, Theodorus, a mathematician, a stranger and Eleate friend of Parmenides and Zeno, and Theætetus. Socrates suggests that Theodorus may be bringing in a god unawares, as Homer says, who may hold the power of confutation in his own hands. (Tr. iii. 103 ; 216 A, B.) It is nearly as difficult to distinguish a philosopher as a god, such various forms does he take. Socrates wishes to know "If statesman, philosopher, and Sophist, mean the same person?" (Tr. 104 ; 216 C, D ; 217 A.) Will the stranger discourse on the matter at length, or by short question and answer, as Parmenides once practised?" (Tr. 104 ; 217 C.)

This being settled, it is arranged that the stranger is to have Theætetus for respondent. (Tr. 105 ; 218 A, B.) "He will first determine what the Sophist is, looking to the essential point, and not terms, and, not to grapple with the whole difficulty, will take some more trivial example of an analogous kind, better known and understood: say a fisherman. (Tr. 106 ; 218 C, D, E.) Of all arts there is a twofold division, the making and the acquiring: these, again, may each be regarded as twofold, and so on *ad infinitum*." One of these, the hunting of animals and fish, is gone into at length, and the various subdivisions are summed up. (Tr. 110 ; 221 B, C.) The parallel is then drawn out between the fisherman

and Sophist, till it strikes home in exhibiting the Sophist as a hunter of men, one who lays himself out to hunt for money, and to get affluent young nobles into his toils by a pretence to learning which he has not. (Tr. 113; 223 B.) Similar changes and dichotomies are performed on the sub-art of acquiring, by which it results that the art of the Sophist is a soul-trafficking, and an offering for sale the means by which virtue can be learnt. (Tr. 115; 224 C, D.) In the further progress of bisection, reference is casually made to long and short arguments, so often spoken of elsewhere. (Tr. 117; 225 B.) The Sophist appears in a third form, as one who partly buys and partly concocts learning, and practises in his chambers in the city (Tr. 115; 224 D); and in a fourth, as one who profits by teaching people to wrangle and dispute needlessly. (Tr. 118; 225 E.) Thus he is a crafty beast, not to be caught off his guard by a bungling left-handed attack. (Tr. 118; 226 A.)

Examples are then brought forward of familiar operations in daily domestic life, which have all of them the notion of discriminating belonging to them, which is equivalent to that of having to do with purification. (Tr. 119; 226 D, E.) Several sorts of body purification are cited. "Reasoning, however, lays slight stress on these, and recognises the art of hunting, as one whether in the general or the vermin catcher. (Tr. 120; 227 B.) There are, then, two purifications; one of soul, the other of body. Depravity in the soul is opposed to virtue, and depravity implies a conflict between opinion and desire, the impulsive nature and pleasure, the rational and pain, though these are allied. (Tr. 121; 228 B.) This gives rise to incongruousness, and this exists in a soul without intelligence, yearning after truth but involuntarily led away from a due appreciation of it." (Tr. 122; 228 C, D.)

A distinction is drawn between the disease of cowardice and injustice in the soul and ignorance as a vice of it. (Tr. 122 ; 228 E.) "The remedy for the first is chastisement ; for the second, instruction : and instruction, too, is two-fold, as well as ignorance. (Tr. 124 ; 229 C.) There is the ignorance of the man who thinks he knows when he does not, including all sorts of imaginary conclusions ; and this must be cured by admonition, such as parents used, in their old-fashioned way, to employ with their children. (Tr. 124 ; 229 D, E.) In the other case, where the man believes that he is wise, and therefore needs no teaching, admonition is of no use. Accordingly, those who, after long consideration, have regarded ignorance as involuntary, have recourse to proofs and confutation, whereby they make the ignoramus ashamed and purify him. (Tr. 125 ; 230 B, C, D.) Thus the Elenchus is the greatest of purifiers, a process which even the great king must undergo if he would be happy." We must decline to say whether the Sophist is he who employs this instrument, and must not be carried away by a specious resemblance which is often slippery. (Tr. 126 ; 231 A.) This confutation is a branch of the nobler kind of sophistry, though we are in doubt about our Sophist, who will escape us if we do not follow him up. (Tr. 126 ; 231 B, C.) First, a hunter for pay ; next, a merchant of soul-teaching ; thirdly, a huckster of the same ; fourthly, as himself, the salesman (if I rightly understand what is said above, the next is made the fourth division : see Tr. 118 ; 225 E) ; fifthly, as a disputant ; and sixthly, though with reserve, a purifier. (Tr. 127 ; 231 D, E.)

The Sophist is discussed as a contradictor. (Tr. 128 ; 232 B.) "If he did not appear wise to his pupils they would never fee him, and this wisdom is thought to be universal, though it cannot be so really. A man who can teach all things for a small sum can make a universe and gods

for a trifle. (Tr. 129, 130 ; 233 B ; 234 B.) He will be like a painter who imposes on ignoramuses and children by exhibiting his pictures at a distance. And cannot this be done by words? and will not the futility of such discourses come to be seen at length when what is real has to be handled? (Tr. 131 ; 234 C, D.) The Sophist is an imitator who deals in appearances and phantasies very difficult to get a sight of." (Tr. 132 to 134 ; 235 A to 236 E.)

This brings up the much-banded controversial dispute about the difference between *Ens* and *non Ens*, and the contradictions it appears to involve: whether *non Ens* ought to participate in the "one" or "many," and other like speculations. (Tr. 137 ; 238 C, D, E.) Non-entity has been said to be unutterable, unpronounceable, and irrational. The stranger challenges Theætetus to say something about non-entity in accordance with reason, without affirming existence or the "one" or "many" respecting it. (Tr. 138 ; 239 B.) "Well, the Sophist has led us into a blind lane, and will equally run a tilt with us when we term him an image-maker, if by images are meant those of mirrors and reflections in water. An image, however, may be described as a seeming truth. It is scarcely a non-entity ; and here the many-headed Sophist seems to have us admitting that there is existence in non-entity. His art effects in us false opinion, which causes us to think that non-entities exist in a particular manner, and that entities do not exist. (Tr. 138 ; 239 E.) Thus the Sophist again gets us in a corner ; shall we, then, say that he is a quack and impostor? If so, shall we show a want of spirit and keep aloof from him, seeing he is not likely to be easily caught?"

The stranger deprecates being thought to do violence to his philosophical father, Parmenides. (Tr. 141 ; 241 D.)

He tells us that "The Eleatic school originated with Xenophanes, and maintained that all things are one. The Ionic school declares *Ens* to be 'one' and 'many.' What is the explanation of all these apparent contradictions? Is the name the same with the thing? In which case the name *non Ens* will be the name of nothing; or, being different, will it not be the name of a name? (Tr. 146; 244 D.) Is 'entity' the same as 'the whole?'" This is another fruitful theme, and the conflicts of opinion are like the wars of the Giants. Some assert that nothing exists but what can be touched, and that nothing is, that does not partake of body. Their opponents insist that the "intelligible" is the only real existence, and call things tangible a production merely. (Tr. 149; 246 B, C.) "The reality of mental qualities and virtues cannot be denied, though they are invisible; yet the earth-sprung hold that nothing exists that they cannot compress with their hands. Let us lay down that all which has a power of action or passion is existent, and that existence is power; that by body we are brought in contact with what is produced, while by the mind we cognise real existence. But our opponents deny this, and do not allow this function to action and passion. If knowing is active, what is known is passive, and some motive influence would be communicated to existence in its becoming known; but how will this suit existence as a state of rest, not motion? (Tr. 153; 248 D, E.) If we regard existence as moving or moved, and that intellect does not belong to what is immovable, we shall deny sameness to existence."

The subject of motion and rest, as attributes of existence, is pursued: how far they are congruous or quite distinct, also of entity and non-entity (251 A); man, as one and many. (Tr. 157; 251 B, C.) Will motion and rest exist if they do not commune with existence? (Tr.

158 ; 251 D, E,) Conflicting theories. The parties arguing are compelled to employ qualifying terms by which they confute themselves, like those who have a ventriloquist and domestic traitor in themselves. (Tr. 159 ; 252 C.) Are we to fly to a doctrine of alternation or reciprocity? Will all things be commingled as in the case of mute and vowel sounds? (Tr. 160 ; 253 A.) Illustration from the grammarian and musician. Are we to look for science in the inquiry, and shall we thus have lighted on the philosopher while looking for a Sophist? (Tr. 160 ; 253 C.) This brings in the science of dialectics, the art of dividing into genera, of seeing one typical form in many particulars which are thus grouped under one idea. This is the province of the philosopher, who differs from the Sophist as one lost in the sun's rays or the splendour of reality, from the other hiding in the darkness of the non-existent. (Tr. 161 ; 254 A.)

The discussion of *Ens* and *non Ens*, same and different, is continued to Tr. 167 ; 257 B. It is remarked, that negation does not assert the contrary of a thing ; that οὐ and μή only negative the word or sentence to which they are attached. (Tr. 167 ; 257 C.) Not only the beautiful and not beautiful, but the just and not just, exist equally, as well as entity and non-entity. We have thus proved to be unmindful of the restrictions of Parmenides, who asserts the contrary. (Tr. 169 ; 258 C.) False opinion and false discourse result from the admixture of non-entity with them. (Tr. 172 ; 260 B.) The Sophist denied the existence of falsehood because he refused existence to the *non Ens*. He will also deny that his is a realm of fancies and image work. We must again, therefore, investigate the nature of opinion, discourse, and phantasy. (Tr. 173 ; 260 E.) The Sophist throws up a fresh stockade as fast as you beat down his previous defences. (Tr. 173 ; 261 B.)

A man who pursues him faintly will hardly capture a city. (Tr. 173; 261 C.)

The investigation of opinion and discourse, things true and false, verbs and nouns, is pursued. The false and true are in the soul, and thought and discourse are one : the first is *διάνοια*, or silent discourse ; the other, *διάλογος*, or oral. (Tr. 177, 178 ; 263 E ; 264 B.) The old division of image-producing is again brought up, and a further dichotomizing begins. Dreams of the day and night class, the production of shadows, things and their images, houses and their pictorial copies, the difference between human and Divine production, which is analogous, resemblances and pure fancies, imitations of other persons by voice or gesture, all pass in review. (Tr. 183 ; 267 A, B.) But imitation, to be successful, requires knowledge. None will appear just who are not so ; and the imitator who knows will be far superior to him who does not. This gives rise to the subdivision of opinion, notional imitating, and scientific imitating. The Sophist who is not scientific is amongst the first. Let us examine him like a piece of welded or wrought iron, to see if he is sound and that there is no buckle. (Tr. 185 ; 267 E.) Reference again is made to two classes of imitators. One who makes long harangues to the public, another who uses the system of short question and reply, and thus confutes his opponent. (Tr. 185 ; 268 B.) The first is mob orator, not statesman, nor is he wise, but he is the real Sophist. The dialogue closes with a re-enumeration of his several classifications. (Tr. 186 ; 268 D.)

STATESMAN.

STATESMAN is the title of one of the dialogues, which is allowed by the canon of antiquity to be a genuine produc-

tion of Plato. It is conducted between the same parties as that of the Sophist, only a junior Socrates, named in the latter (Sophist, Tr. iii. 105; 218 B), takes a larger share in the conduct of the discussion. It pursues the question started in the preceding so far as regards the king, or statesman, or philosopher. (Tr. 104; 217 A.) Sciences are divided into two classes, the practical and speculative or intellectual; and the inquiry is made whether statesman, king, despotic ruler, and the head of a family are all to be regarded under one general designation, or whether they each belong to a separate department? (Tr. 191; Statesm. 258 E.) The same sort of dichotomy is proposed as before: Greek and barbarian, even and odd, male and female, Lydian and Phrygian; and something is said about the relation between general ideas and the parts classified under them. (Tr. 199; 263 C.) This somewhat wearying procedure of subdivision is protracted on to Tr. 208; 268 A, by which it appears that an analogy between the king and herdsman is established. We shall arrive at the end of the inquiry by a system of severing part from part, till, by this process of exhaustion, we get to know what is included in the whole or more general idea.

By way of explaining kingly government (Tr. 209; 268 E), allusion is made to the old story of Atreus and Thyestes, and the change in the direction of the motion of the heavenly bodies, and the origin of man from the earth. (Tr. 210; 269 A, B, C.) "The Divine nature is immutable; not so matter: hence the heavens, being in part material, participate in change, but resist it as much as possible. (Tr. 211, 212; 270 B, C, D.) When the change or conversion takes place, things revert to their contraries: age to youth; childhood to age, &c. (Tr. 213; 271 B, C.) At present they are no longer spontaneously produced. Once the Deity took the control, and had a

care of men, as men now have of the inferior animals. There was no state polity, no property in women and children. Men lived on the produce of the earth, without clothing, the ground their bed and the heavens their canopy, associating with brutes, and capable of indefinite happiness under the reign of Cronus. (Tr. 214; 272 B, C.) All has since been changed. The Governor of the world relinquished His hold of the helm; and, after a period of disorder, things again settled down by a Divine interposition. (Tr. 217; 273 E.) When men were deprived of the guiding care of the dæmon they fell into great straits, until Prometheus, Hephæstus, and Pallas came to the rescue, imparting instruction and arts; and now men are, as it were, masters of their own fate, and have to legislate for themselves." (Tr. 218; 274 B, C, D.)

This episode is introduced to show the necessity of the office of king and statesman, as the parties who must tend the human herd (Tr. 219; 275 B.) Our kings, however, are not on a par with the conception of the divine shepherd, but must themselves be trained and subject to discipline. (Tr. 219; 275 C.) This introduces further subdivision and the establishing a distinction between the Divine and human guardianship. (Tr. 221; 276 D.) Just, however, as statuary attempts too much, so we have somewhat confused our subject by our myth. We have sketched a sort of outline which still lacks its distinctive colours. (Tr. 223; 277 C.) We have only a dreamy, not a waking, view of our subject. (Tr. 223; 277 D.) Our pattern needs another pattern for its elucidation. Children only understand the meaning of short syllables, and grow confused in more complex combinations (Tr. 223; 278 A), until they can detect the known in the unknown. (Tr. 224, 225; 278 B, C, D, E.) By estimating the kingly character in small analogous matters we may get to recognise

the meaning of its higher development, as in a waking vision. (Tr. 225 ; 278 E.)

This again opens up further subdivision, in which the chief illustrations are taken from the art of weaving ; and this brings us to Tr. 231 ; 283 A, B. Next, the nature of excess and defect are alluded to, and their being entirely relative rather than absolute. But this will not do ; for if they be not referred to the moderate, both statecraft and kingcraft will become illusory. (Tr. 233 ; 284 B.) Just as in the Sophist we insisted on the existence of non entity, so here we shall insist on estimating excess and defect by relation to moderation. (Tr. 233 ; 284 B, C.) The art of measuring is now divided, and the process of generalization is described. (Tr. 234 ; 285 A, B.) " If we ask the letters which compose a word, we do so not for the sake of the word but for the grammatical knowledge connected therewith. So, too, we investigate statecraft, or weaving, with some general end in view. (Tr. 235 ; 285 D, E.) We want to give reasons for everything ; and the incorporeal is only to be estimated by reason ; and this is our apology for the round-about way in which we have been proceeding, in order to search out the general in the particular. We must not complain of long speeches when the object is to get a clearer knowledge of general terms." (Tr. 237 ; 286 D, E ; 287 A.)

A return is now made to the Statesman considered after the analogy of the art of weaving. (Tr. 237 ; 287 B.) A number of arts and instrumental causes are brought forward without which neither state nor statecraft can exist, but which are essentially different from those of the king or statesman. " Yet priestcraft and divination come near to the latter. (Tr. 243, 244 ; 290 A, B, C, D, E.) In Egypt and elsewhere the kingly and priestly office are combined in one, and even in Athens the king Archon has the

chief care of the sacrifices." (Ib.) Reference is again made to the fivefold division of state polities considered in the Republic, and to a simpler division of monarchy into sovereignty and tyranny, according as regard is had to the violent or voluntary, to lawful and unlawful, over the rich or the poor. (Tr. 245 ; 291 D, E.) The question is asked, "In whom does the kingly science exist, the mass or the few? (Tr. 247, 248 ; 292 E ; 293 A, B.) The only true polity is that in which the ruler is possessed of science, and can rule with or without laws equally the rich and the poor, inflict punishment for good ends, send out colonies like swarms of bees, or naturalize foreigners where needed. (Tr. 248 ; 293 C, D, E.) Law cannot always meet all cases, and is often hard and inflexible, where its policy may be questioned. (Tr. 249 ; 294 B, C. See Tr. v. 221 ; Laws, 769 D, E.) It is impossible for what is simple to meet cases that are seldom or never simple. (Tr. iii. 249 ; Statesm. 294 C.) Laws are made to suit the majority of cases. (Tr. 250 ; 294 D, E.) It is the same with wrestling, which demands similar discipline from weak and strong. (Tr. 251 ; 295 A.) A thoroughly scientific king would be hampered by written laws. (Tr. 251 ; 295 B.)

"If a king or a physician were about to absent himself he would prescribe rules to be followed in his absence, but would surely alter them, if need were, on his return (Tr. 252 ; 295 D) ; and shall a thoroughly wise legislator do less? (Tr. 252 ; 296 A.) We should not brand with obloquy a compulsion which does good to him who violates a rule (Tr. 253 ; 296 B, C, D) ; nor the captain who preserves his crew by overstepping a customary requirement. Those who can show a strength superior to law are those eminently fit to be entrusted with rule. (Tr. 254, 255 ; 297 B, C, D, E.) We must, however, enter on a δεύτερος πλούς, or descend a step, for after this follows the polity in

which the laws are religiously observed." (Tr. 255; 297 E.)

The stranger, who chiefly conducts the dialogue, now supposes "That to obviate certain apparent acts of arbitrary proceeding on the part of rulers, physicians, or ships' captains, some assemblies of unskilled persons meet to enact regulations about what they do not understand (Tr. 256, 257; 298 A, B, C, D, E); that rulers should be annually chosen and called to account at the year's end for any breach of old usages (Tr. 258; 299 A); that any ignorant talkative person should be able to indict for lawlessness any one seeking to test received theories, who know so much better than themselves. (Tr. 259; 299 B, C, D.) Would not all these things be very absurd? (Ib.) If everything is to stand still, will not life, which has its hardships at present, be utterly intolerable? (Tr. 259; 299 E.) But would not matters be worse if guardians of these departments were chosen by lot, or vote, or accident of birth (Tr. 260; 300 A), and should, in their ignorance and self-sufficiency, tamper with written laws? (Tr. 260; 300 B.)

"In a secondary way (*δεύτερος πλῶς*), then, fixed institutions are safer than mere individual caprice, inasmuch as they are based on experience, and are approaches to truth." The argument has for its object to show that the ruler who rises superior to law must do so only by superior art and knowledge; and as this is never met with in the multitude, he can only be found by careful selection. (Tr. 261; 301 A.) "The true king who can rule without law is only the person endowed with science. He who rules by law does so as an image of the former, and possesses only opinion (Tr. 261; 301 B); but if he violates written laws, and is ignorant to boot, he is a species of tyrant. (Tr. 262; 301 C.) In none of the established five forms of polity do we meet with the perfectly virtuous and scientific ruler; for

no king is produced naturally as among bees. (Tr. 262 ; 301 D, E.) The marvel is that cities last as they do in the midst of their human imperfections. (Tr. 263 ; 302 A.) And now for the best form in practice." (Tr. 263 ; 302 B.)

A sixfold division is next proposed, of which monarchy is the best or worst according as it is based on good laws or otherwise. (Tr. 264 ; 302 C, D, E.) "The democracy, from the subdivision of power, is unable to do anything great either for evil or for good. It is the most inferior of those put on a legal basis, and the best where law is set aside." (Tr. 263 ; 302 A, B.) Allusion is made to washing and melting gold. "We have sifted the science of statecraft much in the same way, and separated from it some things allied to it, and of value : the military, judicial, and oratorical arts. (Tr. 266 ; 303 E.) In all these, the scientific part is that which is entitled to rule over the mere practical enforcements of the art. (Tr. 267 ; 304 B, C, D.) The kingly science does not itself act, but presides over those that do, knowing that all great issues depend on opportunity. (Tr. 269 ; 305 C, D.) The science of the Statesman takes charge of the details of law and political action, so as to weave them into a compacted web. (Tr. 270 ; 305 E.) As the subordinate is only fully comprehended in the view of the general, the kingly texture must be kept present to our minds. The parts of virtue differ from the conception in the gross ; for, though fortitude and moderation are in one sense friendly, they may be regarded as opposed. We hear persons praising bodily acuteness and activity, or their imitations, in works of art, under the head of manliness (Tr. 271 ; 306 B, C, D, E.) ; and also, at other times, quietude, especially in mental exercises and in slow and solemn music. (Tr. 272 ; 307 A.) Yet if any of these are exhibited out of season, we blame them as either mad or lacking energy. Persons of opposite temperaments in these

respects are thus wholly at variance; which, however laughable in the individual, is productive of mischief in the state. (Tr. 273; 307 C, D.) The well-ordered carry their love of repose to such an extent as to succumb to foreign encroachments, and to lower the reputation of the young men for warlike enterprises, thus exposing the commonalty to the danger of slavery; while the high-souled and more daring spirits are always fostering enmities and for waging unequal conflicts with superior enemies, and so endangering the very existence of their states." (Tr. 274; 308 B.)

It is asked, whether science ever makes choice of evil things or only the well-adapted and useful? "The Statesman's science will not willingly form a community of good and bad subjects, but strive for a perfect selection of what can be well fitted together. (Tr. 275; 308 C, D.) The science of the king, in like manner, will educe the good and cast out all that is unmanly, or immoderate, or unable, from want of harmonious temperament, to teach others. All who are capable of being trained to higher aims, it treats as the weaver would his stronger or weaker or softer and more supple threads, and combines them into a texture of stouter or thinner or more elegant stuff. (Tr. 276; 309 B.) When opinion exists in the soul with firmness, as to what is fair, and just, and good, it is termed godlike, and in the polity it will be wise and moderate; when it does not, an opposite result ensues. (Tr. 277; 309 E.) No state will be stable in which the good and evil are mixed." (Ib.)

This brings us to the consideration of marriage, where the practice of selection between classes corresponding in rank and property is shown to be injurious. "Manliness, after many generations, will degenerate into madness, or moderation into slothfulness, if they experience no admixture. (Tr. 278, 279; 310 B, C, D, E.) It is the office of the kingly

weaver to combine habits that are moderate with those that are manly, and to commit the charge of the state to those in whom this well-woven fabric has been brought to accomplishment. (Tr. 279 ; 311 A.) The end of the web of the Statesman's weaving is to combine what is moderate with what is manly, and the kingly science will blend into one warp and woof all that the Statesman's art has accomplished in detail, so as to present one splendid and faultless product of regal workmanship." (Tr. 280 ; 311 C.)

Such is the Statesman, the sequel to the inquiry begun in the Sophist, and wrought out in a manner strictly analogous, forming in reality a whole treated in two divisions. Though both are extremely difficult to follow in detail and to analyse distinctly, though it is baffling in the extreme to conceive from time to time where we are being led, yet before we get to the end of our temporary deviation we come in sight of the goal. In the tiresome and perplexing dichotomies, Plato gives us his ideas on classification and the right process for exhausting the meaning of terms, and in the various illustrations many valuable suggestions are dropped, many casual allusions of interest, or intimations of what was known to the science of his day. The inquiry has been somewhat obscured by the large share of consideration given to kingcraft, and it is not always possible to discriminate the exact limits of the difference between king and statesman, while the philosopher is let alone wholly : a work which he did not execute as a further sequel. The science of the king is, however, evidently the more general, divine and comprehensive of the two ; *i. e.*, the one is that which may be gathered from the traditions of the Divine procedure in ages past, or an elevated conception of such an ideal power ; the other such as our best human arrangements may furnish, and has been treated of agreeably to Plato's plan of seeking the particular in the general, or

vice versâ. On the other hand, the Statesman is, as it were, king over all that remains in the practice of human governments. All that are not scientific are, as it were, a crowd of satyrs and centaurs. (Tr. 265 ; 303 D.) These are the motley kings, priests, and pretended statesmen, chosen by lot, or popular voice, or accident of birth or rank, lions and crafty beasts, and gesticulating satyrs. (Tr. 244 ; 291 A, B.)

On reading over what Mr. Grote has said, in his usually lucid and accurate way, I am glad to see that he fully recognises that Plato does not, in this instance at least, insist on the objective reality of general ideas, as I have pointed out elsewhere. "They are Objects of intelligence to an intelligent subject, but they are nothing without the subject: just as the subject is nothing without them, or some other object." (ii. 439.) "The word *existent*, according to his definition, includes not only all that is or may be perceived, but also all that is or may be known by the mind, *i. e.*, understood, conceived, imagined, talked or reasoned about." (Ib. 442.) Mr. Grote thinks that Plato here contradicts the views maintained by him in the Republic and elsewhere, known as the theory of the Platonic ideas. (458, 460, 472.) He also—and I think with good reason—imagines that the object of the Sophist and Statesman was chiefly to expound Plato's conception of what classification and distribution of the meaning of terms should be, and that the whole was a sort of system of tentative logic which did not yet formally exist elsewhere. The professed subject of inquiry was thus only a peg on which to hang what was not to be brought forward with an air of greater prominence.

CRATYLUS.

CRATYLUS, a dialogue of Plato, has been variously regarded as serious or playful. At a time when investigations into language and grammar were not more advanced than the study of formal logic, ought we to expect much philological precision? May it not have been the author's purpose to fix a more definite meaning on words by association with others somewhat resembling them in sound, apart from any distinct theory of derivation, based on well-established laws? The fact that no less than three different etymologies of *ἔπος* are given in the Cratylus and Phædrus, and more than one of *σῶμα* in the Gorgias and Cratylus, certainly justifies this view.

It opens with the assertion that Socrates believes that there is a natural propriety in names. (Tr. 283; Cratyl. 383 A to 384 B.) Hermogenes believes that the only propriety is one of convention, and that a name is an arbitrary symbol. (Tr. 284; 384 D.) "Is there, then," asks Socrates, "a distinction between what is true and false? (Tr. 285; 385 B.) Is not to speak of things as they are to speak true, and to speak of them as they are not, false? If a discourse is true as a whole it must be true in its minutest part, or the reverse; and as a name or word is the least element of discourse, it must, in like manner, be true or false. Are there to be as many names to a thing as there are persons to confer it?" (Tr. 286; 385 C, D.) Hermogenes replies, "That different countries apply different names to the same things, and even Greeks differ from Greeks in this respect."

Socrates again asks, "Whether things possess any essential nature or are, as Protagoras asserts, such as they appear to each individual, without any stable character? (Tr. 287;

386 A.) Are not some men completely bad and others good?" "Certainly," says Hermogenes; "there are many of the former class and few of the latter. (386 B.) Can some of us be wise and others unwise, if what Protagoras says is true?" "No, surely," remarks Hermogenes, "neither does Protagoras say the truth, nor Euthydemus, who would make all men equally bad and good." (Tr. 288; 386 D.) "There are, then," observes Socrates, "things which have a firm existence of their own, not dependent on our fallible estimate of them; and the same is true of the actions that pertain to them which take their complexion from something more enduring than our opinion, and which cannot be dealt with arbitrarily or at random. (Tr. 289; 387 A, B.) We are bound, therefore, to speak of them correctly. A name is an instrument which we must use properly if we are to learn or distinguish anything by means of it. (Tr. 292; 388 B, C.) It is not the province of all men to assign names, but for the name-artificer, or him who settles customs; and such a person is rare. (Tr. 293; 389 A, B.) Only the dialectician can exercise this power successfully; and Cratylus is right when he says that a name must be derived from the nature of what is to be designated by it." (Tr. 296; 390 D, E.)

Socrates then alludes to the different designations of things by men and by gods, as expressed in Homer (Tr. 297; 391 D); and we are soon brought face to face with the whole string of etymologies contained in this remarkable dialogue, which we shall not here follow more at length. Many have regarded the whole performance as a burlesque of the dreams of the etymologists. Mr. Grote believes that Plato has put these derivations forward in sober earnest. I have indicated above one mode of evading the difficulty by assuming that Plato was more concerned with suggesting the sense of the several words by placing

them in juxtaposition with others bearing an imperfect resemblance in sound, which may be supposed to have been subjected to processes of contraction or lengthening, or local dialectic changes, and thus connecting them together in a bond of association in order to show natural connexion of meaning, rather than of strict grammatical derivation. Or it may be that in Plato's time no progress had been made in those philological refinements which characterise the greater grammarians of modern times, and that it was thought sufficient to catch at certain resemblances of sound which pass for little in our day. In the Index a further reference to groups of etymologies will be found, those of the Gods, Seasons, Mental Virtues, &c.

PARMENIDES.

PARMENIDES, one of the canonical dialogues of Plato, represented as carried on between the philosopher of that name, Socrates as a youth, the Eleatic Zeno (who defends his master Parmenides), and another person of the name of Aristotle, one of the thirty tyrants. (Tr. 403 ; 127 D.) After hearing Zeno's discourse, Socrates begs him to read again the first hypothesis of his first argument; and when it has been read, Socrates asks if Zeno asserts that, if the things existing are many, the same will be both like and unlike? This being admitted, it is impossible for the many to exist. (Tr. 404 ; 127 E.) Socrates declares that Parmenides, in his philosophical poem, asserts that the universe is one, and that he ably supports this proposition (128 A); while Zeno denies the existence of the "many," on apparently equally good grounds. Thus the two agree without really saying one word alike. (Tr. 404 ; 128 B.) It is admitted by Zeno that Socrates is on the right scent, and that what he has

said supports Parmenides against those who would ridicule his doctrine of "the one." (Tr. 405; 128 D.) What he really does is to show that the hypothesis of those who assert the existence of "the many" is more laughable still; but yet it was in a moment when the love of argument was uppermost that he composed it, and then it was stolen from him and made public. (Tr. 406; 128 E.)

Socrates asks Zeno if he does not think there is an essential abstract form of similitude and dissimilitude of which things partake? (Tr. 406; 129 B.) True, things are not one and many at the same time; but what is there startling in the fact of a man having a right and left side, an up and down, or being one of seven? (Tr. 406, 407; 129 C, D.) These abstract forms of like and unlike, one and many, motion and rest, are not to be confounded; but yet Socrates would be more surprised if the same difficulty that exists in visible objects could be shown to have place in forms as comprehended by the reasoning faculty. (Tr. 407; 129 E; 130 A.) Parmenides and Zeno, half annoyed, eye Socrates with great interest; and the former, complimenting him on his acumen, questions him as to his belief in the separate existence of forms of justice, and of the Beautiful and Good—of man, fire, water, mud, dirt, hair, &c. (Tr. 408; 130 C, D.)

On this Socrates expresses a modest hesitation, and Parmenides reminds him of his youth and inexperience in philosophy (Tr. 408; 130 E); he continues to press him with difficulties, to which allusion has elsewhere been made under articles "One and Many," "Many and One." (Tr. 409, 410; 131 A, B, C, D, E.)

Parmenides now urges that a more comprehensive abstract form of magnitude than the form already conceived and its participants, must be assumed, and that this must go on *ad infinitum*. (Tr. 412; 132 A, B.) Socrates here,

however, cautions him that these forms are nothing but concepts in the soul, to which Parmenides rejoins, "Is there a mental conception of nothing?" This Socrates declares impossible. (Tr. 412; 132 C.) He then explains that these forms are patterns in nature—that the participation of which he has spoken is only an assimilation to them (Tr. 412; 132 D); but to this Parmenides objects, that we shall have a similitude, which will reproduce itself *ad infinitum*. (Tr. 412, 413; 132 E; 133 A.) Moreover, if an absolute form exists *per se*, it cannot exist in us, and things existing among us exist with reference to themselves, and not the forms as a common appellation. (Tr. 413, 414; 133 B, C, D, E.) As forms do not exist in us, argues Parmenides, we do not partake of science. (Tr. 415; 134 B.) The absolutely beautiful and good, and other abstract ideas, are therefore unknown. (Tr. 415; 134 C.) The deity will be in the highest degree possessed of science or knowledge, but will he, on what has been shown, be able to know what passes among men? (Tr. 416; 134 D); or will his mastery be a mastery of us? (Tr. 416; 134 E.)

Here Socrates cautions Parmenides lest he should take away knowledge from deity. (Ib.) Parmenides contends that these abstract forms do not exist or cannot be known, or are very difficult to be perceived, and still more to be taught. (Tr. 416, 417; 135 A, B.) Parmenides admits, however, that the denial of forms will be fatal to logic, dialectics, and philosophy (Tr. 418; 135 C, D); and while praising a distinction made by Socrates, between things seen by the bodily eye and the eye of the mind, he lays it down that the most effectual way of procedure is, first to assume that a given proposition is true, and then that its opposite is, and to see what will result from the opposed arguments. As an example for trial, let Zeno's argument on the existence of the "many" be taken, what will happen

on the supposition that the one, the many, the like and unlike, are, and are not? So, too, of generation and destruction, being and not being. (Tr. 419; 136 A, B, C.)

It will not be necessary, after what has been said under article "Many and One," in the Index, to pursue this part of the subject into minuter detail. Parmenides gives the illustration of his meaning by a series of deductions from the two theses "The One is," and "The One is not," which strongly reminds us of what Kant has exhibited as "Antinomies of Pure Reason." I cannot do better than state what remains to be stated in the words of Mr. Grote: "He proceeds to trace out the consequences which flow, first from assuming the affirmative thesis, *Unum est*; next from assuming the negative thesis, or the antithesis, *Unum non est*. The consequences are to be deduced from each hypothesis, not only as regards *Unum* itself, but as regards *Cætera*, or other things besides *Unum*. The youngest man of the party, Aristotle, undertakes the duty of respondent.

"The remaining portion of the dialogue (half of the whole) is occupied with nine distinct deductions, or demonstrations given by Parmenides. The first five start from the assumption, *Unum est*; the last four from the assumption, *Unum non est*. The three first draw out the deductions from *Unum est* in reference to *Unum*; the fourth and fifth draw out the consequences from the same premiss, in reference to *Cætera*. Again, the sixth and seventh start from *Unum non est*, to trace what follows in regard to *Unum*: the eighth and ninth adopt the same hypothesis, and reason it out in reference to *Cætera*."

The whole dialogue is amongst the most subtle and well-argued of the author's productions, though chiefly of interest to the metaphysician, as well as in part barren and scholastic.

SYMPOSIUM, OR BANQUET.

SYMPOSIUM is the title of one of the most lively, sparkling and attractive of the canonical dialogues. The dramatic opening we omit. Socrates is met with, dressed somewhat more smartly than his wont, and, on being asked where he is going, tells Aristodemus that it is to Agathon's; who, being somewhat of a fine gentleman, would expect punctilio in his visitors. (Tr. iii. 476; 174 A.) On the road, Socrates falls into a fit of abstraction, and is left standing in the highway, leaving Aristodemus, whom he has taken the liberty to invite, uninvited, to make his own introduction. (Tr. 478; 174 E.) Agathon bids the boy-attendants take upon them to entertain the guests, just as though they were themselves furnishing the repast. (Tr. 479; 175 B.) In the middle of supper, after many inquiries for him, Socrates walks in, and is asked to lie down next to Agathon, to whom he pays a well-turned compliment.

"What an excellent thing would it be," observes Socrates, "if wisdom always overflowed from its possessor to his less accomplished associate when they are contiguous to one another, like water flowing through a skein of wool from one vessel to its neighbour; for in that case I should highly esteem lying next you. (Tr. 480; 175 D.) My own wisdom is but a dream compared with that flashing oratory of yours, that but lately astonished more than thirty thousand Greeks in the assembled theatre." (Tr. 480; 175 E.) Agathon treats this as an ironical compliment, and observes, "That their wisdom will soon be to be judged of as the drinking proceeds;" and the preliminary libations having been poured, they at once commence their convivialities (Tr. 481; 176 A.) As they have been all pretty largely indulging the day before, they agree to allow each other to

do as they please, and the weaker heads readily accept the conditions, though Socrates, it is said, can swallow any amount of wine with impunity. (Tr. 482; 176 B, C.) See also what is said near the close of the dialogue. Eryximachus, being a physician, hereupon gives his opinion about drunkenness, which he declares to be a very bad thing; and as he is suffering from a headache, and some of the party accept him as their medical adviser, they settle it that there shall be no debauch; that the girl who plays the flute shall be dismissed to amuse herself or the women within, and that they will have some pleasant talk on a subject to be agreed on. (Tr. 483; 176 E.)

Phædrus has been complaining that none of the poets has composed a panegyric on Love, child as he is and yet so divinely endowed. (Tr. 483; 177 A.) "You may meet with the praises of Hercules, or many trivial matters, such as salt, and yet Love still wants a strain worthy of him." (Tr. 484; 177 C.) Accordingly, it is resolved that they shall each try and praise Love to their utmost ability, the order of succession going round to the right hand, and that Phædrus shall commence. (Tr. 485; 177 D.) Socrates at once falls in with this, declaring that it is the only subject on which he himself knows how to talk; and that Aristophanes, who thinks of nothing but Dionysus and Aphrodite, will be sure to assent. (Tr. 485; 177 E.) Phædrus begins by asserting "That Love is a wonderful deity and the oldest and most honoured of the gods" (Tr. 486; 178 A), and quotes Hesiod and other authorities. (Tr. 487; 178 C.) "Neither relationship, nor personal distinction, nor riches can accomplish that dread of shame and love of glory which Love effects. A man will be more pained to be seen acting amiss by the object of his passion than by father or relations. (Tr. 488; 178 D.) A state composed of lovers and loved would conquer the

whole world. The veriest coward would be a hero when thus inspired. (Tr. 488; 179 A.) Love will cause not only men but women to die for each other. Take Alcestis, who won a release from death; while Orpheus, from want of courage, saw only the ghost of his wife and left his Eurydice behind. (Tr. 490; 179 E.) Then there is the honour the gods conferred on Achilles for his love of his friend, and his spurning the promise of old age in comparison with avenging himself on Hector, though at the ultimate sacrifice of his own life. (Tr. 490; 180 A.) It is said that Achilles was younger than Patroclus, and beardless; that when the loved object is attached to the lover, the gods look more benignly upon the former: and so they honoured Achilles, by sending him to the Islands of the Blest, more than they did Alcestis." (Tr. 490; 180 B.)

Pausanias next takes up the discourse. There are, according to him, "Two Loves: the one a daughter of heaven, the other of Zeus and Dione, who is the hackneyed Love. (Tr. 491; 180 D, E.) No action," he tells us, "is in its own nature good or evil; neither is drinking, singing, chatting, *per se*, blameworthy or the reverse; what is rightly done is right, what is ill done is wrong. So it is with Love: only honourable love is estimable. The common earthly love is not so. For example, the love of women or the love of bodies in preference to that of souls, or of persons however silly with attractive faces. (Tr. 491; 181 A, B.) The nobler sort of lovers reserve their affection for those in whom the mind is beginning to develope itself on approaching manhood; and a love formed at this period is likely to prove lasting and not to be capriciously abandoned. (Tr. 493; 181 D.) The love of boys should be prohibited, it being uncertain how the character will turn out in respect of vice and virtue." He furnishes examples of his meaning. (Tr. 494; 182 B, C.) "In some states the rulers dread the

formation of close ties: thus the love of Aristogeiton and Harmodius was fatal to the supreme power. Here, however, it is different: lovers may do what in any other case would be objectionable. (Tr. 495; 182 D, E.) No one would try to obtain money or official power by the acts of obsequiousness which are approved in matters of love. Even the breach of an oath is here pardoned by the gods; so that much license is conceded universally. (Tr. 496; 183 B, C). There are, however, cases of parental interference which might seem to lead to an opposite conclusion. (Tr. 496; 183 D.) The fact is that, taken by itself, as said above, Love is neither estimable nor discreditable. We must not gratify an evil person in an evil way, but only an honourable one in a commendable way. The vulgar lover looks to the body, and when its bloom is past, he takes to flight and scatters his vows and assurances to the winds. On the contrary, the noble lover is such for life. (Tr. 497; 183 E.) He is not to be captivated in a hurry, nor to seek for money or power, but for wisdom and instruction. It is honourable to afford gratification for the sake of virtue, which is characteristic of celestial love." (Tr. 499, 500; 185 A, B, C.)

It is now the turn of Aristophanes to speak, who is still in his hiccough and suffering from past excess, but he appeals to Eryximachus to cure him or speak for him. This the latter promises to do, and in the meantime bids him gargle with cold water or tickle his nose with a feather, to excite sneezing, as a counter-irritant. He next applies the argument of Pausanias to what takes place in medical science. "Health and disease are unlike, and the one longs for the opposed condition; but we only seek to gratify that which is good in the body, not the evil. Medical science is, in a word, the relation of impletion to depletion, and the physician has to excite and promote that

penchant which should be felt, and to get rid of that which ought not to be present: so bringing the relations which are hostile into unity. (Tr. 500, 502; 186 A, B, C, D.) These antagonist relations are those of cold to hot, moist to dry, &c. This was the art of Æsculapius; such, too, is the office of music in harmonizing sharp and grave sounds, wedded to rhythm. (Tr. 502, 504; 187 A, B, C, D, E.) The harmonious combination of seasons is equally favourable to fruitfulness and increase as the opposite arrangement is to disorder, decay and mildew. The heavenly bodies are under this influence of Love, and so are the duties of piety and intercourse with the gods, and the same dictates duty to parents. That which has to do with the Good, and is the result of combined moderation and righteousness, is that which mainly contributes to happiness and makes us dear to the gods." (Tr. 505, 506; 188 A, B, C, D, E.)

The next speaker is Aristophanes, who thinks that men are utterly regardless of Love. (Tr. 507; 189 A, B, C.) He narrates a grotesque and fanciful myth, according to which "Human beings were somewhat like blown bladders, with two faces, having four feet and as many hands, and being hermaphrodite, so that when they wanted to run, they rolled over and over like a wheel. (Tr. 508; 189 D, E; 190 A.) Withal they were proud and aspiring and attempted to assail the gods, and were punished by being split into two instead of being dissipated by the thunderbolts of Zeus, who further threatened, that if they did not behave themselves he would again divide and leave them to hop on one leg. In a twinkling the dichotomy was performed, as men cut pickling medlars or eggs with hairs. (Tr. 509, 510; 190 B, C, D.) Since this severance, each half desires its counterpart; and when it meets it, it is inflamed with an ardent love (Tr. 510 to 513; 191 A to 192 B), and would accept the offer of being melted into one, if Hephæstus should make it. (Tr.

513; 192 C, D, E.) There is still the fear that we may again be split like the profiles on pillars, or the two sections of a counterpart symbol. But should we follow out a perfect Love, there is a prospect that we may again be united as at first." (Tr. 516; 193 C, D.)

Agathon has now to follow, and is playfully flattered by Socrates with a further allusion to his successful *débüt* before the crowded theatre. To this Agathon rejoins, "That he hopes Socrates does not think him vainglorious on this account, or that he does not know that to speak before a few clever men is a far severer ordeal than to do the same before myriads of fools." (Tr. 517; 194 A, B.) Phædrus begs Agathon to postpone a conversation with Socrates till each has delivered himself of his panegyric. (Tr. 518; 194 C, D, E.) Agathon, in complying, comments on the fact, "That none of the preceding speakers has praised Love himself but only his gifts. This he wishes to correct. (Tr. 518; 195 A.) Love is accordingly declared to be the best and most beautiful and youngest of the gods. He hates old Age, who always approaches too rapidly; is ever young, and not to be confounded with Necessity and the violence of its reign. He stands in need of a poet like Homer to describe him suitably. He dwells not in the souls of the violent and harsh; he is supple and graceful, and can penetrate the inmost feelings, his food being flowers, and on flowers only does he light. No violence touches him, but he does everything in accordance with what is right and moderate, and is superior to pleasure. Not even Ares is his match in valour, and his wisdom is equally conspicuous. (Tr. 520, 521; 196 A, B, C, D.) So clever is he in poetry, that he makes others poets, and by his agency all the animal race is produced. (Tr. 522; 196 E.) No artist becomes eminent on whom Love lays not his inspiring touch. At his instigation,

Apollo invented archery, physic, and divination; the Muses became instinct with song; Hephæstus skilled in metal-lurgy; Athène in the labours of the loom, and Zeus with wise counsel. (Tr. 522, 523; 197 A, B.) It was the love of Beauty that ordered all the works of the Divine hand. Not only is he the best and most beautiful, but he is the cause of these endowments in others. He it is that gives

‘To mortals peace, and to the ocean calm,
Rest to the winds and sleep, to sorrow, balm.’

He is the general peacemaker, and president on all occasions of mirth; the giver of good-will, kind to the good, revered by the wise, and the envy of those who do not possess him. The source of all gentleness and desire, he is steersman and saviour of gods and men, whom all should follow, hymning in sweetest strains.” (Tr. 524; 197 D, E.)

This speech of Agathon is received with thunders of applause, and Socrates now justifies his previous remark, that the eloquence of the poet would place him in great difficulty. Nevertheless he proceeds to pull the speech to pieces. “No doubt it is a wonderful string of verbs and nouns, whose force is such that he might well take to his heels and decline to try and emulate it. (Tr. 525; 198 A, B.) The speech reminds him of Gorgias, and he expects the intrusion of a Gorgon’s head to turn him to stone. (Tr. 525; 198 C.) He now thinks he knows nothing of Love, and that he made a very stupid boast. (See Tr. 485; 177 E.) He had,” he says, “foolishly thought that he was bound to speak the truth, and that this was altogether in his line. This, however, appears not to be the case, but that we are to pile up all manner of exaggeration. (Tr. 526; 198 D, E.) But he is not what he has been stated to be to those who know him. As I do not understand

this mode of praising, it was the tongue, not the mind, that made the rash promise." (Tr. 527; 199 A, B, C.)

Socrates draws his usual weapon, and asks Agathon, *Socratico more*, "Whether Love is the love of something or nothing? (Tr. 528; 199 D, E.) Does Love desire that of which it is the love, or that of which it is not? Is this the case when it has it, or has it not? A large man does not wish for largeness or a swift one for swiftness. We want what is absent or what we have not. (Tr. 528 to 530; 200 A, B, C, D, E.) If Love orders the things of the gods, it is through the love of the Beautiful. Yet as we do not love what we have, Love itself must in this case be ugly." (Tr. 530; 201 A, B.) When Agathon declares that he cannot reply to Socrates, the latter says "That he is unable to answer against the truth, not against himself, which would be easy enough." (Tr. 531; 201 C, D.)

✓ Socrates then conveys his views under the fable of a certain Diotima, who has instructed him in love matters, and whose words he will endeavour to recall. She does not allow that a thing is ugly because it is not beautiful. There is an intermediate stage between wisdom and ignorance." "Then," said I, "if he is not ugly, he is a god of power." "Stop," said she; "is he a god at all? The gods are all beautiful and happy, but these are the qualities which Love lacks, and therefore desires them, and how can he be divine? (Tr. 533; 202 B, C, D.) Is he, then, a mortal? No, he is intermediate: a great dæmon power, which acts as interpreter between gods and men, and takes the control of sacrifices and mysterious rites. There are many dæmons, one of whom is Love. At a great banquet of the Celestials, Poverty came to beg at the door, who saw Plenty, overcome by nectar, fall asleep in the Gardens of Zeus, and laid a trap for him by which she became the

mother of Love. Partaking, then, of a twofold nature, he is always poor, rough and sunburnt, unshod and homeless, lying on the bare ground without covering, sleeping under the open sky in doorways and thoroughfares, having his mother's nature always associate with want, but, like his father, too, intriguing with the Beautiful and Good, being manly, adventurous, and always alive, a famous hunter, perpetually weaving devices, an affecter of wisdom, clever in pursuit of and extrication from mischief, philosophising through his whole life, a dreadful quack, and drug compounder, and sophist. He has neither been born immortal nor mortal, but sometimes blooms and lives in the same day while his resources are whole, at another dies, but revives after the nature of his father. Whatever is from time to time supplied him is continually leaking out secretly, so that Love is neither in want nor in weal, and is in the midst between wisdom and folly." (Tr. 534 to 536 ; 203 A, B, C, D, E.)

Diotima explains, "That those who philosophise are neither the wise nor the ignorant, but those who feel their need of wisdom (*see also* Lys. Tr. i. 500 ; 218 A) ; and as Love admires wisdom, he is in this case. The mistake has been that Love has been wrongly supposed to be the thing loved. (Tr. 537 ; Symp. 204 B, C.) The lover of beautiful things longs for them to be his. (204 D.) We are apt to attribute designations somewhat sweepingly : some love is not deemed worthy the name ; others who love in one particular way, take the whole attribute to themselves. (Tr. 538, 539 ; 205 B, C, D.) Those in love are said to be searching for their missing half. Men love only what they deem good, and will even part with their diseased limbs, but this good they long to be ever present with them." (Tr. 540 ; 206 A.)

Diotima further explains the yearning of Love on the

sight of objects of beauty. "A sort of divine transport is excited, which is, in fact, a provision for securing immortality, on the principle of continued production. It is, in short, the love of immortality." (Tr. 541, 542; 206 B, C, D, E; 207 A.) Diotima next points attention to the instinct of love in animals, where there is no reflecting power, as explaining its origin. (Tr. 543; 207 B, C.) "Immortality or duration can only be insured through generation. Our personal identity is consistent with perpetual renewal. We are never the same in the molecules which compose our bodies, but we live on in one unbroken continuity through gradual replacement of our constituent atoms. (Tr. 544; 207 D, E.) It is the same with the soul. No man's views, or feelings, or passions remain always the same, but are always springing up, shifting and dying out, without disturbing our unity. Forgetfulness, too, is the loss of knowledge, which is perpetually replaced by fresh acts of remembrance. Thus everything mortal is maintained through constant change, and partakes of immortality. (Tr. 545; 208 A, B.) All men are eager for posthumous fame, and prolong life in this way, and through the children left behind as their substitutes. It is not to be wondered at that everything delights in its own offspring. (Tr. 545; 208 B, C.) It was this love of undying reputation that stimulated the apparent self-sacrifice of Alcestis, Achilles, and Codrus." (Tr. 546; 208 D, and so on to Tr. 548; 209 E.)

Diotima now sums up the particulars of her teaching, and shows "That the fundamental impulse is the love of beauty; next the recognition that all beauty partakes of a common element which is the same in all its concrete forms; and this will prevent the man from concentrating all his affection on a single object. After this he will regard beauty of soul more than corporeal beauty,

passing onward to pursuits that partake of it, and honouring it in legal enactments and the teachings of science. No longer the slave of one attachment, his thoughts will take a wider range. He will roam over the whole ocean of beauty, drink in knowledge through elevating discourses, giving rise to conceptions of boundless philosophy, till he rises to the level of some master science. (Tr. 550, 551; 210 A, B, C, D.) When he has attained this summit, he will come within view of eternal, indestructible, and undeviating beauty; not that of one thing, or one time, or variable with the occasion, but that which knows no change. Thus he proceeds, step by step, from the first elementary embodiment to the general idea, through beauty of soul to that of pursuits and doctrines, till he attains to the abstract form itself (Tr. 553; 211 B, C); not gold, or splendid vestments, or dim unreality, or bauble of earth, but beauty radiant, unstained with mortal taint, such as may inspire perfect virtue and immortal bliss." (Tr. 554; 212 A.) Socrates concludes by declaring his sincere admiration and belief in the excellency of Love. (Tr. 555; 212 B, C.)

At this stage of the proceedings Alcibiades, with a throng of revellers, forces his way in, in a state of intoxication. A highly dramatic scene follows. (Tr. 556, 557; 212 D, E; 213 A, B, C.) Alcibiades is either jealous or feigns jealousy of Socrates, which is confirmed by the statements of the latter. He first crowns Agathon with fillets, and, on discovering Socrates, binds him with some of the same, elects himself symposiarch, insists on their indulging in deeper cups, and declares that no amount of drinking will tell upon Socrates. (Tr. 558, 559; 213 D, E; 214 A, B.) It is proposed that Alcibiades should follow the example of the rest in praising Love, but he declares that he will only praise Socrates. (Tr. 560, 561; 214 C, D, E; 215 A.) He likens Socrates "To the figures of Silenus, which are made

to open and disclose the statue of a god within. He is a Marsyas, capricious in his actions, and far more wonderful as a piper, keeping his listeners entranced and under a spell by his flow of words. (Tr. 562; 215 C, D.) The hearer is startled and his feelings are roused more than the greatest orators, like Pericles, can effect." Alcibiades describes himself as "Stopping his ears, avoiding him as a siren, and as ashamed to encounter him after neglecting his advice under the flattery of the multitude. He has often even wished him dead. (Tr. 562, 563; 215 E; 216 A, B, C.) Socrates knows not his own lack of outward grace any more than Silenus, but when opened is full of wonderful moderation. He cares not for personal beauty in others, and is full of sarcasm and diatribes against mankind. (Tr. 564; 216 D, E.) Under a false idea that he was charmed with the narrator's beauty, the latter conceived himself a fortunate person, and invited him to a closer attachment." (Tr. 564 to 569; 217 A to 219 B.) And in relating all this he incidentally observes, "That no one who has been bitten by a viper will ever describe his sufferings to any but those who have experienced them. (Tr. 567; 218 A.)

"But such temptations were all of no avail to shake the inflexible virtue of the philosopher, who rose superior to every assault, more invulnerable than Ajax to steel. (Tr. 567 to 570; 218 B, C, D, E; 219 A, B, C, D, E.) During the expedition to Potidæa, he surpassed all in bravery and the endurance of cold and hunger, while he could exceed all in the power of drinking, when compelled. Notwithstanding the severity of the frost he would go abroad in his ordinary clothing and without shoes, where others were buried in felt and skins. He was once observed to stand for twenty-four hours in one spot in deep absorption of thought. (Tr. 571; 220 C, D.) The prize of honour assigned to Alcibiades he declares to have been

really due to Socrates, though steadfastly declined by him. (Tr. 571; 220 E. *See also* vol. iv., Tr. 150; Lach. 181 A, B.) It was also wonderful to witness his sagacity and courage in the retreat from Delium, and the assurance that he inspired that it would be no easy thing to get the better of him. (Tr. 572; 221 A, B.) Totally unlike other heroes, who have their counterparts, he stands first in the power of discourse, though even here he is singular. He is always illustrating his meaning by figures taken from common or mean objects, as donkeys, blacksmiths, shoemakers, curriers, and ringing changes on the same phraseology, but when the inner meaning is discerned, his teachings are replete with ethical wisdom and truth." (Tr. 573; 222 A.)

After a further playful and dramatic description of what took place, the company is again intruded on with a good deal of uproar; whereupon some of the party retire; some fall asleep, overcome by indulgence; others protract the discussion or nod over it till daybreak; and Socrates is last heard insisting that a good tragic poet will make a good comic one, both requiring a common talent; and at last he, too, when all the rest had left or fallen asleep, took himself off to the Lyceum, with no sign of any ill effects from what he had taken. (Tr. 575, 576; 223 A, B, C, D.) The peculiar mannerism of Socrates is touched on Tr. i. 189 to 193; Gorg. 491 A, B, C; 494 B, C. *See* Art. Socrates in Index.

PHILEBUS.

(TRANSLATION. VOL. IV.)

PHILEBUS, a canonical dialogue of Plato, between a person of that name, Socrates, and Protarchus, on the subject of pleasure. Socrates contends, against Philebus, that wisdom and true opinion are preferable to pleasure as a chief good. (Tr. 3, 4; 11 B, C.) We should all strive to determine that condition of soul which will most procure happiness. (Tr. 4, 5; 11 D, E; 12 A, B.) Pleasure, or Aphrodite, with reverence be it spoken, assumes all sorts of forms very dissimilar: there is that of the temperate and thoughtful man, and that of the intemperate and thoughtless. (Tr. 6; 12 C, D.) Protarchus contends that the pleasure, though derived from opposed objects, is not at variance with itself. On this Socrates remarks, that no one denies that pleasure is pleasant; but how will you designate the good that is common to good and evil pleasures? (Tr. 7; 13 B, C.) Protarchus still insists that pleasure *quoad* pleasure is not opposed to itself, but Socrates declares we may as well say that no science is unlike another science. (Tr. 8; 13 D, E; 14 A.) The real question is, Is the chief good placed in intellect or in pleasure? (Tr. 9; 14 B, C.)

Allusion is next made to the paradox of the many being one, and the one many. Want of clear agreement on this question leads to confusion. (Tr. 10 to 14; 14 D, E; 15 A, B, C, D, E; 16 A, B.) With the fire of Prometheus as a gift from heaven came the endowment of speculating on the bounded and unbounded, the search for unity, then the numbered and the infinite; but our

sages jump the intermediate, and pass at once from one to infinitude. (Tr. 14 to 16; 16 C, D, E; 17 A.) The voice is an example of the one and infinite, but only the study of its parts leads to grammar. (Tr. 16; 17 B.) It is the same with music—its sharps and flats, and intervals, and harmonious combinations, rhythms, and metrical feet; if number is not regarded, the infinite in it only baffles and confuses; we cannot pass from one to the infinite without intermediate numbers. (Tr. 17, 18; 17 C, D, E; 18 A.) Theuth first noticed that in the limitless of vocal utterance there were letters, both vowels and mutes, whose proper combinations gave rise to grammar. (Tr. 19; 18 B, C, D, E.)

These illustrations are made to bear on the original question as to the greater desirableness of intellect or pleasure. Each are of many kinds and degrees. The question at issue is re-stated. (Tr. 21, 22; 19 A, B, C, D, E; 20 A, B.) Socrates refers to having heard, in a waking or sleeping dream, that neither intellect nor pleasure is the chief good, but some third thing, so that pleasure need not be subdivided into its several sub-species. (Tr. 23; 20 C.) First, however, let us ask whether the Good is complete in itself and self-sufficing. (Tr. 23; 20 D.) Suppose that no intelligence exists in the life of pleasure, nor pleasure in that of intelligence, seeing that if either is the Good it wants no addition. (Tr. 24; 20 E.) But if a man had neither intellect, memory, knowledge, nor true opinion, he could not tell whether he experienced pleasure or not—it would be to live the life of a breathing viscus. (Tr. 24, 25; 21 A, B, C.) Nor would the purely intellectual life without pleasure suit, but a life made up of both. (Tr. 26; 21 D, E; 22 A.) Yet, although in this mixed state neither pleasure nor intellect is the chief good *per se*, pleasure has no title even to the second prize (Tr. 27; 22 B, C, D, E); intellect is, however, most allied to it. (Ib.).

Here comes in the necessity for further subdivision, that of the limited and unlimited having already been laid down. (Tr. 27 to 29; 23 A, B, C, D, E.) The hotter and colder, the more and the less, belong to the class of the unlimited. (Tr. 30, 31; 24 A, B, C, D, E; 25 A.) The contraries of these, the equal, the double to the limited. (Tr. 32; 25 B, C, D.) It is the introduction of number that causes things to be symmetric and harmonious; the combination of the two classes, when duly made, causes health, and brings music to completeness—causes moderation in the seasons, and innumerable other blessings. (Tr. 34, 35; 26 A, B, C, D.) The third class is intermediate; the fourth has regard to causation. (Tr. 35; 26 E.) These four classes re-enumerated—the limited, the unlimited, the mixed or intermediate, and the cause of the mixed and intermediate. (Tr. 36; 27 A, B.) The first prize was assigned above to the life of intellect and pleasure combined, which accordingly belongs to our third class. (Tr. 37; 27 C, D.) Pleasure and pain are unlimited, and cannot therefore belong to the good, and Socrates asks, To which class must intellect be referred? (Tr. 37; 28 A.) All the wise regard intellect as sovereign lord of heaven and earth. (Tr. 38; 28 B, C.) Shall we say that unreason governs the world by chance, or that mind is the sovereign arranger? (Tr. 38; 28 D.) We see indistinctly how the universe consists of elements—that these elements are feebler in us than in the Cosmos, which is marvellous for its beauty and fulness. (Tr. 39; 28 E; 29 A, B.) But do we feed the fire of the universe, or that of the universe our mortal fire? (Tr. 40; 29 C); or by our previous classification can we possess soul and wisdom, imperfect as we are, and the majestic world and heavens be destitute of it? There is, then, a cause of the universe, which is no other than mind. (Tr. 41; 29 D, E; 30 A, B, C.) Thus intellect

and mind are in the fourth class of the causal, pleasure in that of the limitless, without beginning, middle, or end. (Tr. 42, 43 ; 30 D, E ; 31 A.)

Pleasure is not to be known apart from pain ; according to Socrates, they are contemporaneous in their production, and thus being mixed, belong to the third class of intermediate. (Tr. 43 ; 31 B, C.) Pain is a loosened harmony, pleasure one rightly attuned (Tr. 44 ; 31 D) ; so is hunger a loosening and pain, and eating a restringing and pleasure ; and the same is true of thirst, fever, frigidity. Then there is mental anticipation, giving rise to hopes and fears. (Tr. 44, 45 ; 31 E ; 32 A, B, C.) Pleasure and pain are not, then, coincident with good, but sometimes partake of it (Tr. 46 ; 32 D) ; but as pleasure arises when a given state is restored, and pain when it is destroyed, what is the condition which admits of neither ? (Tr. 46 ; 32 E.) The intellectual person may experience little delight or depression, and this may be the most god-like condition, though it is not likely that the gods feel neither pain nor pleasure. (Tr. 46, 47 ; 32 E ; 33 A, B.) If we cannot obtain the first prize for mind, we must apply our reasoning to obtain the second. (Tr. 47 ; 33 C.) The pleasure of the soul comes to it through memory, and we must recollect what memory and perception are. Outward objects, some of them leave no impression, while others shock our whole frame : the former do not make themselves known to us, and are therefore not forgotten, but we are insensible to them (Tr. 48 ; 33 D, E) ; the latter give rise to sensation. (Tr. 48 ; 34 A.) Memory is the keeping alive a sensation, and it differs from recollection. (Tr. 48 ; 34 B.)

All this is noted that we may clearly understand the nature of mental pleasure and desire (Tr. 49 ; 34 C) ; but hunger and thirst are desires, either for food or drink, or the filling the vacuity which causes them. We desire, therefore, a contrary

state, but if we experience the feeling for the first time, we shall recognise neither the cause nor remedy. The thirsty person does not desire thirst, or its equivalent vacuity, but the filling the void; and this can only be derived from memory, seeing the soul has had no perception of it. The animal desires the opposite of vacuity to cure the defect, and this indicates a remembrance on the part of the soul; so that it is the soul, not the body, that hungers and thirsts, and experiences desire. (Tr. 49 to 51; 34 D, E; 35 A, B, C, D.) The subject is continued through Tr. 52; 35 E; 36 A, B.

It is further asked whether these pains and pleasures can be termed true or false—or partly one, partly the other; to which Protarchus replies, that they can hardly be false, though Socrates thinks they may be, as well as fears or opinions. (Tr. 53; 36 C.) Are not some pleasures false and others true? No, says Protarchus again. Neither, then, in morning nor evening dream, in madness or drivelling, can there be one who deems himself pleased when he is not pleased. (Tr. 54; 36 D, E). Whether anyone is delighted, or holds an opinion rightly or wrongly, will the feeling delight, or opinion, be less real? How, then, is opinion sometimes false, and pleasure always true? Are falsehood and truth inseparable from, and yet qualifiers of opinion? But pleasure and pain admit of qualification, and there are evil and erroneous pleasures as well as opinions. (Tr. 55; 37 A, B, C, D, E.) Are we to call a pleasure right or good when it is based upon illusion? (Ib.) Yet Socrates admits that pleasure does seem compatible with false estimate; and Protarchus maintains his opinion manfully, though admitting that there is a difference between pleasure based on right judgment, and that based on ignorance or misconception. (Tr. 56; 38 A.) "There is," Socrates says, "a true and false opinion, and pleasure and pain attach to them; but opinion is the result of sense-perception and memory."

(Tr. 56 ; 38 B.) The case of distant objects, and a figure standing under a tree by a cliff. (Tr. 57 ; 38 C, D.) Opinion about it entertained and expressed, but if retained in the mind, and kept to itself, the soul becomes a book inscribed with what is true or false. (Tr. 58 ; 38 E ; 39 A.)

There is besides, imagination, like a painter within us, who depicts the scene and gives rise to true and false representation, and all this with reference to past, present, and future. (Tr. 59 ; 39 B, C.) But pleasure and pain are felt by the soul before they are felt by the body ; these representations in us have mainly reference to the future, and so it is with fancies—true pictures occurring to the good, and false to the bad. Thus men's souls are susceptible of false pleasures and pains, and it is possible for them to conceive of what does not, has not, and will never exist, and to have false opinion, and to take pleasure in that which has no real ground ; and so as regards desire and fear. Accordingly pleasure, like opinion, is bad from being false. (Tr. 59 to 61 ; 39 D, E ; 40 A, B, C, D, E.)

To this statement Protarchus objects, and in the further prosecution of his argument, Socrates observes that the soul is that which desires a state which contradicts the bodily feelings, to which pain and pleasure belong. Pains and pleasures lie side by side, and belong to the unlimited, susceptible of "the more" and "the less," and of being compared ; but according as they are viewed at a distance or near, so is their relative seeming importance. and this brings in what is adventitious and not true. (Tr. 62, 63 ; 41 A, B, C, D, E ; 42 B.) Pain is said to be produced by change of bodily state, and pleasure by return to the normal condition, and thus a state of rest would be neutral ; but yet, as all things are in a perpetual flux, we are often, too, unconscious that such a process is going on : hence it is only great changes that are thus sensible, so that the

neutral condition may exist in spite of gradual alteration. (Tr. 64, 65 ; 42 C, D, E ; 43 A, B, C.)

But what are we to make of the statement that to live without pain is the greatest pleasure? Those who think this, and say so, have a false estimate of pleasure, if the negative condition is not the same as that of being pleased. (Tr. 66, 67 ; 43 D, E ; 44 A, B.) The natural philosophers assert that all pleasure is merely an avoidance of pain, and that the former is a witchery ; but, without agreeing with this, let us use it as an auxiliary aspect of the question. Now to know a thing we must judge of it in its extreme cases, and those pleasures which have this character belong to the body, and more to persons in disease than health—as, for example, the gratification of thirst in fever, or of the desire for excessive indulgence. We are not speaking of quantity, but intensity. Thus, too, with the soul, the most violent pains and pleasures are not felt by the most virtuous. (Tr. 67 to 70 ; 44 C, D, E ; 45 A, B, C, D, E.)

He comes next to cases of mixed pain and pleasure, irritation, and relief by scratching (*see* vol. i. p. 57. Phæd. 60 B.) ; the shivering person warming himself at the fire, &c. Further elucidation of the pleasure and pain of scratching, of delirious enjoyment overpowering slight uneasiness. (Tr. 70 to 72 ; 46 A, B, C, D, E ; 47 A.) Persons talk of dying with pleasure. (Tr. 72 ; 47 B.) In the case of the soul, its pains are anger, terror, desire, grief, the passion of love, and envy, and jealousy ; but these are sources of exquisite pleasure also. Take Homer's honey-sweet anger, the tears shed at tragic representation, the delight of the envious man at his neighbour's misfortunes (Tr. 73 to 75 ; 47 C, D, E ; 48 A, B, C) ; also the cases of ignorance, where men fancy themselves richer, or handsomer, or more virtuous than they are. Such ignorance, when feeble, is ridicu-

lous, but when powerful is to be dreaded. The laughing at it is pleasurable; but as ignorance is an evil, this is to laugh at the evils of friends, and thus amusement may become mixed with envy, pleasure with pain. (Tr. 75 to 78; 48 D, E; 49 A, B, C, D, E; 50 A.) Pain and pleasure are also mixed in the drama of life, and in the exercise of the passions; and belong to the soul *per se*, the body *per se*, and to both conjoined. (Tr. 78; 50 A, B, C, D, E.)

Socrates here states that he does not assent to those who make all pleasure to consist in the cessation of pain, though he thinks that there are seeming, as distinct from real, pleasures and pains, and also many of a mixed character. (Tr. 79; 51 A.) The pure unmixed pleasures are those derived from beautiful colours, figures, odours, whose absence leaves no sense of deficiency, and are positively pleasurable when perceived. (Tr. 79; 51 B.) Figure is beautiful in itself (Tr. 80; 51 C); so are clear soft pure tones apart from harmony (Tr. 80; 51 D); the case of odours is not so strongly marked. (Tr. 80; 51 E.) Then there are the pleasures connected with learning, the forgetting which is not felt to be painful, unless we reason upon it. They belong, however, only to the few, and are unmixed. (Tr. 81; 52 A, B.)

His next distinction is, that violent pleasures lack moderation, and the gentler do not—that the pure and simple and adequate are better than the extravagant. As an example he takes the purity of white, and argues that a small amount of unmixed pleasure greatly surpasses a larger quantity mixed with pain. (Tr. 82, 83; 52 C, D, E; 53 A, B.) Pleasure, too, is always generating, and has no fixed existence. That which is noblest in nature is that which is self-sufficing, and does not desire anything else. Now all generating is for the sake of something else, and this will therefore be the case with pleasure, but that for the sake of which generation takes place is in the class of the Good. Thus pleasure

is not the Good. (Tr. 83 to 86 ; 53 C, D, E ; 54 A, B, C, D.) But those who esteem the pleasure of curing hunger and thirst as a great end of existence, prefer destroying and restoring, or generating, to a life of pure thought without pain or pleasure. (Tr. 86 ; 54 E ; 55 A.) It would be absurd that a good man in pain should deem himself a wicked man, or that a man should measure his virtuousness by his present gratification. We must ring every statement like a piece of china, to see if it is cracked or not. (Tr. 87 ; 55 B, C.) In all arts one part is more allied to pure science; and another less; there is also the way in which it is apprehended by the philosophic and the vulgar. Thus one view of it has an aspect of greater clearness and purity than the other. There are, in fact, two kinds of arithmetic and mensuration comprehended under one name. (Tr. 88 to 92 ; 55 D, E ; 56 A, B, C, D, E ; 57 A, B, C, D.)

Higher, however, than all these is the science of dialectics, which takes cognisance of the really existent. (Tr. 92 ; 57 E ; 58 A.) "But," says Protarchus, "I have heard Gorgias extol the art of persuasion above all other arts." This, Socrates declares, is not the question, what most benefits us, but what looks to the clear, exact, and true; we should love truth for its own sake. (Tr. 93, 94 ; 58 B, C, D, E.) Most arts first make use of opinion, and the student of nature seeks to find how the world has been produced, and its modes of action (Tr. 94 ; 59 A); still in these matters of generation there is no clearness or fixity. (Tr. 95 ; 59 B.) There are, however, things immutable and true, perfectly the same and unmixed, and next, all that is most nearly related. Everything besides falls into a lower rank. To these leading things we give the most dignified names, such as mind, intelligence, wisdom, which are concerned with entities. (Tr. 95, 96 ; 59 C, D.)

He here attempts a partial *résumé*, that he (Socrates)

asserts against Philebus that pleasure and good are not identical, and that mind is more akin to good than pleasure. When good is possessed it is self-sufficing. We have been treating of pleasure uncombined with intellect and the converse case, and the conclusion pronounced is that neither is *per se* the absolute Good. It must belong, then, to that which is mixed. (Tr. 96 to 98; 59 E; 60 A, B, C, D, E; 61 A, B.) He therefore suggests a solemn mixing; coupled with invocation to the gods, and supposes two fountains—one of honey for pleasure, and another of pure spring-water for intellect—and then inquires how the mixing must be made. (Tr. 99; 61 C.) Some pleasures and sciences are purer than others; will the best life depend on the due admixture of these? (Tr. 99; 61 D, E.) Will the man who knows the higher geometry, but not the practical mason's patterns, succeed in building?—or the musician by the pure production of sounds apart from imitation? (Tr. 100; 62 A, B.) Are we to throw wide the doors, and let pure and impure sciences throng in, as into Homer's meeting of the waters, and also the pleasures true and false? The answer is, Yes, after first admitting the true. (Tr. 101; 62 C, D, E.)

Having them now all assembled, the question is asked of pleasure and intellect, what is their own decision? Will you pleasures dwell with mind, or without? The reply is, that One should dwell with them which knows itself, and them and all others perfectly. The same question is put to intellect, will it like to be without pleasures?—and the reply is that it needs no vehement desires and maddening joys, but only such as promote health and virtue. So speaks mind on its own behalf, and that of memory and true opinion. (Tr. 101. to 103; 63 A, B, C, D, E; 64 A.) That with which truth cannot be combined has no real essence. (64 B.) We are, then, at the threshold of the Good, and we will consider whether the Good is attached more directly to in-

telleet or pleasure. (64 C.) Every mixture must partake of due proportion and adjustment among the ingredients; but this proportionateness is a beauty and virtue, and the Good takes refuge with the Beautiful. It is becoming clear which of the two rival principles is worthy of most honour. Mind is more allied to truth than pleasure, for pleasure is a boaster, and if mind is not truth it is next of kin; also it is more allied to moderation than its competitor, and to beauty. Has any one in a waking or dreaming state deemed mind not beautiful? (Tr. 104 to 106; 64 D, E; 65 A, B, C, D, E.) We put out of sight or into shade the acts of persons immoderately devoted to pleasure; we assign the first place to moderation, the second to beauty and its associate properties, the third to intellect, the fourth to correct opinion, the fifth to the pure painless pleasures, the sixth to what remains. (Tr. 107; 66 A, B, C.) We now put the eolophon to what has been advanced. Mind is more to a man's interest than pleasure. Neither is the absolute Good, but mind is the nearer related to it of the two. To those who allege the natural instincts of the animal tribes, as proving the omnipotence of pleasure, and think that the unrestrained indulgence of brute beasts can outweigh the verdict of philosophy, we will not yield the least standing ground.

It is easy enough to catch the general scope of the argument, but not always to exhibit the several links in their due connection. So prolific and excursive is the mind of Plato in the person of Socrates, that he has often darted away for new matter of illustration, or what is to be so applied presently, before you are aware of his having broken off, or knowing how he is to get back to that which has been suddenly interrupted. The conclusions arrived at in this dialogue are less of a negative character than usual. Indeed, the chief deduction is expressed in a tone rather of positive assurance, and has nothing halting or uncertain about it, in the terms in which it is expressed.

CHARMIDES.

CHARMIDES, a dialogue of Plato on Temperance or Moderation, regarded in ancient times as genuine, between Socrates, Chærephon, Critias, and the person of this name. No sooner does Chærephon catch sight of Socrates, who has just returned from the battle of Potidæa, than he rushes forward to question him about the incidents of the fight, concerning which the latter tells all he is asked. (Tr. 113, 114; 153 A, B, C.) On his part, Socrates inquires what is going on in the world of philosophy, and who are the most remarkable men of the day for beauty and wisdom. (Tr. 114; 153 D.) "This will soon be seen," says Critias, "for here come the followers of the most attractive youth of his time, Charmides, son of our relative Glaucon;" a judgment which Socrates at once confirms. (Tr. 114, 115; 154 A, B, C.) So beautiful is his person said to be, that his face will go for nothing by contrast. (154 D.) Here Socrates observes, "that he will be a prodigy if his soul is as well formed as his body, and that they ought to lay this bare. Let him be introduced forthwith." (Tr. 115; 154 E; 155 A.) Critias orders that Charmides should be summoned, on pretence of meeting a physician who may prescribe for a pain in his head of which he complains. He comes accordingly, and all struggle to get a place near him, pushing each other from the form in order to monopolize the best place. Socrates is overawed for the moment by the beauty of the youth, and feels embarrassed, but recovering his composure, declares, "That he knows a simple which, with due incantation, will banish his headache. (Tr. 116, 117; 155 B, C, D, E.) I will write down the prescription, which will perform more than it promises. (156 A.) If a man with a pain in the eyes has recourse to a clever physician,

he will not attempt to cure the eyes but the head. Nor will he strive to better the head but the whole body. My incantation was learnt from a Thracian doctor of Zamolxis, one of those who can render men immortal. Zamolxis insisted that it was of no use to cure the eyes before the head, the head before the body, or the body before the soul was cured. The incantations he proposed were beautiful reasonings. When he had presented me, Socrates, with the medicine and the charm, he enjoined me to use the latter first. This I promised to do ; and I now ask you to let me charm your soul before I administer the medicine to your head." (Tr. 117, 118 ; 156 B, C, D, E ; 157 A, B, C.)

"This will be a godsend," said Critias, "if he is to be bettered in his mind and head too ; but he is already conspicuous for his wise moderation." This leads to a long panegyric on the ancestors of Charmides and Critias, and their connection with Solon, accounting for this great beauty and moderation. (Tr. 119 ; 157 D, E ; 158 A, B.) "If Charmides is already thus well-minded, he will not want the charms of Zamolxis or the Hyperborean Abaris, but only the head mixture." Charmides modestly rejoins, "That he cannot say he is not temperate without contradicting what others say, nor that he is, without appearing to praise himself." (Tr. 120 ; 158 C, D.) Socrates suggests that the point should be inquired into. (Tr. 120 ; 158 E.) "If Charmides possesses this temperance or soundness of mind, it must leave its mark on the man, and be associated with some inner feeling. It can, therefore, be expressed in words." Charmides then says, "It is doing everything in a quiet, methodical way." To this Socrates objects, "That in writing, reading, playing a musical instrument, wrestling, boxing, running, leaping, rapid action is generally more beautiful than slow. If temperance is beautiful, therefore it should be something quick rather than quiet.

It is thus, too, in learning, and teaching, remembering, and quick discernment. (Tr. 121; 159 A, B, C, D, E.) So with deliberation and all the actions of the mind and body, swiftness is not less beautiful than slowness: so that a quiet life is not more temperate than an active one, if a temperate life is beautiful." (Tr. 122, 123; 160 A, B, C, D, E.)

Charmides next proposes to define temperance or moderation by modesty; but, according to Homer, modesty is out of place in cases of urgent need, and is not always as good as moderation is. They are not, therefore, identical. He next suggests that it is doing one's own business. Socrates exclaims, "That he got this from Critias or one of the sophists, though it matters not whence, as the question is not who said it, but whether it is true. (Tr. 123, 124; 161 A, B, C.) The person who declared this did not mean what the statement implies. Were every man to be his own tailor and cobbler the state would not be well regulated, and therefore not conspicuous for virtuous moderation. This would be intensely stupid. What, then, is meant by doing one's own business? Or does the man not know what he means, as is probable?" (Tr. 124, 125; 161 D, E; 162 A, B.) In saying this, Socrates has an eye to Critias as the prompter of Charmides. The former grows uneasy, and casts an angry look at Charmides, as not maintaining his credit, any more than a bad actor does that of his author. But Socrates defends Charmides, and begs Critias to take up the cudgels, and reply. (Tr. 125; 162 C, D, E.) The latter admits that all artisans do not only their own but other people's business. Therefore those who do the last may be temperate likewise, and so the definition is valueless. As Critias disputes the last inference, Socrates asks, "If he does not think that making and doing are the same?" To this he replies, "No; nor is 'to work' the same as 'to make.' Hesiod declares work honourable, but he does not

say that to make shoes, or to sell pickled cockles is so. Only the making what is good or beautiful can be so regarded, or what belongs to our home as distinct from what is foreign." (Tr. 126 ; 163 A, B, C.)

"Pray define," says Socrates. "Do you mean to assert that moderation is the transacting or making of what is good?" "I do." "Well, then, he who acts badly has no title to the term. Can a man who is moderate be at the same time ignorant that he is so?" "I think not," says Critias. "Yet the physician may act usefully and fittingly, and so far moderately, while not knowing what he is doing." Critias would rather recall what he has said, if this is the legitimate inference. He will not admit that a man has the virtue of moderation who is ignorant of himself. (Tr. 127, 128 ; 163 D, E ; 164 A, B, C, D.) He is of opinion that the Delphic precept is an exhortation to "moderation," not a mere sentiment, like the *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, and, *τὸ ἐγγύη πάντα δ' ἄρη*, "do nothing in excess," and "be not surety for thyself or another." (Tr. 129 ; 165 A, B.)

After some concessions and explanations, in which both plead ignorance, Socrates observes, "That if moderation is the knowing anything, it is a branch of science. Now the science of medicine or architecture has some beautiful results. What, then, is the beautiful result of moderation as knowledge of self?" Critias, on this, declares "That every science is distinct from others, and stands on its own basis." "Yet every science aims at something not itself. Even and odd, the heavy and the light, are different from the arts of calculation and weighing by which these are estimated. What is the object of moderation, considered as a science?" (Tr. 129, 130 ; 165 C, D, E ; 166 A, B.) Critias will not admit the analogy. "All other sciences have an object ; this is the science of other sciences and of itself as well." He charges his opponent

with wishing to confute merely ; a charge against which the latter defends himself, asserting, "That he cares nothing who is confuted, if the truth can be got at." (Tr. 131 ; 166 C, D, E.) On Critias repeating his previous definition, his collocutor begs to know, "If moderation is the science of ignorance, whether the moderate man is alone able to know himself, and what he does and does not know, and what others know or pretend to know, and what they do not know, despite of pretending? In short, does he assert that self-knowledge of what one does or does not know is moderation?" Critias assents. (Tr. 132 ; 167 A.)

"Let us consider this third point as a libation to Zeus the Saviour, whether it is possible for a man to know what he does not know? If there be a science of self and the other sciences and of ignorance, as asserted, it will follow that there may be a faculty of seeing which does not view ordinary objects, but is the power of seeing itself and the other powers of sight and those powers that do not see : in short, not a sight of colour, but of a more abstract and universal field. (Tr. 132 ; 167 B, C.) Think you that there is a faculty of hearing in like manner that does not hear sound, but itself, and other hearing powers, and those that do not hear ; or any other sense which has a corresponding function? Is there a desire which is not the desire of gratification, but of itself and other desires? a will that wills nothing good or bad, but only itself and other wills? a love, or fear, or act of the imagination which discards all ordinary objects, and is centred on itself and exercises of the same class?" (Tr. 132, 133 ; 167 D, E ; 168 A.) Critias thinks that there is not. Socrates thinks it equally doubtful that there is any science of this kind. "When we speak of a thing as greater, we mean that it is greater than something less. But a thing that is greater than itself will necessarily have the itself less than what is greater ; and on the same rea-

soning, if it is double itself, itself must be the half of its double. Thus more will be less, and younger older. (Tr. 133; 168 B, C.) If hearing hears itself, hearing must be sound; or if sight sees itself, sight and colour are confounded. If motion moves itself, or heat burns itself, which will hardly be credited, we shall need some profound authority to determine what functions or sciences possess this self-reflex action and what do not (Tr. 134; 168 D, E; 169 A), and whether moderation is among the former, which as yet I cannot admit," says Socrates. (Tr. 134; 169 B.) "You must first show the possibility of such a science, and next its utility, and that moderation is of this nature.

"On this Critias, like those who gape when they see others gaping, was infected with my doubts, though ashamed to own it. However, let it be granted that such a science does exist: that a person possessing the science that knows itself will be possessed of self-knowledge, as he who possesses beauty or swiftness is beautiful and swift. But how," asks Socrates, "is a man to know what he knows and what he does not know? The knowing or not knowing what is healthful is different from the knowledge or ignorance of what is just. How can he, who has only science in the abstract, know the objects of particular sciences, seeing that we do not know the objects of medical science, or musical science, or architectural science by moderation? A person ignorant of these in detail will only know that he knows, not what he knows. He cannot discriminate who are skilled or not, nor will he talk with a physician about science, the former having to do with matters of health and disease, and only moderation being of the nature of science." (Tr. 135, 136; 169 D, E; 170 A, B, C, D, E.) "The whole of the argument turns on the difference between the province of particular sciences and a transcen-

dental science of sciences which cannot make a man wise in any special department. If this moderation tells a man what he does and does not know, it will be of obvious utility. All duties would be assigned to the persons best fitted to discharge them, and the state would be well ordered and happy." (Tr. 137, 138; 171 A, B, C, D, E.)

"But," says Socrates, "no such science has been proved to exist; and, if it did, I am not prepared to admit the utility claimed for it a moment ago. Absurd as this may seem, I should like to say what occurs to me. Hear, then, my dream, whether it issued from the gate of ivory or horn. If we were under the rule of moderation as a science, we should know at once who were good pilots or physicians and who not. Our health would be preserved, our artizans more scientific, our prophets more true, and all would run smoothly and happily. And yet what has science to do with happiness? Which is the science that furnishes happiness, as many departments of it do nothing of the sort? Is it the science of past, present, and future that does this, or skill in draughts or calculation, or in medicine?" "That," says Critias, "by which a man knows good and evil." (Tr. 138, 139, 140, 141; 172 A, B, C, D, E; 173 A, B, C, D, E; 174 A, B.) "What a sinner you are!" cries Socrates, "who have kept me thus long in the dark, that to live scientifically is not the cause of happiness, but the living morally. Other sciences are independent of the science of morals, but if this is wanting, they will no longer turn out usefully, so that moderation is no longer the basis of utility." (Tr. 142; 174 C, D.) Critias thinks "that moderation, presiding over other sciences, will rule over what relates to the good and useful." To which Socrates rejoins, "That it will not be moderation, but physic that keeps us in health, so that the utility of moderation is, after all, as he said above, questionable. (Tr. 142; 174 E;

175 A.) We are thus utterly at fault. We have made concessions which rest on no proof, and have supposed a person to know what he does not know. But with all our concessions we have gained no foot of ground, and the question still stares us saucily in the face. For myself I care not; I am only sorry for you, Charmides, with your beauty and moderation, which is of no utility. I am still more sorry for the worthlessness of my Thracian charm. But perhaps I trifle, and you are in possession of this high endowment." "Nevertheless," says Charmides, "I need the charm, and should like it put in practice by you." Critias recommends, and Charmides agrees, to solicit the instruction of Socrates, and they exact the consent of the latter, who is powerless against their united solicitation. (Tr. 143, 144; 175 B, C, D, E; 176 A, B, C, D.)

Though it is easy to catch the scope of the argument as a whole, the steps of the reasoning are quite as obscure and difficult to render intelligibly as parts of the *Parmenides*, *Sophist* or *Theætetus*. Further elucidation may be found in the pages of Grote and Whewell, to which the reader who desires more is referred.

LACHES.

LACHES, a dialogue of Plato, on the subject of Courage or Fortitude, *ἀνδρία*. The conversation is opened by Lysimachus with Nicias and Laches, two well-known generals of the Athenians. Melesias and the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias, together with Socrates, are also present, and take their appropriate share of the discussion. (Tr. 147; 178 A.) Unfortunately all people do not say what they think, but speak to conciliate agreement. There is no reason to suppose that this will be so with the present company. (Tr. 147;

178 B.) "As respects these two boys, Thucydides, son of Melesias, and Aristides, my son, named respectively after their grandfathers, we do not want them to have entirely their own way, as many are allowed to have, but to be well brought up. (Tr. 148 ; 179 A.) Now you, Laches and Nicias, being fathers yourselves, have, no doubt, provided for this in the case of your sons, or if you have not, it is time to begin in connexion with us. (Tr. 148 ; 179 B.) Melesias and I, who mess together, are able to recount, for our sons' example, many deeds of renown on the part of our ancestors, but none of our own, and we deplore greatly that we were allowed, when children, to do too much as we liked. This, then, is what we want to avoid, and the boys promise on their part to be submissive. (Tr. 148 ; 179 C, D.) Much commendation has been bestowed on the learning of the heavy-armed sword and drill exercise ; and for this reason we wished you and ourselves to be present at the display just made. Tell us what you think of this or any other discipline." (Tr. 149 ; 179 E ; 180 A.)

"What you have said comes home to most of us," says Laches ; "but why not ask Socrates here, a man of the same Deme, and whose peculiar forte is education?" (Tr. 149 ; 180 B, C.) "Agreed," observes Nicias. "He it was who lately introduced to me, as my son's teacher in music, the famous Damon." (Tr. 150 ; 180 D.) "Do advise us, Socrates," exclaims Lysimachus ; "for our fathers were always very friendly, and I have often heard the boys speak of you, if you are the same, the son of Sophroniscus." (Tr. 150 ; 180 E.) "Yes ; and Socrates is deserving of his country as well as his parentage," adds Laches ; "and had all behaved as he did at the time of the flight from Delium, we should still have held our heads erect. (Tr. 150 ; 181 A, B. See vol. iii. Symp. Tr. 572 ; 221 A, B ; vol. i. Tr. 16 ; Apol. 28 E.) Well then. Socrates, tell us if you approve

this heavy military exercise as good for boys or not." (Tr. 151; Lach. 181 C.)

Socrates consents to do this, if older men, like Laches and Nicias, will first give their opinion. (Tr. 151; 181 D.) Nicias gives it his decided approbation, and thinks that the practice will facilitate every kind of military discipline and tactics, and conduce to grace in action. (Tr. 151, 152, 153; 181 E; 182 A, B, C, D.) "All knowledge is desirable," observes Laches; "but seeing that the Lacedæmonians give no countenance to those who go about exhibiting in this line, I do not value it much. The writers of tragedy do not hawk their productions round the country, but try their fortune in the metropolis. (Tr. 153; 182 E; 183 A, B.) Besides, I know from experience that these show-men are worth little in the moment of danger. This Stesileus, who makes such a display and boasting, I once saw make a laughable exhibition of himself against an enemy's ship, with a scythe stuck on the end of a spear. (Tr. 153, 154; 183 C, D, E; 184 A.) The disadvantages, on the whole, outweigh, in my opinion, the advantages; so I would rather hear what Socrates thinks." (Tr. 155; 184 B, C.)

"Is the matter to be decided by a majority of votes?" asks Socrates, "or will you prefer the judgment of one skilled and competent person, since a correct judgment is to be formed by science, not numbers?" "The latter, certainly," says Melesias. (Tr. 155; 184 D, E.) "Are either of the present company thus skilled? The matter is no trifling one, as all the reputation of a family hangs upon the turning out of its sons. (Tr. 156; 185 A.) We must first look for the sufficient adviser and what is the thing itself of which we want teachers, all which has yet to be done." (Tr. 156; 185 A, B.) "I thought," says Nicias, "that it was about the advantage of the heavy-armed ex-

ercise." "True," says Socrates; "but we have to consider not the means but the end. We are seeking about something to be learned on the soul's account, and who of us is best qualified in this respect." (Tr. 156, 157; 185 B, C, D, E.) "Have you not," says Laches, "seen some persons make greater attainments without instruction than those who have received it?" "I have," says Socrates; "but you would not take their word for it, without proof of what they could do. And we ought to be able to tell who were our teachers, or if not, to point to the Athenians, or foreigners, freemen or slaves who have been made good by our instrumentality. (Tr. 158; 186 A, B.) For myself, I never had a master. I could never pay the sophists their fees, and I know not the art. Nicias and Laches, who have more at command, are no doubt capable. I appeal to them: let them tell all they know about it. (Tr. 158, 159; 186 C, D, E; 187 A.) The risk is no mean one; it is not an experiment on a vile Carian slave but your own sons, where the proverb of the 'potter's art in the cask' holds good." (Tr. 159; 187 B. See also vol. i. Tr. 218; Gorg. 514 E.)

Lysimachus joins his entreaties to those of Socrates. (Tr. 160; Lach. 187 C. D.) To this Nicias rejoins, "That he does not know Socrates: how he will surely bring the person conversing with him round to declaring his own personal mode of life, and will test him at all points. This he knows will be his fate, though, like Solon, he has no objection to grow old learning. The talk will be about ourselves, not the boys. But let us hear what Laches says." (Tr. 160, 161; 187 E; 188 A, B.) Laches declares that he "delights exceedingly in listening to a really able man, when he talks of virtue. Such a man's converse is a beautiful harmony, like a Doric, not an Ionic, Phrygian, or Lydian mode. But he hates to hear one who is the op-

posite of this, whose words and deeds are at variance. (Tr. 161; 188 C, D, E.) He knows nothing of the words of Socrates, but of his deeds he is fully cognisant. He will, like Solon, grow old learning, but it must be from the good. Let Socrates say what he likes, he will listen joyfully, for he has had proof of his sterling courage and virtue." (Tr. 162; 189 A, B.)

Socrates again urges the desirableness of knowing all the conditions belonging to the subject discussed. "If the sense of sight is a proper adjunct to the possession of eyes, we must know what it is, to be able to confer it most effectually, and so, too, in the case of hearing. (Tr. 162, 163; 189 C, D, E; 190 A.) If virtue, then, is in question, we must know what virtue is, and if we know it, we can tell. We will not take the whole of virtue, but consider it in part, as the easier process. Which part, then, shall we select? Let it be courage, as we have been talking of sword exercise." (Tr. 163, 164; 190 B, C, D.) Laches proposes to define courage as the non-desertion of one's post in the face of an enemy. "What, then," asks Socrates, "is flying and fighting your enemy at the same time, as the Scythians do?" (Tr. 164; 190 E; 191 A.) "This is all proper enough," says Laches, "if you are talking of war chariots and cavalry, but Hoplites must stand their ground. But the Lacedæmonians at Plataea did not keep their place, though, like cavalry, they re-formed and won the fight. I ought to have put the question before you in its whole extent in reference to cavalry or infantry, in operations on land and sea, in circumstances of poverty and disease, in political emergencies and the resisting pain and pleasure or fierce desires, for bravery may exist in all these cases." (Tr. 165; 191 B, C, D, E.) "What," asks Socrates, "is the courage which is the same in all these? If I spoke of swiftness, I should say

it was doing a thing in a short time: what, by the same rule, is courage?" "It is," says Laches, "a power of endurance in the soul's part, *καρτερία*." "But all endurance is not courage: for this last belongs to what is beautiful; true enough of that which is linked with prudence, *φρόνησις*, but what when with *ἀφροσύνη*? It is, then, prudent endurance which you term courage. Yet you would not call prudence in expending money, courage, nor firmly refusing a man what is hurtful to him. (Tr. 166, 167; 192, A, B, C, D, E.) Nor would you call the man who prudently stands his ground and fights because he knows he shall have assistance, or that he is stronger than the enemy, braver than the man who does all this where all is reversed?"

Laches says, "He should think the man braver who did not possess the knowledge and prudence, both in this case and others named." Socrates rejoins, "That imprudent daring and endurance have been admitted to be injurious, which is not consistent with courage being beautiful. We are, therefore, at discord with ourselves and not in Doric harmony: our words and actions are at issue. We must endure to search further, lest courage should deride our want of pluck." (Tr. 167, 168, 169; 193 A, B, C, D, E; 194 A.) Laches feels annoyed with himself that he cannot better explain what he has in mind; and Socrates invites Nicias to take part in hunting for the missing key. "Here we are in a storm of doubt or wandering in a trackless desert; help us out of the confusion." Nicias reminds Socrates that "We have been pronounced to be good as far as we are wise, and *vice versâ*. If the brave man is good he is therefore wise." "Wise in what?" "In the science that relates to things to be dreaded or boldly encountered."

This exposition is derided by Laches. "Physicians know things to be dreaded, and so do farmers, but they are not

therefore brave." To this Nicias rejoins that "The former know nothing of the desirableness of life or death in a given case. The same things are not dreadful to those who would be bettered by dying, and those whose interest it is to live." (Tr. 169, 170, 171; 194 B, C, D, E; 195 A, B, C, D.) Laches thinks "That Nicias must mean to say that prophets are brave men," which the latter repudiates. (Tr. 171; 195 E; 196 A.) The former thinks that "Nicias is shuffling to get out of a difficulty;" and Socrates suggests "That his meaning should be extracted, or that, if he means nothing, he should be taught better." (Tr. 172; 196 B, C, D.) "If," says Socrates, "a man is not brave without knowledge of what is to be feared or dared, a sow would not know this, nor would the Cromyonian sow be brave, nor any wild beast, all being on a level in this respect." (Tr. 173; 196 E.)

Nicias is asked by Laches to say, "If wild beasts, who are admitted to be braver, are wiser than we are?" Nicias asserts that "He does not, but calls them fearless and unintelligent, and that he does not consider fearlessness and courage one. He calls mere boldness, rashness; the brave are only those who know what danger means." (Tr. 173; 197 A, B.) "I will not," says Laches, "say all I think, lest you should consider me abusive." (Tr. 173; 197 C.) "No doubt," observes Socrates, "Nicias got his wisdom from Damon, who was the disciple of Prodicus." "And it is just the office of a sophist to give ingenious definitions," says Laches; a remark with which Socrates falls in, but proposes to question Nicias more closely. (Tr. 174; 197 D, E.) He reminds him "That courage was declared to be a part of virtue. There are also moderation and righteousness which we agree to regard as other parts. Things of dread are such as cause fear; those of boldness do not give rise to it. Past

and present evils do not occasion fear, which is only the anticipation of coming evil. Both things dreaded and dared are future. When we speak of science or knowledge, we do not limit it to past, or present, or future. Medical science regards what has been, is, or is likely to arise. The general turns his mental vision on all sides. He is not the passive instrument of the prophet, nor does he allow the prophet to assume his powers. Now as science is irrespective of time, and courage is declared to be the science of things dreaded and dared, which are future, courage cannot be the science only of these dreadful things, as science also takes cognisance of past and present. (Tr. 175, 176, 177; 198 A, B, C, D, E; 199 A, B.) Courage, therefore, is not the knowledge of things to be dreaded or dared merely, but of all good and evil, and thus embraces not a part but the whole of virtue.

"We thus contradict ourselves, if we declare courage to be only a part of virtue." (Tr. 177; 199 C, D, E.) "We do," says Nicias. "Yet," adds Laches, "I thought that, with all your contempt for me, you would have shed some more light on the subject, by virtue of Damon's wisdom." (Tr. 178; 200 A.) "Look at yourself, not at others, and do not be anxious that I should appear such an ignoramus as yourself; for, ridicule Damon as you may, between us we shall be able to teach you something of which you appear to be in great need." (Tr. 178; 200 B.) "You are a sapient old fellow, Nicias, but I advise Lysimachus and Melesias not to lose hold of Socrates;" and Nicias chimes in with this.

Hereupon Lysimachus renews his entreaties that Socrates will assist the boys. Socrates "Would be glad to do so, but thinks they are all in the same predicament, and equally want a master. Whoever would laugh at us, as too old for school, should recollect Homer's line *Odyss. xvii. 347.*"

(Quoted also Charm., Tr. 123; 161 A.) "Bashfulness is of little use to a man in the hour of his need." To this Lysimachus assents, and says that his age does not stand in the way of his wishing to learn, proposing, at the same time, that they should all meet at his house to-morrow, to confer on what is best to be done. (Tr. 178, 179; 200 C, D, E; 201 A, B, C.)

MENEXENUS.

MENEXENUS, a dialogue of Plato between Socrates and a person of that name, admitted into the canon of the genuine works by consent of antiquity. Socrates rallies Menexenus on his way from the senate-house, as being ambitious of the honours of a ruler, and is informed by him that he has no such object, but has gone there on occasion of the choice of a public orator to pronounce the funeral panegyric on the dead about to be interred. (Tr. 183, 184; Menex. 234 A, B.) Socrates describes his own inflation and growing sense of importance on such occasions, how he participates in the praises of his country, and for four or five days is transported out of earth to the Isles of the Blessed. (Tr. 184, 185; 234 C, D; 235 A, B, C.) Menexenus treats this as quizzing (235 C), and adds that on this occasion all must be done *impromptu*, without preparation. (Ib.) Socrates says there is no difficulty in this case, and will even undertake it himself as a pupil of Aspasia, in common with Pericles and others. (Tr. 186; 235 D, E.) He pretends that Aspasia, knowing that this *epitaphium* was coming off, glued together some of the leavings of the funeral oration of Pericles, and crammed him for the occasion. (Tr. 187; 236 B.) He agrees to recite it, if Menexenus will not laugh (Tr. 187; 236 C), or even to strip and dance if he likes it, as they are alone. (Tr. 188; 236 D.)

We have discharged our duty to the dead, who will now go their fated journey. (Ib.) This is needful to encourage the living. (Tr. 188; 236 E.) The Athenians are *αὐτόχθονες*. (Tr. 188; 237 B.) The dead have now returned to their mother earth. (Tr. 189; 237 C.) This mother-land has abundantly sustained her offspring. (Tr. 190; 237 E.) Praise of the liberal government of it. (Tr. 191; 238 D, E.) Athens has taught that Persia was not invincible. (Tr. 194; 240 D.) The sparing of the Lacedæmonians in Spagia recounted. (Tr. 196; 242 C.) We are invincible to others, but vanquished by our own squabbles. (Tr. 198, 199; 243 C, D, E.) Advice and message of the dead to the living. (Tr. 203; 246 C, D.)

To practise virtue; for wealth brings no glory to the man who is without fortitude, nor do beauty and strength become the coward and poltroon. (Tr. 204; 246 E.) Knowledge apart from justice and the other virtues is craft: you must try and exhibit all strenuous readiness, *διὰ παντός πᾶσαν πάντως προθυμίαν περᾶσθε ἔχειν*. (Tr. 204; 247 A.) The honours of parents are a treasure to children; if you labour for these you will at death come here as friends. (Tr. 204; 247 C.) What is wanted is not immortal, but good children. (Tr. 205; 247 D.) Let the maxim *μηδὲν ἄγαν* be observed. (Tr. 205; 247 E.) Nor must immoderate lamentations for the departed be indulged. (Tr. 206; 248 B.) If the dead have perception of what occurs among the living, they will be gratified by their bearing grief composedly. (Tr. 206; 248 C.) Charge enjoined on the state, though this will be needless. (Tr. 206; 248 D.) Such were their injunctions, and I pray you to obey and imitate them. (Tr. 207; 248 E.) Further obligations about keeping alive these funeral rites, and establishing games and races and

musical contests. (Tr. 208; 249 B, C.) Further oratorical alliteration, *πᾶσαν πάντων παρὰ πάντα.* (Tr. 208; 249 C.) Such was Aspasia's speech; a supremely happy Aspasia if she can compose such speeches, which if Menexenus doubts, he can hear her for himself. (Tr. 208; 249 D.) Menexenus declares his gratitude to Aspasia, or whoever may have dictated the speech, and especially to Socrates, the reciter, who bids him be careful not to denounce him, if he wishes to hear many further political speeches of hers. (Tr. 208; 249 E.

HIPPIAS MAJOR.

THE dialogue called Hippias Major continues to discuss what is the standard of beauty, what is the absolute as distinct from the mere relative, showing that it is not what is ordinarily deemed honourable or useful, about which different persons and states differ, nor the powerful, nor the pleasures of the senses, though these are agreeable. (Tr. 241 to 258; 295 D, E; 304 A.) Hippias characterizes the objections of Socrates as the sawdust and clippings of reasonings, minced into bits, and asserts that the beautiful is to be able to gain your point in a court of justice, and to insure your own safety and that of your friends. According to him, we must let alone these hair-splittings, trifles, and nonsense. The dialogue ends by leaving Socrates in a professed state of humorous confusion.

HIPPIAS MINOR.

IN the Hippias Minor we have an exhibition of Hippias's conceit. (Tr. 264 to 271; 363 D; 364 A; 368 B, C, D, E; 369 A.) The same person has, by his argument,

been made out to be true and false. Hippias taunts Socrates a second time with weaving webs of words, picking out knotty points, and magnifying them unduly; pouncing upon the argument piecemeal, and never looking at the question as a whole. (Tr. 272; 369 C.) Socrates replies with assumed humility. (Tr. 272; 369 D.)

And now arises the question, whether those who are false willingly are not better than those who are so against their will. (Tr. 274, 275; 371 A, B, C, D, E.) Banter of Socrates. (Tr. 275 to 283; 372 A; 376 C.) The better runner is he who can run fast or slow if he likes. (Tr. 277, 278; 373 D.) So with the wrestler, who falls of set purpose. (Tr. 279; 374 B.) So the better body can at will assume an uglier and more villainous expression, like the good actor. (Tr. 279; 374 B.) An ignorant man, when he wanted to say what was false, would unintentionally say what was true; the wise man would lie when he had resolved to do so. (Tr. 268; 367 A.) The close of the dialogue declares again, that Socrates is always wandering up and down in a dreamy state of uncertainty, and no wonder if wise men like Hippias cannot free himself or others from this erratic state of mind.

ION.

ION is the title of one of the shorter dialogues of Plato, which professes to have taken place between Socrates and a rhapsodist of this name, one of a class who sung or recited at public festivals or private rehearsals the poems popularly in vogue in their own day, chiefly Homeric or Epic. When printing was unknown and manuscripts costly, it is manifest that the knowledge of such compositions and the fostering the public taste must have depended largely on

men of this profession. Ion having come off first at Epidaurus at the festival of Æsculapius, declares his resolution to win at the Panathenæa; whereupon Socrates tells him how much he envies his art, which requires to keep up a good outside appearance, and to be familiar with most of the best poets, and especially Homer, the most divine of them. (Tr. 288; 530 B.) A rhapsodist should be the interpreter of his author, and Ion declares that no one ever uttered as many admirable thoughts about Homer as himself, or was so worthy to be crowned by the Homeridæ with a golden crown. (Tr. 288, 289; 530 C, D.) Socrates questions him as to his knowledge of Hesiod, and the relative value of the two poets. (Tr. 290; 531 B, C.)

This leads to the inquiry, What are the qualifications for a judge (Tr. 290; 531 A, B, C), and tests. (Tr. 291; 531 D, E.) Only the same man who knows when an author speaks badly will know who speaks well on the same topic. (Tr. 291; 532 A.) "Why," asks Ion, "do men all become awake when Homer is the theme?" (Tr. 292; 532 C.) Socrates thinks that the judge of art is a good judge of all artistic excellence. (Tr. 293, 294; 533 A, B, C.) The power of speaking on behalf of Homer is a divine power not in the man himself, but diffused through him like a magnetic influence, that makes a string of rings hang together in a chain. (Tr. 294, 295; 533 D; 534 A.) The poet is a light-winged and sacred thing, who can do nothing except by inspiration or madness. (Tr. 296; 534 B.) Poets are the interpreters of the god by whom they are possessed. (Tr. 297; 534 E.)

Transports of the reciter, with his hair on end, his heart bounding, and his eyes streaming with tears (Tr. 298; 535 C), extending to the hearers. (Tr. 299; 535 E.) And if Ion sets them laughing instead of weeping,

he will, to his cost, get off with the loss of his fees. (Tr. 298, 299; 535 E.) Allusion to the magnet. (536 A.) Ion's boast of his knowledge of Homer. (Tr. 300; 536 E.) Driven into a corner. (Tr. 302; 538 B.) If he is such as he believes, why does he not set up for a general rather than a rhapsodist? (Tr. 307; 541 B, C.) Athens will adopt him, even though a foreigner and Ephesian. (Tr. 307; 541 C.) Socrates charges him with being a wriggling Proteus, who evades his promises to reveal the beauties of Homer (Tr. 308; 541 E), and who walks off with a bounce and strut. (Ib.)

ALCIBIADES I.

THERE are two dialogues of Plato which bear the title of Alcibiades I. and II., the object of which is to expose the vanity of his pretensions, to show that power and wealth are not the chief objects for human ambition, but moderation and righteousness. "What we want is the knowledge of what is Best, the *ἐπιστήμη βελτίου*, which is the profitable (Tr. 387-389; Alcib. II.; 145, C, E; 146 E), and which most men miss from trusting to opinion without reason." (146 C.)

In the first Alcibiades a good deal is said incidentally of the practice and usages of the Lacedæmonians and Persians, by Socrates. He indulges a sarcasm at those "Who take more interest in the pursuits of Midias the quail trainer, and other gentlemen of the fancy, who endeavour to take part in state affairs, having, as the ladies would say, the prison cut of hair in their souls, which they have not yet thrown off, and who have come, like barbarians, to flatter and not to rule the state. Is Alcibiades to look to such, neglecting himself, rejecting the necessary

learning, and exercise, and preparation for a statesman?" (Good examples of cognate verb and noun in concord.) (Tr. 340, 341; Alcib. I. 120 A, B.)

Socrates asks, "Is it not likely that better natural dispositions originate from noble stocks, and that those well sprung, if well brought up, will become perfect in virtue? (Tr. 342; 120 D, E.) The kings of the Lacedæmonians and Persians trace their descent through Hercules and Achæmenes to Zeus. So do Alcibiades and Socrates trace theirs to Zeus through Eurysaces and Dædalus; but the lines of Lacedæmonian and Persian sovereigns are wholly through kings from remote ages (121 A), while our ancestors were private men, contemptible by the side of the more imposing pomp and circumstance of those races (Tr. 343; 121 B), whose queens are carefully guarded, to see that no imposition is attempted, or are, in the case of the Persians, beyond suspicion, and whose eldest sons are ushered into the world with universal feasting and sacrifice on the part of all Asia (121 C); but when we were born, as the comic poet says, not even our neighbour was the wiser; we were only handed over to a common nurse, while the heir of Asia was committed to the wisest eunuchs to fashion and compose his limbs, so as to ensure their beauty (Tr. 344; 121 D), taught to ride and hunt at seven, and at fourteen put under four selected teachers, the wisest, the most just, the most moderate, and most courageous; of whom the first instructs him in the Magian lore of Zoroaster, son of Oromasdes; the second requires him to adhere to truth throughout his whole life; the third trains him not to be mastered by pleasure, but to be always truly regal; and the fourth renders him fearless and bold. (Tr. 345; 122 A, B.) If Alcibiades looks to the wealth and delicacies, and vestments with their long trains, to the anointings with costly

balsams, or the numerous followers and other magnificence of the Persians, he must feel ashamed of his own shortcomings; or if he would prefer to look to the wise moderation, the orderly arrangements, the dexterity, the contentment, the highmindedness, the discipline, courage, endurance, love of labour and of emulation and of honour on the part of the Lacedæmonians, he must regard himself as a child by their side." (Tr. 345; 122 C.)

After this Socrates descants on their affluence in land, money, and slaves, and alludes to Æsop's fable of the fox and lion, as illustrating the way in which gold and silver are observed to travel to Lacedæmon, but are never seen to come back again. (Tr. 345, 346; 122 D, E; 123 A.) "All this, however, is nothing to the resources of the Persian king, where a whole territory is assigned to the queen's cincture, and another for her veil, and several for her vestments." (Tr. 347; 123 B, C.) And the subject is pursued through (Tr. 348; 123 D, E; 124 A). A good deal follows on self-insight and knowledge (Tr. 365; 132 C; 133 E), as well as want of knowledge of others, the chief requisite of the Statesman. (Tr. 368; 134, A, B, C.)

ALCIBIADES II.

ALCIBIADES II., a dialogue of Plato, which has come down to us as a genuine production of its author, is held between Socrates and Alcibiades on the subject of praying. The latter is looking serious and thoughtful on his way to the temple of the god, and is interrogated by Socrates as to whether prayer is at all times, and by all persons, effectual in procuring what is sought? "Ought we not to exercise considerable forethought in order not to pray for what will

prove evil, unknown to us? (Tr. 375; 138 A, B.) Thus Œdipus prayed that his children might divide their inheritance with the sword, and invoked curses on his own head, when he might have besought remission of his own evils." "Yes," says Alcibiades, "but Œdipus was mad." "And all other persons are either mad or in their senses," adds Socrates; "and we have to draw the line of distinction between the two classes. There are also others in health or ailing, and these comprise the whole of mankind, there being no intermediate condition. Is it the same with intelligence and folly: must a man be wise or foolish, or may he be neither the one nor the other? (Tr. 376; 138, C, D; 139 A.) If, then, insanity is contrary to being in one's senses, and want of sense is likewise contrary, folly and madness must be the same, as a thing has not two contraries. (139 B.) The great mass of men are fools or, what you admit, madmen; and, living in such an association, should we not have suffered all manner of personal ill-usage such as madmen are apt to inflict, and have long ago paid the penalty of the connexion? (Tr. 377, 378; 139 C.)

"We must modify our admissions. A man in bad health may not have experienced the worst disease. Ophthalmia is a disease, but every disease is not ophthalmia. Diseases are different in their effects, and there are degrees of them as there are grades in vulgar handicrafts. Folly has undergone a like subdivision. Those who have most of it, we term mad; others are only silly or thunderstruck. All degrees of spirit and incapacity are to be found amongst these, though they belong to the non-sensible class. (Tr. 378, 379; 139 D, E; 140 A, B, C, D.)

"Well, then, do you mean, by persons of sense, those who understand what they are doing and saying, and how to do it, and by the insensate, those who do not?"

"I do," says Alcibiades. (Tr. 380 ; 140 E.) "But Œdipus was only one of the latter sort. Many still living, though calm and without passion, pray for what will prove a curse, not knowing that it will be so ; though this was certainly not his case. Suppose, now, that, before you could open your lips, the deity to whom you are about to pray should ask, 'Will you be satisfied to be despot of Athens?' and you should suggest, 'Of all Greece!' and the god should appoint you to be lord of all Europe, would you not be in a transport as if the happiest fortune had befallen you?" (Tr. 380, 381 ; 141 A, B.) "I should be only like the rest of mankind," observes Alcibiades. "But," adds Socrates, "you would not accept this power at the cost of life, and why should you do so if you were likely to make a bad use of it?" (Tr. 381 ; 141 C.) Clearly, then, we should not accept a seeming good thoughtlessly, nor pray at random for what may turn out hurtful. Many are the tyrants that have lost their lives by conspiracy. Only lately a minion of the tyrant Archelaus slew his lover through ambitious views, and in a few days experienced a similar fate. Many of our generals are exiles or have died in disgrace, or fallen beneath the tongue of informers, after all their doing and suffering in battle, and have been eager to enjoy again a private capacity. So, too, many have prayed for children, who have proved to be their greatest calamity, or who have been cut off in the moment of highest promise to the inconsolable grief of their parents. Notwithstanding, it is rare to meet with any who would refuse a proffered boon or would decline to pray for what prayer would procure, or would reject despotic power when placed within their reach.

"It is, in fact, not true that the gods are the authors of calamity, which is due to men's crimes or infatuated

wishes. (Tr. 381, 382 ; 141 D, E ; 142 A, B, C, D, E.) He was a sensible poet who wrote :

‘Thou sov’reign Zeus, on us good gifts bestow
Prayerless, or at thy footstool bending low ;
But what thy wisdom knows would prove our hurt,
Deaf to entreaty, let thy power avert.’ ”

(Tr. 383 ; 143 A.) “How many evils,” observes Alcibiades, “does ignorance cause! Strange that a man cannot pray for what is best for him!” To this Socrates demurs, “As ignorance is sometimes a good as well as an evil. The ignorance of what is best is certainly an evil, but yet if Orestes had not known his mother, he would not have killed her ; nor, were it your purpose to slay Pericles—I do not mean to hint that such is the case,—would you kill any one in his place who was unknown to you ; and, therefore, were you ignorant of Pericles, you would avoid a crime.” (Tr. 383, 384 ; 143 B, C, D, E ; 144 A, B, C.) “Consider,” says Socrates, “that unless a man is possessed of the knowledge of what is best, other knowledge is mostly hurtful. When about to say or do a thing, we ought to know what we are going to say or do. But is this the case with our political speakers who counsel about war and peace, or public improvements, and who are the prime movers in everything ?

“We agreed that the many were destitute of sense : and surely he is not a person of sense who does not know whether, and in what respect, a given line of conduct is better. Nor is an abstract knowledge of war, or murder, or plunder, apart from its moral fitness, a mark of good sense. The knowledge of what is best, is what is beneficial. We term the man who in every art knows what belongs to his art, its professor : for example, he is a rider, or boxer, or musician, but we do not regard this knowledge as one with intelligence. That state would be ill-adminis-

tered where specific arts, or mere abstract knowledge, were all that went to constitute it, without a knowledge on some one's part of what was best. Such a commonwealth, where every subordinate art sought to get the ascendant, would be full of confusion and tumult. (Tr. 386, 387, 388, 389; 144 D, E; 145 A, B, C, D, E; 146 A.) We said that the mass were senseless, trusting to opinion rather than clear insight. If, then, by doing what they know or fancy they know, the multitude is likely to injure itself, it were better for them not to know or not to fancy they do know.

"Thus the possession of other sciences, as was said above, if unaccompanied with the knowledge of what is best, is mostly injurious. (Tr. 389, 390; 146 B, C, D, E.) A state or a human soul, if it is to live as it ought, must stick to this knowledge, as the patient to his physician, or the voyager to his pilot, if he would avoid the dangers of storm or drifting on the rocks. (Tr. 391; 147 A.) The poet speaks of one who knew many trades, but all badly. Poetry is mostly enigmatical, and I presume that the writer meant to say that the knowledge of these trades was bad for him, Margites."

On this, Alcibiades, who had previously spoken of the verse as inapplicable to the reasoning, changes his mind, and is twitted by Socrates for his instability, and he now again questions him as to how he would act if the deity should make him the offer alluded to above (Tr. 380; 141 A, B), before he put up his petition, or what he would do if left to himself to ask? (Tr. 391, 392, 393; 147 B, C, D, E; 148 A.) On this, Alcibiades expresses hesitation, and thinks that "The answer is one requiring great caution." (Tr. 393; 148 B.)

Socrates cites the case of the Lacedæmonians, "Who pray to the gods alone for what is beautiful as well as good. Even where they have been unfortunate,

though a rare event, it cannot be traced to any foolish urgency on their parts. (Tr. 394 ; 148 C.) The story goes, that when the Athenians were always unsuccessful in encountering the Lacedæmonians, they resolved to send an embassy to the god Ammon, to inquire the cause, notwithstanding the many and costly sacrifices, dedicatory offerings and splendid processions which were always taking place in Athens. His answer was, that 'The gods preferred the simple address of the Lacedæmonians to the pompous ritual of their adversaries, and their gilded victims.' (Tr. 394, 395 ; 148 D, E ; 149 A, B, C. So Homer. *See* Art. Prayer):

' Sweet was the smell, but vain the purpose all,
The gods immortal feast not at the call :
For sacred Troy, and Troy's imperious lord,
And spear-armed host of Priam are abhorred.'

'The nature of the deity is not to be soothed by presents like a corrupt judge. The soul of the worshipper is regarded, not his sacrifices. Nothing is easier than to sin, and with its produce to offer blandishments to the gods. Righteousness and intellect is what they prize, and only the sensible and upright know how to propitiate both gods and men." (Tr. 395, 396 ; 149 D, E ; 150 A, B.)

"Well, then, we must wait till these endowments are ours ; but when," asks Alcibiades, "will this happy time arrive, and who is to be my teacher?" "One who cares for you ; but his first operation must be to take the mist from your eyes, to enable you to discern good and evil." "I am quite ready," says Alcibiades, "and I will wait till the change is effected. (Tr. 396, 397, 398 ; 150 C, D, E ; 151 A.) Accordingly, Socrates, as you give me good counsel I shall deck your brows with this chaplet, and offer crowns to the gods in due season, praying that

the time may soon arrive." "I accept your gift," adds Socrates, "as I shall always value anything conferred by you; and I am reminded of Creon, who has been made to say by Euripides, on his seeing Tiresias decked with garlands, and hearing that he bore them off as first fruits of victory, by virtue of his art, 'I accept as an omen thy crowns, that tell of success in battle.' We lie, as you know, at the mercy of the waves; thus I, too, accept a chaplet from you as a mark of favourable opinion and good omen. And I deem myself in no less a crisis than Creon, and long, as one of your admirers, to be the announcer of victory." (Tr. 398; 151 B, C.)

THEAGES.

THEAGES, a short dialogue reckoned amongst those that are genuine, supposed to be held between Socrates and Demodocus, accompanied by his son Theages. The father begs the philosopher to step into the portico of Zeus Eleutherius with him for a short conference. The former opens with some remarks on the great care that plants and animals, children among the rest, require in their rearing. (Tr. 401; 121 A, B.) "My boy here wants to become a wise man and to follow the example of some of his associates in attending on the lessons of a sophist, for pay. I don't care about the money, but I have my fears for the result. I do not like to thwart him, so I am glad to have met you opportunely in order to ask your advice." (Tr. 402; 121 C, D; 122 A.)

"Conference," says Socrates, "is a divine thing, and so is the consulting about the education of ourselves or those dear to us. But let us see that we mean the same thing. (Tr. 402; 122 B.) Let us ask the young man himself what it is he wants." Socrates approves the name

of the stripping as a very nice one, and is told, in reply to a question, that he wants to be wise. (Tr. 403 ; 122 C. D.) "Wise, however, in what? No doubt your father has had you taught the usual accomplishments." "My father knows well what I want," replies the youth, "but he opposes my wishes. (Tr. 403 ; 123 A.) I want to be made wise in governing men." (Tr. 404 ; 123 B, C, D.) "Do you mean sick men, or singing men, or gymnasts?" "Well, others besides these." (Tr. 405 ; 124 A.) "You are not, then, speaking of men employed in horticulture, or farming, or of carpenters and turners, but of all these and many more taken together?" "Yes." "You mean to govern like Ægisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias?" "Quite so." (Tr. 406 ; 124 B, C, D.) "What name was assigned to Bacis, the Sibyl, and Amphilytus?" "Oracle singers." "What to Hippias and Periander?" "Why, tyrants, I suppose."

"You desire, then, O scapegrace! to play the tyrant over us, and find fault with your old father for not complying with your whim? And you, Demodocus, are you not ashamed to have thwarted so reasonable an ambition? Let us confer, then, as to who will make a wise tyrant of him. (Tr. 407 ; 124 E ; 125 A.) You know Euripides says—

‘Tyrants are wise by consort with the wise.’

Do you want to enjoy the society of one who follows the same pursuit as Callicrète, daughter of Cyanê, who was versed in the arts of tyranny?" "You are only burlesquing me, Socrates," rejoins Theages. (Tr. 408 ; 125 B, C, D, E.) "But you want to be a tyrant?" "Yes ; and so would you and other men, if the chance came in your way ; but I am not doggedly bent on this. I do not want to rule men by force, but with their own consent." "What !

like Themistocles, Pericles, and Cimon?" "Ay, by Zeus, that's it!" (Tr. 409; 126 A.) "Well, then, you must study under such statesmen as are first-rate politicians and have had experience in home and foreign affairs." (Tr. 409; 126 B, C.) "Only I hear, Socrates, that you say that the sons of these men were no better than those of common craftsmen; and if they could not benefit their own sons, I am sure they could not be of use to me." (Tr. 410; 126 D.)

"If the difficulty is so great," says Socrates, "why blame your father for indecision, seeing he will put you under the best rulers you may select, by which you may save your money and gain repute, more than you would as the pupil of a sophist?" (Tr. 410; 126 E; 127 A.) "Suppose, Socrates, you let me come under you." "Excellently spoken!" said Demodocus; "let me join my entreaties to those of my son." (Tr. 411; 127 B, C.) "But why, Demodocus, should I be able to better him more than yourself: you my senior, and a man skilled in official posts? Then, if he does not care for statesmen, there are Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias the Leontine, and Polus the Agrigentine, who are very popular, and will charge a round sum as fee; while I know nothing more than all men do." (Tr. 411, 412; 127 D, E; 128 A, B.) "Socrates is not willing to meet my wishes, father," says Theages, "though he has been of vast use to others of my age, and might be to me." (Tr. 412; 128 C.) "The reason of this is," observes Socrates, "that my dæmon will not permit me and I must not oppose him."

Hereupon Socrates relates fatal consequences that attended on disobeying this intimation. "There was the example of Charmides, the beautiful son of Glaucon, who persisted in a competition in the stadium at Nemea (Tr. 413; 128 E); that also of Timarchus, who perpetrated a deed

which cost him his life, in opposition to the warning. (Tr. 414 ; 129 A, B, C.) The case, too, of the destruction of our army in Sicily, and that of Sannio, gone with Thrasyllus to the war in Ephesus and Ionia, which will probably issue in disaster. (Tr. 414 ; 129 D.) True there is an opposite side to the picture. Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, represents himself as having greatly benefited by being near and touching me, though he never learnt anything directly from me. (Tr. 415, 416 ; 130 A, B, C, D.) Over all this I have no control, and the dæmon turns the intercourse to good account or not, as pleases him." "This," says Theages, "then, is what I will do: make trial of the dæmon by keeping near you; and if he is propitious, all will be as I wish; if not, I will try and appease the divinity by prayer and sacrifice, and do what the prophets advise." "So let it be," says Socrates. (Tr. 416 ; 131 A.) This notion of wisdom flowing over by means of contact rather than oral communication is again touched on. (Vol. iii. Tr. 480 ; Symp. 175 D.)

THE RIVALS.

THIS short dialogue, enumerated in the list of the genuine ones by Thrasyllus, and which Mr. Grote sees no reason for rejecting as spurious, is supposed to be carried on by Socrates and two others who are only designated as above. Socrates falls in with certain youths, in the school of Dionysius, who are described as very prepossessing in appearance, of good parentage, and much admired. In explanation of their earnestness in some discussion with which they are occupied, one of the admirers, who is standing by, informs Socrates that they are merely wasting their time in philosophizing or speculating about the motions of the

heavenly bodies, probably. (Tr. 419, 420; 132 A, B.) Another rival admirer begs that Socrates will not be surprised at so illiberal a reply, because the man who made it is one of those who think only of feats of bodily strength and stuffing and wasting his time in bed. (Tr. 420, 421; 132 C, D.) This second admirer is the type of one who believes himself to be a philosopher and so turns upon himself the attention of Socrates, who asks, "Whether or no philosophizing is in his idea honourable?" This has the effect of putting a stop to the original discussion between the handsome youths, who now become listeners; and Socrates here takes occasion to express his own admiration for youth and beauty of person. One of the rival admirers, doubtless he who has spoken last, asserts in loud terms that he does regard philosophizing as honourable. (Tr. 421; 133 A, B.)

"But is it possible," says Socrates, "for a man to know the value of a pursuit who is ignorant what it is itself?" "Surely not," observes the respondent. "I accept the view of Solon, that it is to grow old learning." (Tr. 422; 133 C.) This reply is hardly satisfactory, and Socrates further asks "Whether philosophy is one with much learning, and whether it is good as well as honourable? This goodness, however, is not peculiar to philosophy. The love of gymnastic exercises is likewise good and honourable. If philosophy and much learning are one and the same, so will much toil and the love of exercise for the good of the body be identical. (Tr. 422; 133 D, E.) This being so, the first rival, who is devoted to the gymnasium, ought to be able to say something on the matter. Let him tell us whether the body attains its best condition through much or little labour." This elicits from him the expression of a preference for moderate exertion; and Socrates excites a laugh from the youths who are listening, at the expense of the philosophic rival, by a quaint sketch of the gaunt

bodily aspect of the philosopher, Democritus or some popular sage of the time, possibly. (Tr. 423 ; 134 A, B.) The second of these rivals, though he will concede nothing to the first, "Will admit, for the sake of Socrates, that moderate exertion and moderate food are better for the body than excess of either, and that this is specially so in respect of the soul.

"Thus it is a moderate amount of learning, rather than much, which is the more beneficial. (Tr. 424 ; 134 C, D.) As we consult the physician, or the trainer, or agriculturist, about diet, and exercise, and planting, so must there be some one who can explain what is moderate in mental husbandry." Who the fitting person is, is not so easy to be described ; and Socrates makes a playful allusion to the youths, as fit to come to the rescue, and to the lines Hom. Odys. xxi, 285, referring to the scene where the bow of Ulysses is placed in his hands in presence of the suitors. (Tr. 425 ; 135 A.)

Socrates now asks, "What kinds of learning are most suitable for the philosopher?" and the sager of the rivals "Thinks they should be as many of the highest class and as intellectual as possible." (135 B.) "But are we in this respect to act as we should in the case of a carpenter, who can be got readily for five or six minæ, while a good architect could only be acquired for ten thousand drachmæ?" "I do not mean," says the respondent, "that the philosopher is to know the art of carpentry or architecture like a professional man, but only to comprehend in a general way more about these and all other arts than the mere ordinary person." (Tr. 426 ; 137 C, D.) "You mean," says Socrates, "a kind of pentathlete, who would gain the best prize for general proficiency, but not be the best runner, or wrestler, or boxer. (Tr. 426 ; 135 E.) In other words, your philosopher is to be second in everything, while all others are only best in one department." This is admitted to be the proper view of the case. (Tr. 426 ; 136 A.)

Again Socrates propounds his question otherwise: "Does the interlocutor regard good persons to be those who are useful or useless? If they are the useful, the useless must be bad. To which class do the philosophers belong?" "The most useful," is the reply. "How can philosophers be useful if they are all second-rate and inferior to individuals exclusively pursuing a special calling? (Tr. 427; 136 B, C.) If you were ill, you would not call in the philosopher, but the physician." "I would call both," says the wiser of the rivals. "Yet you would call in one in preference to the other: and so in every other case. (136 D.) Thus the philosopher is useless; and we agreed that what was useless was bad. (136 E.) We are, therefore, got into a dilemma. (Tr. 428; 137 A.)

"Will it not hence appear, that philosophizing is not meddling with many arts, nor poring with head and eyes bent on mechanical work, which is usually regarded as a reproach? (137 B.) In the case of horses and dogs, the art that makes them better is that which chastises them, and knows the good and the vicious in practice. (137 C.) So with mankind: the art which discriminates character and knows how to discipline is that which betters men. (137 D.) That science which punishes the lawless and vicious is the judicial; and what applies in the case of one holds good in that of the many. The horse, and ox, and dog, not recognising any moral classification of good or bad, cannot tell to what class they themselves belong. Nor can a man who cannot distinguish bad from good be differently circumstanced. (Tr. 429; 137 E.)

"It is this knowledge of self to which the Delphic precept points. And the same science teaches proper discipline. Justice, or righteousness and moderation, or sound-mindedness are the same. (Tr. 429, 430; 138 A, B.) This correct administration is the distinguishing cha-

racteristic of the statesman, tyrant, king, steward, master, who are on a par with the just man and the sound-minded. (Tr. 430; 138 C.) Well, then, will it not be disgraceful that the philosopher should not know how to discover that the physician is giving good advice, or that the artizan, or the ruler, and the judge is talking sensibly on matters of his profession? Is he merely second-rate in judging of such subjects, or is he to decline the mastery of his own house and abrogate the office of judge and administrator, when any question is submitted for his award? (Tr. 430, 431; 138 D, E.) It will follow, then, that philosophizing is not being a walking lexicon nor a jack-of-all-trades." And on the announcement of this conclusion, the sager rival has nothing to reply, while his more uncultivated co-rival joins in the general approval with which it is greeted. (Tr. 431; 139 A.)

HIPPARCHUS.

HIPPARCHUS is the title of one of Plato's dialogues which is chiefly concerned with determining the character and nature of gain or the gainful. No good skilful leader employs what is worthless. That which is of no value is never sought except through ignorance. The lovers of good are lovers of gain. Again, some gain is, for the sake of argument, conceded to be good; other gain, evil. What is there in common between good and bad gain? All men love gain, good as well as evil. No positive conclusion is established out of the conflicting statements. The opponent is compelled, not persuaded. It occupies Tr. 435 to 446; 225 A to 232 C.

MINOS.

MINOS, a canonical dialogue of Plato on law, carried on between Socrates and a friend. It commences abruptly, with the question, "What is law—law in its universal application?" To which the friend replies, "What is legislated." (Tr. 449 ; 313 A, B.) But as speech is not what is spoken, sight not what is seen, nor hearing what is heard, so law cannot be what law enacts. (Tr. 450 ; 313 C.) The friend again defines law to be "dogmas and decrees." (Tr. 450 ; 314 A, B.) Thus law, then, would be political opinion. (Tr. 451 ; 314 C, D.) But this is too sweeping, as a bad dogma cannot be law. (Tr. 452 ; 314 E.) Yet Socrates thinks law is a kind of opinion ; one that is good ; that is, true. (Ib.)

This true opinion is a discovery of *Ens*, the actual. "Why, then," asks the friend, "do we not always use the same law about the same matters?" (Tr. 452 ; 315 A.) To this Socrates replies, "Because we are not always able to find out what *Ens*, the actual, the law aims at. (Tr. 452 ; 315 B.) Clearly, different people do not use the same laws : we do not sacrifice human victims like the Carthaginians, nor offer our children to Cronus ; then, again, there are our funeral rites compared with those of the persons who buried their dead in their houses." (Tr. 453 ; 315 C, D.) This long statement and reply will be of no avail. (Tr. 453 ; 315 E.) Socrates asks, "Do you think the just unjust, and the unjust just, or the reverse? All persons think as we do. So in Persia, so about light and heavy, so about the beautiful and ugly, whether in Carthage or Lycia. (Tr. 454 ; 316 A, B.) We, equally with others, hold that there are reals and unrels." But the friend says he can hardly be persuaded of this,

when he sees that we never cease changing our laws up and down. (Tr. 454; 316 C.)

After an interchange of questions, the friend agrees that both Greeks and barbarians are in accord, where they both know of what they are speaking, and agree always. (Tr. 455; 316 D.) Matters of physic, agriculture, gardening, cookery, are discussed in their several treatises, and have their special laws. (Tr. 455, 456; 316 E; 317 A.) "Well, then," asks Socrates, "to whom belong the writings and legal compilations which respect the government of the state — do they not belong to those who know how to rule it?" "They are the compositions of kings and of wise and able men." (Tr. 456; 317 A.) "But these are not arbitrarily changed and men are to be regarded as not skilled who do this. Shall we call the lawful that which is right in all the cases enumerated? (Tr. 456; 317 B.) And what is not right, not in accord with law? Well, then, in the ordering a city, or in treatises on the just and unjust, the same rule holds; the rightful is the royal law, and that which is not right is not, however it may seem to those who do not know. Thus," says Socrates, "we have agreed that law is the discovery of *Ens*, a reality." (Tr. 456; 317 C.)

After referring to the art of sowing seed, and of accompanying songs on the lyre and pipe, in each of which the best artificer is he who is most legal—after this parallel, he, Socrates, asks, "Who is best at distributing nutriment to the bodies of men—is it not he who has the greatest personal worth?" "The distributions and laws of such a person are the best, and the most lawful is the best distributor." (Tr. 457; 317 D, E.) This leads to the introduction of the names of Minos and Rhadamanthus; the latter of whom was a just man by report, while Minos was said to have been fierce, intractable, and unjust; which

Socrates declares to be a mere exaggeration of the Attic tragedians. (Tr. 459; 318 D.) Homer and Hesiod do not say this, and they are more to be trusted than all the tragic poets. (Tr. 459; 318 E.) This should induce caution in speaking of divine men, for the deity is incensed when the good man, his own image, is blamed, a thing more divine than wood, or serpents, or birds. (Tr. 459; 319 A.) It is thus Homer speaks of Crete and its ninety cities:—

“In which is Cnossus city, famed and great,
Where ancient Minos held his ample state,
By mighty Zeus in converse dear caressed,
And every ninth revolving year his guest.”

(Tr. 460; 319 B.)

He notes here, by the way, that *δαριωτής* does not mean “pot companion.” (Tr. 460; 319 E.) Socrates, who has utterly set at nought his own rule of short speeches, goes on to say that the Cretans and Lacedæmonians abstain from banqueting and wine feasts, that Minos forbade intoxication, and enacted admirable laws. (Tr. 461; 320 A.) It is thus that Hesiod speaks of him:—

“O’er numbers vast, the neighbouring people all
Who owned him king, obedient to his call;
Jove’s royal sceptre like a god he swayed,
To which those hosts admiring homage paid.”

(Tr. 461; 320 C, D.) “Why then,” asks the friend, “has this report been spread abroad that Minos was uncultivated and harsh?” “Well, he got to loggerheads with the poets, which, if you are wise, you will never do. He lost his good opinion when he got to war with this city of ours, where there is various wisdom, and tragic poets are numerous. (Tr. 462; 320 E.)

“This discovery of tragedy was a very old one on our parts, not from Thespis or Phrynichus; it is the most

popular, delightful, and soul-seductive of all kinds of poetry, and with it we avenged ourselves on Minos, though he was a good man and a respecter of laws, and his enactments have never been abolished, because they were based on a thorough understanding of the truth of *Ens*, or the actual, with respect to the administration of a state. (Tr. 462; 321 B.) These, then, were the best law enactors among the ancients, both herdsmen and shepherds of men, as Homer has termed a good general a shepherd of the people. (Tr. 462, 463; 321 C.) It is, however, a discreditable thing to our souls individually that they should appear to be ignorant of what it is in which their good and evil consists, while we have well considered that of our bodies and other interests." (Tr. 463; 321 D.)

CLEITOPHON.

CLEITOPHON is classed among the genuine dialogues of Plato by the ancients. It is occupied with a remonstrance offered by a person of this name to Socrates, whose purport will appear from the following extracts.

Socrates observes, that "It would be assuredly disgraceful, if, when Cleitophon is eager to aid him, he should not await the result, for it is clear that by knowing in what way he is worse or better he will be more on his guard." (Tr. 468; 407 A.) On this, Cleitophon begs him to hear "How astonished he had often been in listening to him rebuking men like a god on the tragic machine, for not finding teachers of righteousness for their sons, in addition to the learning of their letters, music, and gymnastics, which somehow has not bred a contempt for riches." (407 B, C.) "You say,"

Socrates is represented as observing, "that it is not through want of instruction or intellect, but voluntarily, that the unjust are unjust; and again you dare to say that injustice is base and god-aborred. How, then, can any one make choice of so great evil? Conquered, you say, by pleasure. Is not this, then, involuntary, if the conquering is voluntary? so that the argument wholly proves that to do injustice is an involuntary act, and on this account it the more becomes states and individuals to be cautious." (Tr. 469; 407 D, E. See Art. Voluntary; also Badness.)

Socrates is also further reminded of saying, "That he who does not know how to use eyes and ears, had better not see nor hear; and that he who does not know how to use his soul aright had better keep quiet or die, or, if he lives, be a slave to some one better than himself, and surrender to him the rudder of his understanding." (Tr. 469, 470; 408 A, B). Also, that "Politics is the art of governing men, and is the same as righteousness and right decision." (Ib.)

To these and many other beautiful assertions, how that virtue may be taught, and that a man should take great care of himself, Cleitophon declares that "He had never offered any opposition, as he considers them most conducive, *προτρεπτικώτατους*, and available to stir us up from sleep." (408 C.) "But how are we to begin the study of righteousness? (Tr. 471; 408 E.) Physic and gymnastics pertain to the care of the body, but what art is there, for the virtue of the soul? (409 A.) This art is no other than righteousness. (Ib.) But as every art has two sides: for example, physic makes physicians, and also health, or is didactic as well as practical, so righteousness not only teaches men to be righteous, but confers special benefits as a result, which one will call advantageous, another necessary, useful, profitable." (Tr. 471; 409 B, C.)

Cleitophon, who supposes that the preceding inquiries have

been addressed to some disciples of the Socratic school, declares, "That he asked at last what Socrates himself had to say, and that he told him it was the business of righteousness to injure enemies and to do good to friends, but afterwards shifted his ground and declared that the just man did good to all." (Tr. 472, 473 ; 410 A.) Under these circumstances, he supposes Socrates not to know what it is, or that he will not tell ; and therefore Cleitophon will have recourse to Thrasymachus. (410 C.) He adds : " Lay it down that Cleitophon admits that it is ridiculous to be solicitous about other things, and to neglect that soul for the sake of which all other labours are expended. (Tr. 473, 474 ; 410 D.) I will say, Socrates, that you are worth everything to a man not yet having undergone the protreptic impulse to virtue ; but to one already incited, you are all but an obstacle to his attaining happiness through virtue." (410 E.) In this quasi-dialogue, Plato, no doubt, intends to exemplify the sort of objection to which the Socratic method of surrounding a subject with doubts, and probing it thoroughly, was open, and he may have intended hereafter to reply to the objection more at large.

EPISTLES.

THE Epistles ascribed to Plato, are, first, one from Dion to Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, complaining of unworthy treatment ; and returning a present of gold given by the latter. The second, from Plato to Dionysius, reminds him that the intercourse of great men is not consigned to oblivion : " Men will speak of us when we are dead, and all men desire to be well spoken of. (Tr. 480 ; Epist. II., 311 B, C.) The higher the order of intellect, the more this is regarded ; and those who have passed away would desire,

if they could return, to correct anything wrong in their past lives. (Tr. 481; 311 D.) Nothing is worse than to neglect our reputation in respect of philosophy. (Tr. 481; 311 E.) If you, the sovereign, honour me, it will redound to your honour as a philosopher." (Tr. 482; 312 C.) And he reminds him "of the universal King, whose, and for whose sake, are all things, Him who is the procuring cause of all beautiful things." (312 E.) What follows contains advice and expostulation, and incidentally it is stated that there is no composition of Plato's that bears his name, nor will be, "As what has been said belongs to Socrates, a man illustrious even when young." (Tr. 485; 314 C.)

In the third Epistle, from Plato to Dionysius, he exonerates himself from some false charges, and there occurs a curious passage, in which he says he appeared reluctantly in public (Tr. 487; 315 E), but busied himself about the proemia to his Laws, to which he has heard that additions have been made, though his own style will be easily discriminated. (Tr. 488; 316 A.) Plato taxes Dionysius with having broken his solemn assurances and sold Dion's property, without his consent (Tr. 490; 318 B); and this has produced a wolfish friendship and severance between them, τὴν ἐμὴν καὶ σὴν λυκοφιλίαν καὶ ἀκοινωνίαν διὰ σε ἀπειργάσατο. The rest is carried on in a strain of objurgation, in which Plato tells Dionysius that he "Did not say what he should have said, lest his setting sail should have been restricted to narrow limits instead of an open sea." (Tr. 492; 319 C.)

The fourth Epistle contains one piquant passage, that "To accomplish much, you must please men, but self-will has its dwelling in a desert." (Tr. 495; 321 B.) The fifth and sixth we may pass over. The seventh, one of the most interesting of the series, is addressed to the friends and familiars of Dion. It tells the story of Plato's

disappointment and disgust at the government of the thirty, who soon showed that the previous administration was gold in comparison with what they put in its place, and treated his revered friend Socrates badly. (Tr. 499, 500; 324 B.) "Evils will never cease," he says, "till philosophers are the chief power in the state." (Tr. 502; 326 A, B.) See Rep. vol. ii., where this is frequently insisted on. Then it was that he went to Italy and Sicily, the morals of which and its excesses he reprobates. (Tr. 503; 326 C, D, E.)

Here follow various moral and religious reflections, incorporated elsewhere in this Index. (Tr. 505, 513, 514, 515; 328 C; 334 B; 334 E; 335 A, B, C.) "He is sure that had Dion held the chief power he would have adopted the best form of government consistent with liberty, and have saved Dionysius. (Tr. 515, 516; 335 E; 336 A, B.) But now some evil dæmon has thrown all into confusion. There is no cessation of ills to those who espouse party quarrels. (336 E.) Men must first become masters of their passions, and lay down laws no less for the victors than for the vanquished (Tr. 517, 518; 337 A, C): conferring good alike on each. (Ib.) The conquerers must show themselves more conformable to the laws than the conquered." (Tr. 518; 337 D.)

The letter is still protracted, and recounts a third invitation and promises, affecting the deepest interest in philosophy, in which the tyrant was said to be much improved. (Tr. 519 to 521; 338 A to 339 B.) Plato relates his going a third time (Tr. 522; 340 A), wishing to test the truth of the report (340 B): hears that he, Dionysius, has written as his own what was not so. (Tr. 523, 524; 341 B.) "The communication of philosophy is like a light kindled by personal intercourse, in the soul self-nourishing;" and Plato adds, that "What has been

written or spoken by him was the best, and that what had been written badly would be no small grief to him." (Tr. 524; 341 C, D.)

The eighth Epistle we pass over. The ninth has a good passage on what we owe to parents and country, as not being born for ourselves. (Tr. 547; 358 A.) In the tenth he observes that "The stable, and faithful, and sound are true philosophy: other qualities are but pretentious cleverness. (Tr. 548; 358 C.) From the thirteenth we quote only the request to present the daughters of Cebes with three dresses seven cubits long, not of the costly description from Amorgus but of Sicilian linen (Tr. 555; 363 A); and the concluding farewell and greeting to the fellow-sphærist, or possible members of some Royal Geographical and Astronomical Society, which had Dionysius for president, perchance. (Tr. 556; 363 D.) Allusion has been made to a little sphere. (Ep. II. Tr. 482; 312 D.) This letter was written prior to any estrangement.

LAWS.

(TRANSLATION. VOL. V.)

THE *Laws* is one of the more lengthy and discursive of Plato's dialogues, in which the doctrines are more authoritatively laid down, and in which discussion is not the object so much as exposition. This peculiarity it possesses in common with the *Republic*, to which it is related both in systematic completeness, and elaboration, and community of purpose. Why our author, after he had furnished the scheme of an ideal republic, in adorning which he had expended all his intellectual wealth, in the period of his fullest vigour, should in the decline of life have turned to retrace his line of thought anew, does not appear. No doubt his ideal flights and poetic dreams had, to a large extent, been checked, or lulled into inactivity by the sobering influence of age; and his restless, inquiring, dialectic temper of mind had given place to a more conservative and deferential sentiment of entire subjugation to law, and the authoritative traditions of religion, as expounded or insisted on by the lawgiver. The model state of his earlier years was that after which his fancy had then yearned, but whose realization was impracticable; and he has spoken of the value of an attempt to furnish an ideal standard by drawing what is not practicable. (Tr. ii. 283; Rep. 592 A, B.)

In the Magnetic community of his later years, we are presented with a more practical aspect of his general conception of what a working state should be. There

is no longer the same space allotted to the development of the doctrine of pure ideas. The love of the abstract, pure science, philosophy, dialectics, the necessity for a pre-eminently learned ruler, and a perpetual indefatigable scrutiny of the grounds of truth, is no longer pressed as before. The lawgiver and the national creed, and a passive subjection to the recognised standards of religious appeal, are now of chief account. The ethical views about happiness, and the pleasurable nature of the Good, according to Mr. Grote, are assimilated more to those of the Protagoras, while the Republic is more in accord with the Gorgias. In both Laws and Republic, the license of fiction and of the poets is to be coerced, but the censorship of the press is more rigid in the former.

There is also in the Laws much greater detail of positive enactment, and more intolerance of freedom of thought and action. Socrates no longer speaks, and the Athenian who discourses is only a guest among strangers, two old men, at Cnossus in Crete, both occupants of states, primitive, and destitute of the higher pursuits of philosophy and taste.

Book I.—The first book of the Laws touches on the Cretan and Lacedæmonian institutes and their tendencies, and those principles of fear, and pleasure, and pain, which the legislator has to act on.

Book II.—In the second, the purpose of education is dwelt on, and many special regulations as to the teaching of poets, the allowing wine to boys, and the severance of music and poetry from dancing.

Book III.—The third treats of the rise and fall of states, of the evils of uncontrolled power, of the fluctuations in the Persian monarchy, of the Athenian democracy, and concludes with Clinias asking his collocutors from Athens and Lacedæmon for their advice in the foundation of a new state.

Book IV.—In the fourth we have many cursory comments on the conditions' that affect a state for weal or woe, and stress is laid on belief in the providence and goodness of the gods, and the practice of piety and obedience.

Book V.—The fifth treats of personal virtue, purification of the state, limitation of numbers, equal apportionment of lands, and the strict maintenance of ancient traditions. Then follow restrictions on commerce, currency, foreign travel, interest on loans and debts, right of recovery, etc. Notwithstanding the equality of property and lands, yet some will become richer than others, and special provision is made for such cases.

Book VI.—The sixth is concerned with the appointment of magistrates, and the selection of fit persons to colonize the state, the qualifications of the law guardians, Generals, Hipparchs, Phylarchs, and Taxiarchs, and rules for electing them. The government is to be intermediate between democracy and monarchy. In addition, there are to be public ministers of religion, city and market inspectors, and appeals to the oracle at Delphi. The offices are to be served in a certain routine through all the territorial subdivisions, and the magistrates are to be obnoxious to citation and punishment, for abuse of their power or breach of rule. Leaders in music and gymnastics are also to be appointed, and a minister of education. After this follow rules for proceedings in the law courts, and the selection of judges and rules for marriage, as to which it is recommended that the rich should not seek to ally themselves with the rich; then we pass to indulgence in drinking, the treatment of slaves, the education of women, uniformity and long duration of natural events, the strength of the passions and their due direction.

Book VII.—Book the seventh discourses on the education of children, and the danger of changes in their sports; on the duties of piety, and what we owe to divine influence; on domestic duties and early rising; learning to read and write; on committing poetry to memory, and its danger; on training women to gymnastic and warlike exercises; the studies of geometry, number, astronomy, as tending to religiousness; and concludes with some prohibitions on unlawful hunting.

Book VIII.—The eighth speaks of a more effective gymnastic discipline, which is hindered by the pursuit of gain, the source of all rascality in states; denounces unnatural practices, and appeals to the opposite conduct of even brute beasts. *See particularly Laws.* (Tr. 318 to 335; 831 A to 841 D.) After this it discusses the subject of laws agricultural, removal of land-marks, and cases of trespass, imports and exports, and public markets and places of exchange.

Book IX.—The ninth touches on sacrilege, and forbids punishing children for the sins of a parent, unless three generations in succession have been capitally convicted; asserts that persons are evil against their will; but this is no argument against bettering them by punishment, both for their own sake and by way of example to others; lays down rules for homicide. It speaks of the imperfection and hardship of law, of the evils of lust and avarice, leading to murder and suppression of evidence; of the terrors of another world as restraints on vice, of further provisions in the case of murder and homicide, of the office and necessity of law for protecting the common weal, and of the offences of children against their aged parents, which even the prospect of future punishment has not been able to prevent, though truly threatening.

Book X.—The tenth book is occupied with dogmas of religious belief; questions as to the force and validity of laws and institutes. We are bound to act and think as the lawgiver teaches, who must come to the rescue of the gods and the old traditions. Then follow remarks on motion and self-activity as products of soul, which is the cause of good and evil, beauty and deformity, and disposes the heavens. Soul is so beautiful that we cannot gaze on it fully; it is to be apprehended by reflection only. The gods take care of men and the minutest matters, and cannot be influenced to wink at wrong. All has been done to insure, not individual happiness, but that of the greatest number. All the events of the universe, and what shall be left to our individual will, have been settled by deity. Depravity will seek that which is depraved, and virtue will tend to what is virtuous. No man is so small that he will escape the divine notice, nor so great as to circumvent it. The gods and dæmons are our allies, and we are their property. Injustice will be our ruin, and a just intelligence our safeguard. Our gods will not, like charioteers, be bribed to lose the race. No persons are to hold sacred rites in private houses or establish sanctuaries in opposition to the national religion, and the fulfilment of religious vows of dedicating altars, and temples, and statues must be anxiously scrutinized.

Book XI.—Book the eleventh speaks of treasure trove, sale of defective or unsound articles or slaves, adulteration, asking two prices, and prescribes for the cases; reprehends the villainy and extortion of hotel-keepers and other hucksters; treats of wages, intestacy, right of willing, hereditary succession, the ill-will of the dead as regards the injury of orphans; protests against unkindness to parents, who are images revered by the gods; poisoning, witchcraft; and forbids that lunatics should be

left at large. Further, the license of misrepresentation and of the comedians is denounced, and the love of litigation or the corrupting of jurors.

Book XII.—The twelfth and last book contains injunctions on acting collectively for the common good, on courage in battle, on the funereal honours paid to priests; also against perjury and loose pleading, with observations on the right of jury challenge. Even bad men know how to discriminate goodness. Then there is a description of the classes of visitors that haunt a town, exhortation against bribery, against lavish offerings to the gods, and pomp of funereal display. We are reminded of the hopes and fears belonging to the next world, of the supremacy of intellect, and of the qualities that should be possessed by the night committee; of what has been said of the soul, and that the study of astronomy does not tend to atheism, as the multitude fancy. No man's piety is to be accepted who does not admit that the soul is the oldest of things born, and that it is immortal and rules all bodies, and who does not assume the existence of mind in the stars.

Such is a rapid sketch of the topics embraced in this remarkable exposition, not always distinguished by systematic arrangement of its parts, nor by any brilliancy of invention, or lofty poetic enthusiasm. It is just such an unimpassioned collection of old thoughts or suggestions as might have been treasured in the mind of Plato, when his fire of genius was quenched, and the frost of age had cramped his original vigour, and made him yearn after a different model of his political ideal. But there is the exuberance, and fertility, and universality, and wisdom of the master still apparent, though he has settled down into a stereotyped creed, and has given doubt and the love of disputation to the winds. There is a

curious passage in *Tr. iv.* 488, *Epist. iii.* 316 A, where Plato observes "that his attention had been engaged in some other trifles, and in a moderate degree with the proemia of his *Laws*, excepting what you or some other person have added to them, for I hear that some have meddled with them subsequently, yet those familiar with my style will be able to discriminate the two."

In the very short and cursory analysis here given, the usual practice of referring to the Greek paragraph has been laid aside, in favour of the wider subdivision by books, in which both English and Greek agree. Particular allusions occurring in the *Laws* have been given copiously in the Index, and it is not necessary to repeat them in the Analysis. Profoundly interesting as the dialogue is, and rich in intimations from the mind of Plato of what appeared to him to be included in a scheme of effective legislation, it adds very little to our conception of Plato, the philosopher and dialectician, who must be studied chiefly in such dialogues as "*The Republic*," "*The Gorgias*," "*Protagoras*," "*Theætetus*," or "*Parmenides*," and some others. To have enumerated specially all the striking observations and references to facts of everyday life contained in the *Laws* would have swelled this volume to a formidable bulk, and would have partly defeated the object of giving a compendious means of consulting the author readily, without any corresponding advantage to set against it.

EPINOMIS.

(TRANSLATION. VOL. VI.)

THE *Epinomis* is a dialogue or discourse of Plato, which was pretty generally regarded as genuine by the ancients. In it, happiness is regarded as the lot of few in this life, but to the righteous there is hope in his end. (Tr. 4, 36; *Epin.* 973 C; 992 C.) The attainment of particular arts and sciences is not wisdom, which is attributed to number synonymous with the reasoning power. (Tr. 7, 8; 976 A, B, C, D.) Of this numbering power God is the author, *αἴτιον*, or procuring cause: it is the source of what is well-ordered, just and fair. (Tr. 9, 10; 977 A; 978 A, B.) This power not possessed by other animals, and cannot be handed down as among men (Tr. 12; 978 C): its presence seen in the recurrence of day and night, the waxing and waning moon, months, years, in the distinction of seasons. (Tr. 13; 978 E; 979 A, B.)

But the acquisition of goodness is, of all things, most difficult, implying, as it does, wisdom, justice, temperance, and fortitude. (Tr. 13, 14; 979 C, D.) The legislator is to inculcate exalted views of the gods and their worship (Tr. 14, 15; 980 B, C.); to correct false views of their providential care. (Tr. 16; 980 D.) The soul is older and more honourable than the body, and ought to rule it (Tr. 16; 980 E; Tr. v. 543, 544; *Laws*, 967 D; 966 E); ascent through secondary causes to the Cause of all. (Tr. 16; 981 A.) The soul is without colour, invisible, cognisant, intellec-

tually apprehended, possesses memory and calculation in the changes of the even and odd (Tr. 17; 981 C); the motions of the heavenly bodies and planets in orderly periods, perpetually recurring, prove their being instinct with soul. (Tr. 18, 19; 982 B, C, D; Laws, 966 E; 967 B.)

Analogy insisted on, of these motions with those of the human being. (Tr. 19; 982 E.) The glorious dance of the stars. (Ib.) Their magnitudes. (Tr. 20; 983 A.) A God the cause of their movements. (Tr. 20; 983 B, C.) Folly of the doctrine of fortuitous concurrence. (983 D.) Body and soul distinguished as the governed and governing, as the non-intelligent and intelligent. (Tr. 21; 983 E.) Body incompetent to the production of the heavenly worlds: they are either gods or representations of divine power, produced as statues under the workmanship of the divine hand. (984 A.) No images ever more beauteous or worthy of religious reverence, or set in such exalted station. (Tr. 22; 984 B.)

Five classes of existences: the gods, the stars, dæmons who act the part of good angels between men and gods, who seem to be of two classes, ætherial and aërial, and a fifth, aqueous in origin, demigods. (Tr. 22, 23, 24; 984 D, E; 985 A, B, C.) Then follow a number of astronomical details, which occupy the succeeding paragraphs to Tr. 27; 987 C. He then touches on the excellent climate of Greece (Tr. 28; 987 D); the superiority of the Greeks to the barbarians (987 E), particularly in religious matters and lofty views of the divine nature. (Tr. 28, 29; 988 A, B.) The deity knows that when he teaches, man will follow, and what he teaches is to number and count. (Ib.)

Again he reverts to the *τὰ τῆς θαυμαστῆς ψυχῆς*, and its self-activity, and being the cause of all motion. (Tr. 29, 30; 988 C, D, E.) The scarcity of good natures;

but when produced, their great influence in controlling others, and preserving alive the services of religion. (Tr. 30, 31; 989 B, C, D.) The whole winds up with a further reference to number and to geometry, absurdly so called, as facilitating the study of Being, as well as to the investigation of surfaces, solids and ratios, regarded as branches of mathematical or numbering and computative science (Tr. 32; 990 C); reference to the nocturnal assembly. (Tr. 36; 992 D; Tr. v. 535; Laws, 962 C, D.)

AXIOCHUS.

AXIOCHUS, a dialogue, found amongst the list of the complete works of Plato, which was regarded as spurious in ancient times, and, from its mention of the Academy, written after Plato's death. It contains a striking account of the disquiet and alarm felt by an old man, Axiochus, at the approach of his end, and the arguments of Socrates to allay his fears, and inspire confidence of future happiness.

Description of the sufferer. (Tr. 40; Axioch. 364 B; 365 A.) Reproof addressed to him. (Tr. 41; 365 B.) Life is only a sojourn, and it is childish to hold to it so firmly. (Tr. 42; 365 C.) True; but there is still the physical reluctance to rot among worms and creeping things. (365 D.)

“Ay, but to die, and go we know not where,
To lie in cold obstruction and to rot.”

SHAK.—*Measure for Measure*, act iii. sc. 1.

The child thinks how he shall feel in his coffin, but this is to give to insensibility the attributes of perception:

“This sensible warm motion to become
A kneaded clod.”

The soul's aspirations after the Celestial world, when the

lump of earth is left behind, described. (Tr. 43, 44; 366 A, B.) Description of the ages of man (Tr. 44 to 46; 366 D, E; 367 A, B, C); with which compare Shak., "As You Like it," act ii. sc. 7, where the melancholy Jacques moralizes. Sources of human dissatisfaction dwelt on. (Tr. 47 to 49; 368 C, D, E.) Fickleness of the surging mob, savage, envious, and uneducated. (369 A, B.) Soul's immortality proved by its wonderful scientific achievements. (Tr. 51; 370 B, C.) Entire conviction of the dying man. (Tr. 52; 370 D, E.) Judgment and the joys of Paradise. (Tr. 54; 371 C, D.) Pains of the wicked. (Tr. 54, 55; 371 E; 372 A.) The righteous may safely presume on immortal happiness. (Tr. 56; 372 B.)

The effect of this discourse is declared by Axiochus to have removed his fears, and to have made him long for death as that which will introduce him to a better home.

ERYXIAS.

ERYXIAS, one of the dialogues of Plato, considered spurious from ancient times, is occupied with the discussion, how far riches are equally valuable with wisdom and science, and whether the value of a thing does not consist in the use we can make of it. Erasistratus asks, "What good will wisdom do a man who lacks necessities?" And the reply is, "That if he lived among those who treasured wisdom, it would be to him in place of money. (Tr. vi. 63; Eryx. 394 A, D.) Are men to despise wisdom in comparison with Pentelic marble, when only the wise captain or physician can provide for the advantage of others? (Tr. 64; 394 E.) Wealth is indeed a blessing to those who know how to use it." (Tr. 68, 69; 397 E.)

Here again he asks, "Would not a man seem to be

out of his wits if he expected to learn grammar, or any other science to be acquired by his own diligence and by other men's instruction, by praying to the gods?" (Tr. 69, 70; 398 C, E.) The preference given to the testimony of the wise man before judges in court is then touched on. (Tr. 70, 71; 399 B, C.) "Again, riches would be useless if we had no bodily wants, as hunger or cold, or unfulfilled desires. (Tr. 74; 401 D, E.) If such is the case, in the absence of these bodily wants, the man of science will be the richer. (Tr. 76; 402 E.) A horse is useful only to those who know how to use him." (Tr. 76, 77; 403 A.) Being less easy to convince the collocutor by argument than to soften a stone by boiling, it is proposed to change the subject. (Tr. 80; 405 B, C.)

ON VIRTUE.

ON VIRTUE is the name of a dialogue included in the collection of the complete editions of Plato, not, however, regarded as genuine. It is but a repetition of parts of the Menon. It commences with the inquiry whether Virtue is or is not to be taught. (Tr. 85; 376 A, B.) "Whom have Thucydides, Themistocles, Aristides, and Pericles made good? (Tr. 86; 376 D.) Good men confer benefit, and bad men hurt, and all wish the former. (Tr. 86; 377 A.) Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, notwithstanding all the care bestowed on his education, was a failure. (Tr. 87; 377 C.) The same is true of Lysimachus, brought up by Aristides (Tr. 87; 377 D), and of Paralus and Xanthippus, the sons of Pericles. (Tr. 88; 377 E.) Thucydides, too, had his sons, Melesias and Stephanus, made good wrestlers, but evidently did not expect to make them virtuous. (Tr. 88; 378 A, B.)

"If, however, virtue cannot be taught, are men good naturally? (Tr. 89; 378 C.) There are many departments of art where certain professors have great skill in discriminating excellency, such as in horses, dogs, &c, (Tr. 89; 378 D, E.) Which, then, are of most importance—good horses or good men? Why men, surely. Would there not, then, be an art for recognising the natural characteristic of goodness, highly prized among men? (Tr. 89; 379 A.) Would not such be selected when mere boys, and shut up like silver in the Acropolis to keep them out of mischief, to be laid up for use as saviours and patrons of the state in maturer life? (Tr. 90; 379 B.)

"If, then, human nature is not good by means of education or early endowment, it must be by divine inspiration, as in the case of seers and oracle singers. (Tr. 90; 379 C.) Good men are superior to these by far. Women speak of them as divine; and the Lacedæmonians and Homer use similar language. When a god wishes that a state should be prosperous he causes good men to dwell therein; and when a city is about to suffer ill, he takes these good men out of it. Thus it would seem that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but is present by a divine dispensation to those who possess it." (Tr. 90; 379 D.)

ON JUSTICE.

ON JUSTICE is the title of one of the spurious dialogues of Plato. It is not an adequate definition to say that Justice is what is considered just. (Tr. 91; 372 C.) We distinguish greater and less by measure and weight—what is the instrument by which we distinguish just and unjust? (Tr. 92; 373 A.) The decision is made by speech on the part of judges who enunciate a judgment respecting the

points in dispute. (Tr. 92; 373 B, C.) When things sink in the scale we term them heavy, or when they rise we call them light. (Tr. 92, 93; 373 D, E.) We cannot, however, say what the just and unjust are in this offhand way.

This leads to the assertion, oft repeated, that Socrates does not believe that men are willingly unjust and vicious. To lie and deceive are unjust, and to tell truth and not deceive are to do what is beneficial. To be unjust, then, is to hurt. (Tr. 93, 94; 374 A, B, C.) But is this true when we hurt an enemy? for if so, it is just to lie in order to deceive an enemy. (Tr. 94; 374 D.) The interlocutor even thinks it just to deceive friends for their benefit; so that it thus appears that lying and truth are both just and unjust, as well as deception. (Tr. 94; 374 E.) Still we want some better criterion, if only such as we use in distinguishing right from left. The respondent thinks that things are just when they are done at the proper time, and the reverse when done out of season. (Tr. 94; 375 A.) But this doing in season implies knowledge in every department of art. The just man is therefore just by knowledge, and the unjust man is unjust by ignorance. (Tr. 95; 375 B, C.) But men are without instruction against their wills, and therefore the uninstructed and unjust are so unwillingly, and injustice is involuntary. (Tr. 95; 375 D.) The poet, then, who declared that no one is voluntarily evil, nor unwilling to be happy, declared what is true.

SISYPHUS.

SISYPHUS, one of the dialogues believed to be improperly attributed to Plato, on the subject of consultation. Socrates asks, "What is meant by consulting in the abstract—in

what good or ill consulting consists? (Tr. 100; 387 B, C.) Is it mere guessing, or is knowing concerned in it, and not mere surmising?" (Tr. 101; 388 B, C.) Again, Socrates asks "whether men consult about what they know or what they don't know? (Tr. 102; 388 D.) As a case in point, geometricians do not seek whether a figure has a diameter, but what is the relative length of a diameter compared with the sides, or what is the side of the double cube (Tr. 102; 388 E. *See Art. Side*); nor do they seek whether the air exists, but whether it is unlimited and infinite. (Tr. 103; 389 A.)

"What, then, are the hindrances that stand in the way of inquirers? (Tr. 103; 389 B.) This can be only defect of knowledge. We must, therefore, make all sail and let out or strain our ropes to come up with it." (Tr. 103; 389 C.) Compare loosing the reins (Tr. i. 268; Protag. 338 A) and stretching every rope. (Ib.) "Can a person who is ignorant take counsel about any art? (Tr. 104; 389 D.) Ought not, then, the man who does not know to seek to learn? (Tr. 104; 390 A.) What was the use of yesterday's consultation, where all were ignorant? and why did you not seek to be taught by those who knew? (Tr. 105; 390 B, C.) All consultation is about the future: what has really no existence. Can a man, then, consult well for what does not exist? (Tr. 106; 390 E.) A man cannot tell who is the best marksman when the competitors have no mark to shoot at and aim at nothing at random. (Tr. 107; 391 A, B.) You cannot hit what does not exist, and how can you consult well or ill for it? (Tr. 108; 391 C.) We have, then, still to discover what we mean by good or evil counsellors." (Tr. 108; 391 D.)

DEMODOCUS.

DEMODOCUS, one of the quasi dialogues, included in the complete editions of Plato, which antiquity regarded as spurious. It contains three or four cases to which a certain amount of speciousness attaches, but which admit of easy reply.

"Is it not ridiculous," he asks, "to meet together for counsel on a subject about which there is no knowledge, and which, if known, needs no counsel? (Tr. 109; Demod. 380 B.) You either know or you don't know, or some do and others not; if none of you know, what use is it to advise? (Tr. 109; 380 C.) One wise man, knowing, can solve the whole case for those who are inexpert; but you want to hear those who do and who do not know." (Tr. 110; 380 D.) The whole of the case is carefully argued.

He then asks, "What is the value of the vote or decision, where those who argue are incapable (Tr. 111; 381 D), and to go through the farce of declaring a verdict? (Tr. 111; 381 E.) You do not individually not know and become wise by congregating, nor doubt personally and get clear-sighted by assembling." (Ib.)

Again, he meets with a man who rebukes his friend for believing an accuser without listening to the defendant (Tr. 113; 382 E); neither has he seen the occurrence nor any friend whom he might trust. (Tr. 113; 383 A.) There is an old saying, "Do not decide before you have heard both sides." (Tr. 113; 383 C). The objector replies, "That it seems to him absurd if he cannot possibly know which of the two speaks true or false, to take this course. If he does not know by what is truly stated, how is he to judge better when he has heard what is false?" (Tr. 114; 383 D) and so forth.

Again, a certain person abused another for not lending

him money or trusting him. He is asked, "What error was committed by the one who refused, and whether he was not himself in fault by not persuading him? (Tr. 115; 384 B, C.) You failed because you did not get what you wanted, not he who would not lend. (Ib.) You did not go to work the right way, and why should you abuse him?" (Tr. 115, 116; 384 D.)

Again, a man charges another with folly for yielding too ready credence to any one who fell in his way (Tr. 117; 385 C), knowing that men are boasters and wicked, and that he should only trust his own friends and fellow-citizens. (Ib.) But what says the party impugned? If he says what is true, is it not better to trust him quickly than slowly? (Tr. 117; 385 D.) You would have blamed him more if he had taken more time and been out in his judgment with persons who did not meet him accidentally. What is worthy of blame is, not the rapidity of the trusting, but believing what is not true. (Tr. 117, 118; 385 E.) Ought we not to consider equally whether relatives and familiar acquaintances speak the truth? (Tr. 118, 119; 386 A.) And does it really matter who the party is, if all agree in this particular?

The last case really proceeds to the root of the matter, and at least suggests the real solution of the difficulty. With regard to the first and second cases, the answer is obvious. We cannot put ourselves in the position of an independent, perfectly intelligent bystander who is in possession of the secret. The further advocacy may pervert as well as enlighten. The truth of conflicting testimony can be only surmised or solved on the principle of striking an average, or tested by its contradictions and concurrences. In the midst of counsellors there is wisdom. Even a decision in favour of the wrong side is often right, and inevitable under the imperfect cognisance we can take of the case.

DEFINITIONS.

THE Definitions are a catalogue of general terms appended to the complete editions of our author, but which shed little light on anything peculiar to him. Many of them are inadequate, or leave as much to be explained as needed explanation at first. Others are mere commonplace, and are already better understood by those who are capable of reading Plato at all; while Plato's own explanations are both more full and precise. The time may have been when the meaning of such terms may have been less fully understood than they are in our day, and when such a list may have had its use. They may be worth preserving as a specimen of ancient exposition, and a mark of painstaking regard for the most exalted of all the early philosophers, but will hardly be appealed to in our own day, except in some rare case which might render a reference to the mind of antiquity desirable, though even then but small weight could be attached to them as solving any important question.

TIMÆUS THE LOCRIAN.

TIMÆUS the Locrian, generally regarded as a short translation or modified version of the Timæus of Plato, is presumed to belong to a much later period, and is written, partly at least, in the Doric dialect. It is not, however, a mere transcript or compendium of its namesake, and it contains some passages of value. It tells us that the material of the world $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ is immortal but not unmoved, without form or scheme by itself, but receptive of all form; that what envelopes bodies is divisible and has the nature of the different, which $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ is place and space (94 A). $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$

and *αἰσθήσεις* are conjoined. (Tr. 148 ; 94 B,C.) The Cosmos is made out of *ὑλη*, and is *μονογενής*, instinct with life and reason, and spherical, a created god, indestructible by any other power than that of the Supreme Maker. What is good has in it no tendency to decay, and the world is, therefore, incorruptible, deathless, and blessed, made by One who did not look to a pattern made by hands but to intelligible essence, *ἀπαρεχρίρηνον*. (Tr. 149 ; 94 D, E ; 95 A.) Things compounded according to the best analogy, or proportion, suffer neither augmentation nor decay. (Tr. 149 ; 95 B.) God the eternal can only be seen by the mind, the Cosmos by the eyes. (Tr. 150 ; 96 C.) The same planet is at one time evening and at another morning star when not lost in the sun's rays, and Venus often performs this office as having an orbit not very different from the sun's. (Tr. 154 ; 96 E.) The sun, by its annual and diurnal motion, moves in a spiral ; its periods are called time : the image of an uncreated time or eternity. (Tr. 155 ; 97 C.)

The first principles of created things are matter and form ; the first the substratum, the second determining the shape. Their product is body, earth, water, air, fire. (Tr. 156 ; 97 E.) The pyramid with four equal faces, formed out of the elementary trigon and equilateral and having four equal solid angles, is the element of fire, the most unstable and minute in its atoms (though certainly very stable in fact). The octohedron, with eight equal faces and six equal solid angles, is that of air. The icosihedron, with twenty equal faces and twelve solid angles, is that of water, the largest and heaviest of atoms. The dodecahedron is the model of the universe, being most nearly related to the sphere. (Tr. 157, 158 ; 98 A, B, C, D.)

Account of the creation of man's soul. (Tr. 159 ; 99 D.) The same tripartite division as that of the *Timæus*, and

the same location is assigned. (Tr. 160; 99 E.) Some organs are for nutriment, others for preservation. Some sensations are too feeble to excite attention or rouse thought. What is consonant to nature is pleasant, that which does violence to it is painful. (Tr. 160; 100 B.) Touch judges of heat, cold, dryness, moisture, smoothness, roughness, softness, resistance, &c., as well as of weight and levity. (Tr. 161; 100 D.) The centre of the sphere is our "below," and what is between it and the periphery is "up." Heat expands and cold compresses bodies, while taste is allied to touch. (Tr. 163; 101 E.) Quick sounds are acute, slow sounds grave. What is composed according to musical ratios is in tune, what is without order or proportion is inharmonious.

The highest and most varied of the senses is that of sight, embracing all tints and colours, chiefly white, black, red, and bright, all the rest arising from the admixture of these. White expands the sight, black contracts it (the physical action on the lid and pupil is exactly the reverse), just as heat and cold diffuse the sense of touch or contract it, or as the harsh constricts the palate while the acid dilates it. (Tr. 162; 101 B, C.) The veins are made channels of nutriment, conveying a stream to the whole body like water pipes. Respiration is explained on the principle of the abhorrence of a vacuum, the air flowing in and being drawn on to fill the place of what is expired through unseen pores, about which the moisture is seen to stand in drops. (Tr. 163; 101 C, D.) The cupping-glass and attraction of amber are examples in point. (Tr. 163; 101 E; 102 A.) All nourishment is conveyed to the body from the heart as the root, and from the cavity of the belly, as a fountain, which, if it be irrigated by more than what is drained off, is said to undergo growth, or contrariwise decay; the stage of perfection lying between

the two, and conceived of as an exact equality of inflow and outflow. (Tr. 164; 102 A.)

Then death and disease are explained. From bodily disease, that of the soul, too, in part arises, according to the faculties influenced. (Tr. 164; 102 B, C, D.) These powers or faculties are next enumerated. (Tr. 165; 102 E.) The limits of virtue and vice depend on our indifference to, or our being wholly under the dominion of the passions. (Tr. 165; 103 A.) For this is the definition of temperance or moderation, viz., a willingness to obey and exhibit endurance. Intelligence and philosophy with its lofty and far-reaching aims, purging away false impressions, have established science, calling back the mind from gross ignorance and setting it free to dwell on the view of divine things. To ponder these in a manner self-sufficing and according to human need, and with a bountiful flow adapted to the contemporaneous time of life, is a blessed thing. He to whom the deity has allotted such a fate is conducted to the most blissful life through impressions or opinions the most true.

If, however, the man is obdurate and disobedient, let punishment follow him, both from the laws, and reason, and conscience, bringing with them terrors intense of this world and of that below, where inexorable punishments are appointed for the unhappy dead, and all the ills which I commend the Ionian poet for imposing on the unholy and polluted. In the same way as we sometimes restore bodies to health by injurious remedies where they will not yield to very restorative ones, so do we keep souls under restraint by false statements where they cannot be led by true. Strange punishments would necessarily be spoken of among the number: such as that the souls of cowards put on the shapes of women who are given to railing; that murderers assume the bodies of

wild beasts by way of punishment; lechers those of sows or boars; light and lofty-minded persons those of air-traversing birds. Again, the idle, the do-nothings, the unlearned and unreflecting pass into the shapes that occupy water. On all these, in a second period, Nemesis, together with the ancient deities that dwell beneath the earth, who are the appointed judges of human beings, have passed sentence. These are they to whom the sovereign deity and guide of all entrusted the distribution of the Cosmos, conjointly filled with gods and men and all other living things, as many as have been fashioned after that noblest ideal of the Uncreated, Eternal, and Intelligible. (Tr. 167, 168; 104 B, C, D, E; 105 A.)

INDEX.

A.

ABSOLUTE beauty, goodness, and greatness, *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*, require the admission of the soul's immortality (Tr. i. 106 ; Phæd. 100 B.)

—— goodness and folly on the part of men inconsistent with the dictum of Protagoras, that "The man is the measure of all things" (Tr. iii. 287 ; Cratyl. 386 B, C).

—— heat or cold does not exist in subject or object separately (Tr. i. 387 ; Theæt. 157 A) ; it is argued that there is no unchangeable unit, either the me or not me, in nature (Tr. 387, 388 ; 157 B, C, D, E) ; the absolute continuous one, or *Ens*, is opposed to the doctrine of the many and discontinuous, in the systems of Parmenides and Zeno (of which see a good account in Grote's Plato, i. 97, and following).

—— science is that of pure doctrine or learning, not of any particular qualified science (Tr. ii. 123 ; Rep. 438 B, C, D) ; what admits of dependence or relation belongs to itself alone, though it may be the species of a class (ib.) ; the understanding beholds pure righteousness, moderation, and science, when duly nurtured, viz., absolute science or knowledge of the true *Ens* (Tr. i. 323 ; Phædr. 247 D).

—— and self-sustaining, *τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*, as opposed to the *τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ἐφειμένον ἄλλου* (Tr. iv. 83 ; Phileb. 53 D) ; that for the sake of which whatever is produced always is in the class good (Tr. 85 ; 54 C).

Absorption in thought makes Socrates stand still a whole day and night in one spot (Tr. iii. 571 ; Symp. 220 C, D).

Abstinence from excess, not for its own sake but the fear of worse evil, entitled "a foolish moderation" (Tr. i. 67 ; Phæd. 68 E).

—— of the Tarantine Iccus from all gratification of the senses (Tr. v. 333 ; Laws, 840 A) ; men should be superior to brutes in the

exercise of the sexual passion (Tr. 334; ib.; 840 C, D); no man to touch other than his wedded wife, nor to indulge a passion for males (Tr. 335; 841 D).

Abstract love of truth, not the art or science which is greatest and best, and most aids us, but that which, without reference to profit, regards the clear, the certain, and most true (Tr. iv. 93; Phileb. 58 C).

—— and concrete, different (Tr. i. 74, 75; Phæd. 74 A, B); explained in reference to equality and the equal (ib.); abstraction implies comparison with something not present, and requires reminiscence (Tr. 76; 74 E; 75 A); everything concrete comes to us through sensation, and is compared with that previously conceived abstract which we got to know before birth (Tr. 76; 75 C); this is true not only of equality but of the beautiful, the good, the just and holy (ib., Tr. 77; 76 A); the abstract is never subject to change or decay (Tr. 80, 81; 78 D, E); is only laid hold of by thought, *διανοίας λογισμῷ* (Tr. 81; 79 A); partakes of permanency, and is allied to soul; is unseen as opposed to seen (ib.; Tr. 81, 82; 79 B, C).

Abstracts, do they exist apart from concretes? (Tr. iii. 407, 408, Parm. 130 A, B, C, D, E); what is abstract similitude as distinct from personal? (ib.); is there an abstract man, or fire, or water? (ib.); abstract hair, mud, or dirt? (ib.); Socrates expresses hesitation and doubt (Tr. 408; 130 D); does like partake of similitude, large of greatness, things just and beautiful of justice and beauty as something added? (Tr. 409; 131 A); does each thing so partaking partake of part or of the whole species? (ib.); is it one in each of the many? (Tr. 409; 131 B); whole will be separate from itself (ib.); Socrates replies that "Day is one and the same, and at the same time in many places without being distinct from itself (ib.). Though it is quite true that Plato's language leads us to suppose that he conceived some of these at least—whether we term them abstracts or general ideas or concepts—to possess a real substantive existence, and active working power, yet still he warns us that these *νοούμενα* may be only in the mind and not otherwise objective (Tr. i. 81; Phæd. 79 A; iii. 412; Parm. 132 B; Tr. ii. 196; Rep. 507 B). Certainly they are regarded as invisible (Tr. i. 80, 81; 79 B, C; Tr. ii. 357, 358; Tim. 51 A, B to 52 A). In one sense they are the objects of our thought world, without which we can neither reason nor interchange our ideas; and while even the outer world of sense may be conceived of only as something like a phantasmagoria of changing appearances, and not the same to each individual, they might consistently enough have been deemed the more permanent and real of the two. In the midst of perpetual birth and decay, becoming and perishing, multitudinousness and discontinuousness, it was a legitimate aspiration of philosophy to strive

to discover something fixed and enduring, not limited by conditions of time or place, the real objects of the intelligible world, bearing a direct relation to the ultimate reality of realities as partial manifestations of it or indissolubly knit with it. We still profess in the region of religion and morals to hold to the conviction of the eternal truth and validity of some of these abstracts as having so far objective existence that they cannot be made to depend on human caprice, nor obliterated by any moral fall. Happily a large measure of agreement about them prevails, and they are not openly opposed or discredited; but were all mankind capable of repudiating them with entire conscientious conviction, though we could no longer appeal to our common consciousness respecting them, we are bound to believe that they are rooted in something that lies outside the region of the changeable. But whether this be so or not, such abstract conceptions, if they rest on no ascertained philosophically certain ground, are equally valid as a rule of life, and will be held indispensable by those who, as it were, translate and expound their meaning as symbols into what answers to them in practice. They are thus, as it were, *data*, the common staple of thought and literature, inherited from age to age, and the differences about them, dependent on different education, do not interfere with a certain fixedness of type. But even external objects are not wholly the same in the view of the ploughman, the chemist, or the metaphysician, and take a complexion and filling up from the mind of the spectator, and are to a certain extent indefinite. It is, no doubt, a proof of mental haziness of conception when numbers and triangles, and air, and fire, and chaos, and necessity are spoken of as productive energies, or the Good and Beautiful as one with creative power, though we still talk of the Infinite and Unconditioned in much the same way; but have we any clearer view of what is implied in the production of the material world by any fiat of Intelligence or will, save only that the expression is more in accordance with that pre-eminence of function which we assign to our thinking part? When the principle of number becomes creative and takes on it intelligent operations, gives birth to rhythm and harmony, and the well-ordered in heaven and earth, what is it but divinity with a changed name though without any corresponding advantage? It would, however, be absurd to measure the early attempts of philosophical Greece to break through the mystery by which we are surrounded, and which are marvels of speculative and suggestive wisdom, by our greater modern precision of language and idea. Most of the problems which she handled are no nearer solution, excepting so far as light has poured in from quarters then unknown or unexplored. It is certainly true that few men could give a systematic and accordant account if

suddenly asked to tell what are the independent provinces and definite limits of holiness, piety, goodness, righteousness, virtue, wisdom, &c. There is, in fact, no sharp, no hard and fast line to be circumscribed about them. They are often, in part at least, used synonymously; they intrude into each other's province, and their fulness of meaning varies with the mental range and grasp of those who speak of them. The mind itself has no such apprehension of moral attributes as is implied in that of a square or triangle. All such abstracts have a shadowy edge and a certain elasticity and spontaneity which fit them admirably as media of exchange between minds of the most diverse order and moral finish, so to speak. They always admit of and invite further analysis; they can be expanded into an almost infinite fulness of meaning, and yet they have sufficient precision for the indispensable service they have to discharge. The highest and holiest and most spiritually active exercises of the mind have their familiar seat among them: the most difficult of logical exposition and yet the most consciously real, though they may be hazy and indistinct like the visions of the poet or seer. We believe that it is not wise in rationalist metaphysicians to taunt the multitude with this vagueness, by way of parading their own superior sagacity. Can they ever create a vocabulary which shall be coextensive with the sober realities of human thought? or is there not ever cropping up the conviction of the utter inadequacy of language to do much more than furnish a suggestion to other minds of what we want to convey, which will more or less succeed in its purpose as the sympathy between the two parties is more or less complete. If Plato needed any defence against the charge of raising mere abstracts into the rank of absolute existences, it is easy to point to the probing analysis by which he continually, in the person of Socrates, makes them recede into thin air, and shows how little there is in them that is tangible or that can be grasped without slipping through your fingers. See his remark on the smoothness, and sleekness, and slipperiness of certain representations (*Tr.* i. 498; *Lys.* 216 C), and arguments escaping you like a Proteus. See *Tr.* 476; *Euthyphr.* 15 D, E; *Tr.* 470; 11 D, where arguments are as shifty as the statues of Dædalus. Also, *Tr.* iv. 234, 235; *Hip. Maj.* 292 D; *Tr.* 238, 239: 294 C, and elsewhere abundantly. See Grote, i. 95, 234, 380, on what he conceives Plato's error in objectivising every general term. My own notion is that more stress is laid on this by many strict logicians than it deserves. The arguments of Zeno or Parmenides are such as Plato puts into their mouths, and certainly he does not dogmatize on the strict meaning of general terms. It is one thing to believe that we may possibly by search arrive at a definition which is indisputable and adequate to

the embracing all that may be classed under it, and which shall satisfy the universal reason of mankind, while acknowledging at every step that we have not yet found it in practice, any more than we have been able to establish the model state. See Tr. ii. 283; Rep. 592 A, B. I would rather find fault with Plato for the occasional application of the abstracting process where it seems wholly unmeaning. It is a fair subject for inquiry what is the *ἔν* which is common to all law, the sublimated quintessence that pervades all the appointments of the lawgiver, as it presents itself in the Minos; but when it is asked whether there is a sight which is the sight of itself and of all other things that are not the objects of sight, and which being sight does not take cognisance of colour but of its own faculty and that of others; when a similar question is asked of hearing, of desire, will, love, fear; also whether motion can move itself, or fire burn itself, or the eye see itself (Tr. iv. 132; Charm. 167 C, D; Tr. 365; Alcib. I. 132 D.), it looks very much like verbal trifling, and is not more pregnant of meaning than making a world by holding up a mirror (Tr. ii. 285; Rep. 596 D, E). The process of abstracting *ad infinitum* is alluded to as involved in certain modes of proceeding (Tr. iii. 412; Parm. 132 B). We may remark further, that no logical discrimination of these abstracts is made. Abstract righteousness and an abstract table have nothing in common: the one, if it means anything, is the abstract of what is, from first to last, mental, not of anything in the external act which accompanied the display; while the abstract of a physical object can only be that which has reference to form or use (Tr. ii. 285; Rep. 596 A). Again, other abstracts, like the *ἔν* of law, are derived from the mind's translation of a written precept. All of a moral kind have reference to a state of consciousness or emotion in our own minds in which we attempt to realise the meaning of our own acts or those of others. But it is altogether fallacious to suppose that the mind's concepts can be taken to pieces or made to contradict themselves, just like the verbal propositions which in part define them but which are of totally different extent. Thus the good and the useful, good and happiness, cannot be made to change places. The useful or profitable has nothing in it expressive of a state of mind or feeling whatever. The happiness of the good and the wicked is totally unlike, and can only be brought into comparison or contrast by some qualification. Before the happiness of both can be brought under one definition, a whole series of conditions must be attached, which, in ordinary parlance, are not taken into account. Of course endless confusion and contradiction is the result of an attempt to harmonize terms of variable content and shifting meaning.

"Speech is but broken light upon the depth of the unspoken."—*Span. Gypsy*, 98.

Abstract beauty, justice, and holiness are subjects of knowledge, not of opinion or ignorance (Tr. ii. 168; Rep. 480 A).

—— and concrete, the former is an idea in the mind (Tr. 196; Rep. 507 B; Tr. 212, 213; 523 E; 524 C, D; Tr. 224; 534 C; Tr. 284, 285; 595 B; 596 A).

Abstraction, the process clearly described as a taking away part after part in order to arrive at the thing sought (Tr. iii. 209; Statesm. 268 E).

Abuse of a thing no argument against its use (Tr. i. 148; Gorg. 456 D, E); because a man has learnt to fight he is not to strike his friends or his father (ib.).

Accidental death, author of, incurred in gymnastic exercises, not punishable (Tr. v. 317, 318; Laws 831 A); inflicted in self-defence (Tr. 380; 869 D).

Accidental properties do not stand opposed to individual unity (Tr. iii. 156, 157; Soph. 251 A, B); we call the individual a man, though assigning to him colours, size, form, virtue, and vice (Tr. 157; 251 B).

Accounts should be well kept and money well expended (Tr. iv. 554; Epist. xiii. 362 D).

Accumulation of negatives, *μηδέποτε μηδένα μηδενός μήτε* (Tr. i. 311; Phædr. 236 E; Tr. 415; Theæt. 180 A; Tr. iii. 154; Soph. 249 B; Tr. 468; Parmen. 166 A; Tr. 284, 285; Cratyl. 384 D; Tr. ii. 182; Rep. 495 B).

Accusative and infinitive after *ᾤτι* (Tr. ii. 258; Rep. 568 B. *See my "Syntax of Relative Pronoun," 84.*

Achelous, in the graphic account of fragrant shade and blossom of a plane-tree by the fountain side (Tr. i. 304; Phædr. 230 B).

Achilles, his character, in Homer, whether better than Ulysses (Tr. iv. 263; Hipp. Min. 363 B, C); Homer has made Achilles best, Nestor wisest, Ulysses most shifty (Tr. 264, 265; 364 C, D, E); a liar as well as Ulysses (Tr. 273, 274; 370 A, B, C, D); but unwillingly, and not by design, like Ulysses (Tr. 274, 275; 370 E; 371 A, B, C, D); he is declared inferior to Ulysses (Tr. 275; 371 E), inasmuch as deliberate deception is better than unintentional, according to a view that has been maintained; but Hippias questions this, and thinks this is contrary to law and common sense (Tr. 275; 372 A).

—— the lover of Patroclus (Tr. iii. 490; Symp. 179 E; 180 A); more honoured than Alcestis (180 B); would he have died for Patroclus, or Alcestis for Admetus, or Codrus for the kingdom of his children, had not they looked to posthumous fame, or being ever remembered? (Tr. 546; 208 D).

Accidents, wilements of God's providence (Tr. ii. 179; Rep. 492 E).

Acoustics exhibit other conditions of motion, the enharmonic, which, according to Pythagoras, are allied to those of astronomy (Tr. ii. 220; Rep. 530 D); their pretensions require to be narrowly scrutinized (530 E); the analogy between listening for concordance in strings, the trying to detect the comma or any smaller interval, and staring or peering at the heavens, thus putting the ears and eyes before the mind (Tr. 221; 531 A); reference to fiddlers tuning their strings and screwing their pegs (531 B); such persons seek numbers in the audible sounds and do not ascend to problems and the ground of symphonious relations (531 C) in search after the Good (ib.); this is an arduous labour (531 C, D, also 530 C, D); the reasoning out of these relations is a prelude to a more perfect strain accomplished by dialectics (Tr. 222; 531 E); dialectic belongs to the Intelligible, not the Visible, but vision imitates it in looking at animals, the stars and sun, &c. (Tr. 222; 532 A).

Acropolis, we should guard our virtuous youth like gold therein till their services could be available for public use (Tr. iii. 33; Men. 89 B).

Action and reaction, the joint sources of phenomena (Tr. i. 387; Theæt. 157 A); nothing is active till it meets what is passive, or *vice versâ* (ib. 157 B); active and passive have no separate existence considered as independent unities, and they change place in different combinations (ib.).

— implies power and asserts existence (Tr. iii. 151, 152; Soph. 247 E).

Actions correspond to immutable moral distinctions (Tr. iii. 288; Cratyl. 386 E); not to be estimated by opinions anyhow contracted (Tr. 289; 387 A); they have their appropriate instruments and mode of treatment (ib.); *per se* are indifferent, neither ugly nor beautiful, but only such from the way in which they are done; beautiful when rightly done, when not rightly, base (Tr. 491-496; Symp. 181 A; 183 D); may they not be realised truly as well as their description in words? (Tr. ii. 159; Rep. 473 A).

Actors cannot at the same time be rhapsodists (Tr. ii. 75, 76; Rep. 395 A); nor tragic actors be comic (ib.).

Adamant and iron, words of (Tr. i. 211; Gorg. 508 E); to be made of (Tr. ii. 38; Rep. 360 B); spindle and hooked joint of the distaff of necessity made of it (Tr. 306, 307; 616 C); translated by some as "steel." See also Tr. vi. 18, 19; Epin. 982 C. See verse quoted, Epist. i.; Tr. iv. 478; 310 A.

Addition of equal quantity or number to two original quantities increases the ratio of the smaller to the larger (Tr. iii. 449; Parm. 154 D).

- Administration, wise, of state and family (Tr. iii. 6 ; Men. 73 A).
- Adulteration, the same as lying and fraud, and utterly inadmissible (Tr. v. 461, 462 ; Laws, 916 D).
- Advice to others how to prepare for death and judgment (Tr. i. 231 ; Gorg. 526 E).
- Æacus, judge in Hades, from Europe, appointed to judge souls from Europe (Tr. i. 228, 231 ; Gorg. 524 A ; 526 C ; Tr. 28 ; Apol. 41 A).
- Æschylus, lines of, applied to the unjust man (Tr. ii. 40 ; Rep. 362 A) ; blamed for what he makes Thetis say of Apollo (Tr. 364 ; 383 A).
- Æsculapius knew all about maladies, but did not attempt to cure bodies utterly diseased within (Tr. ii. 89 ; Rep. 407 D) ; if descended from Apollo would not be fond of fees, or, if fond of fees, then not descended from Apollo (Tr. 90 ; 408 C).
- Affinity, doctrine of, contained in Plato's view of the inaction of similar atoms, *inter se*, as compared with those of dissimilar elements which become one with the victor (Tr. ii. 364, 365 ; Tim. 56 D). *See also* Tr. 335 ; 31 C.
- Agamemnon, etymology from, "long remaining" (Tr. iii. 304, 305 ; Cratyl. 395 A) ; chooses the life of an eagle (Tr. ii. 310 ; Rep. 620 A, B).
- Agathon, before 30,000 Greeks in the theatre (Tr. iii. 480, 481 ; Symp. 175 E ; Tr. 517 ; 194 A, B), observes that a few wise men are more formidable than many fools (194 B) ; proposes to lie beside Socrates, and excites the jealousy of Alcibiades (Tr. 574, 575, 576 ; 222 E ; 223 A, B, C, D) ; his eulogium upon Love (Tr. 518 ; 194 E ; 195 A) ; applause at its conclusion (Tr. 525 ; 198 A) ; his overstrained and overloaded panegyric in the view of Socrates (Tr. 526 ; 198 E) ; crowned by Alcibiades (Tr. 556 ; 212 C, D, E).
- Aggregation by sifting and winnowing of larger and smaller atoms (Tr. ii. 360 ; Tim. 53 A) ; sieves, machines, and ventilating fans referred to (ib. 364, 365 ; 56 D).
- Agnus castus, its height and dense shade and fragrance (Tr. i. 304 ; Phædr. 230 B).
- Agreeable is done for the sake of the good, not the good for that of the agreeable (Tr. i. 201, 202 ; Gorg. 500 A, B, C).
- Agreement as to the thing and not the name essential to clear reasoning (Tr. iii. 106 ; Soph. 218 C).
- Agricultural laws first to be settled ; no one to move his neighbour's landmark (Tr. v. 337 ; Laws, 842 E).
- Agriculture, its pleasures and hardships ; bewailing drought and rain, unseasonable heat and cold (Tr. vi. 47, 48 ; Axioch. 368 C).
- Agriculturists, laws to be made for them, and flock and bee masters (Tr. v. 336, 337 ; Laws, 842 D).
- Ailments, their cure ; emetics ; upward and downward purges ; cautery

knife; diet; wrapping up the head (Tr. ii. 88; Rep. 406 D); drugs and the knife (Tr. 89; 407 D); impletion and depletion (ib.).

Air, æther, water, absurd as principles of things, and a contradiction of his previous theory on the part of Anaxagoras (Tr. i. 104, 105; Phæd. 98 C, D, E).

Ajax, delight of meeting him in the other world (Tr. i. 28; Apol. 41 A); chooses the life of a lion (Tr. ii. 310; Rep. 620 A, B).

ALCIBIADES I. and II. See Summary, pages 205, 207.

Alcibiades, his natural advantages (Tr. iv. 311; Alcib. I. 103 A); his ambition would not be satisfied with so narrow a field as Europe (Tr. 313, 314; 105 C; Tr. 380, 381; Alcib. II. 141 A, B); not observing Socrates, bursts in intoxicated, and crowns Agathon (Tr. iii. 553, 554; Symp. 212 C, D, E; 213 A); his sudden surprise and real or affected jealousy (Tr. 557; 213 C, D); decks Socrates with some of the fillets (ib.); elects himself symposiarch (Tr. 558; 213 E); his picturesque and graphic sketches of Socrates (Tr. 561; 215 A); intended as truth, not fun (ib.); declares Socrates to be like Marsyas, or the figures of Silenus and the Satyrs, which, when opened, show a statue of one of the gods within (Tr. 573, 574; 215 B; 221 E; 222 D); ashamed on account of his broken promises of amendment, and wishes Socrates dead (Tr. 563; 216 B, C); again compares Socrates to Silenus (Tr. 564, 573; 216 D; 221 D); flatters himself with regard to the power of his beauty; (Tr. 565, 569; 217 A; 219 C); narrates how he tempted Socrates (Tr. 565, 566, 567; 217 B, C, D, E; 218 A, B, C, D); the reply of Socrates (Tr. 568; 218 E), who depreciates himself (Tr. 569; 219 A), and refuses compliance with the offers of Alcibiades (219 C); not otherwise treated than as a father or elder brother (ib.); surpassed by Socrates in courage, endurance, and in the power of drinking or abstinence (Tr. 570, 571; 219 E; 220 A, B; 220 E); account of his pleasantry (Tr. 575, 576; 222 E; 223 A, B, C).

ἀληθὴς δόξα, or δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, as opposed to νοήσις μετὰ λόγου, is that which, by the aid of unreasoning sensitivity, takes cognisance of the eternally derived but not absolutely existent, while the latter comprehends that which has no beginning, viz., the eternally existent (Tr. ii. 331, 332; Tim. 27 D; 28 A); the first are designated as the αἰσθητά, the γιγνόμενα, and γεννητά (28 C); the difference of ἀληθὴς δόξα and νοῦς is further discussed (Tr. 358; 51 C, D, E; 52 A), where the former is again joined μετ' αἰσθήσεως. Three forms of cognisance, νοῦς, λογισμός, and αἰσθήσις, coupled with δόξα, are given (Tim. Loc. 94 C); ἀληθὴς δόξα is again assigned to the better horse of the tripartite soul, that which is lordly necked and eagle-nosed, with form erect and perfect joints (Tr. i. 330; Phædr. 253

- D; Tr. iii. 25, 28; Meno. 84 C; 86 A; Tr. 44, 45, 46, 47; 97 B, D; 98 C; 99 A, B); these *δόξαι ἀληθεῖς* run away unless chained (Tr. 44; 97 D); they are almost treated like innate ideas in the examination of the boy, who has correct answers drawn out of him in relation to geometry (Tr. 25; Meno. 84 C); dreams or latent recollections from a previous existence (Tr. 28; 86 A); in some respects not inferior to knowledge or science as regards rectitude of action (Tr. 44; 97 B); compared to the statues of Dædalus (97 D); they are termed also *ὀρθαὶ δόξαι*. (See also province of opinion, Tr. ii. 163, 164, 165; Rep. 476 E; 477 A, B, C, D, E; 478 A, B, C, D; Tr. 195; 506 C; Tr. 224; 534 A; Tr. 293; 603 A, B; Tr. i. 443; Theæt. 201 A, B.)
- Alliteration, *ἄγαμον, ἄπαιδα, ἄοικον* (Tr. i. 314, 315; Phædr. 239 E), with π sounds *διὰ παντὸς πᾶσαν πάντως προθυμίαν πειρᾶσθε ἔχειν* (Tr. iv. 203; Menex. 246 C.) This accumulation and alliteration is a favourite practice of the Greek tragedians.
- Amber, its property of attracting substances, cited as being analogous to the phænomena of respiration, the action of the cupping glass, the coinciding of musical vibrations, the rise of water in pipes, fall of thunderbolts (Tr. ii. 394; Tim. 80 A; Tr. vi. 163; Tim. Loc. 101 E; 102 A).
- Ammon, the divine utterance of, referred to; the man who regards written language as doing more than putting us in mind of what we knew before said to be ignorant of it; written words, like painting, answer no questions (Tr. i. 355, 356; Phædr. 275 D).
- Analogy of mathematics (Tr. iii. 189; Statesman, 257 B).
- ἀναλογίαν κατὰ* (Tim. Loc. Tr. vi. 148; 94 B, C), opposed to *κατὰ εὐθυρίαν*; things compounded according to the best analogy or proportion, with forces duly equalized, are neither overpowered nor overpower others, so as to undergo augmentation or decay, but remain in an indissoluble bond, agreeable to the best reason (Tr. 150; 95 B, C).
- Anaxagoras, his saying of "all things mixed in one" (Tr. i. 158; Gorg. 465 D; Tr. 72; Phæd. 72 C); declares mind to be the disposing cause of all things (Tr. 103, 104; Phæd. 97 C, D, E; 98 A, B); but he is not true to his principles when he has recourse to secondary agencies (Tr. 104, 105; 98 C, D, E); referred to in connection with Pericles, as pretending to teach meteorology, or loftiness of thought, and the nature of reason and the lack of it (Tr. 349; Phædr. 270 A; Tr. iv. 215; Hipp. Maj. 283 A).
- Animal, is everything which partakes of life, a definition which is intended to include plants as well, though these are animals without locomotion (Tr. ii. 390, 391; Tim. 77 B, C); the gods are animals as they have life (Tr. iii. 93; Euthyd. 302 E).

Answers will be shaped not to what things are, but to what they appear (Tr. ii. 13; Rep. 337 C); difficulty of, where the person questioned does not know and is overawed by the presence of some one of weight (Tr. 14; 337 E).

Anytus, son of the wealthy and wise Anthemion, who gained his riches by wisdom and assiduity, and takes on him no lofty airs, nor is pompous or important (Tr. iii. 33, 34; Meno. 90 A).

Antagonism of good and evil (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 A).

Antecedent plural, followed by *ἄστις*, singular (Tr. ii. 256; Rep. 566 D.) See Stallbaum, and instances cited (Tr. 110; 426 C; Tr. i. 276; Protag. 345 D, &c.).

ἀντιλογικός, as distinguished from *δικανικός*; in the former the process is by short question and answer, in the latter by long replies to discussions conducted at length (Tr. iii. 117; Sophist, 225 B).

Antinomies, proofs and denials of contradictory propositions, such as that "the one and the many both are and are not" (Tr. iii. 420, 421; Parm. 137 B, C, &c.).

Antipodes, *τὸ καταντικρὺ*; the man who should walk round a solid sphere would have to speak of the same as both above and below, and have his feet opposed, *ἀντίπους*; it is not the part of a wise man to talk of up and down in reference to a sphere (Tr. ii. 372, 373; Tim. 63 A). Parmenides is said to have been the first who maintained that the earth was spherical, and Aristotle to have maintained and proved it (Grote, Plat. i. 26, note).

Antiquity, loss of its traditions, among the early races of men (Tr. ii. 416; Critias, 109 E).

Ants, the form of, assumed by souls not wholly philosophic but possessing political virtues (Tr. i. 85; Phæd. 82 B); men compared to ants living on the border of a swamp (Tr. 118; 109 B).

ἀντωμοσία, the declaration upon oath made by plaintiff and defendant, but it seems rather to be put for the strict letter of the indictment to be urged only subject to the flow of the clepsydra, and without introduction of irrelevant matter (Tr. i. 407; Theæt. 172 E).

Apollodorus, the Cyzicenean, chosen for a leader by the Athenians, though a foreigner, as well as Phanosthenes, the Andrian, and Heraclides, the Clazomenian (Tr. iv. 307; Io. 541 C).

Apologue of Alcinous (Tr. ii. 304; Rep. 614 B).

APOLOGY. See Summary, page 1.

Apothegms, short sentences, worthy of being held in remembrance, invented by the lovers of Lacedæmonian culture, dedicated, as first-fruits of wisdom, to Apollo, at Delphi: e. g., "Know thyself;" "Nothing in excess;" "It is difficult to be good" (Tr. i. 273; Protag. 343 A, B). See Aristogeiton.

Apparition of a beautiful female in white foretells the death of Socrates (Tr. i. 32; Crito, 44 A).

Appearance, is it real, or does anything underlie it? Are our sense perceptions all that exist, and is it absurd to talk of things cognisable by intellect alone? If intellect and true sensuous perception both exist, there are mental objects, *νοούμενα*; if these are one and the same, the phenomenal and intelligible are confounded; the existence of these unseen *νοούμενα* is then asserted (Tr. ii. 357, 358; Tim. 51 B, C, D, E; 52 A), See also *δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως*, as opposed to *νόησις*.

Appearances, said to be only necessary for the orator to consult, because persuasion depends less on truth than popular impression (Tr. i. 337; Phædr. 260 A); are real to those to whom they arise (Tr. 381; Theæt. 152 A); are they the same with perceptions, and do perceptions always indicate reality and agree with science or knowledge in wanting all that is false? (Tr. 382; 152 C); are they the same to all persons and animals? (Tr. 383; 153 E; 154 A); what appears to each, said to be that which exists for him (Tr. 393; 161 C). We may remark, while on the subject of appearances, that the language of philosophers is anything but clear respecting the distinction between real and phenomenal. A painting or a shadow cannot be made to disclose more than its coloured or shaded flat surface, however ingeniously framed to deceive. Any experiment upon it at once proves what it is. A solid substance, on the contrary, is always something more than the one phenomenal impression which it conveys. We cannot vary it by thinking, but by moving we can get round it, or see behind it, and educe ten thousand phenomenal variations, which point to something in it not in ourselves, since if the body moved as we moved, we should see no change. We can also distinguish between a picture or shadow and a merely mental image in a similar way. Our external world is an appearance, not of the phantasm class, nor even of the picture or shadow. The phenomena remain permanently the same under like circumstances, and may be made to vary by a thousand experimental processes, which tell a consistent tale, and which show that the phenomenon of the moment is not all. There is a something which is more than the phenomenon, and may be made to develop thousands of others more than what we have ever yet realised in experience. The phenomenon never changes itself, nor does the mental volition change it. The conclusion is irresistible that to every change of the phenomenon there corresponds a change in that of which the phenomenon is only the momentary one-sided expression, or that our relation to the object has changed. So much, at least, we claim on behalf of the reality of an external world; and if the series

of changes is as complex as the phenomena represented by them, little will be got by supposing that things as they are have no correspondence with what appears. Our own common sense is clearly the best expositor; nor are we likely to find anything in philosophy that can better help us to unriddle the difficulty. This is our real external world, the only one we can know; and until we assume a nature wholly diverse, we cannot look beyond or outside it. Like creatures living immersed in a circumambient ocean of sea or air, we cannot get rid of its aspects, nor the effects of its pressure or stimulus, though from habit we have no sentient impression of their presence, and can only gasp and die out of them. No one can ever be brought to believe that the productions of the great masters in literature or art are fantasies in his own mind, or that the daily advances with the spectroscope and microscope do not point to something out of the mind of him who reads of them. Again, we are in no danger of confounding reality with our dreams. We know when we are really burnt or have a leg broken. We can experiment during a lasting or lingering illness, in a hundred convincing ways, on the one series of experiences, while the others are unstable and evanescent, and often contradict the reasoning principle altogether. No man can be an ideologer except for the purpose of metaphysical exercitation. There lie at the basis of all thinking and feeling certain axiomata which refuse further explanation, because they are already elements and no further decomposable.

A priori and *a posteriori* distinguished (Tr. ii. 200, 201; Rep. 510 B, C, D; 511 A, B, C, D, E).

Apterus orders spoken of, as well as of plantigrade, biped, quadruped, and winged (Tr. iii. 206; Statesm. 266 E).

Aptitude for acquirement, coupled with gentleness and manliness or courage, very uncommon (Tr. i. 371; Theæt. 143 E).

Aqueous, the same body may exist solid, liquid, or gaseous; water becomes ice, or, when heated, becomes breath, air, or fiery gas. Thickened vapours become fog or cloud, and rain when more condensed; we ought not to talk of fire, air, or water, but only of body as fiery, gaseous, or liquid (Tr. ii. 355; Tim. 49 C).

Archelaus, the example of a tyrant (Tr. i. 166; Gorg. 472 D; Tr. 230; 525 D).

Architect, differs from his workman the mason (Tr. iii. 193; Statesm. 259 E).

Ardæus, story of his sufferings in the other world (Tr. ii. 306; Rep. 615 C, D, E).

Arguments which are sound are not to be indiscriminately rejected with those that are not so, nor is truth or knowledge to be abandoned

for any such reason (Tr. i. 95; Phæd. 90 D); when drawn from probability or superficial resemblance, they are not to be trusted in geometry or other things (Tr. 97; 92 D).

Aristides, a rare example of justice in high station (Tr. i. 231; Gorg. 526 A).

Aristodemus (Tr. iii. 576; Symp. 223 D).

Aristogeiton, the story of, and Harmodius, and also of the setting up Hermæ in the streets with inscriptions rivalling the Delphic *γνώμαι*, such as, "Go thy way thinking what is just;" "Do not deceive thy friend" (Tr. iv. 439, 440; Hipparch. 228 B). See Apothegms.

Aristophanes, alluded to (Tr. i. 69; Phæd. 70 C); speaks of his yesterday's potations (Tr. iii. 482; Symp. 176 B); his whole life has reference to Dionysus and Aphrodite; probably looking to his business as a comic poet rather than his personal character, though both may be aimed at (Tr. 485, 486; 177 E); has a fit of hiccough, through repletion (Tr. 500; 185 C); his hiccough ceases, and he relates a fanciful myth (Tr. 507 to 516; 189 A, B, C, D, E; 190, 191, 192, 193) throughout. Again brought in (Tr. 574 to 576; 222 E; 223 A, B, C, D).

Aristotle, a person so named (Tr. iii. 420, 421; Parm. 137 C).

Arithmetic, twofold, vulgar and philosophic (Tr. iv. 90; Phileb. 56 D).

Art, its twofold nature as science and practice (Tr. iv. 88; Phileb. 55 D); when great requires study and contemplation of nature (Tr. i. 348, 349; Phædr. 269 E); its use in oratory (Tr. 337; 260 C); said that oratory lies and is no true art, and that the true art of speaking must grasp truth (Tr. 338; 260 E); no one by mere technical rules can approach the poetic threshold of the muses, but must participate in madness (Tr. 321; 245 A); has to do with measurement (Tr. iii. 234, 235; Statesm. 285 A, B, C); not an irrational thing (Tr. i. 157; Gorg. 465 A); is there in all art the radical defect of some higher art to determine what is advantageous for it, and so on *ad infinitum*? (Tr. ii. 19; Rep. 342 A, B); this is answered in the negative, when it is correctly art (*ib.*); it rules and controls that of which it is the art (342 C); arts are not to be confounded because they cross each other's path (Tr. 23, 24; 346 C); the particular use to which an art is applied constitutes its specialty (Tr. 31; *ib.*; 353 A); that which arts have in common is some attendant advantage, such as that of pay, when they share the art of pecuniary recompense (*ib.*); the fees paid for its exercise no part of the art as such (Tr. ii. 24; 346 D); examples in point (*ib.*); is there any or no use in the gratuitous exercise of it? (346 D, E); no art nor government consults its own utility but that of the weaker (*ib.*); that is its special function or specialty, which it performs better than other arts do (Tr. 31; 353 A); what its special virtue does will be that which it discharges well, and what its special defect

accomplishes will be ill discharged (Tr. 32; 353 C); inelegance therein or illiberality to be restrained in the same way as in the case of poetry (Tr. 83; 401 B); is the discovery of things (Tr. iv. 450; Minos. 314 A, B).

Article and participle, in nominative with a subject in the dative, put for relative and finite verb, *ὁ γευσάμενος ἀνάγκη δὴ τοῦτω λύκῳ γενέσθαι* (Tr. ii. 255; Rep. 565 E). Common in New Testament Greek.

Artists to be chosen who shall be like a health-bringing breeze from an excellent climate, wafting men onward to virtue (Tr. ii. 83; Rep. 401 C).

Artizans not wiser than the poets in believing that their knowledge extended to all subjects (Tr. i. 8, 9; Apol. 22 D).

Arts, empirically discovered (Tr. i. 137, 138; Gorg. 448 C).

Aspasia, teaches Pericles and Socrates oratory (Tr. iv. 186; Menex. 235 E); represented as glueing together scraps from the funeral oration, and giving Socrates a lesson, and as all but roundly beating and be-rating him for being forgetful (Tr. 187; 236 B).

Assimilation, doctrine of; our outward frame is always wasting and distributing its fellow elements to their like, and the minutely-divided blood-molecules distribute kindred atoms to the several structures, producing growth when in excess, or decay when in defect (Tr. ii. 395; Tim. 81 A).

Association of ideas, the doctrine of (Tr. i. 73, 74; Phæd. 73 D); attributed to memory (ib.); connects like and unlike (74 A; Tr. 503; Lysis, 220 A).

Astronomy, we ought to search out the Supreme God and the universe, not to busy ourselves too deeply in scrutinizing secondary causes (Tr. v. 306, 307; Laws, 821 A); sun and moon and evening and morning stars are planets (821 B, C); orbits of the stars partake of order and design and of mind, and he who takes an enlarged view of their constitution is opposed to atheism (Tr. 542; 966 E); alleged tendency of the study of astronomy to atheism (Tr. 543, 544; 967 A); astronomical follies and speculations derided (Tr. iv. 419, 420; Rivals, 132 B); Thales taunted by the Thracian damsel (Tr. i. 409; Theæt. 174 A, B). *See* Planetary Spheres. Astronomy and geometry the studies of the philosopher (Tr. 408; Theæt. 173 E); astronomy the science of moving solids (Tr. ii. 218; Rep. 528 D); to be studied with geometry and number, with a view to the search after the really existent and good (Tr. 216 to 218; 526 E; 527 C, D; 528 D, E); put next after plane geometry (528 E); compels the soul to look upward; this, however, is questioned, as the present mode of handling philosophy makes it look earthwards (Tr. 218; 529 A); gazing on the

ornaments of a ceiling on tiptoe not an operation of the intellect but of the eyes, while the half-closed downward scrutinizing look may contemplate Being and the Unseen (Tr. 219; 529 B, C); case of a man on his back on land or sea looking upward, not one of scientific search (ib.); the stars which stud the sky, like the roof ornaments above referred to (529 B), are beautiful, but do not disclose to us those higher truths contained in their true numbers, paths, and velocities in space (529 D); the bearing of their motions on agriculture and strategy has been before alluded to (Tr. 217; 527 D); the variegated heavens but a pattern of higher truths, and no more able, *per se*, to teach laws of symmetry, number, and proportion than the statues of Dædalus (Tr. 219; 529 D, E); the practical astronomer will recognise the beauty of the orbs, and that the heavens and their hosts have been admirably fashioned by their Maker, but he will deny that this will prove the unchanging nature of their periods (Tr. ii. 220; 530 B); a further study is necessary, that of acoustics (Tr. 220, 221; 530 C, D, E; 531 A, B, C; Tr. i. 141; Gorg. 451 C).

Atalanta, chooses the life of an athlete in the other world (Tr. ii. 310; Rep. 620 A, B).

Atheists, none who have been such in youth have maintained their scepticism in old age (Tr. v. 410, 483; Laws, 888 C; 929 C); those who are not such often hold that the gods take no account of human affairs, or that they are easily bent by prayers and sacrifices to wink at wrong (ib.); as a remedy for this state of mind recourse must be had to the lawgiver (Tr. 411; 888 D); Socrates denies the imputation of atheism (Tr. i. 13, 14; Apol. 27 A). *See further* Tr. v. 543; Laws, 966 E; 967 A. *See what is said on the changes of belief effected by time; that what was once least deserving of credence, now no longer appears so, and what was formerly believed is so no longer or is least regarded* (Tr. iv. 485; Epist. ii. 314 B).

Athenian prejudice of caste in not freely intermarrying (Tr. i. 215; Gorg. 512 C).

Athenians, said to be 9000 years old on the authority of records of Sais, preserved for 8000 years (Tr. ii. 327; Tim. 23 E; Tr. ii. 415 to 418; Critias, 108 E; 111 A, B); were they bettered by Pericles? (Tr. i. 219; Gorg. 515 E;) made idle, talkative, covetous and cowards by pay (ib.); impossibility of being safe among them or any other mob, where an individual is contending only for what is just (Tr. i. 19; Apol. 31 E); corrupt their young philosophers by ovations and stormy blame and praise in their public meetings (Tr. ii. 179; Rep. 492 B, C), and by punishments and fines where they cannot bring a man to their mode of thinking (492 D); impossibility of running counter to this despotism but by God's help (Tr. 179; 492 E).

Athens, a city most highly reputed for wisdom and strength (Tr. i. 16, 17; Apol. 29 D); compared to a great lazy, well-bred horse, requiring stimulus (Tr. 18; Apol. 30 E).

Athletes require a special diet; their habits sleepy and soon disordered (Tr. ii. 86; Rep. 404 A); our warrior athletes, on the contrary, require to be like sleepless dogs, tolerant as well of drought as of cold (ib.); Homer never feasts his heroes during their campaigns on fish or boiled meats, but only on roast, because camp kettles are an impediment (Tr. 86; 404 C); makes no mention of condiments given to his warriors (ib.).

Atlantis, island of, and its extensive dominion over other isles and the continent of Europe, extending to Tyrrhenia, Libya, and Egypt; submerged by flood and earthquake in twenty-four hours (Tr. ii. 328; Tim. 25 A; Tr. 415; Critias, 108 E); its place occupied by mud and impassable by ships (ib.); effect of sea's encroachment and denudation described (Tr. 418; 111 A, B); is assigned to Neptune (Tr. 421; 113 C); thickly peopled and occupied with houses, docks, ships, and innumerable traffickers (Tr. 425; 117 E).

Atlas, stronger than, more immortal and more capable of sustaining all things than the good and fit (Tr. i. 105; Phæd. 99 C).

Atomic laws; molecules have geometric shapes (Tr. ii. 364; Tim. 56 B); elsewhere spoken of as triangles (Tr. 362; 54 B); of which the most beautiful is that which has its hypothenuse twice the shorter side (ib.; Tr. 363; 55 A); these molecules are so small as to be invisible by themselves and can only be seen *en masse* (Tr. 364, 365; 56 D); effect no change on atoms of like kind but enter into changed relations with unlike (56 D); matter cannot move itself, and heat and motion are related, while molecules interpenetrate and occupy interstices between other atoms (ib.; Tr. 366; 57 E).

Atomic theory. None of the ancient philosophers or physicists is worthy to compare, probably, with Democritus, whom Plato, whether by accident or from contempt or jealousy, never mentions. The system of this great man maintained the reality of the outer world and of space, apart from the mere conception of it in our minds. Just as water in which a buoyant or submerged body can be freely moved is real, or a vessel may exist either full or empty and be refilled again, so is it with air, or that which the air would occupy were the air withdrawn. Space is that which no abstraction can further decompose or simplify, and to which the ideas of geometry, form, motion, quantity, and number inseparably belong; valid, however, for objects contained in it, as they stand related to our senses or conclusions of the understanding. The real externality of such grounds of phenomena is a fundamental belief resting on our utter

inability to produce them by any conscious operation of the mind itself, corroborated by all other human experience. If the changes that take place are nothing but some unconscious play of fancy, they require an elaborate contrivance of mental constitution, which, in the absence of our involuntary interpretation of them, are infinitely more baffling and hard of conception than the theory they seek to displace. The real, if it exists, cannot be more real, nor can it be otherwise apprehended. Of the properties of these external bodies, some appeal to special organs of sense, as taste, hearing, sight, smell, not the less corresponding to real differences, but conceivably absent or variable, without interfering with the general notion of body. Others belong to a more comprehensive estimate, are more inseparable, and rest, at least in part, on conceptions of the understanding. Democritus correctly held and expressed this distinction of primary and secondary. He also held that the density or weight of bodies is due to the presence of a larger or smaller number of atoms, equally heavy, in a given solid space, just as the moderns do; that there were fundamental differences in size and form among them which might explain all the different effects they produce on our senses, a notion which still holds its place among us; that generation and destruction were the results of passing change which neither altered nor lessened the atomic elements, but belonged wholly to rearrangements of the molecules; and this view is still recognised as the true one. Of gravity or celestial rotation, though they are the two great facts of any cosmical theory, he could give no intelligible account; it is sufficient praise that he recognised their vast influence in the system of the universe. Neither can we. It is here that we are brought face to face with infinite power and intelligent adjustment, or that we must admit in matter a self-ordaining power, which is not a whit less marvellous and worthy to be worshipped, if we follow our religious instincts after shutting out the Eternal mind. In the speculations of Democritus on the course of nature as carried on by the operation of fixed laws which have been acting from all eternity, by means of forces or energies transmitted in an endless round or long succession not yet exhausted, if not unending, he is entirely coincident with the modern materialistic view, or that which banishes all intervention on the Creator's part to a period indefinitely remote. Nor do we know that in the last resort he would have denied the doctrine of a divine providence and ruler, though he may be certainly pardoned for having less than a Christian's clearness of view of that subject. He believed in the existence of mind, though he may have conceived that mind is a result of bodily organization; an opinion still as strongly held by some who do not for a moment confound the distinct provinces of physics and

psychology. The phenomena of the senses and the intellect are not less different whatever theory of mental origin we hold. We only know of mental functions in connection with an exquisite bodily structure, and at death those functions and our personal consciousness may put on another and diviner body elsewhere. John Locke agrees in this. On similar grounds I would defend the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras as strictly analogous to our idea of creative intelligence, though confusedly involved with its own subordinate operations, as ours might and would be apart from Revelation and our more developed reasoning.

Atoms have form, and by their junction produce earth, water, air, fire (Tr. vi. 156, 157; Tim. Locr. 97 E); taking the elementary trigon or triangle as given above, two such or six will make up the equilateral, according as the sides are conjoined in one way or another. Four equilateral planes form the pyramid (I presume the tetrahedron with four equal solid angles) (Tr. 158; 98 D), which is the most minute and unstable, and the form of fire. The cube, with its six sides and eight solid angles, the most stable, is that of earth (Tr. 157; 98 C); the octahedron, with eight faces and six solid angles, is that of air. The icosahedron, with twenty triangular faces and twelve solid angles, is the largest and heaviest, that of water; and the dodecahedron is the model of the universe, approaching as it does the sphere (Tr. 157, 158; 98 A, B, C, D). The icositetrahedron would have been better chosen as the more regular derivative of the cube.

Atreus, its etymology, from a word signifying what is deadly (Tr. iii. 305; Cratyl. 395 B).

Attic, suburban scenery (Tr. i. 303, 304, 313; Phædr. 229 B; 230 B; 238 D).

Attraction, the qualifying adjective of the demonstrative clause, transferred into the relative clause, τῶν ὅσα θαλάττια (Tr. iv. 25; Phileb. 21 C); so, also, θειοτέρου (Tr. 402; Theag. 122 B), with relative οἷς (Tr. ii. 151; Rep. 466 A).

αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν, "We are alone" (Tr. iii. 420; Parm. 137 A).

αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, "to extemporize," ἐξ ὑπογυίου, "on the spur of the moment" (Tr. iv. 185; Menex. 235 C, D).

αὐτόχθονες (Tr. ii. 416; Critias, 109 D; Tr. iv. 188; Menex. 237 B; Tr. iii. 210, 226; Statesm. 269 D; 279 D, E).

Auxiliary class, like good sheep-dogs, not to maltreat the flocks as if they were wolves (Tr. ii. 99; Rep. 416 A, B); more noble than victors in the Olympian games, and not to be put on a level with those engaged in other pursuits (Tr. 151; 466 A).

Avenger of blood; justice in this capacity appoints that the doer should suffer like vengeance, and blood can only be washed out in this way (Tr. v. 385, 386; Laws, 872 C, D, E; 873 A).

Awkwardness of philosophers in courts of law (Tr. i. 407; Theæt. 172 C, D).

AXIOCHUS. *See* Summary, page 239.

Axioms or truisms : "Nothing becomes greater or less while it is equal;" "That from which nothing is subtracted, or to which nothing is added, can never be other than equal;" "Nothing can first begin to exist without being produced" (Tr. i. 385; Theæt. 155 A, B).

B.

Bacchus, said to be muddled in his wits by the intervention of Juno (Tr. v. 74; Laws, 672 B).

Badness is involuntary; no one becomes wilfully bad, but only by reason of a bad habit of body or defective training (Tr. ii. 402; Tim. 86 D; Tr. iv. 242; Hipp. Maj. 296 C); it is the more powerful and better soul that acts willingly when it commits injustice; the good man does it voluntarily, and the bad man involuntarily (Tr. iv. 283; Hipp. Min. 376 A, B); Hippias refuses to grant this, and complains that Socrates unsettles him (Tr. 283; 376 C); he declares, too, that the laws take a different view (Tr. 275; 372 A); the doctrine of the superiority of the willingly bad further supported by examples (Tr. 277; 373 C).

Bag full of arguments (Tr. i. 393; Theæt. 161 A).

Baggage, ignorance how to pack it, or to make sauces, or fawning speeches, no ground of reproach to the philosopher (Tr. i. 410, 411; Theæt. 175 E).

Ballot, or equality of the lot, to be employed for avoiding the ill-nature of the mob; God and good fortune to be invoked in prayer to direct the result aright (Tr. v. 201; Laws, 757 E).

Bankers and rich men, their conversation worthless compared with philosophical discourse (Tr. iii. 475; Symp. 173 C).

Banter of Socrates (Tr. iv. 407, 408; Theæg. 125 A, D).

Baptized, an expression used of those sodden with drink (Tr. iii. 482; Symp. 176 B).

Barter to be made without adulteration of the article exchanged, which is lying and fraudulent, though too leniently regarded by the multitude (Tr. v. 461, 462; Laws, 916 D); is prayer and sacrifice to the gods barter? (Tr. i. 474, 475; Euthyphr. 14 E).

Base metal, a man not to be this, but always simple and true, and to take care that he is not deceived by any adulterated metal in others (Tr. v. 173, 174; Laws, 738 E; 739 A).

Baseness is swifter than death (Tr. i. 26, 27; Apol. 39 B).

- Battle of the Giants (Tr. iii. 149; Sophist, 246 A; Tr. ii. 59; Rep. 378 C).
- Be and become, their difference (Tr. i. 268, 269; Protag. 339 A, B, C, D; 340 B).
- Beard, an element of grace and beauty (Tr. i. 287; Protag. 309 B).
- Beast, great wild, who must be petted and studied and soothed, and carefully approached, an appropriate simile for the public (Tr. ii. 180; Rep. 493 A, B, C).
- Beating, cutting, wounding, when suffered, is indecorous, but not nearly so much as the perpetrating such acts (Tr. i. 211; Gorg. 508 E).
- Beating cover, in quest of righteousness or justice, described; also the obscurity of the thicket or brake in which it lay concealed (Tr. ii. 121; Rep. 436 B, C).
- Beautiful and just and good (Tr. iii. 276; Statesm. 309 C); is a divine opinion in a race possessed (ib.); beautiful reasons compared to incantations (Tr. iv. 117, 118; Charm. 156 E); is good (Tr. 333, 334; Alcib. I. 116 C); beautiful things, bodies, colours, forms, sounds, pursuits, are such in respect of utility or being pleasurable (Tr. i. 169; Gorg. 474 D, E); it is the same with the beauty of the sciences (Tr. 170; 475 A); the praise of beautiful persons open to suspicion (Tr. 371; Theæt. 143 E); beautiful, and pure, and good, and other simple ideas not cognisable in themselves (Tr. iii. 415; Parmen. 134 B, C); the beautiful is, according to the proverb, a difficult thing (Tr. 284; Cratyl. 384 B; Tr. ii. 185; Rep. 497 D); we become beautiful by partaking of beauty and goodness (Tr. i. 107; Phæd. 100 D); the passion for the beautiful is inspired by harmony and rhythm, tending to all nobleness, goodness, and simplicity (Tr. ii. 84; Rep. 401 E); beautiful moral principles in the soul make a man to be loved in the highest degree (Tr. 85; 402 D); loving what is beautiful and orderly the source of true love (403 A); if a lover does not look to beautiful consequences he is to be blamed (403 B); the beautiful is the end of music (Tr. 85; 403 C); beautiful things are hard, a saying (Tr. 119, 120; 435 C); not to be separated from the good (Tr. v. 59, 60; Laws, 663 B); the beautiful life excels in its whole scheme as productive of good esteem (Tr. 162; 732 E); most beautiful and greatest of symphonies is the greatest wisdom (Tr. 99; Laws, 689 D); just men, and matters, and actions are all beautiful (Tr. 363; 859 D); and this despite ugliness of body (ib.); with regard to the Just and the Beautiful, we ought to act and think as the lawgiver teaches (Tr. 414; 890 C); how should it not be beautiful to indulge in judicial inquiries, seeing that justice is beauty? (Tr. 497; 937 E); is not gold, nor the ivory of Phidias (Tr. iv. 229, 230; Hipp. Maj. 289 E; 290 A, B, C); that which suits each is beautiful (Tr. 231; 290 D); in this sense figwood

is more beautiful than gold for spoons (Tr. 232; 291 A); the beautiful is now declared to be riches, old age, splendid burial, &c. (Tr. 233; 291 E); is the beautiful the real or the apparent? (Tr. 238, 239; 294 A, C, E); is it the useful or the powerful? (Tr. 241, 242; 295 D, E; 296 A); is it the advantageous? (Tr. 243; 296 E); it is declared to be the cause of the good (296 E); it is denied that it is either the useful or the profitable, or the ability to do good (Tr. 244; 297 A); is not sensuous pleasure in any of its forms (Tr. 246 to 250; 298 A to 300 B); the beautiful is a knotty point (Tr. 258; 304 D); giddy with the intricacy of the argument, it is probable that it is allied to the friendly, being a thing soft, sleek, and smooth, that slips through one's fingers (Tr. i. 498; Lys. 216 C); prayer to be made inwardly beautiful (Tr. 360; Phædr. 279 C); things that are beautiful are everywhere so regarded, and so with right and wrong, heavy and light (Tr. iv. 454; Minos. 316 A).

Beauty, next after health in things human, as second to divine (Tr. v. 11; Laws, 631 B, C; Tr. 57; 661 A); he who hungers after body and youthful beauty is not satisfied without he is gorged with it, and cares little for the soul of the object loved (Tr. 328; 837 B, C); justice is pre-eminently a thing of beauty (Tr. 497; 937 D, E); of bodily form can eclipse beauty of face (Tr. iv. 115; Charmid. 154 D); Hippias denies the distinction between beauty in the abstract and concrete (Tr. iv. 223; Hipp. Maj. 287 D); rebuked by Socrates (Tr. 224; 287 E); beauty of apes is ugliness compared with human beauty, and that of the most elegant Chytræ as nothing compared with maiden's beauty (Tr. 227; 289 A); man but an ape in beauty compared with the gods as well as the fairest maiden (Tr. 228; 289 B); its transcendent splendour in that glorious pre-existent state when we beheld it, together with the gods, with faculties unimpaired and inexperienced in mortal suffering (Tr. i. 326; Phædr. 250 B); description of an old wrinkled visage from which all trace of beauty has been wiped out (Tr. 315; 240 D); the highest beauty belongs to deity and is an ultimate principle unknown to us (Tr. iii. 415, 416; Parmen. 134 B, C, D); by partaking of it, things become beautiful (Tr. i. 107; Phæd. 100 D); beauty in the concrete leads to the love of beauty in the abstract (Tr. iii. 550; Symp. 210 A, B); beauty of soul is higher than corporeal beauty, and leads to virtue and love of country (210 C); wider range of that of the sciences enabling us to contemplate the vast ocean of beauty entranced in deep thoughts of philosophy boundless in extent (Tr. 551; 210 D); arrival at essential and primal beauty (Tr. 552; 210 E); ever existent, and neither produced, nor decaying, nor variable, nor existent in the concrete (211 A), but in its absolute eternal pattern (Tr. 553; 211 C); description of the gradual

- progress of the rise from the concrete, through beautiful doctrines, to ultimate principles of beauty (Tr. 553, 554; 211 D); negative account of beauty, what it is not (Tr. iii. 554; 211 D, E); the blessed fortune of the man who can gaze on this pure translucent essential beauty not as a shadow but as a truth (Tr. 555; 211 E; 212 A).
- Beauty absolute; as to this the question is asked, "Can he who denies that there is such a specific ideal immutably the same, and so, too, in the case of the just, but who recognises and admits that there are many concrete examples of Beauty and Justice, refuse to admit that these beautiful and just things vary much in their appearance, and sometimes seem to be the very opposite?" (Tr. ii. 166; Rep. 479 A); such being the case, these concretes cannot be made matters of knowledge or science which has to do with eternal truths, but only of opinion (Tr. 167; 479 D, E); those who maintain that beauty is only concrete are lovers of opinion rather than wisdom, and cannot quarrel with the truth (Tr. 168; 480 A); only those who embrace each thing, and beauty among the rest as it is absolutely, are philosophers (ib.).
- Become and be, their difference (Tr. i. 269, 270; Protag. 339 A, B, C, D; 340 B).
- Becoming, as opposed to being or being nothing (Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 152 D); brought about by motion, change of place, and commixture (ib.); in this, Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Epicharmus, Homer, agree (152 E); Parmenides being an exception (ib.; Tr. ii. 210; Rep. 521 D, E).
- Bee, to fly away like, and to leave a sting behind (Tr. i. 96; Phæd. 91 C).
- Bees, form of, assumed by souls not philosophic, but yet virtuous (Tr. i. 85; Phæd. 82 B); in a hive of bees a king is produced naturally, but not in cities, where men must meet and enact laws (Tr. iii. 262, 263; Statesm. 301 E). See Queen Bee. So, too, Tr. ii. 208; Rep. 520 B. So Virgil Gorg. iv. 68, 75, 95, 106. See Art. King.
- Beggars, not to be allowed in the city (Tr. v. 495; Laws, 936 C).
- Beginning, said to be more than half (Tr. ii. 57, 58; Rep. 377 B); the half said to be more than the whole (Tr. 151; 466 B); as a first principle said to be uncreated and underived; must be a source of motion and activity, self-originated, and can be no other than soul unbegotten, incorruptible, and immortal (Tr. i. 321; Phædr. 245 B, C, D).
- Being differs from becoming, in not having relation to anything else but itself (Tr. i. 391, 392; Theæt. 160 B). Grote quotes a passage from Parmenides, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι, nearly equivalent to Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum*.
- Belief, true and false, produced by persuasion or rhetoric (Tr. i. 145; Gorg. 454 D, E).

Below and above defined ; the centre of the sphere is our "below;" what is between this and the periphery is "up" (Tr. vi. 161, 162; Tim. Locr. 100 E).

Best, he who says what is so, and not what most pleases the ear, is at a disadvantage when he has to plead before the courts (Tr. i. 226; Gorg. 521 E).

—— life, not the longest but that which is most in conformity with the polity of the state (Tr. i. 216; Gorg. 512 E); science of the Best (Tr. iv. 387 to 391; Alcib. II. 145 C, E; 146 E).

Better, declared to be the same with the more powerful (Tr. i. 187; Gorg. 489 C); not as applied to shoemakers or cooks, but to politicians (ib.).

Big beards, an expression used sarcastically for "would-be philosophers" (Tr. i. 402; Theæt. 168 E).

Billow, escape from, *τρικυμία* (Tr. ii. 141, 157 to 159; Rep. 457 C; 472 A; 473 B).

Birds of passage, used to express the migratory habits of certain travelling merchants, one of four sorts of visitors that come to towns (Tr. v. 517; Laws, 952 D).

—— not to be craftily snared by boys (Tr. v. 309, 310; Laws, 823 E); birds, serpents, and stones are less divine than men (Tr. iv. 459; Minos, 319 A); the good man is the most sacred of all, and the bad the most impure (ib.).

—— of a feather, *ἡλιξ ἡλικά* (Tr. ii. 3, 4; Rep. 329 A; Tr. 109; 425 C); birds do not sing while in pain, neither the swallow, nightingale, nor hoopoe, by way of proving that the dying strain of the swan is one of joy, not of sorrow (Tr. i. 88; Phæd. 85 A); birds of the goose and crane species bred in feeding marshes among the Thessalian plains (Tr. iii. 201; Statesm. 264 C).

Birth of ideas, promoted by Socrates, who acts the midwife for Theætetus (Tr. i. 392, 393; Theæt. 160 D, E; 161 A); customs usual at birth described (ib.), and decision as to whether the offspring shall be reared or exposed (ib.).

Blessed, their glorious abodes (Tr. i. 123; Phæd. 114 B, C); isles of the (Tr. 227 to 231; Gorg. 523 A, B; 524 A; 526 C; Tr. iii. 490; Symp. 179 E; 180 B; Tr. ii. 207, 230, 231; Rep. 519 C; 540 C).

Blind, persons who are half so, have discovered many things quicker than those who see more acutely (Tr. ii. 284, 285; Rep. 595 C); apparent to a blind man, a proverb (Tr. iii. 142; Sophist, 241 E; Tr. ii. 150, 239; Rep. 465 C; 550 D).

Blissful choir, in the description of beauty (Tr. i. 326; Phædr. 250 B); blissful career of those who have already begun their heavenly journey (Tr. 333; 256 D, E).

Blood, is the thinking principle contained in it, or is the latter air or fire? (Tr. i. 102; Phæd. 96 B); circulation of, touched on, where it is said, "And they placed the heart at the same time, the origin of the veins and the fountain of the blood forcibly propelled through all the members" (Tr. ii. 381; Tim. 70 B); the veins or arteries described as channels cut in the body to water it, and to promote the growth of the marrow (Tr. 391; 77 D); the same is repeated as to the veins being channels of nutriment (Tr. vi. 162, 163; Tim. Locr. 101 C, D); but in this passage respiration is made to take place, in part at least, through the sweat pores. But for the mixed psychological and sensational power attributed to the vessels and the heart, in agreement with the earlier theories of passion and emotion, we should declare the writer to be on the right track. Compare Galen, l. c. v. f. 148; also Shakespeare's "Coriolanus," act i. sc. i. line 140, published 1609:

"But if you do remember
I send it through the rivers of your blood,
Even to the court, the heart, to the seat of the brain,
And through the cranks and offices of man."

Harvey published his discovery 1628. See a passage quoted by Grote from Empedocles, in which it is stated that the blood about the human heart is thought. Shakespeare also believed that at death the veins were destitute of blood:

"From cold and empty veins where no blood dwells."

Richard III., act i. scene 2.

Bodies are preserved by motion and gymnastics (Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 153 B); not to be despoiled in battle, which is to treat the body as an enemy when the enemy has fled away:

"Thou hadst but power over his mortal body,
His soul thou canst not have, therefore be gone."

SHAKESPEARE, *Richard III., act i. scene 2.*

Bodily pleasure, its decay enhances that of reasoning and discourse (Tr. ii. 3; Rep. 328 D).

Body and soul, radically different; the latter is invisible, cognisant, and intellectually apprehended, participant of memory and the power of calculating the changes of even and odd (Tr. vi. 17; Epinom. 981 C); when their union is dissolved and the soul is gone to its own abode, the body it leaves behind is a mere lump of earth. We consist of a soul, an immortal living principle shut in a mortal guard-house, while this ethereal principle desires its native sky and the heavenly choirs (Tr. 43, 44, 52; Axioch. 366 A, B; 370 D); body may be a tomb (Tr. i. 326; Phædr. 250 B; Tr. 191; Gorg. 492 E; 493 A; Tr. iii. 315; Cratyl. 400 C); seeming good habit of body and soul (Tr. i. 156;

Gorg. 463 E; 464 A); body so called, *σῶμα*, because it is the *σῆμα*, or tomb of the soul, or from *σημαίνω*, because the soul shows to the body what it does show, or because it is kept by it safe as in a prison (Cratyl. 400 C; Gorg. 492 E, above quoted). Professor Thompson recognises this notion in the word *ἀσήμαντος*, "unmarked," "unpolluted." The notion and etymology, he says, are both Orphic (Tr. 326; Phædr. 250 C); our solicitude ought not to be for it but for the soul, and to keep aloof from it as much as possible (Tr. i. 63; Phæd. 65 A); the mere multitude think that he who despises it ought not to live (65 A); is not body an impediment to the soul? (ib.); can it view truth, or is this best attained by reflection? (Tr. 64; 65 E; 66 A); folly of the body (Tr. 65; 67 A); is an impediment to thought (Tr. 82; 79 C); is akin to the mortal and subservient (80 A); resembles most the human, the mortal, the unintelligent, the multiform, divisible and inconstant (Tr. 83; 80 B); wholly perishable (80 B, C); but does not perish wholly at the moment of death, and by embalming may be long preserved, especially the bones and tendons (80 D); polluted and impure, believes nothing but what it can eat or drink, and flies from the unseen and what is appreciable by thought and philosophy (Tr. 84; 81 B); resembles a lyre, capable of uttering harmonies in its relation to the soul, and may outlive the perished harmony (Tr. 90; 86 B, C); further application of the argument and illustration (86 D); body is always made living by soul, and the opposite, or death, being incompatible with the nature of soul, the latter does not die (Tr. i. 114; 105 E); Socrates regards his bodily personality as something distinct from his soul (Tr. 124, 125; 115 D, E); immaterial to him how his body is interred (ib.); body desires its other half (Tr. iii. 510 to 512; Symp. 191 A, D; 192 E; Tr. 539, 540; 205 E); limbs of the body are not cherished when diseased or requiring amputation (ib.); body, however good, cannot render the soul good in the same way that the soul can the body (Tr. ii. 85, 86; Rep. 403 D); we ought to turn over the care of the body wholly to the understanding (ib.); body regarded merely as a mould (ib.); superfluous care of the body injurious to active or studious pursuits, with its fancied aches and pains (Tr. 89; 407 B, C); is but shadow, and soul only is what constitutes us what we are (Tr. v. 529, 530; Laws, 959 B).

Boil, proverb, "To boil a stone" (Tr. vi. 80; Eryx. 405 B, C).

Boldness, unmixed, will in time, if not checked, become madness (Tr. iii. 278, 279; Statesm. 310 D).

Bones and nerves, not the primary but only the casual cause of sitting (Tr. i. 104, 105; Phæd. 98 D); Socrates declares that his bones would have been at Megara or among the Boeotians if his mind had not otherwise determined (99 A).

- Booby and star-gazer, captain supposed to be so called by his mutinous crew (Tr. ii. 174, 175 ; Rep. 488 E).
- Books answer no questions (Tr. i. 355, 356 ; Phædr. 275 D, E ; Tr. 257 ; Protag. 329 A).
- Bottomless pit of trifling (Tr. iii. 408 ; Parmen. 130 D).
- Bounded, hot and cold, have no limit, between them is only a question of degree (Tr. iv. 30, 31 ; Phileb. 24 B, C, D) ; growth, degree, and intensity are marks of the unbounded or infinite (25 A) ; the equal, the given multiple or measure, and the numbered belong to the bounded (Tr. 32 ; 25 B) ; health and disease are compounded of both (Tr. 33 ; 25 E) ; in music, unlimited gradation of tone, with the bounded numbers of harmony and rhythm, produce the highest results of art (Tr. 34 ; 26 A) ; pleasure can only be wholly a good as unbounded, and pain, too, wholly an evil (Tr. 37 ; 27 E ; 28 A).
- Bow, drawing it to its full stretch (Tr. iv. 425 ; Rivals, 135 A) ; making a distant bow (Tr. ii. 187 ; Rep. 499 A).
- Boys ordered to spread the banquet without stint or limit (Tr. iii. 479 ; Symp. 175 B, C) ; and to imagine that they are giving the feast to the master (ib.).
- Brain, the question asked whether the senses are in it, and do memory and opinion, and, lastly, knowledge, spring from sense ? (Tr. i. 102 ; Phæd. 96 B) ; is the sovereign part of the body and root of the marrow (Tr. vi. 159, 160 ; Tim. Locr. 99 E ; 100 A) ; why shut in the spherical skull (Tr. ii. 349, 350 ; Tim. 44 D) ; that part of the medullary system that was to be the field of the diviner element of our nature was made globular, the lower soul was distributed through the ramifications of the marrow, like so many hawsers shut in a bony envelope (Tr. 385 ; 73 C).
- Brass and iron, when they keep watch, a state will be destroyed (Tr. ii. 97, 98 ; Rep. 414 C).
- Breathing explained, not as the filling up a vacuum but as taking place by consecutive displacement of air : " Thus then the breath dismissed from the chest and lungs outwards, the latter again become full by reason of the air which invests the body entering and circulating through the pervious flesh and mouth and nostrils " (Tr. ii. 393 ; Tim. 79 C ; Tr. vi. 162, 163 ; Tim. Locr. 101 C, D).
- Bribery, inspectors obnoxious to reproach if influenced by it (Tr. v. 208, 209 ; Laws, 762 A) ; ministers of state to administer without bribes (Tr. 522 ; 955 C) ; gods do not accept bribes (Tr. 447 ; 906 E).
- Brigands, the thieves and prædones who infest Italy (Tr. v. 234 ; Laws, 777 B).
- Builder and architect very different in rank and value (Tr. iv. 425 ; Riv. 135 C).

- Burial of Socrates cannot be effected, only that of his body (Tr. i. 124, 125; Phæd. 115 D, E); about which he is wholly indifferent (ib.).
- Burning shame, to extinguish a (Tr. ii. 245; Rep. 556 A).
- Burnt child dreads the fire, a proverb expressed in equivalent terms (Tr. iii. 574; Symp. 222 B).
- Busybody, one who is not a, but a philosopher and who has lived piously, goes to the Islands of the Blest (Tr. i. 231; Gorg. 526 C).
- Butting, biting, kicking, marks of bad training (Tr. i. 219, 220; Gorg. 516 A).

C.

- Callias, pun on his name (Tr. i. 293, 294; Protag. 361 A, B, C, D, E).
- Callicles twits Socrates with being a day after the fair (Tr. i. 136; Gorg. 447 A); is twitted by Socrates for never saying the same thing (Tr. 189; 491 B, C); questioned by him as to whether a man with a golden soul ought not to desire a touchstone (Tr. 184; 486 D); Callicles pursues his argument on the desirableness of license and intemperance as against moderation (Tr. 190, 191; 492 B, C); Socrates considers that in stating this he expresses what others feel but do not venture to say (492 D); he declares further that lust ought not to be punished (ib.); asserts that pleasure and good are the same (Tr. 193, 194; 495 A); is half convinced, but love of being on the popular side stands in the way (Tr. 216, 217; 513 C, D); is asked whom he, Callicles, has made better of those formerly depraved, unjust, intemperate, and without mind (Tr. 218; 515 A, B); Socrates asserts that he describes those who cater for lust, who know nothing of the fair and good, who make full and gross the bodies of mortals, and ruin men and their old flesh (Tr. 222; 518 C); Gorgias and Polus with Callicles, three of the wisest of the Greeks, are unable to shake Socrates' idea of happiness (Tr. 231, 232; 527 B, C); the rejection by Socrates of the theory of Callicles as worth nothing (Tr. 232; 527 E).
- Camp kettles for boiling food, an incumbrance to soldiers on a campaign (Tr. ii. 86; Rep. 404 C).
- Capillary attraction, by means of a skein of cotton or wool, causing fluid to pass from cup to cup (Tr. iii. 480, 481; Symp. 175 D, E).
- Caprice of the dæmon of Socrates (Tr. iv. 416, 415; Theag. 130 E; also 129 E; 131 A).
- Captain of a ship does not brag of having saved his passengers, when he has landed them (Tr. i. 215; Gorg. 511 E).
- Cart before the horse, *ὑστέρων πρότερον* (Tr. ii. 207; Rep. 518 D, E):

"But yet I run before my horse to market."

SHAKESPEARE, *Richard III.*, act i. scene 1, at end

- Cask**, filled and emptied, resembles human life (Tr. i. 192, 193; Gorg. 494 B).
- Casks** set within one another like a set of cup weights, said of the planetary spheres (Tr. ii. 307; Rep. 616 D).
- Casuistry**, an art which causes the same thing to appear either just or unjust at pleasure to the same parties; Palamedes of Elëa made like and unlike, one and many, bodies at rest and in motion, to seem to his auditors the same thing (Tr. i. 339; Phædr. 261 D).
- Caterers for lust** (Tr. i. 222; Gorg. 518 C).
- Cattle**, the shepherd, herdsman, and horse breeder must carefully purify their stock, and select the sound and well-formed into a separate class, reflecting how important it is to preserve purity of breed (Tr. v. 166, 167; Laws, 735 B, C); fine levied for cattle impounded, *μεσεγγυωθέν* (Tr. 457, 458; 914 D, E).
- Causality**, all that exists, does it not exist through a cause, or, in other words, a Maker? (Tr. iv. 35; Phileb. 26 E); there are four divisions; the limited, the limitless, the mixed or intermediate, and causal (Tr. 36; 27 C); if, in reference to our own souls and healthy preservation of body, wisdom plays the chief part, will it be less so with reference to the whole heaven in all its vastness, purity and beauty? (Tr. 41; 30 B).
- Cause and Maker** are one (Tr. iv. 35; Phileb. 26 E); nothing done without a cause (Tr. ii. 332; Tim. 28 A, C); what is the eternal existence that has no beginning, and what the eternally derived, the former comprehended by reason, the latter by sense impression? (ib.); the Maker looked to an eternal and not a created visible pattern (Tr. 333, 334; 29 A, B, C, D, E).
- Causes** are twofold, necessary and divine (Tr. v. 379; Tim. 68 E); of birth and death investigated by Socrates (Tr. i. 102; Phæd. 96 A); absurdly so called, where nothing is assumed beyond material agency (Tr. i. 105; 99 A); though true that the action could not take place without the concurrence of such agency (ib.); causes one thing, and that without which they cannot act is another (99 B).
- Cautery** as a cure (Tr. i. 176; Gorg. 479 A).
- Cavern** described, in which men are chained so as to be incapable of seeing one another and stand with their backs to the entrance, while before them, on the opposite wall, are seen the shadows of puppets, or a procession projected by firelight, figurative of the condition of the human mind (Tr. ii. 202, 207; Rep. 514 A; 518 C).
- Celestial plant**, used as a synonym of man, in whose apex dwells a dæmon as the highest soul elevating us to kinship with heaven (Tr. ii. 406; Tim. 90 A).
- Celibacy**; it is proposed that marriage shall be compulsory between

thirty and thirty-five years of age, or that the man be fined in money or loss of civic privilege (Tr. v. 147, 148; Laws, 721 A, B); immortality, and progress, and posthumous fame depend on this (ib.; C).

Censorship of the press, the license of the comedians is not to be tolerated; no poet of comedy, or iambic verse, or of lyric melody is to burlesque any of the citizens, either in word or in representation, on the stage, either with or without anger (Tr. v. 494; Laws, 935 E); the giver of the games to banish him from the country the same day, or to fine him three minæ for breach of the rule (936 A); decision to rest with the prefect of education; and the poet is not to recite either to freeman or slave what he rejects (Tr. 494, 495; 936 B).

Cephalus (Tr. ii. 3; Rep. 328 D).

Chærephon (Tr. i. 137, 138; Gorg. 448 C).

Chain of gold, meant to symbolize the sun or his rays by Homer (Tr. i. 383; Theæt. 153 D).

Change of diet, or from luxurious habits to moderate or the reverse, usually attended with disorder, and the party is only gradually benefited thereby; so it is with the soul, which dreads to have its faith and settled opinions disturbed in reference to the laws which have existed from time immemorial (Tr. v. 265, 266; Laws, 797 E; 798 A, B).

——, physical, effected through isomorphism (Tr. vi. 157, 158; Tim. Locr. 98 A, B, C, D); the same elements being capable of being changed into one another.

—— of rotation; though this tendency is resisted, yet the material cosmos must be subject to change, as not immortal, but after a long cycle such a change takes place and is attended with corresponding destruction and renewal in human bodies (Tr. iii. 212; Statesm. 270 C, D); great convulsions and destructions of animal life caused thereby (Tr. 216; 273 A); it might be almost imagined that the mutations of geology were hinted at.

—— of sides in his argument made by Socrates (Tr. i. 393; Theæt. 161 C; Tr. 399, 400; 166 C); change of mind brought about by education is like that brought about by physic in the body or by sophistry in reasoning; is the production of a better habit; both states are equally true, and the same persons cannot have at one time false notions and at another true (Tr. 400; Theæt. 167 A); the highest, best, and healthiest persons and things the least subject to change (Tr. ii. 61; Rep. 380 E); so in the case of fabrics of the first class and in that of the soul (Tr. 62; 381 A); *a fortiori*, does not happen to deity (Tr. 62; 381 B); he cannot change for the better, and must, if he does so, change for the worse (ib.; 381 C); folly of

opposing all changes in government, whether needed or not (Tr. 110; 426 C).

Character which is feeble is never the cause of great good or evil (Tr. ii. 178; Rep. 491 E).

Charioteer who guides the two horses of the soul (Tr. i. 322; Phædr. 246 A); is himself one of the three divisions of the soul, and the highest; of the two horses, one is perfect in form and joints, with arched neck and aquiline nose, white with black eyes, a lover of honour, moderation, modesty, and correct opinion, requiring neither whip nor spur, obedient to a word; the other crook-limbed, stiff-jointed, with thick, short neck and throat, ape-faced, black, grey-eyed, hot-blooded, the friend of boasting and insolence, shaggy, and scarce yielding to the whip and goad (Tr. 330; 253 D, E; 254 B).

CHARMIDES. *See* Summary, page 185.

Charming serpents alluded to (Tr. ii. 35, 36; Rep. 358 B; Tr. iii. 75, 76; Euthyd. 289 E; 290 A).

Chastisement for the soul better than intemperance (Tr. i. 204, 205; Gorg. 502 E).

Chaunters of oracles are under a divine impulse, not of wisdom but of inspiration, like seers and poets, and statesmen who govern by correct opinion but not from perfect knowledge, often conduct successfully many and great affairs, knowing nothing of what they speak about (Tr. iii. 47; Meno. 99 C).

Children, no wine to be allowed them up to eighteen years of age, which would be adding fuel to fire (Laws, 666 A); afterwards wine in moderation to thirty, without drunkenness; after forty to be allowed freely (Tr. v. 64; 666 B, C); toys to be such as to leave the least possible room for sorrow, terror and pain (Tr. 256; 792 B); must have games up to six years of age adapted to their dispositions (Tr. 258; 793 E); clever inventions for enabling them to count by means of apples and garlands, and to acquire geometrical conceptions (Tr. 302, 303; 819 B, C); danger of making innovations in their games (797 A); people think that meddling with these is unimportant, while they do not see that thus they will make different men of them (Tr. 265; 797 C); all men pray for children in spite of the unhappiness and misfortune that may attend the realisation of their wishes (Tr. iv. 382; Alcib. II. 142 B); should be considered the property of the state (Tr. ii. 320, 321; Tim. 18 D); of good parents to receive special honour (19 A); children's pursuits take strong hold of the memory, it being easier to recollect what occurred long ago than what took place yesterday (Tr. ii. 330; Tim. 26 B); are not indulged with power or control by their parents but subjected to slaves and masters (Tr. i. 487, 488; Lysis, 207 E; 208 A, B, C, D); reference

to a mother's indulgence, as allowing the child to play with her wool and loom, and beating him for meddling (Tr. i. 487, 488 : *Lysia*. 207 E; 208 A, B, C, D); taught by fables and story-books before anything else (Tr. ii. 57; Rep. 377 A); plastic and easily moulded, and susceptible like wax (Tr. 58; 377 B); are they to be at the mercy of the fable maker? (ib.); ought to be instructed by persons of ripe years and not to be at the mercy of poets (Tr. 59; 378 C, D); do not discern what is figurative (ib.); what they first hear should tend to virtue (378 E); not to be terrified with stories of the freaks committed by the gods at night (Tr. 62, 63; 381 E); are generally like their parents, but silver is sometimes produced from gold, and the reverse (Tr. 98; 415 A); duty of closely discriminating the different metals in children and classifying them accordingly (Tr. 98, 99; 415 B, C); their amusements from the first should not run counter to the spirit of law, if they are to grow up rightly (Tr. 108; 424 E); to be in common and not to know their parents (Tr. 141, 142; 457 D); children of the best men and women to be reared, others not (Tr. 143, 144; 459 D); either we ought not to beget them or we ought to undergo the pain of rearing and instructing them (Tr. i. 34; *Crito*; 45 D); life valuable for the sake of children (Tr. 44; 54 A); fallacy of the argument exposed (ib.); will friends care for the children of a banished man and not those of a deceased person? (ib.).

Children of men and women of the guardian class to be kept apart unknown by their parents, under nurses assigned to them, to be suckled by their unknown mothers and by wet nurses, all severe labour falling on the nurses; while children of the bad, or those which have bodily defects, are to be put out of the way (Tr. ii. 144, 145; Rep. 460 C, D); children of unlawful unions contracted past the legal age to be abandoned and exposed (Tr. 145, 146; 461 C); all born within seven to ten months after a formal union or unions to be regarded as children in common whoever be the real parents, and the children of these to be regarded as grandchildren (461 D); they are to be taken to see battles (Tr. 152; 467 A); objection that they will be lost to the state replied to (467 B); suggestions for their safety and that they should be placed on fleet horses (Tr. 153; 467 C, D, E); to be carried into battle on horseback to insure safety and made to taste blood like whelps (Tr. 227; 537 A. See also Tr. 55; 375 A; Tr. 152, 153; 467 C, D, E); after two or three years' gymnastic training the readiest to be set apart as a select number, this being a period unfavourable to study by reason of the weariness of the body induced by it, though favourable as a good test of character (Tr. 227; 537 B); they are after twenty to pursue a more condensed synopsis of study, and to receive more honour, with a view to developing the dialectic temper.

- (537 C); after thirty, a further selection out of the selected is to test this dialectic power (Tr. 228; 537 D); should have a controlling power set up in them, like that of the virtuous state guardian, before they are let go free (Tr. 282; 590 E; 591 A).
- Chimæra, hippo-centaurs, Gorgons, and Pegasi and the whole tribe of monsters make large demands on our belief (Tr. i. 303, 304; Phædr. 229 D).
- Chip of the old block, a proverb, *ἀποφύψης. ἀποφύψως ὁμοίον τοῦτοίς* (Tr. i. 216; Gorg. 513 B), noticed by Mr. Grote.
- Chisel out noble statues, said of Socrates' description of what rulers should be (Tr. ii. 230, 231; Rep. 540 C).
- Choice of magistrates should be determined after testing their capacity and the character of their families from boyhood (Tr. v. 190, 199; Laws, 751 C; 756 E).
- Cicadæ, all resonant with the chirp of; their chorus summer-like and shrill (Tr. i. 304; Phædr. 230 B); said to have been men before the birth of the Muses until they died from excessive absorption in the beauty of their songs, and to whom it was given to chirp and sing on without food till their second death (Tr. 336; 259 A, C); they are termed Prophets of the Muses, who are singing above our heads on the branches of the trees (Tr. 340; 262 D).
- Circulation of the blood. *See* Blood.
- Cities overturned, in numbers, foundering like ships which have been and will be lost through the foolhardiness and ignorance of captains and crews; so men who know nothing of statesmanship plume themselves on their fancied skill (Tr. iii. 264; Statesm. 302 A).
- Citizens, magistrates, and soldiers fabled to have been moulded and reared under the earth with their arms and equipments shot up from it, and are under an obligation to regard their country as their nurse and their countrymen as brethren (Tr. ii. 98; Rep. 414 E); some are compounded by the deity of gold, viz., the rulers; others of silver, the auxiliaries; others of iron and brass, viz., the rustics and artisans (415 A); but in their children the metal is sometimes changed, and virtue and vice are not necessarily hereditary (ib.).
- "Whose arms were moulded in their mother's womb."
SHAKESPEARE, 1 *Henry IV.*, act i. scene 1.
- City, can it exist where the laws have no force? (Tr. i. 39, 40; Crito, 50 B).
- Class legislation for the few not the object of government (Tr. ii. 103; Rep. 420 C).
- Classification, based on the condensing or embracing under one idea many different concretes (Tr. iii. 161; Sophist, 253 D); all things

with which art is concerned partake of measurement; those who do not divide according to species lump like and unlike into one class, and their analysis is just as imperfect; when a man first perceives that which is common to many things, he ought not to quit the objects till he sees all the differences in them and all the non-resemblances, and should continue his scrutiny till he has shut all peculiar marks of generic relation into one embracing resemblance (Tr. iii. 234, 235; *Statesm.* 285 A, B, C).

Clear reasoning depends more upon agreement as to things than as to names (Tr. iii. 106; *Sophist*, 218 C); clear and certain and true sought, though of small benefit, rather than that which is greatest and most profitable (Tr. iv. 93; *Phileb.* 58 C); clear connexion, a bringing details widely separated into a connected view under one idea (Tr. i. 344; *Phædr.* 265 D).

CLEITOPHON. *See* Summary, page 224.

Clepsydra (Tr. i. 407, 443; *Theæt.* 172 E; 201 B).

Clever, sharp practitioners well described (Tr. i. 408; *Theæt.* 173 A, B); contrasted with philosophers (Tr. 408, 409; 173 C, D, E; 174 A); the counter contrast (Tr. 410; 175 C, D); the name of cleverness ought not to be conceded to unholy acting (Tr. 411, 412; 176 D); clever persons proud of what is really a reproach to them, and think a great deal of themselves (ib.); they are not what they fondly imagine (ib.); they disbelieve warnings of future suffering as the assertions of weak-minded persons (Tr. 412; 177 A); outstripped by baseness, which is swifter than they (Tr. 26, 27; *Apol.* 39 B); the clever, so called, and unjust classed as one (Tr. ii. 87; *Rep.* 405 B, C, D, E); clever conceited men described as quickly suspicious of evil from experience of their own craftiness (Tr. 91; *Rep.* 409 C); their inferiority by the side of their betters, and their self-estimate a false one, based only on acquaintance with depraved society, in which they have moved (Tr. 92; 409 D); clever speaking is not always true (Tr. i. 3; *Apol.* 17 B).

Cleverness commands attention; but where the speaker seems to be contemptible, Socrates takes no notice of him (Tr. iv. 272; *Hip. Min.* 369 D).

Clods, mere lumps of earth, said of people not smart (Tr. i. 411; *Theæt.* 176 D).

Cobblers and old clothes-menders put on a par with Protagoras, yet they would be detected if they sent back their clouted shoes and garments worse than they received them, while he could corrupt his scholars and be paid more than Phidias or ten sculptors for so doing (Tr. iii. 36; *Meno.* 91 D).

Cockcrow and daybreak (Tr. iii. 575, 576; *Symp.* 223 C).

Cock-fancier : Socrates observes that " One man desires horses, another dogs, another gold, a fourth horses, but he prefers a good friend to the best quail or cock " (Tr. i. 492; Lysis, 211 D, E)).

Colander, its utility in preventing large bodies passing through it, as also that of a sieve, and of winnowing and separating (Tr. iii. 118; Sophist, 226 B).

Coldness, can it be predicated of a wind which makes one man shiver and another not? (Tr. i. 381; Theæt. 152 B).

Collective education is the great point, not the right education of one boy or one choral troop (Tr. v. 26; Laws, 641 B); collective attribute is not that of the parts, nor *vice versa*; Socrates, by a quibble, declares that if two are even then each of the units of which it is composed are even and not odd, by way of refuting Hippias, though he admits it to be absurd that two persons should be beautiful and each of them not (Tr. iv. 253, 254; Hipp. Maj. 302 A, C).

Colonist, his right of removal with his family from Athens to another place; plea assumed to be put forward by the state against him who breaks the laws (Tr. i. 41; Crito, 51 D).

Colonization : are the citizens at their own option to determine who shall emigrate? (Tr. v. 126; Laws, 707 E); colonies not always formed with equal facility; there are those which swarm over like bees from want of room in the hive, those thrust out in times of sedition, or by conquest (Tr. 127; 708 B); difficulties where all do not speak one language, and time required before the horses of the state vehicle pull together (Tr. 127; 708 C, D).

Colophon, to put the, said of giving the finish to a thing (Tr. i. 383; Theæt. 153 C; Tr. iv. 490, 491; 3rd Epist. 318 B; Tr. v. 77, 78; Laws, 673 D, E; 674 C; Tr. iii. 92; Euthyd. 301 E).

Colour explained as being the efflux of figures commensurate with and sensible to sight (Tr. iii. 12; Meno. 76 C). Here figure and colour are united in one impression according to the modern view, where Mr. Bain's notion is not accepted. In the passage, Tr. 9, 10; 75 B, it is asked whether our conception of figure is not that alone of existences, which always happens to follow in connexion with colour?

Colours, theory of: white is that which dilates the sight, and black is its opposite; yellow is formed from red and white mingled with brightness; he makes blue to result from white and black, as was done in subsequent times by Goethe; and consistently with this a further addition of the white gives grey, and of course on this principle purple will result from red, black and white. There are added some further remarks which, though commendable for their piety, are out of place in a system of experimental philosophy (Tr. ii 378, 379; Tim. 68 B, C, D). Colours are produced by motions impinging on the eyes in a

- manner suitably to their production, and do not exist either in that which impinges nor in that which is impinged upon, but arise out of their mutual action (Tr. i. 383; Theæt. 153 E; 154 A); a question is started whether dogs and other animals see the same colours as one another (ib.); their physiological explanation attempted (Tr. 387; 156 E); they are neither in the object, nor the sense organ wholly, but correlative (ib.; Tr. 387; 157 A).
- Colts, reference made to training them by exposing them to noises and sights of terror, and thus teaching them to stand firm (Tr. ii. 96, 97; Rep. 413 D).
- Combination and arrangement in composition, with a view to clearness (Tr. i. 344; Phædr. 265 D).
- Comœdians not to burlesque persons (Tr. v. 494; Laws, 935 E; 936 A).
- Comœdy and tragedy distinguished from the dithyramb and epic (Tr. ii. 75; Rep. 394 D); said to require the same powers, and that he who can excel in one can excel in the other (Tr. iii. 576; Symp. 223 D); comœdy and immoderate laughter not commendable any more than immoderate grief (Tr. ii. 296; Rep. 606 C).
- Command, fondness for, will show itself ready to accept the most obscure and trivial field for its display (Tr. ii. 161; Rep. 475 A), thus manifesting eagerness for all rule (ib.).
- Commonweal is a bond of connection, while private weal drags states to pieces by pulling the opposite way (Tr. v. 388, 389; Laws, 874 B); a man should teach his soul by good habits neither to know nor understand how to do anything apart from others, but that a collective and common life should to the utmost extent exist (Tr. 500; 942 C).
- Common properties not known by sense perception (Tr. i. 422; Theæt. 185 B).
- Communication, can mutual, exist between opposites? (Tr. iii. 159; Sophist, 252 D).
- Communion with the dead, a felicity almost passing what is conceivable (Tr. i. 29; Apol. 41 C); what price would we not willingly pay for it? (ib.).
- Community derives its complexion from the individuals composing it (Tr. ii. 120; Rep. 435 E); of wives and children, explanation demanded of Socrates before proceeding (Tr. 132, 133; 449 C; 450 A); likely to excite controversy (Tr. 133, 134; 450 B, D); may be spoken of safely before persons who are sufficiently sensible, but failure a fearful thing (Tr. 134; 450 E; 451 A); a community in which "the mine" and the "not mine" are each severally held by all at the same time in common admits of being admirably governed (Tr. ii. 147, 149; 462 C, D; 464 B, C, D); when a part of the body suffers the whole suffers with it (Tr. 147; 462 D, E); community of pain and pleasure

- (464 A); community of women and children contributes to bring about this (ib.; Tr. 149; 464 B); allusion to its having been before discussed (Tr. 191; 502 E); in a perfect state women and children and male and female education should be in common (Tr. 232; 543 A). This is here stated without any particular limitation; but in Book v. cap. 8, marriages are not to be indiscriminate but to be settled by the rulers in due form and with sacred rites.
- Complete education for purposes of virtue, the learning letters, gymnastics and music (Tr. iv. 468; Cleitoph. 407 C).
- Complex of terms is the same thing with description (Tr. i. 444; Theæt. 202 B).
- Compound and complex bodies are perishable (Phæd. 78 B); simple not so (ib.; Tr. i. 80).
- Compounds may be known, not primary elements (Tr. i. 444; Theæt. 202 B); this is disputed in sections (201 C to 206 B; Tr. 443 to 450).
- Comprehend, it is difficult to do so when we do not know what a thing is (Tr. i. 375; Theæt. 147 B).
- Compulsion, not to be employed in education, because no freeman should be treated as a slave, and study should be made a pastime to boys (Tr. ii. 227; Rep. 536 E).
- Concealment is unwise; when a man strives to avoid discovery, and fails, he is sure to render men more harsh and suspicious, as they will set him down for a rogue (Tr. i. 245; Protag. 317 A); is not always easy for a bad man, nor for him to escape the notice of the gods (Tr. ii. 44, 45; Rep. 365 C, D).
- Concentration on one pursuit weakens the flow of mental power in other directions, as in the case of a stream prevented from seeking to diffuse itself (Tr. ii. 171; Rep. 485 D).
- Concourse of atoms, unintelligible as an explanation of the material universe; the movements of the heavenly bodies indicate intelligence, seeing that they are not capricious (Tr. vi. 18, 19; Epin. 982 B, C, D); this orderly procedure has been used by some as proving that they are without life because they employ uniform, not capricious or voluntary, motion (Tr. 19; 982 E); he who talks of violent impulses or natural endowments of bodies will talk unintelligibly (Tr. 20; 983 C, D).
- Concretes, whether beautiful or not, are ever changing (Tr. i. 81; Phæd. 78 E); are visible as opposed to their unseen abstracts (79 A); never permanent, and partake not of soul but of body (ib.; Tr. 81; 79 B).
- Conformity of temper always agreeable (Tr. i. 216, 217; Gorg. 513 C).

Confusion and despair of the man who dies unprepared (Tr. i. 231; Gorg. 527 A).

Confutation the best of purifications of the soul (Tr. iii 125, 126; Sphist, 230 D).

Connoisseurs in wine lay stress on trifling peculiarities or even defects (Tr. ii. 161; Rep. 475 A).

Conscience, its terrors at the approach of death, described (Tr. ii. 5, 6; Rep. 330 D, E; 331 A).

Consistency of life and agreement of conversation therewith; its value; one in which existence is attuned into a concord of words with deeds (Tr. iv. 161; Laches, 188 C); every speech should be consistent, like an animal having its own body, head and feet (Tr. i. 342, 343; Phædr. 264 C); of inner and outer life prayed for (Tr. 360; 279 C).

Contemplation of nature, all great arts require consummate investigation and lofty estimate of this, and this was exemplified in Pericles (Tr. i. 348, 349; Phædr. 269 E).

Contempt for sensuous pleasures is equivalent to dying, and is characteristic of a living death (Tr. i. 63; Phæd. 65 A).

Contiguity to the wise man conceived of as causing participation of his wisdom (Tr. iii. 480; Symp. 175 D), on the principle of water passing by capillary attraction (ib.; Tr. 480; 175 E).

Contradiction with one's self (Tr. i. 180; Gorg. 482 B); about the nature of the one (Tr. iii. 420, 421; Parm. 137 A, B, C, D, E).

Contradictory assertions, in which is proved, by a quibble or fallacious reasoning, that a man is and is not the same; that he knows and is ignorant (Tr. iii. 80; Euthyd. 293 C); gold not gold; man not a man; your father is everybody's father (Tr. 87; 298 C).

Contrariety of opinion, utter, and its tendency to run into contempt (Tr. i. 39; Crito, 49 D).

Contrast and parallelism of the arraignment of Socrates before a human court, and the soul of the unjust at its judgment in the other world (Tr. i. 231; Gorg. 527 A).

Cook laying an accusation against a physician before a tribunal of boys, supposed (Tr. i. 226; Gorg. 521 E; 522 A).

Cookery assumes the garb of physic (Tr. i. 156, 157; Gorg. 464 B, C, D); culinary art is a branch of flattery and underlies physic (465 B).

Copy-book ruled with lines referred to (Tr. ii. 224, 225; Rep. 534 D).

Corporeal frame, desire of it and love of the body on the part of bad men's souls, the cause of their flitting as ghosts about graveyards (Tr. i. 84; Phæd. 81 D); they assume a body allied to their leading propensities: the glutton that of the ass, the tyrant that of the wolf or hawk (Tr. 85; 81 E).

Correct speaking is not the uttering whatever seems fit to a man, but

- what is naturally suited and without which he will miss his mark (Tr. iii. 290; Cratyl. 387 C).
- Corrupter of youth, Socrates, indicted by Meletus on this head, declares that all care should be taken of youth how they may become the best possible (Tr. i. 458, 459; Euthyphro. 2 C, D).
- Corybantes, as they seem to hear the sound of flutes, so the expostulations of the laws are said to be heard by Socrates dinning in his ears to the exclusion of all other dissuasives, which would urge him to spurn death (Tr. i. 44, 45; Crito, 54 D).
- Cosmetic flattery parasitical on gymnastics (Tr. i. 157; Gorg. 465 B); deceives by forms and colours, smoothness and drapery, producing a spurious beauty (465 B); is to gymnastics what cookery is to physic, or sophistry to legislation (Tr. 157; 465 C).
- Cosmological speculations that the sun and stars once rose where they now set, and set where they now rise (Tr. iii. 210; Statesm. 269 A); that the men of former days were produced from the earth, and not generated from one another (Tr. 210, 211; 269 B; 271 D, E); the deity accompanied the circular movement in an orbit, and when he abandoned it the motion changed backwards (269 D); only the divine absolutely is without change, therefore the Cosmos, which is material, must partake of it, and the minimum of this change is a slow uniform revolution on an axis (269 E; 270 A, B); change of rotation attended with cataclasms (Tr. 211, 216; 270 C, D; 273 A); in the divine period dæmons presided over the animal world, and there was no war nor devouring of one another (Tr. 213, 214; 271 D, E); fruits were spontaneous, and men were born from the soil (ib. See also Tr. iv. 188; Menex. 237 B); when the dæmons departed, men became weak and the prey of the more powerful (Tr. iii. 218; Statesm. 274 B, C).
- Cosmos, a beautiful arrangement, moderation, righteousness, &c., and a fellowship contracted between heaven and earth, gods and men, not disorder nor excess (Tr. i. 210, 211; Gorg. 508 A); the Cosmos changes because it is partly material (Tr. iii. 210, 211; Statesm. 269 E; 270 A); is the likeness of a pattern (Tr. ii. 332, 333; Tim. 29 A); is beautiful because the Maker looked to an eternal pattern not to one created; let this be termed the heaven or Cosmos (28 B; 29 A); it is visible and tangible and has body, so that it is amongst the things comprehended by opinion with perception, and is created by a Cause who is difficult to find and clearly to expound (28 C), who is the best of things begotten as He is of causes (29 A); that understanding has adorned and disposed all things revealed to sight is a notion worthy of the Cosmos, sun, moon, stars, and celestial movements (Tr. iv. 38, 39; Phileb. 28 E); since we are made up of body and soul, is not that

greater body and that celestial fire of the Cosmos or Universe more truly animated? (Tr. 39, 40, 41; Phileb. 29 C, D, E; 30 A, B); an ordinary power (Tr. 103, 104; 64 B).

Coughing down a speaker (Tr. i. 248; Protag. 319 C).

Country, a mother, not a stepmother, in whose bosom they, her children, are now deposited, and which begat and reared them (Tr. iv. 188, 189; Menex. 237 C).

— walks and scenery about Athens described (Tr. i. 303, 304; Phædr. 229 A, B, C, D; 230 B, C); locality styled divine, and the narrator, *νυμφόληπτος*, transported beyond himself into dithyrambs (Tr. 313; 238 D).

— is more precious and holy than father or mother, and more beloved by gods and men (Tr. i. 40, 41; Crito, 51 A, B); it may command us to die or suffer, and unless we can persuade it to change its decisions, we must submit (51 C); gave us birth and permitted us to emigrate if we disliked the conditions it imposed (Tr. 41; 51 D).

Courage and rashness contrasted (Tr. i. 291 to 293; Protag. 360 A, B, C, D, E); moral courage, not being brave merely against pain or objects of terror, but in fighting against lusts and pleasures (Tr. iv. 165 Lach. 191 D); *ἀνδρεία* may be translated courage, manliness or fortitude; it is often found in connection with *σωφροσύνη* (Tr. v. 541; Laws, 965 D); like *ἀνδρείος* with *σώφρων* (Tr. iii. 275, 279; Statesm. 308 E; 311 B); is one of the four parts of virtue, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, or wisdom, moderation, manliness, and righteousness, which is opposed to *δειλή, ἀνανδρία*. (See Tr. i. 331; Phædr. 254 C, and elsewhere); courage, like the terms expressing other general qualities, has some essential element present in all its varieties, which never varies (Tr. iv. 165, 166; Laches, 191 D, E), just as celerity has; and this Socrates presses his correspondent to tell (192 B); courage is not properly affirmed of lions and tigers, says Nicias; they are fearless because they do not know the danger which threatens them; I call no animals brave who are fearless through ignorance, but only destitute of fear and foolish, and so of children (Tr. 173; 197 A, B); made out by the reasoning to be the whole, not part of virtue, which contradicts what was said before (Tr. 177, 178; 199 E).

Courts of law, the necessity for having recourse to them, evidence of defective education, it being disgraceful to waste the greater part of life either as plaintiff or defendant (Tr. ii. 87; Rep. 405 B); the tortuous subterfuges of the courts alluded to (405 C).

Cowards rejoice and grieve more than brave men, but in the main they do so equally (Tr. i. 199; Gorg. 498 C); they are evil, and brave men are good; but the question is asked whether they are similarly good

- and bad, or whether cowards are not more good and bad? (Tr. i. 199; Gorg. 498 C); cowards to be punished (Tr. v. 503; Laws, 944 C, D).
- Cratylus, his irony, and what is his oracular secret about names? (Tr. iii. 283, 284; Cratyl. 384 A); his reservation of his real sentiments (ib.).
- CRATYLUS. *See* Summary, page 155.
- Created differs from the eternally same (Tr. ii. 331, 332; Tim. 27 D; 28 A).
- Creation, is it automatic or the work of deity? (Tr. iii. 180; Sophist, 265 C); done without thought or by reason and divine science? (ib.); was made as perfect as possible and as like the Creator (Tr. ii. 333, 334; Tim. 29 E; 30 A); instinct with thought and understanding (30 B, C); is single, only one heaven existing, made visible by the agency of fire, and tangible by resistance, and spherical in shape, and compounded definitely (Tr. ii. 335 to 337; Tim. 31 B, C; 33 B); foolish to say that the number of worlds is infinite (Tr. 363; 55 B).
- Credit, goods are to be exchanged for money, and money for goods, in proper marts or places of exchange, and not on trust. He who gives credit is not to be allowed to recover by action at law (Tr. v. 348 to 351; Laws, 849 B; 850 A); this is repeated expressly (Tr. 460, 461; 915 D, E. *See also* Tr. 180, 470, 471; 742 C; 921 D).
- Cretans do not hold banquets nor drinking matches (Tr. iv. 460, 461; Minos, 320 A).
- Crew, description of a lawless ship's company, as despising the captain's knowledge of astronomy and the seasons (Tr. ii. 174, 175; Rep. 488 B, C, D, E).
- CRITIAS. *See* Summary, page 132.
- CRITON. *See* Summary, page 11.
- Cronus, a name whose derivation implies that which is pure and unmixed (Tr. iii. 307; Cratyl. 396 A, B).
- Crowing before the victory has been obtained (Tr. i. 397; Theæt. 164 C).
- Cubical forms of our modern tesseral or cubical system derived from the equilateral triangle, which is first derived from the right-angled triangle of 60° and 30° , either with short sides and hypotenuses contiguous to one another when six such form the equilateral, or with two longer sides together when two make up the equilateral. Such an elementary triangle has its angles as 3, 2, and 1, and its sides as $\sqrt{3}$, 2, and 1 (Tr. ii. 362, 363; Tim. 55 A); such a triangle is described as τὸ δὲ τριπλὴν κατὰ δύναμιν ἔχον τῆς ἐλάττονος τὴν μείζω πλευράν (Tr. 361, 362; 54 B).
- Cupping glass (Tr. ii. 394; Tim. 80 A; Tr. vi. 163; Tim. Loc. 101 E).
- Curable sins may be atoned for and rectified in Hades (Tr. i. 229, 230; Gorg. 525 B); incurable sins are punished as a warning and example (Tr. 230; 525 C).

Current traditions (Tr. i. 303, 304; Phædr. 229 D).

Curry favour with the populace as with children (Tr. i. 205, 206; Gorg. 502 E).

Curved, what is it that it has in common with the straight, and which makes that which is contained by straight lines or curves equally a figure? (Tr. iii. 9; Meno. 74 D, E); what is a limit? (Tr. 10; 75 D); figure is declared to be the limiting bound of a solid (Tr. 11; 76 A).

Cynocephalus, conceived of as the measure of all things; it is wonderful that Protagoras, in his treatise on Truth, did not say that a pig or a cynocephalus was such a measure (Tr. i. 393; Theæt. 161 C); the objector considers this reference to pig and cynocephalus as swinish in argument (Tr. 399, 400; 166 C).

Cypress trees of wondrous height and beauty near Cnossus in Crete (Tr. v. 2; Laws, 625 B, C), and meadows to rest in (ib.).

D.

Dædalus, his runaway statues (Tr. iii. 44; Meno. 97 D); amusingly applied by Socrates to the hypotheses of an opponent (Tr. i. 470; Euthyph. 11 C); Socrates not the Dædalus who makes his arguments light of heel or to run round in a ring (Tr. 475, 476; 15 C); described as inferior to modern statuary by modern artists, who assert that his most famous works would be ridiculous by the side of theirs (Tr. iv. 213; Hipp. Maj. 282 A; Tr. i. 475, 476, 470; Euthyph. 15 C; 11 D).

Dæmon evil, as an avenging or malignant power, overturning all (Tr. iv. 516; Epist. vii. 336 B); dæmon of Socrates (Tr. i. 459; Euthyph. 3 B); so called from *δαίμων*, one who is wise (Tr. iii. 310; Cratyl. 398 B); applicable to the wise man both in life and death (398 C); of Socrates did not oppose him on going before the tribunal that was to condemn him, because his death was to be to him a blessing (Tr. i. 27, 28, 29; Apol. 40 B; 41 D); a dæmon is assigned to each man in life, and leads him before his judges in the other world (Tr. i. 116; Phæd. 107 D); represented as struggling and bearing away by force the soul that passionately loves the body, much against its will (Tr. 117; 108 A, B); Love represented as being a great and powerful dæmon who keeps alive intercourse between gods and men (Tr. iii. 534; Symp. 203 A); term applied to brave men when dead (Tr. ii. 154; Rep. 468 E); applied to dead rulers (Tr. 230, 231; 540 C); the dæmon shall not select you, but you your dæmon (Tr. 308; 617 C); the highest form of soul in us is a dæmon given us by deity, which elevates us to heaven as celestial plants (Tr. ii. 406; Tim. 90 A); a man will be happy with such a richly-adorned dæmon dwelling in him (90 B); dæmon of Socrates always dissuades him from under-

- taking anything (Tr. iv. 412, 413, 414, 416; Theag. 128 D; 129 E; 130 E; 131 A).
- Dæmonic and divine is destitute of falsehood (Tr. ii. 63, 64; Rep. 382 E).
- Dæmons believed in by Socrates (Tr. i. 14; Apol. 27 D); inconsistency of this with the charge of his being an atheist (Tr. 14, 15; ib.; 27 E); in rank below the stars, but friendly to men; cognisant of their thoughts and acting the part of good angels; susceptible of pleasure and pain and hating wickedness (Tr. vi. 22; Epin. 984 B, C, D); divine dæmons are represented as regulating the course of animal life in the early ages; under the rule of the gods men sprang from the earth, which brought forth fruit spontaneously, lived naked and sun-burnt, and slept on the ground under a climate which was painless; afterwards, when the dæmon ceased to superintend, men were reduced to great straits (Tr. iii. 213, 214, 218; Statesm. 271 D, E; 274 B, C).
- Damon, a teacher of music, spoken of with approbation by Plato (Tr. iv. 149, 150; Laches, 180 C, D), where he terms him a man the most accomplished, not only in music, but in almost all other subjects you can name. Elsewhere, he says, we will confer with Damon what are the metrical systems suited to express illiberality, insolence, madness, or other baseness (Tr. ii. 82; Rep. 400 B); the forms of music are not disturbed without affecting the greatest political laws, as Damon says and I believe (Tr. 107, 108; 424 C); the skill of Damon (Tr. iv. 173, 174, 178; Laches, 197 C; 200 A, B).
- Dance of the stars described as most glorious and imposing, as they move in chorus (Tr. vi. 19; Epin. 982 E).
- Dancing given us by the gods with wine and song to lighten our labours (Tr. v. 44, 45; Laws, 653 D); young animals cannot remain still, but jump and skip, and make noises; but to humanity has been given a sense of rhythm and harmony additional; counselling to choral movements (Tr. 45; 654 A); when joyous we cannot keep still (Tr. 51; 657 C); and old men love to look on when their own elasticity is gone (Tr. v. 51, 76, 77; 657 D; 673 D).
- Dancing and piping girls (Tr. i. 277; Protag. 347 D).
- Danger of men finding excuses for themselves; the source of all their faults excessive self-regard (Tr. v. 160; Laws, 731 E); to shun danger is not the first object of a wise man (Tr. i. 214; Gorg. 511 B); is preferable to disgrace (Tr. i. 15, 16; Apol. 28 D; 28 E); true not only in military matters but in the sphere of moral duty (ib.; 29 A).
- Darkness of the lower world; no law that those who have commenced a heavenly career should descend to it (Tr. i. 333; Phædr. 256 D, E).
- Dative with accusative a common construction (Tr. ii. 296; Rep. 606 E; Sophoc. Elect. 479; Æschy. Coeph. 396; Acts xxvi. 3; Ephes. i. 18).

Day of doom not to be shunned (Tr. i. 227, 228; Gorg. 523 B); day is one and the same though at the same time in many places (Tr. iii. 409; Parm. 131 B).

Dead men's anger; those who have died a violent death when newly dead are enraged with the perpetrator (Tr. v. 373, 374; Laws, 865 D); the souls of the dead after their departure have a certain power by which they exercise an oversight over the affairs of living men, and this influence is especially to be feared in the case of orphans (Tr. v. 479, 480; 927 A, B); that there is a perception to the dead of the things done here (Tr. iv. 480; Epist. ii. 311 C).

Death is the least of evils to those that are incurable (Tr. v. 354, 355; Laws, 854 E); a physician not to be punishable where the patient dies contrary to his wishes (Tr. 373; 865 B); is not the extreme of evils, but the penalties inflicted in the other world on the incurable are far more so, which, though truly stated, do not suffice to prevent crime (Tr. 400, 401; 881 A); graphic description of the fear of death by an old man (Tr. vi. 39, 40; Axioch. 364 B); unless a divine life existed in the soul, it could not have achieved what it has done in the way of astronomical prediction and other arts, and thus death is a passage to immortality, where a purer enjoyment, unmixed with bodily evils, awaits the departed (Tr. 51, 52; Axioch. 370 C, D); a noble thing to die in battle and to have a funeral oration over one (Tr. iv. 184 to 187; Menex. 235 A; 236 D); at his death, the man who has bequeathed his honours and reputation to his children will be welcomed by the honoured dead (Tr. 204; 247 C); if there be any perception to the dead, immoderate grief on the part of the living will not be acceptable (Tr. 205, 206; 248 B); is easily submitted to where no wrongdoing exists (Tr. i. 227; Gorg. 522 C, D); not a thing to be feared in the mere act, by those who are reasoning and manly, but only in the case of having acted unjustly (522 E); it leads the just and holy to the Islands of the Blessed (523 A); is nothing but the dissolution of soul and body, in which both retain their peculiarities (Tr. 228, 229; Gorg. 524 B, C); makes no difference as to the bodily characteristics (ib.), nor does it alter the qualities and affections of soul (524 D); preparation for death (Tr. 231; 526 D); the risk of it not worth shunning, when set beside the value of doing what is just (Tr. 15; Apol. 28 B); case of Achilles (28 D; Tr. 19; 32 A); may it not be the greatest of all a man's blessings? (Tr. 16; Apol. 29 A); the death of Socrates would have happened in the course of nature, without violence, had he not been brought to trial (Tr. 26; 38 C); his death due to audacity and shamelessness on the part of his foes, not for want of arguments for his defence, but because he would not prophesy sweet things (38 D); reasoning on the grounds of his refusal to adopt

certain expedients for avoiding death (38 E; Tr. 26, 27; 39 A, B); death is accompanied by the hope that it will prove a great good, and if it is merely a sleep without dreaming, it is a great gain (Tr. i. 28; 40 C, D), or if it be the soul's removal to another place (ib.); there are few days and nights happier than those nights in which not even a dream disturbs the sleeper (ib.; 40 E); is nothing to a good man who is never neglected by the gods (Tr. 29; 41 D); is freedom from trouble (ib.); is a severance of soul from body, and their dwelling apart (Tr. 62, 66; Phæd. 64 C; 67 D); only after death and separation from sense can we obtain the objects of intelligence, not in life (Tr. 65; 66 E); freed from the folly of the body and purified, we can alone attain the true, and simple, and pure (67 A); compare with this the Scripture passage "corruption doth not inherit incorruption;" death is not to be feared by him who lives as near as possible to it (Tr. 66; 67 D, E); at death the soul assumed to be dissipated like smoke (Tr. 69; 70 A); this is universally so unless life springs from it (Tr. 72; 72 D); if the soul is extinguished at death, it is a god-send to the wicked (Tr. 116; 107 C); death under good omen and borne with fortitude (Tr. 127; 117 D); terror of an evil conscience at death described (Tr. ii. 5, 6; Rep. 330 D, E; 331 A); we should teach men not to fear death (Tr. 65; 386 A); the stories told of the terrors of another world are condemned (386 B), though such are narrated as credible (Tr. i. 116 to 123; Phæd. 108 to 114); no man of distinction fears death as an evil, nor will he mourn the loss of friends (Tr. ii. 67; Rep. 387 D).

Decay and growth; assimilation and resolution of the blood minutely described as effected by the displacement and replacement of minute atoms conveyed by the blood (Tim. 81 A); nourishment is conveyed from the heart as the root, and from the cavity of the belly as a fountain, the most perfect effect being where the inflow and outflow balance each other (Tr. vi. 163, 164; Tim. Loc. 102 A).

Declination of the sun, view of, taught in the myth of Phæthon (Tr. ii. 325; Tim. 22 B).

Defects of written language, it will not answer any questions any more than painting (Tr. i. 355, 356; Phædr. 275 D).

DEFINITIONS. See Summary, page 247.

Deity is incomprehensible and unseen. We, however, feign him as a sort of immortal animal, possessed of body and soul, but would desire to speak of him as agreeable to himself (Tr. i. 322; Phædr. 246 A); has made all things best (Tr. ii. 360; Tim. 53 B); said to accompany the revolutions of the universe (Tr. iii. 210; Statesm. 269 D); described as a second time resuming the helm of affairs (Tr. 216, 217; 273 B, C, D); is righteous to the highest degree (Tr. i. 411; Theæt.

176 C); and the just man resembles him (ib.); is not to blame for the perverseness of human choice (Tr. ii. 308; Rep. 617 E; Tr. vi. 28, 29; Epin. 988 B).

Deliberate choice of evil impossible (Tr. i. 290; Protag. 358 E).

Deliberation, the time for it said to be past, and resolution to be now wanted (Tr. i. 34; Crito, 46 A).

Delphi and Dodona, mantic prophetesses of, did not receive their designations as a disgrace, and it is suggested that *οἰονοιστική* derives its origin from *οἴησις* and *νοῦς*, and *μαντική* from *μάνια* (Tr. i. 319, 320; Phædr. 244 B); short sentences inscribed at Delphi (Tr. 273; Protag. 343 A, B).

Delphic inscriptions, *γνώθι σαυτόν*,—*μηδὲν ἔγαν*,—*ἐγγύη ἔτη* (Tr. i. 304; Phædr. 229 E; Tr. iv. 429; Rivals, 138 A; Tr. 439, 440; Hipparch. 228 B; Tr. vi. 28; Epin. 988 A; Tr. iv. 348, 349; Alcib. I. 124 B; Tr. iv. 128, 129; Charmides, 165 A).

Deluges, repeated, have swept over the world, and the earth has required to be re peopled, leaving an infinite terrible solitude and devastation (Tr. v. 881; Laws, 677 E); frequent in olden time (Tr. ii. 325; Tim. 22 B); these caused great denudations, and many islands are only the bones of masses once existing (Tr. ii. 417, 418; Critias, 111 A, B).

Demigods, a fifth class of powers (Tr. vi. 23, 24; Epinom. 985 C).

Democracy, corrupted by, and brought to shame; Socrates fears that this will be his friend's fate, for "fair-faced is the crowd of the great-souled Erectheus," and it ought to be seen stripped of its outward glaze (Tr. iv. 364; Alcib. I. 132 A); is the weakest of legal polities (Tr. iii. 264, 265; Statesm. 303 A); best of those that are independent of law (303 A).

—described; love of money leads acquisitive dispositions to encourage waste and profligacy in others, with a view to profiting by their embarrassments (Tr. ii. 244, 245; Rep. 555 B, C); the ruined men, like bees or wasps armed with stings, become plotters against the usurpers of their property (Tr. 245; 555 D); graphic account of a designing person marking out his victim so as to avoid observation, by injecting into him the poison of a loan, which bears so heavy interest as soon to exceed greatly the principal (Tr. 245; 555 E); he has no wish to extinguish the burning scandal of inducing or allowing a man to waste his means (Tr. 245; 556 A); no interest ought to be allowed on loans (556 B; see also Laws, Tr. v. 180; 742 C; Tr. 470, 471; 921 D; also see Credit); graphic account of the superiority of the poor man in difficulties and hardships to the daintily reared man, superfluous in flesh and gasping for breath under unusual exertion (Tr. ii. 246; 556 C, D); ailing bodies want only a little to upset them wholly (Tr. 246; 556 E); the poor soon get the ascendant in a de-

mocracy, kill or banish the rich, and choose their magistrates by lot (557 A); men are free to act and speak in it as they please (557 B); is apparently to be preferred, judging by its various outward attractions (Tr. 246, 247; 557 C); it possesses samples of all other polities in itself, and is a sort of general mart of them (Tr. 247; 557 D); there is no necessity for a man to undertake rule in it, nor that he should be ruled, or observe the laws, which is highly gratifying at the moment (Tr. 247; 557 E); is very lenient to convicts (558 A); in it honour does not spring from superior education and endowments, but from the favour of the mob (Tr. 247; 558 B); it is styled a pleasant, anarchical, and fancifully diversified polity (Tr. 247, 248; 558 C); in describing the derivation of the democratic man from the oligarchic, he stops to distinguish desires that are essential from others not so (Tr. 248; 558 D); those desires which do a man no good are non-essential, while eating, so far as it contributes to good health, is classed with the essential or necessary (Tr. 248; 559 A); the parsimonious and oligarchic man confines himself to essentials; the dronish man is full of lusts and pleasures which are non-essential (Tr. ii. 248; 559 B, C); the oligarchic man with defective education first tastes the drone's honey and associates with fierce and fiery insects (not without reference probably to their golden rings), and allies himself with external desires, while the exhortations of his father and relatives support the oligarchic temper within him, and a sedition results (Tr. 249; 559 D, E; 560 A); internal conflict described (Tr. 249; 560 B); low desires at last triumph and seize the acropolis of the youth's soul, when abandoned by the sciences and beautiful reasonings and endowments, which are the best garrison in the mind of god-beloved men (ib.); opinion and falsehood, in lieu of knowledge, now occupy the fastness, and are referred to under the figure of lotus-eaters, with whom they desire to dwell, and repel all foreign aid or friendly remonstrance by shutting the gates of the soul to reason, calling vice virtue and bringing back from banishment, insolence, anarchy, restlessness, and shamelessness, as a crowned troop of revellers (Tr. 249, 250; 560 C, D, E); again, when grown older and wiser, the man relents in part, and recalls some of the banished desires, and strives to put necessary and unnecessary on an equal footing, but does not allow the love of the good and beautiful to occupy the stronghold of the mind while he wavers between self-indulgence and philosophy, living only for the passing day (Tr. 251; 561 C, D); a life of disorder which he terms sweet, free and happy (ib.; Tr. 251; 561 E; 562 A); three peculiarities in a democracy (Tr. 254; 564 C); the sharper witted portion of the democratic mob, always assembled round the orators' benches in a continual buzz (Tr. 254; 564 E); also the cleverest make

the most money, and this honey the drones press out of the combs, their best feeding ground being among such (Tr. 254; 564 E); the third class, the labouring, who have little property, is the most numerous and powerful, and gets an occasional largess of honey from the demagogues who retain the largest share of plunder for themselves (Tr. 254, 255; 565 A); this leads to informations and judicial squabbles, and ends in one man being established with excessive powers (Tr. ii. 255; 565 B, C), viz., the military dictator or tyrant.

DEMODOCUS. See Summary, page 245.

Demodocus (Tr. iv. 402, 411; Theag. 122 B; 127 B).

Denudation (Tr. ii. 417, 418; Critias, 111 A, B).

Deodand, in the case of kindred blood spilt, is, that murder must be paid by murder (Tr. v. 387; Laws, 873 A); the culprit to be slain where three ways meet, to be cast naked out of the city, and all the rulers to throw a stone at the head of the corpse, after which the unburied body is to be dragged to the confines of the territory (Tr. 387; 873 B); but what is he to suffer who takes his own life without state compulsion or pressing accident of fortune or disgrace, but from weariness of life and cowardice? (Tr. 388; 873 C); the animal which has killed a man or, even when an inanimate thing, is the means of slaying, is to be killed in the one case, and cast out in both, thunder-stroke alone excepted (Tr. 388; 873 E); if the animal injures the property of another, the owner is to make it good (Tr. 495, 496; 936 E).

Dependent, there are two conditions, the one absolute and self-sustaining, the other always hanging on something else (Tr. iv. 83, 84; Phileb. 53 D); the thing for which another thing is produced is in the class good; the thing which exists for something else is in another (Tr. 85, 86; 54 C).

Depraved are often potentates (Tr. i. 230; Gorg. 525 E); when men of power are not so, they merit high praise (Tr. 230; 526 A); difficult not to be so (ib.); Aristides an exception (ib.); sent to Tartarus by Rhadamanthus (Tr. 230; 526 B), and marked or branded as curable or incurable (ib.; Tr. 231; 526 C).

Depravity of soul is like sedition in a state (Tr. iii. 121, 122; Sophist, 228 B); contradictions in it (ib.); difference from ignorance, which is a disease of soul (Tr. 122; 228 D); never knows itself or virtue (Tr. ii. 292; Rep. 409 E).

Depth of a stream known to him who fords it, a saying (Tr. i. 443; Theæt. 201 A, B).

Description of the two horses of the soul (Tr. i. 330; Phædr. 253 D), the essence of a description is a complex of terms (Tr. 444; Theæt. 202 B).

Deserting the ranks, a crime (Tr. i. 40, 41; Crito, 51 B).

Desire is always kindled by the sight of anything possessed of great magnitude and power; all men wish that everything should happen according to their own will (Tr. v. 94, 95; Laws, 686 E); what desire is in the case of hunger and thirst (Tr. iv. 49, 50; Phileb. 34 E); the first time hunger is felt it is not connected with a longing for food, since the hungry person knows nothing of the satisfaction caused by it (Tr. 50; 35 A); desire, therefore, is not a bodily feeling but springs from memory of an antecedent state (Tr. 51; 35 C).

Desire is a stronger bond than that of Necessity. This is used as an argument for showing that the souls of men in the nether world prefer to remain there, seeing that Necessity, as being a weaker bond, could not hold them (Tr. iii. 320; Cratyl. 403 C, D). See Pluton and Sirens.

Development, doctrine of, considerations bearing thereon. Mankind never had a beginning, nor will have an end; but animals have experienced many changes. Are we to believe that vines, olives, corn suddenly arose spontaneously, not having previously existed? or that any Triptolemus furnished them? or that animals at one time did not exist? (Tr. v. 242, 243; Laws, 781 E; 782 A, B).

Diacritical process includes soul purifying (Tr. iii. 126; Sophist, 231 B).

Diagrams, their use in geometry; are the shadowy images or watery reflections of those real entities which are grasped only in thought, and answer to hypotheses assumed as self-evident for the purpose of attaining higher truth, and not for their own worth (Tr. ii. 200; Rep. 510 C, D, E. See also Tr. 216; 527 A). In another place he says: "Wherefore no man of intellect will dare to express the conceptions of his mind by that which is never to be changed, which is the case when they are described by diagrams" (Tr. iv. 525, 526; Epist. vii. 343 A); but he is here arguing against written exposition altogether, if he means anything more than to assert that we build nothing in geometry on the utterly faulty diagram, which would empirically only mislead us. To the knowledge of the circle belong its name, its definition, the rough sketch, the appeal to the mental estimate, and the absolute ideal of it *αὐτὸ κύκλος*.

Dialectician, name assigned only to the philosopher (Tr. iii. 161; Sophist, 253 E).

Dialectics is the discriminating of genera and species (Tr. iii. 161; Sophist, 253 D); is the chief of sciences, and would disallow of our giving the palm to any rival (Tr. iv. 92; Phileb. 57 E); the science of sciences exercised about being and the absolutely immutable (Tr. 93; 58 A); are something which may be compared to a lay or strain

of which certain reasonings are preludes, there being few perfect reasoners or dialecticians (Tr. ii. 222; Rep. 531 D, E); belong to the Intelligible in contradistinction to the Visible (532 A); dialectics seek by reasoning alone to solve the problem, what each thing is *per se*, and if they reach the Good they arrive at the full end of the Intelligible (532 B). Socrates here again recurs to the case of the captives in the den looking at shadows and ascending to the light. *See* Human Mind (Tr. 202 to 207; 514 to 518 E). Analogy pointed out between the highest faculty of the soul and the clearest vision (Tr. ii. 222, 223; 532 D); what is the dialectic power, and what are the roads by which it conducts to final rest? (Tr. 223; 532 E). Socrates can only speak of it as it appears to him; it is, in his view, the only power by which what a thing really is can be comprehended; all others having reference to things that are produced and compounded (Tr. 223; 533 A B); geometry and other such sciences only dream about the existent, while they hold to hypotheses and do not see a waking vision *ὑπάρ* (Tr. 223; 533 C); dialectic as a science wholly abolishes hypotheses and goes to first principles (*ib.*); drags the eye of the soul out of the mire by auxiliary arts which are less than science but more than opinion, and are here described (Tr. 201; 511 D); as understanding, the second of a fourfold division (Tr. 224; 533 E). *See* Understanding. Science and understanding constitute intelligence, *νόησις*, which has regard to essential existence, *οὐσία*, but belief and conjecture, *πίστις* and *εἰκασία*, constitute *δόξα*, or opinion, which is exercised about *γένεσις*, or production. Intelligence is to belief what understanding is to conjecture (Tr. 224; 534 A); the dialectician comprehends the reason for each thing, while he who does not is without *νοῦς*. So, too, of the Good: he who looks not to *οὐσία*, knows nothing of it or of any other good, but sleeps till he will wake up in another world (Tr. 224; 534 B, C); dialectic is the battlement or top stone of all the learned sciences (Tr. 224, 225; 534 D); this dialectic power is to be tested and furthered by successive selection and reselection of men at twenty and thirty years of age (Tr. 227; 537 B, C, D); he describes, in a charming way, the abuse of dialectics, the rearing men in false dogmas about beauty and pleasure (Tr. 228 to 230; 537 E; 538 A, B, C, D, E; 539 A, B, C, D); it may degenerate into disputatiousness if got hold of too young (Tr. 229; 539 A); striplings use the reasoning faculty for mere confutation, exulting, like puppies, in dragging and tearing in argument all they fall in with, and thus throw discredit on the conclusions of reason (Tr. 229, 230; 539 C); older men will not do this, so that the right of arguing should only be conceded to the well-ordered and stable-minded (Tr. 230; 539 D); five years to

be spent in these mental exercises (Tr. 230; 539 E), and fifteen in military commands, after which a descent must again be made to the cavern (Tr. 230; 540 A); after fifty the students of dialectic are to keep to the philosophy of the Good (Tr. 230; 540 B), and to turn the keen lustrous eye of the soul upwards to it as a pattern (ib.).

Diaphragm, its office; is placed between the courageous and impulsive soul (Tim. 70 A); the second division of the mortal soul is placed below the diaphragm, where it is allowed to feed peaceably like an ox in its stall, by the side of the dark and shining liver, whose function is to mirror thoughts in sleep, enabling us to divine (Tr. ii. 382; 70 D); this oracular power is given as a compensation for the lack of intelligence in this third soul (Tr. 383; 71 E).

Dicasts and physicans in the state, are evidence of evil and illiberal education in the subjects of it (Tr. ii. 87; Rep. 405 A).

Dichotomy of the body (Tr. iii. 515; Symp. 192 C); to be feared as a punishment, if we are not well-ordered (Tr. 514, 515; 193 A); reference to profiles or faces on stone pillars as cut through the nose, also to *tali*, cut in two and used as means of identification (ib.); allusion to Love seeking his other half (Tr. 540, 510 to 514; 205 E; so 191 A, D; 192 E); examples of subdivision or dichotomy (Tr. iii. 110; Sophist, 221 B, C; Tr. 194; Statesm. 260 B, C, D); lifeless and animated (Tr. 196; 261 B, C); Greek and barbarian (Tr. 198; 262 D); odd and even (ib.; E); part distinct from its class (Tr. 199; 263 B); cloven-hoofed and solid (Tr. 203; 265 D); the breeding of horse and ass an exception to rule (265 E); plantigrade, biped, quadruped, apterous (Tr. 206, 207; 266 E; 267 B); violent and voluntary (Tr. 221, 222; 276 D).

Difference of sentiment, compared to the case of a lyre unstrung and dissonant (Tr. i. 180; Gorg. 482 B); the knowledge of difference or *differentia* essential to true conception (Tr. 452; Theæt. 208 A).

Dialogues of Plato. This is the form in which most of his writings are cast, his own name only appearing twice incidentally, and then he does not take part in the conversation recorded. He appears to have declined to commit to writing any systematic exposition of philosophy, if, indeed, he had framed any such. His notion is that books answer no questions, that mistakes are founded on them, and that thought is best eliminated by oral intercourse. His object appears rather to have been to elicit all that might be said on both sides of an argument and to leave the rest to work its own result, or he was of opinion that a sure criterion of truth was not possible. Hence the way in which he strives to overthrow the most opposite dogmas. There may have been something of more completeness in his cosmical and geometrical speculations, but he has taken no pains to make

these clear, if he did not purposely use mystification under the idea that these could never be of use to those not indoctrinated or initiated, and that the school was the proper arena for all such pursuits. Accordingly, in his Second Epistle, he says there is no systematic writing of Plato's nor will there ever be, that which has been said having been said by Socrates (Tr. iv. 484, 485; Epis. ii. 314 A, B, C). Burn this letter when you have read it again and again (ib.). Again he says people know nothing of his opinions, for there is no formal composition of his expressed in writing, nor ever will be, nor are his opinions spoken like other doctrines, but brought out by frequent intercourse, kindled like a leaping flame, and when in the soul feeding itself (Tr. 524; Epist. vii. 341 C, D). Elsewhere he speaks of books that are like paintings and can make no reply (Tr. i. 356; Phædr. 275 D, E), and again says that Theuth was not aware how the powers of memory would be impaired by the introduction of letters (Tr. 355; 274 E; 275 A). See also Phædr. 276 A, B, C, D, where he contrasts the sowing in ink with planting seed in the gardens of memory. Of these dialogues, besides those usually regarded as spurious, viz., Eryxias, Sisyphus, Demodocus, Axiochus, De Justo, De Virtute, and others, not usually printed in the editions of Plato, the German editors, one or more of them, reject Hipparchus, Minos, Cleitophon, Alcibiades II., Rivals, Epinomis, the Epistles, Parmenides, Sophist, Critias, Charmides, Lysis. See Grote i. 176. Theages, Euthyphron and Menexenus fall under suspicion. Thus there remain the Republic, the Laws, the Symposium, the Gorgias, Protagoras, Apology, Phædon, Phædrus, Parmenides, Cratylus, Theætetus, and some others as allowed to stand by almost general consent.

Different when asserted of the same makes the synthesis of verbs and nouns false discourse (Tr. iii. 177; Sophist, 263 D); different and same, what is included in this expression (Tr. ii. 138; Rep. 454 C); because a bald person cuts leather, is it improper for a person with flowing hair to do so? this depends on the previous limitation (Tr. 138; 454 D); the fact that woman brings forth and man begets does not make women and men different in our sense (Tr. 138; 454 E).

Differentia, the foundation of all special knowledge (Tr. i. 454; Theæt. 209 C, D); essential to the formation of true opinion (Tr. 455; 210 B; Tr. 73; Phæd. 73 C).

δικανικός (Tr. iii. 117; Sophist, 225 B).

Dilemma of Protagoras with regard to his dictum of man the measure of all things (Tr. i. 405; Theæt. 171 A, B).

Dimly, those who see but, have discovered more than the sharpsighted (Tr. ii. 284, 285; Rep. 595 C).

Din resounding in the ear of Socrates from the expostulation of the

- laws of his country dissuading him from proving untrue to them (Tr. i. 44, 45; Crito, 54 D).
- Dion, his true patriotism (Tr. iv. 515, 516; Epist. vii. 335 E).
- Direct for relative structure (Tr. ii. 305; Rep. 614 C) οὗς . . . τοὺς μὲν δίκαιους.
- Disagreeable to hear a child talk like a sage old man (Tr. i. 183; Gorg. 485 B).
- Disciples are spoken to openly when in secret, but enigmas are uttered before the crowd (Tr. i. 381, 382; Theæt. 152 C).
- Discourse, one that is light and playful is preferable to one that is grave and lengthy (Tr. iii. 104, 105; Sophist, 217 D); requires verbs and nouns (Tr. 175; 262 C); discourse and thought are identical, only that one is within the soul and is not διάλογος, but διάνοια (Tr. 177; 263 E); this silent inward reflection is opinion, but when perception or sense is the medium, it is termed "fancy" (Tr. 178; 264 A); is of two forms, true and false (Tr. ii. 57; Rep. 376 E).
- Discussions of philosophy, their pleasure and benefit (Tr. iii. 475; Symp. 173 C).
- Disease and death result from corruption of the blood (Tr. ii. 396; Tim. 82 A); where also mention is made of the serum of the blood, bile, phlegm, tears, sweat, and of epilepsy, convulsions, fever, and ague. Excessive indulgences of pains and pleasures are the greatest of soul diseases (Tr. 402; 86 B. See also Tr. vi. 164; Tim. Loc. 102 B, C, D).
- Diseased, one who is so incurably had better be drowned than saved (Tr. i. 215; Gorg. 512 A).
- Disgrace is greater when a man injures another than when he is injured (Tr. i. 169; Gorg. 474 C); there is no disgrace in not avoiding death (Tr. i. 15; Apol. 28 B, D); disgrace swifter than death (Tr. 26; 39 A).
- Disgraceful to pretend to know the things in Hades and to disobey a superior, whether God or man (Tr. i. 16; Apol. 29 B).
- Disinterested, contrasted with interested feelings; we ought to do favours to those who need them, who will be grateful in proportion to their need; to invite beggars, who will pray for many blessings on our heads, and not exert ourselves for those who, when they cease to desire, will find a pretext for hatred (Tr. i. 308; Phædr. 233 D, E).
- Dispensaries, public, for dealing out medicines (Tr. ii. 87; Rep. 405 A).
- Disputations, those who are much exercised in them, think that there is nothing sound or settled in arguments (Tr. i. 95; Phæd. 90 C).
- Disputes required to be clearly stated, which often demands time and

- deliberation; litigants should first submit their case to friends and neighbours before going into court (Tr. v. 216; Laws, 766 D, E).
- Distaff of necessity, the axis of the heavens (Tr. ii. 307; Rep. 616 C).
- Distance causes things to appear indistinct (Tr. iv. 57, 58; Phileb. 38 D); so also it is with the feelings: they appear greater and more intense or the reverse, according as viewed near and in connection, or afar off and separate (Tr. 63, 64; 42 B); it diminishes apparent evil (Tr. i. 287; Protag. 356 C).
- Dithyramb akin to rhodomontade (Tr. i. 313; Phædr. 238 D).
- Divination, madness, declared to be better than sober wisdom, inasmuch as divination is more perfect and honourable than augury, the former madness coming from God and not on a par with human wisdom (Tr. i. 319, 320; Phædr. 244 B); accomplished by means of the liver (Tr. ii. 382; Tim. 70 D).
- Divine, epithet of a charming place (Tr. i. 313; Phædr. 238 D); reference to the possession of a divine element, where the soul is not puffed up (Tr. 304; 229 D, E); virtue described as a divine allotment, a true substance among shadows (Tr. iii. 48; Meno. 99 E; 100 B); divine things are to be pondered, if a man is to partake of immortality and have a dæmon richly adorned dwelling in him (Tr. ii. 406; Tim. 90 B; Tr. vi. 162; Tim. Locr. 101 B); divine suggestions spoken of as occurring in sleep or in dreams or at death (Tr. vi. 23, 24; Epinom. 985 C); divine men are not to be evil spoken of (Tr. iv. 459; Minos, 319 A; Tr. iii. 213, 214; Statesm. 271 D, E); are unclothed (ib.); can divine things be believed in without our believing in divine persons? (Tr. i. 14; Apol. 27 C); pursuit of divine things, belief in the earlier traditions, and the rites of religion and the providence of the gods, though the subject is not without its difficulties, better worked out by the Greeks than the barbarians (Tr. vi. 28, 29; Epin. 988 A, B).
- Doctrine of chance as originating the universe; there are those who say that all things are, have been, and shall be, partly by nature, partly by art or design, and partly by fortune (Tr. v. 411; Laws, 888 E).
- Dodecahedron is the type of the universe (Tr. ii. 362, 363; Tim. 55 A).
- Dodona (Tr. i. 319, 320; Phædr. 244 B).
- Dog fancier (Tr. i. 492; Lysis, 211 D, E). "By the dog!" *μὰ τὸν κύνα*, a favourite oath of Socrates.
- Dogs, watch; their fierceness to strangers and fawning on acquaintances (Tr. ii. 55, 56; Rep. 375 C, D, E; 376 A); dogs have something philosophic in them (376 B); the man who is like this watchdog will be philosophic too, and we must look to his training as a guardian for the state (Tr. 57.; 376 C); warriors should be sleepless,

quick-sighted dogs (Tr. 86; 404 A); parallel drawn between good sheep-dogs and the auxiliary and soldier classes (Tr. 99; 416 A, B); dogs snarl at the stone which strikes them rather than him who threw it (Tr. 155; 469 E).

Domestic foe, he whose reasoning is undermined with that which is hostile within him is like one with a traitor in his camp or the ventriloquist Eurycles in his inside (Tr. iii. 159; Sophist, 252 C); pursuits of women described (Tr. i. 487, 488; Lysis, 207 E; 208 A, B, C, D, E).

"Mutinies in a man's bosom."

SHAKESPEARE, *Richard III.*, act i. sc. 4.

Doom, at one time wrongly assigned by the judges of the dead until souls were brought naked before them immediately after death (Tr. i. 227, 228; Gorg. 523 B).

Doorkeepers, described as overborne and hustled by the crowds pressing for admission (Tr. iv. 100, 101; Phileb. 62 C).

Doric harmonies adapted to peaceable enterprises, such as teaching or praying, or any voluntary moderate line of action (Tr. ii. 80, 81; Rep. 399 B).

Double prices never to be asked by him who sells anything in the market; if he fails to obtain the first-named price the article must be withdrawn from sale for that day; no puffing to be allowed (Tr. v. 463; Laws, 917 C, D, E).

Dovecote or aviary, birds flying there are in a sense possessed without being laid hold of (Tr. i. 438; Theæt. 197 C).

Down and up, defined in connection with the sphericity of the globe and the position of our antipodes (Tr. ii. 372, 373; Tim. 63 A); are connected with heavy and light (62 C; 63 C; Tr. vi. 161, 162; Tim. Loc. 100 E).

Drachmæ, fifty, given as the price of a demonstration (Tr. iii. 284; Cratyl. 384 B); contrasted with a reading of which the price is a penny (ib.); for there you might buy a carpenter for five or six minæ at the outside, but an architect not for ten thousand drachmæ (Tr. iv. 425; Riv. 135 C).

Dread of death on the part of men of apparent worth, as if it were something dreadful, reduces them to the level of women, just as if they would be immortal, if not put to a violent death (Tr. i. 22; Apol. 35 A, B); the dramatic exhibitions in our courts of law tending to excite pity and dread ought to be put a stop to (35 B); we ought not to beseech and move the pity of a judge, but convince him (Tr. 23; 35 C).

Dreaming, what is the criterion whether we are awake or in a waking dream or otherwise? (Tr. i. 388, 389; Theæt. 158 B); during half

our time we believe our dreams to be true, that is, in the one half devoted to sleep (Tr. i. 388, 389; 158 D).

"Even when I wake it is
Without me as within me."

SHAK., Imogen in *Cymbeline*.

Dreams; having explained the theory of vision as a concretion, *ἐκπαγὲς γινόμενον*, arising from the meeting of an inner light from the eye with an outer light from the object, *τότ' ἐκπίπτον ὁμοιον πρὸς ὁμοιον*, which thus gives rise to an impression of bodily reality in the direction straight before the eye, "As if the meeting light between their eyes made permanent union"—Span. Gipsey, p. 66—*ἐν σώμα δικειωθὲν ξυνέστη κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὀμμάτων ἐνθυωρίαν*, he goes on to say that darkness cuts off this mutual action of the inner and outer fire of light and becomes conducive to sleep, *ἐπαγωγὸν ὕπνου*. The eyelids and lashes preserve the eyes and restrain the flow of the inner fire, and calm the organ so as to produce a dreamless or a disturbed repose, according as this irritation is allayed, and in this latter case phantasies are formed which are remembered on waking. This theory would attribute dreaming to a sort of reflex sense excitation of the optic nerves, and represents the doctrine on its physical side, not, however, excluding that of the divinely suggested or heaven-sent dream (Tr. ii. 350, 351; Tim. 45 C, D, E; 46 A); dreams and a diseased state of the senses, defective sight or hearing, are considered as more than false and often contradictory (Tr. i. 388; Theæt. 157 E); *ὄναρ* and *ὑπαρ* distinguished (Tr. 389; 158 B, D; Tr. ii. 64, 163, 209; Rep. 382 E; 476 C, D; 520 C, D); where *ὑπαρ* is a reality, *ὄναρ* a semblance; so also (Tr. 223, 264, 265; 533 C; 574 E; 576 A; Tr. iii. 223 to 225; Statesm. 277 D; 278 E; Tr. iv. 23, 53, 106; Phileb. 20 C; 36 D, E; 65 E; Tr. i. 358; Phædr. 277 D, E; Tr. v. 548; Laws, 969 B); dream for dream (Tr. i. 444; Theæt. 201 E); undergone in a dream, said of a fabulous narrative (Tr. ii. 98; Rep. 414 D); sleep not disturbed by dreams said to be happier than most waking moments (Tr. i. 28; Apol. 40 D, E); starting up in dreams (Tr. ii. 5, 6; Rep. 330 D); in the Republic, a man's dreams are the index to his character, lawless and licentious, if such is his waking state, or temperate if his habits are virtuous (Tr. ii. 260, 261; Rep. 571 A, B, C, D). See Hom. Odys. τ 547.

Drinking, unlimited capability of, on the part of Socrates (Tr. iii. 482, 559, 570, 575; Symp. 176 C; 214 A; 219 E; 223 A, B, C).

Driven at random up and down in the vagaries of fancy (Tr. iii. 288; Cratyl. 386 D).

Drivellings of old women (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 B).

- Drones with stings** (Tr. ii. 241, 242, 244, 245, 254, 248, 262, 257, 255; Rep. 552 C, E; 554 D; 555 D; 564 B; 559 B, C; 573 A; 567 D); with wings and without stings (552 C); foot soldiers, some with and some without stings (ib.); they press out the honey of the rich (564 E). This expression of pressing out honey is also to be met with, Virg. Georg. iv. 101. The drones sting them (565 C); foreign drones used as a designation for a mercenary body guard (567 D); great winged drone as the leader of idle desires (572 E; 573 A); sting of desire said to be implanted (ib.), as prefect of the soul, with a body guard of madness (573 B). Shakespeare speaks of soldier bees with stings, Henry V., act i. sc. ii.
- Drugging fish**; no turbid concoction or stupefying juice to be used for this purpose (Tr. v. 311, 312; Laws, 824 B).
- Druggists and doctors** referred to as scenting and colouring their medicines in order to please the palate and the eye (Tr. iii. 302; Cratyl. 394 A).
- Drunk to the sound of a flute**, contrasted with drinking water and fasting (Tr. ii. 251; Rep. 561 C, D).
- Drunken license**; having dwelt on the disgusting feeling which must be excited by an old man's endearments towards a youthful beloved one, bad enough when he is sober, he enlarges on the still more intolerable case of having to listen to him in his drunken freedom of speech (Tr. i. 315, 316; Phædr. 240 D, E).
- Drunkenness**; what is the effect of wine on the senses, the memory, opinions, and prudential feelings, do they become more active or fail wholly? (Tr. v. 34, 35; Laws, 645 E); makes a man again a child and his plight evil (Tr. 35; 646 A); he puts the Colophon on this disquisition (Tr. 77; 674 A); no one is to taste wine during a campaign, no slave to touch it, no magistrate during his year of office, no captain of a ship, nor juryman, nor person about to consult the senate, nor married persons at night; all this would render it needless to cultivate many vines (Tr. 78; 674 B, C); only becoming at the festivals of the gods, at other times not safe, particularly not at time of marriage (Tr. 230; 775 B); drunkard is unfit to be a parent (Tr. 231; 775 C, D).
- Duality, difficulty of the notion** (Tr. i. 107, 108; Phæd. 101 A, B, C, D); dualism and monadism (ib.).
- Dulness of our organs of sense**, is so great that a few only behold the genus of the quality imaged in the resemblances, here on earth, of justice and moderation (Tr. i. 326; Phædr. 250 B).
- Durability of cities**, wonderful how long they last, though many are submerged through the mismanagement of captains and rulers (Tr. iii. 263; Statesm. 302 A).

- Duration of time and the human race from its origin incalculable; the latter never had a beginning, nor will have an end (Tr. v. 242, 243; Laws, 782 A).
- Duplication and sententiousness. Socrates asks what are we to say of Polus's curiosities of words, his duplications, his sententiousness, his word imagery? *μουσεῖα λόγων ὡς διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνωμολογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν* (Tr. i. 346; Phædr. 267 C).
- Duty of the good citizen. God, the source and end of all, fixes the limits of rectitude of procedure in accordance with natural laws. After him Justice, the avenger of everything that transgresses the divine law, follows, and then the man humble and adorned with every virtue. Fate of the rich insolent man described. To the temperate man the deity will be the measure of all things not man; he will be occupied in the duties of piety, prayer, and sacrifice, and only from such will it be fitting that the gods should receive this homage (Tr. v. 137 to 141; Laws, 715 A, B, C; 716 C, D, E); duty of obeying God rather than man (Tr. i. 16, 17, 25; Apol. 29 C, D; 37 E).
- Duty to God and man; Euthyphron observes that piety and holiness are parts of justice, and that they appertain to the service of God, while the remaining part of justice is our duty to man. The remainder of the dialogue tends to establish that the ground of intercourse between gods and men differs essentially from that between man and man (Tr. i. 472; Euthyph. 12 E and following).
- Dyers, if they wish to dye wool a fine purple, select a pure white as the ground and by mordents fix their colours so that they cannot be washed out, otherwise they do not remain fast but fade (Tr. ii. 113; Rep. 429 D, E); applied illustratively to the training of soldiers (Tr. 114; 430 A, B).
- Dying songs like those of the swan are uttered from a feeling of joy, and are accompanied with a prescience of bliss and not a dread of pain (Tr. i. 88; Phæd. 85 A); dying with pleasure (Tr. iv. 72, 73; Phileb. 47 B).
- Dynamical force is seated wholly in the soul. No mention is made of the muscles as parts of the machinery through which force or motive energy is exerted; the soul would appear to act, as it were, directly apart from the contractile muscular fibres; the flesh is regarded as something for keeping the bones moist and warm and flexible, and is accumulated over the least intelligent parts, while the seat of thought and reason has but little of it; only flesh, as in the case of the tongue, may be the seat of special sense organs (Tr. ii. 386, 387; Tim. 73 E; 74 A; 75 A).
- Dysentery, a disease prevailing among the troops while on a campaign (Tr. i. 369; Theæt. 142 B).

E.

Early rising of masters and mistresses of a household insisted on. A master should not sleep all night, and should be up before his servants; for a mistress to be waked by her domestics ought to be regarded as a disgrace; much sleep is injurious to soul and body; he who sleeps is for the time no better than dead, nor is sleep much needed, where habits have been well formed (Tr. v. 283; Laws, 808 A, B, C).

Ears, to let them out for hire, said of flighty and Paul Pry kind of persons (Tr. ii. 162; Rep. 475 D, E); spoken of as crushed or bruised (Tr. i. 219; Gorg. 515 E):

"Pitchers have ears."—SHAKESPEARE, *Richard III.*, act ii. sc. 3.

Earth, was once peopled by gods (Tr. ii. 416; Critias, 109 B), who governed, like pilots sitting at the helm, by persuasion, Vulcan and Minerva obtaining Attica as an inheritance, and giving origin to the ἀνθρώπους (Tr. 416; 109 C, D); its form described as spherical, situated in mid space, and requiring nothing for its support, as being equally solicited on all sides (Tr. i. 117; Phæd. 108 E; 109 A); is vast, and Europe is but a small part of it (Tr. 118; 109 B); is full of hollows, where water, and fog and air flow together (Tr. 118; 109 B); as a whole lies bright in the pure sky termed æther, in which are the stars (Tr. 118; 109 C); our condition on it at the bottom of our misty hollows is like that of persons viewing the sky through a superimposed ocean, who have never thrust their heads above the surface (Tr. 118; 109 C, D); when seen from above all is splendid with the hues of the rainbow (Tr. 119; 110 C), with colours of which those of the painters are only inferior samples, but here the purple is of wondrous beauty and the white is whiter than snow (ib.); even the hollows as seen from above shine with a subdued colouring (Tr. 119; ib.; 110 D); here grow trees and flowers and fruits in due proportion, and stones have the lustre, smoothness, and transparency of gems (Tr. 119; 110 D), and are not corroded any more than plants and animals are disfigured by disease; a sight for the blessed (Tr. 119, 120; 110 E; 111 A); air there takes the place of sea and water with us, and æther that of our air; the seasons are more tempered, the senses more acute, and life is longer to the inhabitants of the great ball, than to us in its hollows (Tr. 120; 111 B); there will be found real living temples, and oracles, and a present deity, and the unveiled view of the planetary worlds (Tr. 120; 111 C); in addition there are recesses deeper than those in which we dwell, where are rivers of fire and mud like lava streams (Tr. 120; 111 D, E); Tartarus is the name of the profoundest abyss without bottom or sound-

ing (Tr. 121; 112 A, B, C); Ocean, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, Styx, Cocytus (Tr. 122; 113 A, B, C); the moderately wicked go to Acheron (Tr. 122; 113 D); the worst offenders to Tartarus, from which there is no escape, though some after a year proceed to Cocytus, or Pyriphlegethon, whence they escape only by the forgiveness of those they have injured (Tr. 122, 123; 113 E; 114 A, B); the righteous occupy the upper surface of the earth world in a disembodied state, and come to still more glorious abodes which transcend all powers of description (Tr. 123; 114 B, C). Compare with all this the objections urged against the fictions of the poets (Tr. ii. 66; Rep. 387 B).

Earthly sphere is obnoxious to evils (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 A).

Easy good-nature, an euphonious expression for stupidity (Tr. ii. 82, 83; Rep. 400 D).

Eclipse of the sun viewed by reflection in water or through a medium which softens the fierce glare (Tr. i. 106; Phæd. 99 E); analogous to considering the details of reasonings more in their images than in their actual effects (Tr. 106; 100 A).

Edge and boundary of a thing is its limit (Tr. iii. 10; Meno. 75 D).

Education of children, is not that of a mere individual; the results of it seen in their proving brave and noble and conquering their foes in battle (Tr. v. 26; Laws, 641 B, C); differences of individual character prevent the adoption of one undeviating rule, and to be perpetually punishing every trifling deviation from one given standard will become vexatious and harassing, while habits of disobedience must not be allowed to prevail (Tr. 249; Laws, 788 B, C); growth is greatest at the outset, and human beings do not more than double their stature from five to twenty-five, but during the early period of nurture most exercise is requisite (Tr. 250, 251; 788 D; 789 D); treatment of women and children (Tr. 251 to 260; 789 E; 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, &c.); sports and exercises of children are to be duly regulated; they should be made to play at house-building or farming if intended for builders or farmers; but this is only a part of education and is sometimes carried too far, what is really such being that which produces right desires and the knowing how to be ruled with justice as perfect citizens (Tr. 29, 30; 643 B, C, D, E; 644 A); education is a term improperly applied when the aim is for the acquisition of money or strength, which is low and illiberal (Tr. 31, 32; 644 B, C); the human being is a divine animal wonder, either a plaything of the gods or produced with some earnest intent, having in him affections which, like ropes and nerves imbedded, pull and drag him in different directions, opposed by counteracting forces, and between these are the limits of virtue and vice (Tr. 32; 644 D, E);

if good education be a man's portion, he enjoys an entire and sound lot and avoids the greatest disease; but otherwise, after a maimed and imperfect life, he returns uselessly to the grave (Tr. ii. 349; Tim. 44 C); though good parentage and bringing up does not always succeed, yet all such will be better so far than in the case of those who have had no advantages. Even if a man appear unjust, if he has been brought up to respect the laws he will show favourably by the side of a mere savage (Tr. i. 255; Protag. 327 C); it may be difficult to find teachers for the sons of very clever parents, but not at all for the million (Tr. 256; 328 A).

Effect and production are one; cause and thing making are the same (Tr. iv. 35; Phileb. 26 E), and also the created and the born or produced (Tr. 36; 27 A).

Effluxes of Empedocles affirmed, and that there are passages into and through which these effluxes travel, some exactly fitting, or being larger and smaller than the passages. Vision is connected with them, and colour is treated as an efflux of figure (Tr. iii. 11, 12; Meno. 76 C).

Egyptians, their unchanged institutes; it was unlawful among them for painters or designers of figures and persons to innovate upon the conventional practice, and the same rule held good as to music and melody. In ten thousand years no change has taken place in their writings or sculptures, which have always been the same as now (Tr. v. 49, 50; Laws, 656 D, E; 657 A); Egyptian priest compares the antiquity and unchangeable character of his country's records with the ephemeral and recent archives of Greece (Tr. ii. 325; Tim. 22 B, C); reference to what was told Solon by the Egyptian priests (Tr. i. 415; Critias, 108 D); we are not to wonder that Grecian names are given to foreigners, seeing that Solon, inquiring the meaning of Egyptian names, translated them into Grecian equivalents, as the Egyptians had previously done in translating the early myths into their own tongue (Tr. 420; 113 A); their embalming preserves bodies an incredible time (Tr. i. 83; Phæd. 80 C, D).

ἑθελοδουλεία, or voluntary service for the acquisition of virtue, is neither fawning nor discreditable (Tr. iii. 498 to 500; Symp. 184 C, D, E; 185 A, B, C); a similar compound is ἑθελοθρησκεία, used by St. Paul (Ep. to Coloss. ii. 23).

εἰ for ὅτι, or genitive of the article and infinitive, ὑποθεσις εἰ πολλά ἐστι for τοῦ πολλά εἶναι; this usage occurs three times (Tr. iii. 418, 419; Parmen. 128 D. So 136 A, bis; 136 B). εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστι; nor do I see the point of Mr. Burgess's objection to the syntax.

Ejectment, summary, inflicted on the man who persists in speaking

before the Athenians on a subject to which he has not been bred. They are described as coughing him down, scuffling with their feet, laughing at him, and overwhelming him with tumult, however rich, or noble, or beautiful, just as at our own hustings (Tr. i. 248; Protag. 319 C).

Elective franchise to be conferred only on those well drilled in the knowledge of the laws (Tr. v. 190; Laws, 751 C); an election so conducted would give rise to what is intermediate between the practice in monarchical and democratic polity (Tr. 199; 756 E); slaves and masters, as such, can never become friends (757 A); between men of unequal rank, equality will soon become inequality (ib.); ballot advocated as a practical remedy for the ill-nature of the mob (Tr. 200; 757 E).

Electric torpedo benumbs those who touch it; and this is used as an apt illustration of the Socratic method of confutation, which is likewise compared to befooling, drugging, enchanting, and filling another with perplexity (Tr. iii. 17, 18; Meno. 80 A, C).

Elements; the primary principles of things not explicable (Tr. i. 444; Theæt. 201 E); we only in these cases assign names (Tr. 444; ib.; 202 B); this is said not to be true in the case of syllables and words (Tr. 449, 450; 206 B); elements of the alphabet are declared to be more intelligible and better understood than words and syllables (206 B); the several parts that go to make up a chariot better understood than the thing as a whole (Tr. 451; 207 C).

Elenchus is the greatest and most availing of purifications (Tr. iii. 125, 126; Sophist, 230 D); is applied to test a vain pretentiousness of wisdom (Tr. 126; 231 B); Elenchus and Epexelenchus used respectively in making charges and reply (Tr. i. 345; Phædr. 266 E); ranked with ἀποδείξεις (Tr. iii. 142; Sophist, 242 B); for all time (Tr. v. 415; Laws, 891 A); a proof or test of life, or the account to be rendered of it (Tr. i. 27; Apol. 39 C); is the instrument with which Socrates lays bare the assumption of sophists and pretenders. See Electric Torpedo, Proof.

Elevation of mind; all great arts require deep investigation and lofty contemplation, which Pericles manifested, in addition to splendid natural ability (Tr. i. 348; Phædr. 269 E).

Elysian fields; thither are sent all whom a good guardian angel inspired in life, where the bountiful seasons teem with all fruitful produce, and fountains of pure water flow, and the variegated meads are sprinkled with painted spring flowers; where, too, are conferences of philosophers, theatres of poets, Cyclian choruses, musical treats, symposia abounding in song, banquets self-spread, and joy without alloy. There is neither storm nor heat, but a well-tempered

- atmosphere permeated by the soft beams of the sun, and thrines for the Initiated, where their sacred rites are consummated (Tr. vi. 54; Axioch. 371 C, D).
- Encomia on favourites are encomia on oneself, however disguised and apparently addressed to the beloved object (Tr. i. 484; Lysis, 205 D).
- Empedocles, his doctrine of effluxes and pores (Tr. iii. 11, 12; Meno. 76 C; Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 152 E).
- Endowments, seeming wise and clever in public affairs, despicable as compared with self-knowledge, or if in the arts of life, sordid (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 C).
- Endymion, the tale respecting him would be a joke, if all should sleep without waking (Tr. i. 72; Phæd. 72 C).
- Enemies; ought we to restore them their own? (Tr. ii. 7; Rep. 332 B); we may do mischief to enemies according to the popular belief (ib.); especially if they are evil enemies (Tr. 11; 335 A).
- Enemy; he who is such should, on the principle of doing him harm, be allowed to escape punishment, and not be held accountable, but be permitted to be immortal in his depravity (Tr. i. 178; Gorg. 481 A).
- Engagements, represented as not standing in the way of a particular line of action (Tr. iii. 190, 191; Statesm. 258 B).
- Enigmatical new coined phrases shot out of a quiver (Tr. i. 415; Theæt. 180 A).
- Enigmatically speaking to the crowd, but openly before disciples (Tr. i. 381, 382; Theæt. 152 C).
- Entities and nonentities discussed (Tr. iii. 137; Sophist, 238 C); can they be qualified by any addition or epithet? (ib.); can the non-existent be an object of thought? (ib.); is it not inconceivable, unutterable, unpronounceable, unreasonable? (238 E; 239 A; Tr. 140, 141; 241 A, and following).
- Entity and nonentity further discussed (Tr. iii. 167, 146; Sophist, 257 C; 244 D).
- Entreaty, not fit for courts of justice, but we should seek only to convince (Tr. i. 23; Apol. 35 C); persuasion of this sort is a persuasion to atheism (Tr. 23; 35 D).
- Enunciation of a thing not to be qualified with the addition of "the," "that," "this," "many," "each," which are additions not belonging to that to which they are appended (Tr. i. 444; Theæt. 202 A).
- Ephesus, the philosophers of, represented as being stark mad on the subject of motion (Tr. i. 415; Theæt. 179 E).
- Epicharmus (Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 152 E) spoken of as a poet of comedy, in opposition to Homer as a poet of tragedy.
- Epimetheus cheats us in the allotment of functions and is inferior to

Prometheus (Tr. i. 293; Protag. 361 and following). *See* the myth in full (Tr. i. 249 to 251; 320 C, D, E; 321, 322 throughout).

EPINOMIS. *See* Summary, page 237.

ἐπίσταμαι, its meaning as a verb of "knowing," probably based on the idea of "taking one's stand on anything;" hence "to know thoroughly," "to be skilled," if it be not derived from *ἴσθημι*. It is used also with reference to that pre-existent or innate knowledge which Plato insists on (Tr. i. 76; Phæd. 75 C); where we are made to have known, or to know on the instant of birth, the equal, the greater, the less, the good, the holy, the beautiful, and just. Hence *ἐπιστήμη*, positive knowledge or science, as opposed to *δόξα*, a mere opining, whether true or false (Tr. ii. 164; Rep. 477 B, E); its office is to know, *γινῶναι*, what the real is (477 B; Tr. 165; 478 A); and the *γνωστόν* is opposed to the *δοξαστόν* (ib.); while *γνώσις* and *ἀγνοσία* are opposed, as the knowledge of what is, and the negation of the knowledge of what is not, which last is intermediate to science and ignorance *ἀγνοία* (Tr. 164; 477 B). In the Tr. iii. 337, 338; Cratylus, 411 D, E; 412 A, a somewhat different etymology is suggested, the inquiring soul being represented as insisting on the object that would seem to fly from it, so as neither to outrun it or fall short of it (412 A). *See* also *νοῦς*, *συνίημι*, *γνώμη*.

Ἐξάφνης ἢ αὐτῇ φύσει ἔκτοός τις is placed between motion and rest, and occupies no time, being the infinitesimal of time between rest and motion. Just as a curve is made up of an infinite series of straight lines which change their direction as often as there are terms in the series, so motion is conceived to be broken up into an infinite series of *momenta* divided by infinitesimals of rest (Tr. iii. 452; Parmen. 156 D, E).

EPISTLES. *See* Summary, page 226.

Equal loves equal, a proverb (Tr. i. 315; Phædr. 240 C).

Equality, absolute, how it differs from equals in the concrete (Tr. i. 74, 75; Phæd. 74 B); is not the same (74 C); such an abstraction implies reminiscence (Tr. 76; 74 E).

Equilateral triangle, the most beautiful (Tr. ii. 361; Tim. 54 B); formed in two ways (Tr. 362; 55 A; Tr. vi. 157; Tim. Loc. 98 A, B, C, D).

See Atomic Laws and Atoms.

Equilibrium or equipoise prevents the earth moving to either side in space; a sort of demonstration on the principle of the sufficient reason (Tr. i. 117, 118; Phæd. 108 E; 109 A); we attribute rest to equilibrium, motion to the opposite, and the want of equilibrium is the cause of the anomalous or unequipoised (Tr. ii. 365; Tim. 57 E.)

Er, the Armenian of the race of Pamphylus, his fable or apologue. (Tr. ii. 304; Rep. 614 B).

- Eros**; the derivation of this word from ἐρρωμένος is suggested, based on the idea of strenuous force (Tr. i. 313; Phædr. 238 C). Elsewhere it is hinted that it may be connected with πτέρως, "winged" (Tr. i. 328; 252 C); or ἔσρος (Tr. iii. 355, 356; Cratyl. 420 A, B).
- Erotics**. Physic is said to be a science of the same (Tr. iii. 501; Symp. 186 C), so is music (Tr. 503; 187 A, C); Socrates declares them to be his chief study (Tr. 485; 177 E); professes, after Agathon's speech, to know nothing about them (Tr. 525; 198 D).
- Error**; is a man more powerful when involved therein? (Tr. ii. 17; (Rep. 340 C); it is never committed by a true artist (340 E); men err from lack of science, while a governor, καθ' ὅσον ἔρχων ἐστί, never errs (ib.); is a want of knowledge (Tr. i. 288; Protag. 357 C, D); when a man knows nothing he necessarily errs, that is, if he at the same time thinks he knows, but not where conscious of his ignorance (Tr. iv. 335; Alcib. I. 117 B); it is from this false supposition that errors in action arise (Tr. 336; 117 D).
- ERYXIAS**. See Summary, page 240.
- Espionage** described, as resulting from jealousy for a beloved object (Tr. i. 315, 316; Phædr. 240 D, E).
- Essence or existence**, if self-existent, does not exist in us (Tr. iii. 413; Parm. 133 C); ideas or abstract conceptions here, ἰδέαι or εἶδη, are declared not to be in the concrete objects, nor can we have any knowledge of them (Tr. 415; 134 A, B); all such ideas as the good and fair must be unknown (134 C); and this leads to question whether gods and men can be mutually cognisant of each other's thoughts (Tr. 416; 134 D, E); have things any fixed essence or are they what they appear to each person? (Tr. 287; Cratyl. 386 A); best appreciated by reflection apart from the bodily senses (Tr. i. 63; Phæd. 65 C); not to be touched by hand (65 D); is best contemplated apart from sense (Tr. 64, 65; 66 A, B, C, D, E; 67 A, B); is permanent and unchangeable (Tr. 80, 81; 78 D. See Existence); the essence of a thing requires to be known, before we can talk about it with precision, and for want of this persons in argument get into a fix and are involved in contradictions (Tr. 312; Phædr. 237 C).
- Estimate** acquired, is one ruling principle in us, the other is a desire of pleasure, which two ideas are sometimes in accord, sometimes in conflict; the former aiming at the best, and, under the guidance of reason, leading to moderation; the other, not so checked, ending in insolence (Tr. i. 312; Phædr. 237 D).
- Eternal**, definition of it (Tr. ii. 331, 332; Tim. 27 D); the Maker of the Cosmos looked to an eternal pattern (Tr. 332, 333; 29 A); the world formed with a view to its permanence (ib.)
- Eternity**; in comparison with it time is short (Tr. ii. 186, 298; Rep.

- 498 D; 608 C); ought we as immortal beings to be solicitous for the things of time? (ib.); is but one night, if death is an eternal sleep without dreams (Tr. i. 28; Apol. 40 E); is never older or younger (Tr. ii. 341; Tim. 37 E). Time is born with the universe and dies with it, its relations being bound up with the motions of the planets and their intervals (Tr. 341; 38 A, B); after death, those who have lived well go to pass a blessed existence in their cognate star, or, if not, become, secondly, women, or pass into the nature of brutes (ib.).
- Etymologies**; that of Eros, threefold (Tr. i. 313; Phædr. 238 C; Tr. 328; 252 C); of *μανία* (Tr. 317; 241 B); *ἡμερος* (Tr. 327; 251 C). See also Tr. iii. 355, 356; Cratyl. 420 A, B, and throughout. These are generally thought to have been brought forward by way of burlesque, as a satire on the trifling in the schools; but Mr. Grote strongly opposes this view and believes that they are proposed seriously, though, if so, they do not indicate the author's profundity in this walk. The origin of the names of the divinities, of the heavenly bodies, of the elements, of the seasons, is given after other etymologies to which we have referred elsewhere (Tr. 332; Cratyl. 408 E and onward). Intelligence, consciousness, justice and the like (Tr. 336; 411 A); those of the Evil, the Ugly, and the Beautiful (Tr. 346; 416 A); the Beneficial, Profitable, Useful, Gainful, and their opposites (Tr. 348; 417 A); Pleasure, Pain, Desire, &c. (Tr. 353, 354; 419 B). See also Tr. i. 320; Phædr. 244 C, where are other fanciful derivations. Also "choir" from "chara," gratification (Tr. v. 45; Laws, 654 A).
- Euclid's**, forty-seventh of the first referred to (Tr. ii. 361; Tim. 54 B), as τὸ δὲ τριπλὴν κατὰ δύναμιν ἔχον τῆς ἐλάττονος τὴν μείζω πλευρὰν ἀεί, that having the square of the greater side, always triple that of the less.
- Eunuch** is described as slamming the door in the face of Socrates (Tr. i. 243; Protag. 314 D).
- Euripides** quoted as saying that each one shines in his own line (Tr. i. 182; Gorg. 484 E); also quoted in what he makes Zethus say (Tr. 183; 485 E); again in the famous passage burlesqued by Aristophanes, "Who knows if life be not death and death life?" (Tr. 191; 492 E); in the passage, "The mind is unsworn" (Tr. 384; Theæt. 154 D; Tr. iii. 526; Symp. 199 A); is blamed for his view of tyranny (Tr. ii. 258; Rep. 568 A, B); although he gives a striking view of its evils in his Iphig. in Aulis, v. 323 and following, where Menelaus denounces the arts to which Agamemnon resorts or has had recourse. The passage, however, that is objected to is in the Troades, v. 1114, τῆς ἰσοθέου τυραννίδος. A graphic account of one who fancied himself able to write tragedy, because he could make long speeches, though very trivial, on a great subject, or mournful ones, or fearful

or threatening ones, is sketched, as presenting himself to Euripides or Sophocles and getting an answer (Tr. i. 347; Phædr. 268 C, D). Euripides is quoted as saying that "Tyrants are wise by consorting with the wise" (Tr. iv. 407; Theag. 125 B;* as well as Tr. ii. 258; Rep. 568 B). See Stallbaum's note.

Euripus, up and down in (Tr. i. 95; Phæd. 90 C).

Euthydemus referred to, as asserting that virtue and vice are alike in all men (Tr. iii. 288; Cratyl. 386 D).

EUTHYDEMUS. See Summary, page 137.

Euthyphro's conceit (Tr. i. 462; Euthyp. 5 C); cleverer than Dædalus (Tr. 470, 475; 11 D; 15 C); prosecutes his father on a charge of murder or homicide (Tr. 460; 4 A).

EUTHYPHRON. See Summary, page 90.

Evening and morning dream, *ὕπνῳ* and *ὕπνῳ*. See Dreams (Tr. iv. 106, 23; Phileb. 65 E; 20 C).

— star are sometimes the same: the first, when it follows the sun so far off as not to be lost in the splendour of its rays, and at another time; secondly, the morning star, when it rises before him at day-break. Venus is often morning star, by her orbit not differing much from the sun's, though other planets and stars are so in their turn (Tr. vi. 154, 155; Tim. Locr. 96 E).

Evident to a child or to a blind man, a common expression (Tr. iii. 537 Symp. 204 B). See Proverbs.

Evil and base are the same (Tr. i. 169; Gorg. 474 C); when in the soul is the worst case, and is, happily, to be got rid of by punishment (Tr. 173; 477 A); evil of the body is weakness, or disease, or deformity; that of the soul is injustice, ignorance, or cowardice (Tr. 173, 174; 477 B, E); this last is the severest evil, and its cure renders the man most happy (Tr. 175; 478 D); the worst evil is ignorance of the diseased nature of the soul (Tr. i. 86; Phæd. 83 B), viz., the believing that to be the most true by which it is most occupied (Tr. 87; 83 C); what is the greatest evil in a state? is it not what splits it into factions and makes it many and not one? causing one to rejoice where another is grieved (Tr. ii. 146; Rep. 462 B); evil speaking not to be tolerated; the making a small verbal matter great by disputing and indulging censure so exaggerated as to become ridiculous (Tr. v. 492, 493; Laws, 934 E; 935 A, B); the evil committed by men exceeds the good (Tr. iv. 242; Hipp. Maj. 296 C); evil is akin to nothing but alien and opposed to itself and everything; the wicked are never like themselves, but capricious and unstable (Tr. i. 495; Lysis, 214 C);

* This passage belongs to Sophocles, not Euripides, and is twice inaccurately attributed to the latter by Plato, here and in Theages, 125 B. Mr. Grote considers that this fact helps to prove the genuineness of Theages, vol. i. p. 431.

- this view at variance with the conclusion (Tr. 506 ; 222 C) ; when evil is destroyed will there be no hunger and thirst, or will the latter exist as long as animal life endures ? or is the whole question absurd ? (Tr. 504 ; 221 A) ; it is a much preferable condition to suffer evil than to commit it, seeing we are born for immortality, so far as our souls are concerned, which will be judged when freed from the mortal body (Tr. vi. 514, 515 ; Epist. vii. 334 E ; 335 A, B, C) ; evil of a too quiet life (Tr. iii. 274 ; Statesm. 307 E) ; of a too active one (Tr. iii. 274 ; 308 A) ; the evil and good of things depends on circumstances (Tr. i. 264 ; Protag. 334 B, D) ; can evil be desired by any one who knows it to be evil ? (Tr. iii. 13 to 16 ; Meno. 77 C, D ; 78 A, E.).
- Evils fewer, and more peace among men spoken of (Tr. i. 410 ; Theæt. 176 A) ; evils will never die out of the world (ib.), and will be always antagonistic to good (ib.).
- Example is better than precept ; the man who is in accord with his expressed sentiments is a real musician ; his is a truly Doric strain, the only true Grecian one which is neither Ionian, Phrygian, nor Lydian (Tr. iv. 161 ; Laches, 188 C) ; the ill effects, or otherwise, of example (Tr. i. 10, 11 ; Apol. 25 D, E).
- Excess in wine, how far lawful (Tr. v. 21 ; Laws, 637 E) ; Spartans would inflict punishment on a drunkard, nor would they admit attendance on a Dionysiac festival as an excuse (Tr. 20 ; 637 A, B) ; we must not give too much sail to ships, too much food to bodies, nor unlimited rule to young men (Tr. 102 ; 691 C, D) ; excess prohibited, *μη ἄγαν, ne nimis* (Tr. iv. 205 ; Menex. 247 E) ; excess is called insolence, and is a vice, with many names, being also many-membered and many-formed (Tr. i. 312 ; Phædr. 237 D).
- Excessive power, its bad effects (Tr. v. 102 ; Laws, 691 C, D).
- Exchanges and markets, places where goods must be sold for money, not on trust (Tr. v. 348, 459, 460 ; Laws, 849 B ; 915 D, E).
- Existence is only allowed by some persons to what they can grasp with their hands (Tr. i. 386 ; Theæt. 155 E) ; is not absolute, but relative, and only a becoming for the sake of something else (Tr. 391 ; 160 B) ; existence, essence, *οὐσία*, likeness, similarity, quantity, oddness and their opposites are not perceived by any bodily faculty but only by the soul alone (Tr. 422 ; Theæt. 185 D) ; so, too, with respect to the Beautiful and Good, and their opposites (Tr. 423 ; 186 A, B, C) ; existence is not predicable of things (Tr. 444 ; 201 E) ; its quantity and quality badly assigned by Parmenides (Tr. iii. 142 ; Sophist, 242 C) ; is defined to be power (Tr. 151 ; 247 E) ; existence of the gods asserted, proved by the divine nature of earth, sun, moon, and stars, which are not mere earth and stones (Tr. v. 406, 407 ; Laws,

- 885 E; 886 A, D); existence implies and requires a cause (Tr. iv. 35; Phileb. 26 E); is impossible without truth (Tr. 103; 64 B); prior to the present life, we gazed at true existence, not the so-called existences that appear to result from many sense perceptions joined into one by a rational process, and which are but remembrances of what we once beheld (Tr. i. 325; Phædr. 249 A, B, C).
- Existent, the, *Ens* or *Entia*, is it one or many? (Tr. iii. 149; Sophist, 246 A); the discussion of such questions is a battle of the Giants, bringing even the things of heaven to the test of sensible handling, and pouring contempt on those who stand up for immaterial existence (ib.); intelligential and incorporeal forms (Tr. 149; 246 B); are not virtue and justice real *entia* in the soul, and yet invisible and intangible? (Tr. 151; 247 B); differs from what is born or produced which is exhibited in sensation, while real existence is only got at or reached by reasoning (Tr. 152; 248 A); is always the same and invariable (ib.); defined by the power of doing and suffering (Tr. 152, 153; 248 C); but this is declared to belong to production not to existence (Tr. 151, 152; ib.; 247 E); knowing and being known are active and passive, and imply motion and production, as distinguished from the existent, which is at rest (though elsewhere predicated of annihilation); but are we to suppose that motion, life, soul, intelligence are not present to the perfectly existent? (Tr. 153, 154; 248 E; 249 A); absurdity of denying motion to the existent (Tr. 154; 249 B); existence and soul are more than mere rest and soul, and comprehend them (Tr. 155, 156; 250 A, B, C).
- Exists; that which appears to each is that which does so exist (Tr. i. 393; Theæt. 161 C).
- Expectation of relief is a positive pleasure, depending on memory or experience (Tr. iv. 52; Phileb. 36 B); is a source of fear; neither past nor present evils create fear, only what is expected, fear being the forecast of future ill (Tr. iv. 175; Laches, 198 B).
- Experience makes life artistic (Tr. i. 137; Gorg. 448 C), and inexperience renders it a matter of chance (ib.); is a personal thing, and what is done to me is not done to another (Tr. 392, 394; Theæt. 160 C; 161 D); is always true (Tr. 400; 167 A); experience with added years brings about a change of early opinions and invalidates word appearances (Tr. iii. 131; Sophist, 234 D).
- Experiment prohibited, seeing that the divine and human power are so different that what the one compounds, the other cannot resolve again into many, nor ever shall be able (Tr. ii. 379; Tim. 68 D).
- Expiration in breathing described (Tr. ii. 392, 393; Tim. 78 E; 79 B).
- Expostulation on the fear of death, addressed to an old man by Socrates (Tr. vi. 39, 40; Axioch. 364 B); with one who is supposed to be on

the point of evading the decision of the law (Tr. i. 39 to 44; *Crito*, 50 A; 50 D, E; 51 A to 54 B, C).

Extemporaneous funeral oration, said to have been learnt from *Aspasia*; proof of Plato's power as a rival of the orators (Tr. iv. 187; *Menex.* 236 B).

Eye, a seeing, is not the same as sight (Tr. i. 387; *Theæt.* 156 E); image in the pupil of (Tr. iv. 365; *Alcib. I.* 133 A); also on the eye seeing itself (Tr. iv. 365; *ib.*; 132 D, E).

Eyes made to swim by too close mental exercise (Tr. i. 385; *Theæt.* 155 C); references to the burning out of eyes (Tr. 167, 168; *Gorg.* 473 C).

F.

Fable makers to be under state surveillance, and nurses and mothers to tell only selected stories to children (Tr. ii. 58; *Rep.* 377 C); the greater poets blamed for what they say in the way of fable (377 E); an instance is that of *Cronus* and *Uranus*, told by *Hesiod* (378 A); a fable is not to be uttered without consideration before persons of no understanding, who might make a bad use of it (*ib.*); examples taken from the poets (Tr. 59; 378 C, D); reference made to *Phœnician* fable and those of the early mythologies as vehicles of persuasion (Tr. 97, 98; 414 C); fable applicable to the purpose of benefiting the magistrates and community by what he terms a noble untruth (*ib.*), viz., that the earth shot them up all armed to defend and protect her as brethren (Tr. 98; 414 D), and that the deity mixed gold and silver, and iron and brass in different orders of the citizens (415 A), imposing on all the duty of transmitting a pure metallic type to their children (Tr. 98; 415 B).

— or apologue of *Er*, containing the account of his visit to the unseen world and his return therefrom. The narrative states how, having been slain in battle and placed, ten days afterwards, on the funeral pile, before decomposition had set in, he revived on the twelfth day (Tr. ii. 304; 614 B); that he came to a place where were two chasms leading downwards and two leading upwards (Tr. 305; 614 C. Compare with this Tr. i. 120; *Phæd.* 111 C, D, E); the judges, seated between these chasms, order the righteous to ascend to heaven with marks on their fronts or foreheads, by way of distinction, and the unjust branded on their backs to go to the left downwards (Tr. ii. 305; 614 D). *Er* is told that he must carefully observe and relate to men, on his return to Earth, what he sees there. Souls ascend and descend in one pair of chasms as well as in the other. After sentence pronounced by the judges, the doomed soul descends through one of the subterranean channels to undergo what awaits it

below, while others that have passed their course of trial ascend shrivelled with heat and choked with the dust that rise from the Stygian abyss. On the other hand, the pair of openings that lead heavenward give ascent and descent to the souls of the Just either about to enter on a state of happiness or, returning from it, to begin life again in new bodies (Tr. ii. 305; 614 D); those coming from above descend, as if after a long journey, and take their departure cheerfully to the meadow, while the souls emerging from earth or the subterranean abyss, meeting those descending from the upper air or the heavenly abode, question each other as to their experience, the former bewailing the remembrance of the miseries they have suffered (Tr. 305; 614 E); the journey below the earth occupies a thousand years (*see* Tr. i. 325; Phædr. 249 A); the souls from above next narrate their happy experience and the ravishing sights of inconceivable beauty which they have beheld (Tr. ii. 305; 615 A); the sins of earth have to be atoned for by a tenfold punishment, based on the computation that a life is estimated at one hundred years, and the period of retribution at ten times that, or one thousand years (*ib.*); rewards are conferred on the just and holy in a measure proportionate to this (Tr. 306; 615 B). Casual reference is made to the lot of those who die in infancy, but the subject is passed by as not sufficiently important, and it is added, that heavier penalties are inflicted on those guilty of impiety towards the gods or parents (Tr. 306; 615 C); story of Ardiæus, tyrant of Pamphylia, who murdered his father and brother (Tr. 306; 615 D); when he attempts to ascend and other tyrants with him, the mouth of the cavern utters a bellowing sound and refuses to admit a passage, whereupon they are seized by the middle by fierce and fiery-looking executioners, who throw them down, flay them, and card them either on thorns or frames set with spikes, after which they are pitched into Tartarus (Tr. 306; 615 E; 616 A). There is nothing so much dreaded by souls as this rejection by the roaring of the chasm (*ib.*). When the souls that have descended from above to the meadow have waited there seven days, they move forward on the eighth, and after journeying four days they come to a place where they see a light stretching through the whole concave above them, as it were a pillar, mostly like a rainbow but brighter and purer. This description is not very intelligible, unless we suppose the spectator in the plane of the great arc, in which case the two opposite limbs would appear vertical (Tr. 306; 616 B). There is still more obscurity in what follows, where the spindle of Necessity and the variously coloured planetary spheres, with their opposed motions and different velocities, are spoken of, presided over by Sirens, each uttering a tone of one pitch, but harmonious in the aggregate,

and giving rise to the harmony of the spheres. The three Fates are also described in connexion with the story (Tr. 306 to 308; 616 C, D, E; 617 A, B, C). Next follows the taking of each soul's lot from the lap of Lachesis and the choice of a future life (Tr. 308; 617 D). The lot so taken is thrown towards all in succession, which each soul takes up and which entitles it to choose, in due order, from a list of patterns or exemplars of life ranged before its view, and from which each makes its own selection in turn (Tr. 308; 618 A). Among these patterns or examples of life are those of particular animals or men, of tyrannies either lasting or soon coming to an end, or ending in beggary, of good and beautiful men and women renowned or otherwise for their own or their ancestors' virtues (Tr. 308, 309; 618 B); no soul pattern is to be found in the list, because this would change with the act of choice, as all the patterns were mixed, rich with poor, healthy with diseased; that is probably that the choice of these contained or implied all that could have been involved in the choice of what was single and unmixed, and therefore it was not necessary to simplify the matter further, or, in other words, to abolish the *ænigma* as a test of character (*ib.*); the danger of man is in this choice, in discriminating wherein his good or evil lies, what mixtures to choose, what will bring about that he shall be just or unjust (Tr. 309; 618 C, D, E); we ought to go to the grave prepared to make a choice such as shall ensure happiness (619 A); even he who is so far at a disadvantage that his turn to choose comes last will be safe if he selects with understanding; the first must not do so rashly and negligently nor the last despair (Tr. 310; 619 B); when they proceed to choose, the first who selected took tyranny, at the instigation of folly and gluttony, not knowing that he would have to devour his own children, and when he found out his mistake did not blame himself but fortune and the deities, and all but the right person; nor was this a bad man, though he was one destitute of philosophy (Tr. 310; 619 B, C); those souls that descended from heaven made as many errors of choice as others, while many of those that came up from below chose warily, owing to wisdom acquired by previous suffering (Tr. 310; 619 D); the philosophical had a chance of journeying, not by a subterranean rugged path from that world to this, but by a smooth upper-ground celestial one, yet it was pitiable to see the bad choice that was often made (Tr. 310; 619 E); most chose according to the habit of their preceding lives: Orpheus choosing the life of a swan, Thamyras of a nightingale, a swan that of a man (Tr. 310; 620 A); Ajax chose that of a lion, Agamemnon that of an eagle, Atalanta that of an athlete (Tr. 310, 311; 620 A, B); Epeias assumes the nature of an artistic workwoman, Thersites that of an ape; while

- Ulysses**, who came last, chose the life of a *privé* man, which pattern had been neglected by all who preceded him, and then he declared that had it been his lot to have made the first selection, he would have made the same choice (Tr. 311; 620 C, D). After this the narrative tells how the souls proceeded, in the midst of dreadful and stifling heat, to the plain of Lethe, where not a tree grows, and then encamped by the river Ameles, whose water no vessel will keep in, of which all were compelled to drink (Tr. 311; 620 E; 621 A); then forgetfulness comes on and thunder and earthquake, and each is borne upwards different ways to their new birth residence, twinkling like stars; after which the narrator wakes and finds himself on the funeral pyre (Tr. 312; 621 B). The moral to be drawn from all this will be of saving efficacy if we obey its warning and if we cross the river of Lethe unpolluted in soul, believing in the soul's immortality and keeping the upward road (Tr. 312; 621 C).
- Fable** of the life of men under Cronus, their mode of birth and support (Statesm. 269 A; 271 C); another cosmical change (272 D, E); after a period of disorder the deity again resumes the helm of affairs (Tr. iii. 209 to 216; 273 E).
- Fables**, 'old wives', may be rejected if we can replace them by better and truer (Tr. i. 231; Gorg. 527 A, B).
- Facial expression**; the several organs of sense and emotional expression are set in the face as the front of the head, the seat of the soul, and occupying the throne of the body (Tr. ii. 349; Tim. 44 D, E).
- Faction**, its evils; no cessation of ills to those who espouse party quarrels (Tr. iv. 517, 518; Epist. vii. 336 E; 337 A).
- Facts** are of less importance than probabilities in law and oratory; even facts cannot be urged when they are altogether improbable, and truth is not the object with the speaker (Tr. i. 352; Phædr. 272 D).
- Faculties** impaired by forgetfulness; against such an event the man who possesses the science of just and beautiful and good things will treasure up for himself reminders, not written in water, nor sown in characters inscribed by a pen unable to explain themselves, but planted in the gardens of intellect (Tr. i. 356; Phædr. 276 C).
- Failure** of governments, which in early times were dynasties without written laws, but only with oral traditions (Tr. v. 84, 85; Laws, 680 A); the history of government brought down to the siege of Troy, and the coalition of Lacedæmon, Argos, and Messene, which had for its object to prevent the subversion of kingly power and to help other kings when in danger (Tr. 90, 91; 684 A, B). Consideration of the causes of failure is pursued in what follows, and Tr. 101; 691 A.

Fair and good, regarded as the same (Tr. i. 169; Gorg. 474 C); he who speaks nobly is fair and good (Tr. 423; Theæt. 185 E; also Tr. ii. 84; Rep. 401 E; Tr. 404; Tim. 88 C; Tr. iii. 51, 52; Euthyd. 271 B; Tr. vi. 70; Eryx. 398 D; Tr. iv. 166; Lach. 192 C; Tr. i. 244; Protag. 315 D); all the good is fair and the fair not without measure (Tr. ii. 403; Tim. 87 C). The instances of the two found in connexion are very numerous, for which Ast's Lexicon may be consulted, from which we may also add Tr. i. 164; Gorg. 470 E; Tr. 369; Theæt. 142 B; Tr. iii. 403; Parm. 127 B; Tr. i. 5 to 7; Apol. 20 A; 21 D; Tr. 498; Lysis, 216 D; Tr. 222; Gorg. 518 A; Tr. iii. 530; Symp. 201 C; Tr. ii. 259; Rep. 569 A; Tr. iv. 410; Theag. 127 A; Tr. ii. 109; Rep. 425 D; Tr. iv. 349; Alcib. I. 124 E. The fair is also joined with the wise and just (Tr. iv. 228; Hipp. Maj. 289 B; Tr. iv. 349; Alcib. I. 124 E; Tr. v. 354; Laws, 854 C), and is opposed to the *αἰσχρόν* (Tr. 50; Laws, 656 E; Tr. iv. 228; Hipp. Maj. 289 B).

False estimate of criminality made by law, as it often happens that of two crimes for which punishment has been adjudged, that which undergoes the worse sentence is the lighter, and that more lightly sentenced is the worst (Tr. v. 377; Laws, 867 D); this applies even to cases of murder (867 E); slaves always worse punished than freemen (Tr. 378; 868 B); the False mimics the True, in the minds of men, so that in the unrestrained indulgence of opinion the man opines what does not exist, and has never existed or shall never exist (Tr. iv. 60; Phileb. 40 C, D).

Falsehood and truth sometimes characterise the same person, as, for instance, the accountant who knows the truth or falsehood of accounts, where the truthful man is no better than the liar (Tr. iv. 268; Hipp. Min. 367 C); persons employ falsehood from craft, not through silliness or want of intellect (Tr. 266; 365 E); the man incapable of it and untaught in it cannot be false (Tr. 267, 268; 366 B; 367 A). Socrates exhibits the result of this reasoning in a kind of contradictory statement, that if Ulysses was false he was likewise true, and if Achilles was true he was likewise false (Tr. 272; 369 B). Achilles utters falsehood unwillingly (Tr. 273, 274; 370 A, B, C, D, E); the false willingly appear better than the false who are so against their wills (Tr. 274, 275; 371 A, B, C, D, E); so, too, of the willingly bad (Tr. 277; 373 C); the good man commits evil voluntarily, the bad man against his will (Tr. 283; 376 A, B). Socrates admits the confusion and contradiction (Tr. 283; 376 C); falsehood may be employed by rulers for the benefit of the ruled (Tr. ii. 143; Rep. 459 C); and as a remedy (Tr. 144; 459 D); in the case of those marriages arranged by state provision, and the procreation of children (ib.); explained as taking place by a divine allotment, where the ruler only

determines (Tr. 144; 460 A); lucky falsehood (Tr. iii. 4, 5; Meno. 71 D). So Shak. .

"Tell thou thy earl his divination lies,
And I will take it as a sweet disgrace,
And make thee rich for doing me such wrong."

2nd *Henry IV.*, act i. sc. 1.

False notions are the greatest of all misfortunes (Tr. i. 149; Gorg. 458 B).

—— witnesses, however numerous, do not confute the statements of one that is true (Tr. i. 165, 166; Gorg. 471 E; 472 B); is the false to be used in instruction? (Tr. ii. 57; Rep. 377 A); children's education is generally begun by teaching them fables (ib.); the false is loathsome to the soul more especially (Tr. 63; 382 B); it is useless to the gods and only to be employed by men remedially or for the sake of expediency (Tr. 69; 389 B); may be made use of by rulers, but by them only (ib.). A good deal is said on true and false opinion and discourse (Tr. iii. 172 to 178; Sophist, 260 B to 264 B).

Fame, posthumous, the love of it, present in all but the most slavish; all men of the highest stamp leave nothing undone in order that they may be well spoken of after death (Tr. iv. 480; Epist. ii. 311 B, C); this is a proof that the departed have some perception of what goes on upon earth (Tr. 481; 311 D); those who are dead, if they could return, would try and correct what was wrong in their past lives; and if we are eminently good we shall prize philosophy higher (Tr. 481; 311 E).

Fancies are not, according to Protagoras, more or less true at one time or another (Tr. i. 400; Theæt. 167 A).

Fancy, or phantasm, is the proper designation of a bad and imperfect likeness (Tr. iii. 133; Sophist, 236 B); fancy, thought, opinion true and false, are in our souls (Tr. 177; 263 D).

Fare from Ægina or Egypt to the Piræus (Tr. i. 215; Gorg. 511 E).

Fate of the depraved and of the pious (Tr. i. 230; Gorg. 526 B, C).

Fates, daughters of Necessity, viz., Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos, who preside respectively over the past, present, and future (Tr. ii. 308; Rep. 617 C).

Father indicted for murder by his son (Tr. i. 460; Euthyphro. 4 A); declared by him to be a pious act (Tr. 462; 5 E; 6 A); the case is compared with that of the conduct of Zeus towards Cronus (ib.); it is questioned whether the gods can approve it (Tr. 476; 15 D).

Favourite of the mob, his vicissitudes of good fortune with them. After alluding to the perpetual grumbling of farmers about weather and the rust in corn, he inquires whether the popular hero is more happy, at one time clapped and applauded as the people's pet, and at another,

banished, hissed, fined, and led to death (Tr. vi. 47, 48; Axioch. 368 C, D).

Fear, its uses. On many important occasions it preserves us, as the two things most conducive to victory are confidence against the enemy and fear of a bad name among friends (Tr. v. 37; Laws, 647 B, C, D); a medicine is suggested for the production of fear, as a wholesome discipline (Tr. 38; 647 E); it is better to prove a man's temper before he is put to the test in practice, and that the licentiousness of his disposition should be judged of at a Dionysiac festival, before he is let loose against our wives and daughters (Tr. 42; 650 A); if the use of wine is made to conduce to modesty and sensibility to shame, it contributes to what is termed a divine fear (Tr. 73; 671 D); fear of speaking before the crowd on account of the misconceptions and misapprehensions to which it gives rise (Tr. 74; 672 A); fear inspired at the time of the Persian invasion produced modesty, in the possession of which the fearful became free and fearless who without this fear would never have protected temples, tombs, and country (Tr. 114, 115; 699 C, D); fear regards what is future (Tr. iv. 175; Laches, 198 B); if we fear our adversaries we shall make more effective preparation to meet them (Tr. 341; Alcib. I. 120 C); fear of death, as if it were the greatest of evils, proceeds from ignorance (Tr. i. 16; Apol. 29 A); it is unsuited to the philosopher (Tr. 66; Phæd. 67 D, E; 68 A); it is conquered by brave men who are brave through the fear and terror of what is worse; but the philosopher, if he has not conquered it, is an absurd exception (Tr. 67; 68 D); referred to as a spectre to frighten boys or as annihilation (Tr. 79, 80; 77 E); the supposition that this fear may be allayed by singing a daily charm (ib.); fear and shame are sufficient guards against evil (Tr. ii. 150; Rep. 465 B); the latter keeps men from doing wrong to parents, the former makes them dread the resentment of a man's relatives when any of their number has been injured (ib.).

Feast for novices and old men (Tr. iii. 157; Sophist, 251 B); we should invite to our feasts beggars and those who need to be filled (Tr. i. 308; Phæd. 233 D, E). Compare St. Luke xiv. 12 and 13.

Feebleness of character is never productive of great good or evil (Tr. ii. 178; Rep. 491 E; 495 B), where it is termed a meagre disposition.

Fees earned by the Sophists, such as Gorgias and Prodicus, enormous, contrasting with the practice of the ancients who never took money for their wisdom or made an ostentatious display of it, while the moderns, with Protagoras at their head, have made more money than the most celebrated artists (Tr. iv. 213, 214; Hipp. Maj. 282 B, C, D); Hippias claims to have done more in this way than any two

- Sophists that could be named (Tr. 214, 215; 282 E); fees paid to Protagoras (Tr. i. 393, 394; Theæt. 161 D); why paid to him, if each man's experience is good for himself alone? (ib.); paid to Sophists (Tr. iii. 129; Sophist, 233 B; Tr. 297; Cratyl. 391 B, C); to Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Evenus (Tr. i. 5; Apol. 19 E; Tr. ii. 14; Rep. 337 D; 338 B); fees are lawful in some cases, but not indispensable in matters of high concern (Tr. i. 225; Gorg. 520 E); Socrates declares that he never takes fees, and is indignant at the practice (Tr. i. 18 to 20; Apol. 31 B; 33 B).
- Feeling supposed to exist amongst the dead of what goes on upon earth, and their disapprobation of excessive grief on their account (Tr. iv. 205; 206; Menex. 248 B).
- Feud, an interminable, has always existed between the schools who contend solely for the material, on the one hand, and for the intellectual and incorporeal, on the other (Tr. iii. 149; Sophist, 246 B); between philosophy and poetry (Tr. ii. 297; Rep. 607 C).
- Fewness of the Good; Hesiod declares that the road to infamy is smooth and may be journeyed over without sweat, being short and precipitous; this is the *facilis descensus Averni* of the Latins (Tr. v. 144; Laws, 718 D, E).
- Fifty drachmad demonstration (Tr. iii. 284; Cratyl. 384 B).
- Fight with shadows (Tr. ii. 209; Rep. 520 D).
- Figure differs from figure; that is, roundness or squareness of figure differs from figure in the abstract (Tr. iii. 7; Meno. 73 D); so white is a colour and not colour (Tr. 8, 9; 74 C); what is that figure which comprehends curved and straight? (Tr. 9; 74 D, E); is that which bounds the solid (Tr. 11; 76 A); always follows in connexion with colour (Tr. 11, 12; 75 B; 76 C).
- Fine gentleman; reference to one visited by a person in fine clothes (Tr. iii. 476, 477; Symp. 174 A).
- Fire confounded with gas in a state of ignition, as it is said to return to vapour when extinguished (Tr. ii. 355; Tim. 49 C); we ought not to speak of fire or water as absolutely such, but of body in the fiery or liquid state (Tr. 356; 49 D, E; 50 and following); is fire a thing *per se*, and all the objects of sense the only existences, so that there is nothing cognisable by the intellect? (Tr. 357; 51 B); fire penetrates all other matter (Tr. 366, 367; 58 B); the kinds of fire are many, as flame and the light which flows from it (Tr. 367; 58 C); fire is the destroyer of equilibrium (Tr. 367, 368; 59 A); fire consolidates some things, and does not dissolve others, while water dissolves earth not compact, and other earth is so compact as only to be melted by fire (Tr. 370; 60 E); pyramid is the atomic form of fire (Tr. vi. 157, 158; Tim. Loc. 98 A, B, C, D).

First-born ; customs at birth referred to (Tr. i. 392, 393 ; Theæt. 160 E ; 161 A).

Fish, ponds for breeding them, in the Nile and royal lakes (Tr. iii. 200, 201 ; Statesm. 264 C) ; not to be drugged or captured in certain privileged places (Tr. v. 311, 312 ; Laws, 824 B).

Fishing, the art of, dichotomized to a wearisome extent (Tr. iii. 110 ; Sophist, 221 B, C).

Fitness and design in the universe ; has the safety and well-being of the whole in view ; suitable agencies control the minutest suffering and action for the general good ; man is an infinitesimal part of the world, and all that happens is not that he may be personally happy, but that the greatest sum of happiness may be insured to the whole (Tr. v. 440, 441 ; Laws, 903 B, C, D).

Fixed, nothing is, in the arguments and souls of the advocates of perpetual flux (Tr. i. 415, 416 ; Theæt. 180 B) ; they are always at war with the idea of anything firm and settled (ib.).

Flame (Tr. ii. 367 ; Tim. 58 C).

Flashing out of wisdom (Tr. iii. 480 ; Symp. 175 E).

Flattering reception and dismissal of the versatile poet or imitator from the model state (Tr. ii. 77, 78, 79 ; Rep. 396 E ; 397 A, B, C, D, E ; 398 A, B).

Flattery on the part of the lover is often against the best interest of the object praised (Tr. i. 307 ; Phædr. 233 A) ; the flatterer is styled a dire beast and great bane (Tr. 315 ; 240 B) ; it invades the province of politics, legislation, gymnastics, physic, righteousness, or justice (Tr. 156 ; Gorg. 464 B, C) ; aims at what is agreeable but not at what is best (Tr. 157 ; 465 A) ; feigns (Tr. 157 ; 464 D) ; he distinguishes culinary and cosmetic flattery (Tr. 157 ; 465 B).

Flesh ; its use is to moisten the bones, and nothing known of its muscular machinery (Tr. ii. 386, 387 ; Tim. 73 E ; 75 A) ; the tongue, however, is the seat of a special sense (Tr. 387 ; 75 A).

Flight from earthly evils is a studying to bear the likeness of the gods (Tr. i. 411 ; Theæt. 176 B).

Flow and motion, the source of all becoming and production (Tr. i. 382, 392 ; Theæt. 152 E ; 160 D).

Flowering trees (Tr. i. 304 ; Phædr. 230 B) ; fragrant of (ib.).

Flowers represented as the food and resting-place of Love (Tr. iii. 520 ; Symp. 196 A).

Fluctuating in their reasonings, said of the advocates of a perpetual flow (Tr. i. 415 ; Theæt. 179 E).

Flux, the advocates of, as opposed to those who maintain that all things stand still (Tr. i. 415, 416 ; Theæt. 181 A, B).

- Foes** never come on boldly when pluck is shown (Tr. iii. 572; Symp. Tr. 221 A, B).
- Folly** and intelligence are two opposed conditions inconsistent with the dictum of Protagoras (Tr. iii. 287; Cratyl. 386 B, C); the folly of persons having a high notion of their capabilities who can never think alike on the same subject (Tr. i. 232; Gorg. 527 E).
- Food** of the mind (Tr. i. 242, 243; Protag. 313 E; 314 A, B); is not carried or to be carried in a common vessel which may communicate a bad flavour to the food, but itself taints the vessel, that is the mind, which carries it (ib.).
- Fools** are infinite in number (Tr. i. 276; Protag. 346 C); fool is a mad-man (Tr. iv. 377; Alcib. II. 139 C); are not to be regarded or replied to (Tr. 272; Hipp. Min. 369 D); if we are wise, all men will trust us, but if without understanding they will resist us (Tr. i. 490, 491; Lysis, 210 B, C, D); neither fools nor wise men philosophize (Tr. iii. 536, 537; Symp. 204 A); fools are not conscious of their defects (ib.); they overstep the rules of art (Tr. ii. 28; Rep. 350 B); a multitude of fools a less formidable auditory than a few wise men to a man of understanding (Tr. iii. 516, 517; Symp. 194 A, B).
- Foreigners** made generals and magistrates in Athens (Tr. iv. 307; Io. 541 C).
- Form** and matter, the two principles of the created world; matter is the substratum, form decides the shape; their joint product is body, earth, water, fire (Tr. vi. 156, 157; Tim. Loc. 97 E).
- Fortitude**; the difficulty of defining it; is, according to Laches, when wise and prudent, manliness (Tr. iv. 167; Laches, 192 D). *See* Courage. Socrates declines to teach it as not knowing what it is (Tr. 178; 200 A, B, C, D, E; Tr. 179; 201 A, B, C).
- Fortuitous** concurrence, a following the impulse of chance inherent in natural bodies and fitting them for the position assigned them; out of such a chance-medley of opposites the heaven is said to have originated (Tr. v. 412; Laws, 889 A, B, C); if things did not originally exist, and were produced, was it by the creative power of a God, or by some self-producing or fortuitous agency? (Tr. iii. 180; Sophist, 265 C). Theætetus inclines to the former assumption, and is assured by the stranger that time will fortify this conclusion, so that to reason on it will be needless (Tr. 180; 265 D).
- Fortune** and various accidents are at the foundation of all our institutions; war, disease, bad seasons, all exert their influence on human affairs; it is well to say that God and fortune, and occasion, coupled with divine agency, govern every mortal contingency (Tr. v. 128; Laws, 709 A, B, C); good fortune comes only to the few, in this life, though there is a good hope beyond the grave (Tr. vi. 4; Epinom. 973 C).

- Fountains** are to be erected, in addition to public highways, and drains, and dams, in order properly to irrigate the fields, and these, whether natural springs or artificially constructed, are to be directed into proper channels and led into the sanctuaries of the gods (Tr. v. 206 to 208; Laws, 761 A, B, C, D).
- Fox and lion**, the fable of, applied to coin all flowing into Sparta but never flowing out again (Tr. iv. 346; Alcib. I. 122 E); of Archilochus with his wiles and greedy nature dragged unobserved in the background (Tr. ii. 44; Rep. 365 C).
- Foxland**, humorously spoken of as the country of Socrates (Tr. i. 194; Gorg. 495 D).
- Frequenters of courts of law** are greatly more at home there than the philosophers (Tr. i. 407; Theæt. 172 C, D); the practitioners there talk against time, and the Clepsydra (Tr. 407; 172 E); must be kept to the record and address themselves to the judge and the matter in hand without irrelevancy (ib.).
- Friends**; are we to give them what is hurtful in giving them their own? (Tr. ii. 7, 8; Rep. 332 B); doing good to good friends and evil to evil friends (Tr. 11; 335 A); whether is the lover or the loved the friend? (Tr. i. 493; Lysis, 213 A); friends have their property in common (Tr. 486; 207 C); better to have friends than horses, dogs, or quails (Tr. 492; 211 D, E); many are loved by their enemies and hated by their friends (Tr. 493; 213 A); who else are mutual friends? (Tr. 494; 213 B, C); the evil are hostile to the evil, on the principle that like is friendly to like, for they are never, as evil, consistent (Tr. 495; 214 C).
- Friendship**; what is it in the abstract? what is its fundamental basis? (Tr. i. 502; Lysis, 219 C); it is declared that the question about what friendship is has not been solved (Tr. 507; 223 B); tests of enduring friendship are small anger for great offences, pardoning unintentional affronts, and striving to avert what is done intentionally (Tr. 307; Phædr. 233 B); not strong hatred for trifles (ib.); is an impossibility to tyrants (Tr. 213; Gorg. 510 C).
- Frogs**, men like, dwelling by the sea (Tr. i. 118; Phæd. 109 B).
- Frosts**, terrible, in Potidæa (Tr. iii. 570; Symp. 220 B); protection against them by felt and ramskins (ib.).
- Frying-pan**, out of, into the fire, a proverb; "out of smoke into the fire" (Tr. ii. 259; Rep. 569 B).
- Fugitives from prison** described as seizing anything that comes in their way, for disguise (Tr. i. 43; Crit. 53 D).
- Function of the soul** is a taking thought; can it be performed by any other existing thing, and is not life a function of the soul? (Tr. ii. 32; Rep. 353 D); is life a virtue of the soul? (Tr. 32; 353 E).

Funeral of priests is to be superior to that of other citizens; the attendants are to wear white robes, and a chorus of fifteen boys and girls is to surround the bier and sing, in strophe and antistrophe, a hymn in praise of the defunct (Tr. v. 508; Laws, 947 B); in the case of private persons, their sepulchres are not to be in places capable of cultivation, so as to encroach on the food of the living; mounds only such as five men can heap in five days to cover them, and the stone pillars to be only large enough for an encomium of four heroic verses; the funeral to be moderate and take place on the third day (Tr. 528, 529; 958 D; 959 A).

Funeral oration, its fulsomeness (Tr. iv. 184; Menex. 234 C); its exciting effect (ib.); prepared long beforehand for the occasion, like the obituaries in the "Times" (ib.)

Fuss made about a principle (Tr. i. 415; Theæt. 179 D).

Future punishment; we are none of us born immortal, nor would it conduce to happiness if we were so; evil and good have no value in things without life; we must put faith in the sacred traditions which teach that the soul is immortal, and that it will be judged after it is freed from the body. And then follows description of the man poor in soul (Tr. iv. 514; Epist. vii. 334 E; 335 A, B, C; Tr. ii. 304; Rep. 614 B and following; Tr. i. 120 to 123; Phæd. 111 C, D, E; 112 A, B, C, D, E; 113 A, B, C, D, E).

G.

Gadfly, or horsefly, spoken of, as stirring into activity the great lazy well-bred horse of Athens (Tr. i. 18; Apol. 30 E).

Gain and loss disputed about; do people solicitous for gain or lucre know that it is worthless? (Tr. iv. 435; Hipparch. 225 A); such termed rogues and pickpockets, though many cheat themselves with what is cheap through ignorance (Tr. 435; 225 B); Socrates declares gain to be a good, and that it is only ignorance which makes people overrate what is valueless (Tr. 437; 226 D, E; 227 A); gain is contrary to loss, which is an evil (Tr. 440; 228 D). The whole dialogue is a good specimen of the Socratic negative procedure, which leaves the subject pretty much as it was at starting, after the statement of some pros and cons.

Galling of the fetter that had been placed on the leg of Socrates relieved by scratching (Tr. i. 57; Phæd. 60 C).

Game laws, hunting of men in war, or piracy by sea, not to be indulged, nor crafty capture of birds by boys, nor night-hunting with dogs or twisted snares, nor is the fowler to range over ploughed lands or sacred places (Tr. v. 311, 312; Laws, 823 E; 824 B); nor are fish to be taken by means of intoxicating drugs (Tr. 312; 824 C).

- Gaping, spoken of as infectious, where Critias is said to have been pressed with the doubts of his fellow-disputant, like those who, seeing persons gaping in front of them, are affected similarly (Tr. iv. 135; Charm. 169 C); and turning giddy before the Judge in Hades, as a worse case than that of the awkward philosopher before a human tribunal (Tr. i. 231; Gorg. 527 A. See also Gorg. 486 B, where this helplessness and hopeless confusion is described).
- Gardens of the Muses, said to be flowing with honey, from which the poets, like bees on the wing, collect their sweets, inspired as the magnet magnetizes a string of rings of iron; the poet is a light and winged and sacred thing incapable of making verse without inspiration (Tr. iv. 296; Io. 534 B).
- Generation, does it spring from putrefaction caused by heat and cold? (Tr. i. 102; Phæd. 96 B; Tr. iii. 212; Statesm. 271 A); opposed to *obolía* (Tr. ii. 214; Rep. 525 C; Tr. iv. 83; Phileb. 53 C); of the Cosmos (Tr. ii. 331, 353; Tim. 27 A; 48 A); of men (Tr. v. 242; Laws, 781 E); opposed to decay (Tr. iii. 419; Parm. 136 B); coupled with motion (Tr. iii. 336, 337; Cratyl. 411 C); for further examples consult Ast's Lexicon.
- Gentleness and smoothness in study, compared to the flow of oil (Tr. i. 371; Theæt. 144 B).
- Geometric equality, its influence among gods and men (Tr. i. 210, 211; Gorg. 508 A); geometric *crux*, which has greatly puzzled commentators (Tr. iii. 29, 30; Meno. 87 A). Dr. Whewell's explanation of this case may be consistent with the original; but if so, it makes the original very unmeaning, or a useless truism, as it amounts to asserting that two right-angled isosceles triangles with the same hypotenuse are in every respect equal. It is true, Euclid's propositions may be supposed not to be known; but even then the illustration is bad, as it is only a case of two more general ones: the first, that every isosceles triangle, whether rectangular or not, is equal to another with the same base and opposite angle; the second, that every right-angled triangle, whether isosceles or not, will be capable of inscription in a circle though it may not be a half square. Geometric investigations prove the existence of intuitive conceptions only waiting the questioner to call them into full activity (Tr. 21; 82 B); what is the linear length whose square is eight? (Tr. 22, 23; 83 A, B, C); value of admitted ignorance as a step to knowledge (Tr. 24; 84 A); reference to the torpedo touch (Tr. 25; 84 B;) the boy by his replies arrives at truth entirely drawn from within; that is, he exhibits the existence of true opinions, or notions, or conceptions, altogether his own, that have been stirred up in him like a forgotten dream (Tr. 25; 84 C); this fact is used as an argument for

the soul's pre-existence and immortality (Tr. 28; 86 A, B); the divine origin of geometry is asserted (Tr. ii. 361; Tim. 53 E); and that the geometers are dear to the gods (ib.).

Geometrize, $\delta \theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma \kappa\alpha\iota \gamma\epsilon\omega\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota$: this statement is attributed to Plato by Plutarch (Conv. Disp. lib. viii. 2; Mor. t. iii. p. 663 D, ed. Wytténbach); though he says it is nowhere clearly written in any of his books, but it bears the character of Plato.

Geometry, admirable description of its processes, its postulates of odd and even, of the three fundamental forms of angles, acute, right and obtuse, and of the possibility of diagrams as a self-evident basis upon which all are agreed, without reasoning, for the sake of the ultimate deduction (Tr. ii. 200; Rep. 510 C); the diagrams are not what the geometers have in their minds, but the truths they are supposed imperfectly to resemble; nor do they, the geometers, make any statement about the squares and diameters they actually draw, but only about the ideal squares and diameters (Tr. 200, 216; 510 D, E; 527 A). These passages, with some of John Locke's on the same subject of diagrams, ought to have rectified certain misconceptions which still attach to our modern mathematicians and metaphysicians. Geometry is declared to be essential in war (Tr. 215; Rep. 526 C); in laying out camps and choosing positions only a small attainment in it, and the science of numerical calculation, is requisite, though much more for the beholding the idea of the Good (Tr. 215, 216; 526 D); it is advantageous if it compels us to regard essential existence (Tr. 216; 526 E; Tr. vi. 32; Epinom. 990 D to end); its empirical steps at variance with its treatment as belonging to the pure cognitive faculty (Tr. ii. 216; 527 A; see also Tr. 200; 510 D, E); it has to do with the ever-existent, not the perishable (Tr. 216; 527 B); its study to be enforced on the young in the model state (Tr. 217; 527 C); the study of solid geometry should properly come before that of astronomy (Tr. 217, 218; 528 A, B); of three dimensions (ib.); little studied and appreciated in states (ib.); would be different if the taste for it were more widely spread, which is now growing, happily (Tr. 218; 528 C); difference between geometry of two dimensions and solid geometry of three (Tr. 218; 528 D). It is hardly to be wondered at that, at a time when Euclid's elements were not brought into a connected series of dependent truths, and when mental philosophy was in its infancy, more was expected from geometry and number and motive force than they were capable of performing. Geometry undoubtedly is a field wholly peculiar to itself, where our mental intuitions alone, without the aid of sense, appear to carry us into the region of real and definite discovery, and certainly seemed to encourage the notion that through it men might

attain the remoter realisation of the ultimate existence and highest good. Both geometry and number deal with the conceptions of the infinite, and motive force and that which controls the planetary revolutions seemed to be peculiarly allied to the self-originating energy of the soul. A certain measure of mysticism was therefore natural, if not inevitable, in the outset of speculative thought. These recondite investigations were not to be laid open to men devoid of instruction; they will only be laughed at by the multitude, though nothing can surpass the enthusiasm with which they will be regarded by a better class of students (Tr. iv. 484; Epist. ii. 314 A). If such things could be written or spoken of before the common crowd efficiently, what better thing than to lay nature bare before the gaze of all? But he doubts whether the benefit anticipated would accrue. In some it will breed contempt, in others a vain assumption and inflation (Tr. 524; Epist. vii. 341 D, E). He goes on to expound the difference between the diagram and the mental conception of a circle; what is done by the turner is at variance with what is ideally conceived (Tr. 525; 343 A). So, too, in morals; not even Lynceus can make the mentally degraded see (Tr. 528; 344 A); only by long attrition, and question and answer in a friendly spirit, has intelligence and reasoning power flashed forth (344 B); if what has been most carefully elaborated is committed to writing, after that it is not the gods but men who have destroyed their own understandings (Tr. 529; 344 D); Dionysius is arraigned by Plato for publishing his own speculations from unworthy motives (344 E). In the Laws he again touches geometry, number, astronomy, which he thinks need not be enforced on all to the fullest extent; but only what it is disgraceful not to know (Tr. v. 300, 301, 543; 817 E; 818 A, B; 966 E; 967 A).

Germinating of plants is vigorous and healthy when it starts well at first, and so with men who, according as they begin vigorously and are well trained, become either the tamest and divinest of animals or the most savage (Tr. v. 214, 215, 250; Laws 765 E; 766 A; 788 D).

Ghosts: the half incorporeal souls of bad men linger and flit about the places where the body is buried (Tr. i. 84, 117; Phæd. 81 C, D; 108 A, B); good men's souls do not wander after death (ib.).

Giants, the stories of their battles, and also of gods and heroes, ought to be discountenanced on the part of the poets (Tr. ii. 59; Rep. 378 C).

γινώσκω, in the sense of "know," used much like οἶδα, derived from an obsolete εἶδω or ἴδω, only this last means primarily knowing by sight, as in its preterite, εἶδον. This mediate knowledge differs from that acquired by reflection, for which the compound σύνοιδα is more

employed. See *συνήμι*. It is cognate with *γνώσις*, *γνωστός*, *γνώριμος γνώμη*, and compounds: *γνώμη* signifies a sentiment, a thought, opinion, judgment, wise saying. In *γνώσις*, which Plato regards as specially directed to the acquisition of eternal truths, is also conveyed the notion of mystical or profound knowledge. Ignorance is expressed by *ἄγνοια*. It differs from *ἀγνοσία*, which is opposed to *γνώσις*; the latter having respect to the *ὄν*, the former to the *μὴ ὄν*. An etymological derivation of *γνώμη*, as if from *γνώης νόμησις*, is put forward (Tr. iii. 337; Cratyl. 411 D); also *σωφροσύνη* from *σωτηρία φρονήσεως*, and *σύνεσις* from *συνιέναι*, and *ἐπιστήμη* from *ἐπομαι*, to follow (Tr. 338; 412 A). See *ἐπίσταμαι*.

Giddy, by perpetual turning, causes those that are so to fancy that objects are turning.

"He that is giddy thinks the world turns round."

SHAKESPEARE, *Taming of the Shrew*, Act iv. sc. 2.

(Tr. iii. 336; Cratyl. 411 C): the soul wanders and is giddy, like as though it were drunk (Tr. i. 82; Phæd. 79 C); very old men are giddy (Tr. iii. 336; Cratyl. 411 B); the philosopher is laughed at and turns dizzy, with thoughts suspended on high, a subject of ridicule for Thracian damsels (Tr. i. 410; Theæt. 175 D).

Gifts of the gods thrown aside and treated with contempt (Tr. i. 18; Apol. 30 C, D).

γνώθι σάντόν (Tr. iv. 439; Hipparch. 228 B; Tr. i. 273; Protag. 343 B; Tr. iii. 128; Charm. 164 D; Tr. iv. 74, 75; Phileb. 48 C; Tr. i. 304; Phædr. 229 E; Tr. iv. 429; Rivals, 138 A; Tr. iv. 348, 349; Alcib. I. 124 B).

γνώμαι, of Hipparchus, "Go thy way thinking justly;" "Do not deceive your friends" (Tr. iv. 439, 440; Hipp. 228 B); "Suretyship is unsure" (Tr. iii. 128, 129; Charm. 165 A).

God, the measure of all things; the temperate man is a friend of the deity, and for him to sacrifice to the gods and to serve them with prayers and offerings is most conducive to a happy life (Tr. v. 140; Laws, 716 C, D); the gods are not less careful of small things than of great (Tr. 434; 900 C); nothing is concealed from them, however trivial, that is an object of perception or knowledge (Tr. 436; 901 C); the gods are not careless from indolence, and if they neglect small affairs they do so intentionally (Tr. 437; 901 E); man is the most godfearing of animals (ib.); to see and hear small things is more difficult than to see and hear great; but to bear and to guard and control small things is easier (Tr. 438; 902 B, C, D); physicians look to small ailments as at the bottom of great; pilots and politicians, too, and masons, need small stones to fill the interstices of larger ones.

But God is not inferior to the human workman (Tr. 439 ; 902 E) ; God of Friendship (Tr. i. 463 ; Euthyph. 6 B) ; God is only visible to mind (Tr. vi. 153 ; Tim. Loc. 96 O) ; the nature of the gods cannot be seduced by bribes (Tr. iv. 395 ; Alcib. II. 149 D) ; God is the cause of the revolution of the planetary masses (Tr. vi. 20 ; Epin. 983 B) ; God willing, as a devout qualification (Tr. iv. 288 ; Ion, 530 B) ; God may be brought in unawares, as a guest, like angels (Tr. iii. 103 ; Sophist, 216 B) ; God only knows, says Socrates, whether his death or the lives of his accusers and judges will have the better issue (Tr. i. 29 ; Apol. 42 A) ; propriety of the qualification "God willing" (Tr. iv. 371 ; Alcib. i. 135 D).

God, out of a machine, *deus ex machinâ* (Tr. iv. 468 ; Cleitoph. 407 A) ; God should always be described as He is, whether in epic, lyric, or tragic verse (Tr. ii. 59 ; Rep. 379 A) ; is good, causes no evil, but only success (Tr. 60 ; 379 B) ; He is not the cause of all things, but of our blessings only, which are fewer than our misfortunes (Tr. 60 ; 379 C) ; not the author of evil (ib. ; Tr. 61, 72 ; 380 B ; 391 E) ; not a conjuror, nor one who undergoes change of shape (Tr. 61 ; 380 D) ; cannot change for the better, and will not change for the worse (Tr. 62 ; 381 B, C) ; does not roam at night (Tr. 62 ; 381 E) ; abhors the truly false (Tr. 63 ; 382 A) ; needs no false poet in Himself (Tr. 63 ; 382 D) ; does not deceive from fear, and is absolutely simple, nor does He utter untruth in signs or dreams (Tr. 63, 64 ; 382 E) ; nothing but help from Him will stem the corruption of popular meetings or public men (Tr. 179 ; 492 E) ; the state is preserved by God's providence (ib.) ; He is the absolute Maker and producer of all things in heaven, and earth, and under it (Tr. 285 ; 596 C) ; is His existence to be denied, or is it to be imagined that He partly makes all things and partly not ? (Tr. 285 ; 596 D).

Gods, are they bettered by sacrifices and prayers ? (Tr. i. 472, 475 ; Euthyph. 13 C ; 15 A) ; what is the effect of these ? (Tr. 473 ; 13 E) ; they are evidence of holiness, which is a knowledge of praying and sacrificing, or of making presents to the gods, and begging from them in turn (Tr. 474 ; 14 B, C, D) ; the idea of barter suggested, or of gain only on the human side (Tr. 474 ; 14 E) ; the conclusion is, that holiness is agreeable to them, not advantageous (Tr. 475 ; 15 B) ; the gods care equally for small things as well as great, and are inexorable to the wicked (Tr. vi. 15 ; Epinom. 980 D ; also 980 A, B, C, in connexion ; and Laws, Tr. v. 410, 411 ; 888 A, B, C, D, E), where the disbelief in them or their providence over the world, or in their righteous procedure, is touched on. Gods and divine men are to be called by the names most agreeable to them (Tr. iii. 316 ; Cratyl. 400 E ; Tr. i. 322 ; Phædr. 246 A.) So, speaking of Aphro-

dite, Socrates says, "The terror which I experience in reference to naming the gods is above what is human" (Tr. iv. 6; Phileb. 12 C). With this compare the *Ζεὺς ὅστις ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰ τὸδ' αὐτῷ φίλον κεκλημένω*, Æschyl. Agam. 150. The world is described as "an image of the everlasting gods, endued with motion and life, which, when the Creator beheld, He loved it, and being gladdened, He designed further to elaborate it, so as to equal the pattern." Compare, "And God saw everything that He had made, and behold it was very good" (Genesis i. 31). I did not observe Stallbaum's reference till after I had noted the parallelism. Are not to be ill-spoken of (Tr. iv. 459; Minos, 319 A); whether the gods exist or not is not stated by Protagoras (Tr. i. 395; Theæt. 162 E); evil has no place among them (Tr. 411; 176 A). The gods do not plot and fight against one another (Tr. ii. 59; Rep. 378 B); their descendants are not what the poets represent (Tr. 72; 391 E); why called gods, *θεοί*, from *θεῖν* (Tr. iii. 309; Cratyl. 397 C); were originally sun, moon, earth, stars, heaven, which were seen to travel in a perpetual round, whence they were termed "runners," and this designation was then applied to other deities (ib.); their real names unknown to us, and not to be inquired into (Tr. 316; 400 D, E). Compare with this the reverence for the divine name in the Attic tragedians, the *Ζεὺς ὅστις ποτ' ἐστὶ* of Æschylus, and among the ancient Jews. The gods are invoked at death with propriety (Tr. i. 126, 127; Phæd. 117 C); said by some to have dispensed misfortunes to good men, and prosperity to the wicked; also to be reconciled to injustice by necromancy and the intervention of seers and enchanters, who beset the gates of the rich, and persuade them to employ their services (Tr. ii. 43; Rep. 364 B, C); do they exist or do they care for human affairs, or may they not be bent by prayers and sacrifices, seeing we know nothing of them, but through the poets? (Tr. ii. 45; Rep. 365 D, E).

Goëthe's theory of blue anticipated, as resulting from white and black, though, with Goëthe, the white is rather a colourless or milky haze (Tr. ii. 379; Tim. 68 C).

Gold and silver, not the proper aim of guardians, but only the pursuit of virtue (Tr. ii. 320; Tim. 18 B); it would not avail us if we could convert all the rocks about us into gold if we knew not how to use it (Tr. iii. 74; Euthyd. 288 E); its acquisition, less than that of friends (Tr. i. 492; Lys. 211 D, E); is inferior to the compositions of Lysias (Tr. 302; Phædr. 228 A); the separation of gold and diamonds from mixed earthy substances spoken of (Tr. iii. 266; Statesm. 303 E); exchanged for brass trinkets (Tr. 568, 569; Symp. 219 A); tried in the fire (Tr. ii. 96, 191; Rep. 413 D; 503 A); if a man's soul were

made of gold, would he not try it in the fire? (Tr. i. 184; Gorg. 486 D).

Gongs, their vibrations protracted for a long time till grasped with the hands (Tr. i. 257; Protag. 329 A).

Good, the, and Beautiful, coupled like the agreeable and the just (Tr. v. 59; Laws, 663 B; Tr. ii. 403; Tim. 87 C); see also Beautiful. The good and evil of things depends on circumstances (Tr. i. 264; Protag. 334 B, D; Tr. iii. 491 to 497; Symp. 181 A; 183 D); the good statesman (Tr. iii. 277; Statesm. 309 D); good, its nature: where present nothing else is wanting (Tr. iv. 96, 97; Philob. 60 C); good passes over for shelter to the fair (Tr. 104, 105; 64 E); good and evil, how possessing good in common, so far as pleasure is concerned (Tr. 6, 7; 13 A); good is perfect, self-sufficient, and universally desired (Tr. 23; 20 D); requires no addition (Tr. 23; 20 E): would any prefer to possess intellect, and understanding, and science, and memory of all things, without pleasure or pain, and wholly apathetic? (Tr. 26; 21 E); good is not an unmixed condition of this sort (Tr. 27; 22 C); the good and the just are difficult to discuss, as all do not look upon them in the same light (Tr. i. 341; Phædr. 263 A); men are not good by nature, or otherwise they could be easily distinguished (Tr. iii. 33; Meno, 89 B); and these good natures should be carefully guarded in an acropolis (ib.; also Tr. vi. 89; Virtue, 378 E); good men are rare, earnest persons are few and invaluable (Tr. iii. 99; Euthyd. 306 D); they come into existence with most difficulty (Tr. vi. 30; Epinom. 989 B, C):

"Because sweet flowers are slow and weeds make haste."

SHAKESP., *Richard III.*, act ii. sc. 3.

"You said that idle weeds are fast in growth."—*Ibid.*, act iii. sc. 1.

Good writers do not hawk their writings in the provinces (Tr. iv. 153; Lach. 183 B); good men would like to live their lives over again with a view to correct what was amiss (Tr. iv. 480, 481; Epist. ii. 311 D); test for the nature of good men and children (Tr. vi. 89; Virtue, 379 A, B); this goodness a divine quality, and inspired by the gods (Tr. 90; 379 C, D); good will be friend to good (Tr. i. 506; Lys. 222 C); is it akin to everything? (ib.); represented as hostile to good (Tr. 496, 497; 215 C); Hesiod declares like hostile to like (ib.); what is the greatest good? (Tr. 142, 143; Gorg. 452 D); good is greater to be oneself freed from misconception than to free another (Tr. i. 185, 186; Gorg. 487 E; 488 A, B); so termed from the presence of good things, and evil from that of evil, and their presence or absence is a cause of rejoicing or of pain; this is made the basis of the definition of the good and the bad (Tr. 199; 498 D, E);

what is good is worthy of frequent repetition (Tr. 199; 498 D, E); if good is the pleasant, are not good and bad the same? (Tr. 200; 499 B); all we do should be for the sake of the good, and not good be done for the sake of other things (Tr. 201; 499 E); true as applied to the pleasant (Tr. 201; 500 A, and following): are the good and the pleasant the same? (Tr. 209; 506 C): we are good by the presence of virtue (Tr. 209; 506 D); does not arise at random, but by order, rectitude, and art (ib.: Tr. 209; 506 E): applies to a moderate soul (Tr. 209; 507 A); to make his fellow-citizens good is the chief aim of a virtuous man (Tr. 217; 514 A): only to be done by one who is experienced in what he teaches (Tr. 218; 514 E): is there a good which is desired, not for its results, but absolutely for its own sake? (Tr. ii. 34; Rep. 367 B); for example, joy and the pure sense of lasting pleasure (ib.); is there a good which is prized both for this and its results, such as wisdom, sight, and health? (Tr. 35; 357 C); there is a third good which we treasure for its lucrative results (Tr. 35; 357 D); righteousness is placed in the second rank of these three classes (Tr. 35; 358 A); what is it apart from its results? (Tr. 35; 358 B); what is the greatest good in a state at which the law-giver aims? (Tr. 146; 462 A); that which binds it together in a community of the same pleasures and pains (Tr. 146, 147; 462 B); the words "mine" and "not mine" ought never to be heard together at the same time (Tr. 147; 462 C). Grote remarks that in the Protagoras, Socrates strives to identify the good and the pleasurable, in the Gorgias he maintains the reverse (Plato, vol. i. 208).

Good and beautiful, are they among non-existences, and only perpetually produced? (Tr. i. 388; Theæt. 157 D); or are they real entities? (Tr. 63, 64; Phæd. 65 D); good is never without its antagonistic evil in this world (Tr. 411; Theæt. 176 A); very good men and very bad men are the exception, the vast mass of mankind being intermediate (Tr. 94; Phæd. 90 A); good men go unbidden to the entertainments of the good (Tr. iii. 477; Symp. 174 B); they bear grief more patiently than other men (Tr. ii. 293; Rep. 603 E); they are often destroyed through envy and unjust prejudice (Tr. i. 15; Apol. 28 A); their souls do not wander after death (Tr. 84; Phæd. 81 C, D); can the good and fair be seen by the bodily eye? (Tr. 63, 64; Phæd. 65 D); the good man never deceives another nor says what is not true (Tr. ii. 6; Rep. 331 A); he does not care to be a magistrate for pay or honour, but to avoid that worst of penalties, the being ruled by men his inferiors in morality, probity, and ability. (Tr. 24, 25; 347 A, B, C); there would be no emulation for rule in a state where all were good (Tr. 25; 347 D); the good and wise keep within the rules of art, and do not aim to

have more than others like them (Tr. 28 ; 350 B) ; being self-sufficient, they will not indulge undue lamentations for loss of friends or money (Tr. 67 ; 387 E) ; will discourse in one form of speech (Tr. 77 ; 396 B, C) ; will be reluctant to liken themselves to inferior persons, except in sport (Tr. 77 ; 396 D, E) ; the absolute good alone renders wisdom, courage, moderation, justice, righteousness profitable (Tr. 193 ; 505 A) ; without this knowledge nothing avails (ib.) ; it is of no use to contemplate the universe apart from the good and beautiful (Tr. 193, 194 ; 505 B) ; it seems to the multitude to be pleasure, but to the more elevated minds, *φρόνησις* intelligence (ib.) which, when urged to explain, they call knowledge of the good (ib.) : absurdity of speaking of the knowledge of the good to those who are declared to be ignorant of it (Tr. 194 ; 505 C) : doubts about what it is : is often estimated by appearances on no substantial grounds though reality, not mere seeming, is what we are in search of (Tr. 194 ; 505 D) ; guardians should not be in the dark about it, or they will never gain those good and beautiful things either for themselves or others, which all desire (Tr. 195 ; 506 A) ; is it science or pleasure ? again asked (Tr. 195 ; 506 B). Socrates intimates that it is folly to speak of what is not known as if it was known (Tr. 195 ; 506 C) ; and is then asked to discourse about the good as he did about righteousness and moderation (justice and temperance) (Tr. 195 ; 506 D) ; will not say at present what it is, but will point to its offspring (Tr. 195, 196 ; 506 E) ; this offspring or interest must be accepted for the principal (Tr. 196 ; 507 A) ; all good and beautiful things in the concrete are many and visible, but each and all have a common characteristic, that is, they are included in a unity which is an unseen idea in the mind (Tr. 196 ; 507 B) ; our senses are formed in a manner most perfect, but hearing and voice require no third medium (this is not accurate) (Tr. 196 ; 507 C) ; sight, however, in the eyes, and colour in objects are only experienced through light as a powerful agent (Tr. 197 ; 507 E) ; and the sun god is the cause of this (Tr. 197 ; 508 A) ; there is an analogy between the sun and the eye, neither is sight ; but there is a bond of union and causal action between them (Tr. 197 ; 508 B) ; this is the usufruct of the good, or what the sun is to the visible world the good is to the intellectual (Tr. 197, 198 ; 508 C) ; when light is withdrawn, the eye is blind ; when the sun shines it is full of light ; and so the soul, too, comprehends, when it rests, where truth and real existence shine (Tr. 198 ; 508 D) ; when it rests on the becoming and perishing, the eye of the mind is blinded (ib.). The idea of the good gives truth to things known and power to the person knowing, and is the source of science and truth, being more beautiful than both (Tr. 198 ; 508 E) ; these last are not the

- sun, but they are sunlike (*see* Tr. 197; 508 A, B); they are immeasurable, and different from pleasure (Tr. 198; 509 A); this idea gives nutriment and being, lying in a region beyond, *οὐσία*, ineffable in honour and power (Tr. 198, 199; 509 B). Here, *τὸ εἶναι* and *οὐσία* appear to be distinguished, and the good to stand prominently above both; this idea divinely transcendental (Tr. 199; 509 C); is the real (Tr. 207; 518 D). *See* Human Mind. The good, as the real, is to be got at through number or arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, in addition to music and gymnastics (Tr. 210 to 222; 522 B to 532 A, B, C, &c.) For what follows on the nature of the good and its attainment, and its relation to real being, *see* Dialectics and Philosophy. Though the pursuit of the good is always that of the useful and profitable, and often of the pleasant, either present or by anticipation, it is something substantively distinct, and may be sought for its own sake, when no thought of advantage is consciously present to the mind. It is useless to say that it may in this case be sought, because to decline the search for it would be more painful. If virtue consist only in this more correct estimate of future advantage and the power to postpone apparent present advantage, or in having attained an elevation the descent from which is painful, it is a great and praiseworthy accomplishment; but goodness or holiness is a state which acts spontaneously apart from calculation.
- Good hope respecting the dead, that it is better for good men than for bad in the other world (Tr. i. 61; Phæd. 63 C); grounds of confidence and being of good cheer (Tr. 61; 63 E; 64 A; Tr. 28; Apol. 40 C, D); there is a ground for it, if souls be collected into one place and are not dissipated at death (Tr. 69; Phæd. 70 A, B); at death and in old age (Tr. ii. 6, 184; Rep. 331 A; 496 E; Tr. i. 29; Apol. 41 D).
- Goodness of children, a subject for anxiety; nothing for which an intelligent man should be more earnest (Tr. iv. 411; Theag. 127 D); the difficulty of handing down to them the virtues of their fathers (Tr. 410; 126 D; also Tr. i. 222; Gorg. 518 C; Tr. iii. 38; Meno. 93 D; Tr. i. 248, 249; Protag. 319 E; 320 A, B; Tr. iv. 337; Alcib. I. 118 C).
- Gorgias, one of Plato's most elaborate dialogues, is a professed inquiry into the aims of rhetoric and its applications, or rather misapplications, and teaches that it is only fairly used when made conducive to happiness and a just life; no flattery is to be tolerated, and the popular use of it, as in vogue, must be denounced. Gorgias professed to have found out that the probable was of more worth than the true, and made small appear great, and great small, by force of words, &c.; while Prodicus was in favour of neither long nor short, but only

moderate utterances (Tr. i. 345, 346; Phædr. 267 A, B); what Gorgias says virtue is (Tr. iii. 7; Meno. 73 C); all he pretends is to make his pupils smart (Tr. 41; 95 C); Socrates declines to teach for pay, and suggests as teachers, Prodicus the Cean, Gorgias the Leon-tine, and Polus the Acragantine (Tr. iv. 412; Theag. 128 A); Gorgias, his definition of the greatest good (Tr. i. 142, 143; Gorg. 452 D); Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles are unable to refute Socrates as to his views of punishment (Tr. 232; 527 B, C); Socrates plays on the name (Tr. iii. 525; Symp. 198 C).

GORGIAS. See Summary and Analysis, page 23.

Gorgons, hippocentaurs, chimeræ, and Pegasi (Tr. i. 303, 304; Phædr. 229 D).

Graceful period of life, is when the beard is just grown (Tr. i. 237; Protag. 309 B).

Graces, by the, used as an oath (Tr. i. 381, 382; Theæt. 152 C).

Grammar, its origin from Theuth, who discovered among illimitable sounds the distinctions of vowels and consonants (Tr. iv. 19; Phileb. 18 C); if a man is asked about the letters of a given name, are we to tell him that it is with a view to make him a better grammarian? (Tr. iii. 235; Statesm. 285 D).

Graphic description of the soul of the great king or dynast led up for judgment (Tr. i. 229; Gorg. 525 A); ditto, of recording the substance of a conversation, and correcting it from time to time by consulting the source of the information (Tr. 370; Theæt. 143 A); ditto, of Socrates scratching his leg (Tr. 57; Phæd. 60 B); ditto, of the sharp overreaching character of men who hang about the law courts (Tr. 407, 408; Theæt. 173 A); and their gradual degradation (Tr. 408; 173 B); ditto, of natural beauty of scenery (Tr. 304; Phædr. 230 B); ditto, of a reasoner, obliged to assume the very assertions he would disprove, such as "to be," "apart from," "others," "*per se*," as having a domestic foe always testifying against him, or having in his inside a ventriloquist Eurycles (Tr. iii. 159; Sophist. 252 C); ditto, of the progress from birth to the grave (Tr. vi. 44, 45; Axioch. 366 D, E; 367 A, B, C); ditto, particularizing the material phenomena connected with sitting (Tr. i. 104, 105; Phæd. 98 D); ditto, of men enveloped in the mists of earth (Tr. 118, 119; 109 B, C, D; 110 A); ditto, in a beautiful fable (Tr. 119, 120; 110 B, C, D; 111 A, B, C); ditto, of an exquisite or fop going to call on the fine gentleman (Tr. iii. 476, 477; Symp. 174 A); ditto, of beauty and the love of beauty (Tr. 551 to 555; 210 E; 211 A, B, C, D, E; 212 A); ditto, of Alcibiades; Socrates, Agathon, Aristophanes (Tr. 574 to 576; 222 E; 223 A, B, C, D); ditto, of terrors of conscience at death (Tr. ii. 6, 7; Rep. 330 D, E; 331 A); ditto, of old wives reciting

fables and wagging their noddles (Tr. 28, 29; 350 E); ditto, of the search after righteousness (Tr. 116, 117; 432 B, C, D); ditto, of persons hunting for what they have in their hands, or under their noses (Tr. 117; 432 D); ditto, of an attack on the position of Socrates (Tr. 159, 160; 473 E; 474 A); ditto, of a scientific ship's captain beset by an ignorant, lawless crew (Tr. 174; 488 B, C, D, E); ditto, of the mode in which the Athenians corrupt and spoil their young men (Tr. 178, 179; 492 B, C, D); ditto, of the Sophists studying the views and temper of that great irritable wild beast the public (Tr. 179, 180; 493 A, B, C); ditto, of false training in dialectics and its conducing to mere empty word display (Tr. 228 to 230; 537 C to 539 D); ditto, of men chained by the leg and neck from childhood in a dark cavern, as figurative of our human condition (Tr. 202 to 207; 514 A to 518 C); ditto, of the formation of the timocratic man (Tr. 238, 239; 549 C, D, E; 550 A, B); ditto, of the usurer marking out his victim (Tr. 245; 555 E); ditto, of the sleek, daintily fed man gasping for breath in battle, or difficult enterprise (Tr. 246; 556 E); ditto, of the evacuation of the fortress of the soul by higher principles, and its occupation by false opinions and reasons (Tr. 249, 250; 560 C, D, E); ditto, of democracy (Tr. 254, 255; 564 D, E; 565 A, B, C, D, E; Tr. 256; 566 A, B); ditto, of tyranny (Tr. 256, 257; 566 E; 567 A, B, C, D, E); ditto, of the relation of a father to a scapegrace son (Tr. 258, 259; 568 E); ditto, of the wild license of dreams taking their colour from the man's habit of life (Tr. 260, 261; 571 C, D, E; 572 A, B; Tr. 264; 574 E); ditto, parallel of son and father continued (Tr. 261, 262; 572 C); ditto, of father and relatives trying to reform a son (Tr. 262; 572 E); ditto, of low desires brought in as a crowned festal troop of revellers (Tr. 262; 573 A); ditto, of a tyrannous bad son beating his old father and mother (Tr. 263, 264; 574 A, B, C); ditto, of a tyrant in a desert surrounded wholly by slaves and enemies (Tr. 268, 269; 579 A, B); ditto, of the decision of the controversy about happiness (Tr. 270; 580 B, C); ditto, of the bestial life of the man of low desires (Tr. 276; 586 A, B); ditto, of the compound monster containing within him a circle of heads connected with the bodies of a lion and man, and enclosed in an outer shell of human form, emblematic of the antagonistic forces in the soul of man, where reason has to contend with unbridled desire (Tr. 279, 280; 588 B, C, D; 589 and following); graphic picture of a man of fortitude contending with his grief (Tr. 293, 294, 295; 603 E; 604 D; 605 E); ditto, of the child howling with his hand up to the smitten part (Tr. 294; 604 C); ditto, of Homer's and other tragedy heroes droning out their griefs and chaunting dirges, and beating their breasts (Tr. 295; 605 D); ditto, in contrast with con-

duct under a private bereavement (Tr. 295; 605 E); ditto, of the pleasures of ideal sympathy (Tr. 296; 606 A, B); ditto, of the soul in communion with the body, under the figure of a sea-beaten Glaucus stuck all over with seaweed, pebbles, and shells (Tr. 301, 302; 611 C, D, E; 612 A). The genius and poetry of Plato are nowhere more conspicuous than in these passages so thickly spread in the latter pages of the Republic.

Governed, those who are properly brought up in states learn to regard the same objects as "mine," or "not mine;" and if one member of the community suffers, all the rest grieve and suffer with it (Tr. 147, 149; Rep. 462 C, D; 464 B, C, D).

Government, so far as it can be really so called, looks to the interests of the governed (Tr. 23; Rep. 345 D); of living creatures is more noble than that over lifeless; a king is better than an architect (Tr. iii. 173; 174; Statesm. 261 C); of Athens, monarcho-democratic (Tr. iv. 191; Menex. 238 D).

Grasshoppers, or cicadæ, perched on the branches of trees, men before the birth of the Muses (Tr. i. 304, 336, 340; Phædr. 230 B; 259 A, C; 262 D).

Gratification, when a pleader in the courts does not talk with this object in view, he is placed at a disadvantage (Tr. i. 226; Gorg. 521 E).

Gratitude on the part of the helpless, is that which is most worth striving to obtain; we should not invite to our feasts friends, but beggars, and those who need to be filled; and next to these, those who are likely to repay our favours through life (Tr. i. 308; Phædr. 233 D, E; Luke xiv. 12, 13).

Grave and solid persons apt to be forgetful, and destitute of smartness and activity (Tr. i. 371; Theæt. 144 B).

Great matters require to be first studied and practised in small (Tr. iii. 106; Soph. 218 D); great achievements either in public or private are only performed through dread of doing what is base, and ambition of doing what is honourable (Tr. 488; Symp. 178 D); this is exemplified in the case of the lover (ib.; Tr. 488; 178 E).

Greater or less, can they be produced otherwise than by actual augmentation or diminution? (Tr. i. 384; Theæt. 154 D); or are they what each man's sensitive nature or percipieny makes them? (ib.); a person is said by the reasoner to be so, not by a head, nor shorter by the same amount, but only to be less by littleness and greater by greatness (Tr. 107; Phæd. 101 A); should be first contemplated in an example of the less (Tr. ii. 49, 119; Rep. 369 A; 434 D, E).

Greece, its admirable climate, between extremes of heat and cold, and its adaptedness to the acquisition of virtue and piety (Tr. vi. 28; Epin. 987 D).

Greeks, superior to the barbarians (Tr. vi. 28; Epin. 987 E); Greek names given to barbarians; story of Solon's procedure with Egyptian names (Tr. ii. 420; Critias, 113 A); Greeks and barbarians, a twofold division of the human race (Tr. iii. 198; Statesm. 262 D); Greeks ought not to enslave Greeks, nor spoil corpses slain in battle, which is to regard the body of a man as an enemy, when the enemy has fled away (*see* Bodies; Tr. ii. 155; Rep. 469 D, E); nor ought they to dedicate the arms of their fellow Greeks in temples, lest this should prove a polluting them, nor may they waste Grecian lands and houses (Tr. 155; 470 A); war between Greeks is rather discord and faction, and a disease; but between Greek and barbarian is properly war (Tr. 155, 156; 470 A, B, D, E); it is an obnoxious thing that Greeks should fleece their nurse and mother (*ib.*); the model state will be Greek in avoiding all these misdeeds (Tr. 156; 471 A).

Grief is more calmly borne by a good man than by others, who will struggle to repress it in public more than in private (Tr. ii. 293, 294; Rep. 604 A); suffering induces grief, and this is opposed to law and reason. Law declares it right that he should not give utterance to it, and declares that no human event is worth so much stir (Tr. 294; 604 B, C); it prevents a man becoming himself when it is most necessary that he should, or from taking good counsel, and permitting reason to allot his portion, as in a throw of the die (Tr. 294; 604 C); we ought not, like children who have had a fall, or been punished for doing wrong, to set up a howl, with our hands held to the part that has received the blow, but to put right what is wrong or to take physic (Tr. 294; 604 D); grief is conducive to cowardice (*ib.*); impatience of grief is allied to imitation of it, such as is seen in a crowded theatre by persons who are not themselves in grief (Tr. 294; 604 E).

Growth and decay, causes of, through assimilation and resolution of the blood, are always going on, distributing like elements to like, imitating the universal movement around (Tr. ii. 395; Tim. 81 A; Tr. vi. 163, 164; Tim. Locr. 102 A); an admirable account of the growth and decay of humanity from childhood to old age, which may match with Shakespeare's, is given in the *Ætiochus*. The infant cries as soon as born, and begins life with pain, unable to express its wants; then the sorrows of schooltime have to be borne, *pædagogues*, teachers of grammar, tyrant slave attendants; then in after years the torments of classics and mathematics (Tr. vi. 44; *Ætioch.* 366 D, E); then the severer discipline of the lyceum, the academy, the gymnasium; then the anxiety attending the choice of a profession, and the sufferings in war and conflict (Tr. 45; 367 A, B); then comes deadly old age—first the loss of sight, then of hearing, or of both, then paralysis or broken limbs, or second childhood (Tr. 46; 367 B, C).

Guardians of the state are to be instructed in music and able to recognise virtue (Tr. ii. 84; Rep. 402 C); they must abstain from intoxication (Tr. 86; 403 E); a laughable thing if a guardian should himself require to be guarded (ib.); they require a proper diet, even more than athletes (Tr. 86; 404 A); they should be wise and powerful, and solicitous for what they have charge of, and connect its interests with their personal convictions of what is good (Tr. 95; 412 D); they are bound to refuse what they believe to be disadvantageous (Tr. 96; 412 E), and to be consistent in their opinions (Tr. 96; 413 C); they must be tested as to their firmness in keeping to their professions (ib.); they should be exposed to labour and suffering and scrutiny like colts to noises and situations of terror (Tr. ii. 96, 97; 413 D); also to tests of pleasure (ib.); they should be exposed to trial in youth, childhood, and manhood, have honours conferred on them, when living and dead, obsequies and monuments (Tr. 97; 414 A); perfect against foes without, and towards friends within (Tr. 97; 414 B); the younger guardians are to be auxiliaries to the magistrates (ib.); what good fabulous story by way of incentive can we invent for persuading the latter? (Tr. 97, 98; 414 C; 415 B); good guardians among the ruling class should scrutinize the metal of their children, so as to classify them, not by descent, but by intrinsic worth (Tr. 99; 415 B, C); rulers should lead forth these imaginary sons of earth all armed, and reconnoitre where it is best for them to camp in dwellings fit for soldiers (Tr. 99; 415 D, E); auxiliaries must not be wolves, but like good sheep-dogs, careful of the flocks (Tr. 99, 100; 416 A, B); such education and such precautions to be used as shall prevent their maltreating those whom they guard (Tr. 100; 416 C); these guardians and auxiliaries are to hold no private property, to have no comforts more than brave men in battle require, no pay beyond the mere expenses of the mess (Tr. 100; 416 D, E); they are to possess no gold nor silver, but that divine gold of the soul which is pure and unearthly (ib.; Tr. 209, 232; 521 A; 543 B); neither are they to handle it, nor traffic with it, nor to drink out of it (Tr. 100; 417 A); if they possess lands and houses and money, they will be farmers and economists instead of being guardians, and also intriguers, and hated (Tr. 100, 101; 417 B; Tr. 149; 464 C, D, and following sections). Adimantus objects that such guardians will be unhappy, deprived of all state advantages, and doing nothing but guarding like mercenaries (Tr. ii. 102· 419 A, B); they will have no pay beyond their rations, no right to travel or make presents, and yet they will be the happiest men in the world (Tr. 102, 103; 420 A, B); though this is not the object, that one class in the state should be happier than another (ib.); analogy with the

painting of statues suggested, where we want the whole to be beautiful not the separate parts (Tr. 103; 420 C, D); rustics are not to be decked with jewels, nor artizans to recline on couches while at their work (Tr. 103; 420 E); but even when this is allowed, it is of less consequence for a cobbler to be spoiled than for this fate to occur to a guardian of the laws (Tr. 103, 104; 421 A); guardians are not to be farmers nor jolly good fellows (Tr. 104; 421 B), but must consult for the general happiness (Tr. 104; 421 C); must be screened from the bad effects of riches or poverty (Tr. 104; 421 E); to see that the unity of the state is provided for (Tr. 106; 423 C); they are not to allow innovations in music and gymnastics (Tr. 107; 424 B); not to beget children for the state clandestinely, under thirty, in the absence of prayers and priestly intercession, what is so born being under the cloud of incontinence (Tr. 145; 461 A); nor to touch a woman without consent of the ruler, even though of lawful age, while the children of such unions are to be bastard, unholy, and unaccredited (Tr. 145; 461 B); they are to have intercourse with whom they please after the legal age, but the children in this case are to be exposed (Tr. 145, 146; 461 C); the question is asked, how children and parents are to be distinguished? All born between the seventh and tenth month after the union of pairs are to be accounted children, and the children of any of these are to be grandchildren, but not to have intercourse (Tr. 146; 461 D); brothers and sisters only to cohabit by lot or permission of the Oracle (Tr. 146; 461 E); styled also co-guardians, all whom he meets being brethren or parents (Tr. 148; 463 C); not merely to be such legally, but in all actual, filial, or parental offices and duties of piety (Tr. 148; 463 D, E); they are to be made one in feeling and interests by community of women and children (Tr. 148, 149; 464 A); their qualifications recapitulated (Tr. 149; 464 C; *see also* Tr. 100, 101; 416 D to 417 B); this unity further described (Tr. 149; 464 D); they are never to be split into parties, nor actions to arise for assault and battery (Tr. 149; 464 E); the rights of person to be protected (*ib.*); as they are introducers of peace, they will never quarrel among themselves (Tr. 150; 465 B); the poor have no need to flatter the rich, there is no anxiety about children or money (Tr. 150; 465 C); they are thus freed from annoyances, and much more to be envied than victors in the Olympian games (Tr. 150; 465 D); they have unlimited sustenance and public honours, living and dead (Tr. 150, 151; 465 E); they are rendered happy (Tr. 151; 466 A); *see the contrary assertion* (Tr. 102; 419 A, B); they are spoken of as auxiliaries also (Tr. 151; 466 A); if they aim to be happy and have not a foolish and childish conception of happiness, they will soon

learn that the half is more than the whole (Tr. 151; 466 B); they are to be philosophers (Tr. 159 to 171; 473 D to 485 C, and following); guardians must be versed in the knowledge of the absolute good (Tr. 194, 195; 505 D, E; 506 A, B); they are warriors and philosophers, and must study number and computation (Tr. 214; 525 B, C).

Guardians of others must themselves be well instructed, and philosophers, high-souled, well up in music, gymnastics, and suitable accomplishments (Tr. ii. 320; Tim. 18 A).

Guides from the other world conduct the departed, after long cycles of time, to earth again (Tr. i. 116; Phæd. 107 E).

Gyges, story of the ring of (Tr. ii. 37, 38; Rep. 359 D, E; 360 A, B); supposed case of two such rings (ib.); good application of the story (Tr. 302; 612 B).

Gymnasia, productive of evil, consequent on exposure of the person (Tr. v. 18, 19, 20; Laws, 636 A, B); story of Jove and Ganymede (636 D).

Gymnastics, is its object the good of the body or the reputation of hard work? (Tr. iv. 422; Rivals, 133 D); the advantages of moderation therein (Tr. 423; 134 B); they are to the body what legislation is to politics (Tr. i. 156; Gorg. 464 B); obnoxious to cosmetic flattery (Tr. 157; 465 B); said to be ill-understood by Callicles (Tr. 222; 518 C); as a training for the body (Tr. ii. 57; Rep. 376 E); next in order to music (Tr. 85, 86; 403 D); the best gymnastics are akin to simple music (Tr. 86; 404 B); produces bodily health (Tr. 87; 404 E); but is also adopted together with music for the soul's health (Tr. 92, 93; 410 C); gymnastics *per se* or music *per se* may both beget impulsiveness of nature, which, rightly directed, may become manliness or fortitude; but when pursued to excess, harshness and repulsiveness (Tr. 93; 410 D); gymnastics alone at first promotes high bearing, but when in excess destroys all taste for reasoning or persuasive language, and leads to ferocity (Tr. 94; 411 C, D, E); given by the god not for body alone, nor for soul alone (Tr. 94; 411 E); joint function of music and gymnastics (Tr. 94, 127; 411 E; 442 A); neither of them teaches the ultimate good (Tr. 210, 211; 521 E; 522 A, B). In Book Eight of the Laws, Plato proposes an extended and more effective gymnastic discipline for the production of a higher morality and command of the passions (Tr. v. 317, 318; 831 A and following sections), where he denounces pathic vices.

H.

Hades, the appalling sufferings inflicted there are for the sake of striking terror into others (Tr. i. 230; Gorg. 525 C); these mostly fall to

- the lot of tyrants, kings, or dynasts (Tr. 230; *ib.*; 525 D); many desire to descend thither on account of strong attachment to wives or children who have gone before them (Tr. 66; Phæd. 68 A); pleasure of meeting great men there (Tr. 28; Apol. 41 A).
- Hair**, the uses of, to protect the head and brain, with a light covering to shade and shelter it, and prevent injury from cold or heat (Tr. ii. 389; Tim. 76 C, D).
- Handle**, to give a (Tr. i. 310, 311; Phædr. 236 C); said of a wrestler (Tr. ii. 233; Rep. 544 B; Tr. v. 88, 89; Laws, 682 E).
- Handicraft operations** are only reproached because they tend to develop what is brutish in the man, and because the uneducated persons who exercise them should submit to the rule of the more virtuous, not as slaves, but as friends who possess in themselves a virtue which is their own (Tr. ii. 281, 277; Rep. 590 C, D; 586 C, D).
- Happiness** consists in the use of a thing, not in its possession (Tr. iii. 63; Euthyd. 280 B); as we all desire it, we should seek the attainment of wisdom, which is its best guarantee (Tr. 65; 282 A); for which it is honourable to minister in servile offices if it can be so procured (*ib.*); happiness is the lot of the pious in the next world; rapturous description of it (Tr. vi. 53, 54; Axioch. 371 C, D); happiness must be sought for in the habit and disposition of the soul (Tr. iv. 3, 4; Phileb. 11 C); can happiness coexist with injustice? (Tr. i. 164; Gorg. 470 C, E); it is placed in education and justice of action (Tr. 164; 470 E); is due to nobility and goodness (*ib.*); it is important to know who is and who is not happy (Tr. 166; 472 C); impossible for a tyrant to be so (Tr. 166; 472 D); does not belong to those who have no felt need of anything (Tr. 191; 492 E); the happiness of being with departed great men such as Orpheus, Musæus, Homer, Hesiod (Tr. i. 28; Apol. 41 A); there is a pseudo happiness procured by appearances, and a magic circle of specious virtue is set forth (Tr. ii. 44, 45; Rep. 365 C); as a safeguard (*ib.*).
- Harangue**, a description of, old men and boys seated, introducing the gods into their speeches (Tr. i. 395; Theæt. 162 D); such declamations or harangues contain only commonplaces and probabilities (Tr. 395; 162 E).
- Hardships of youth** (Tr. vi. 42; Axioch. 365 D); also of middle and old age (Tr. 44, 45; 366 E; 367 A, B).
- Harmonies**, styled threnodic, the mixed and tense Lydian, which last are not fit even for women (Tr. ii. 80; Rep. 398 E); the effeminate, relaxing, and convivial are the Ionic and Lydian (*ib.*); there will be left the Dorian and Phrygian, which induce to bravery and moderation (Tr. 80; 399 A); we do not require in our lyrics, such at least as those fit for the model republic, many chords and many har-

monies (Tr. 81; 399 B, C); sweet, soft, and querulous melodies spoken of (Tr. 93; 411 A).

Harmonist must know more than how to sound a few notes, acute or grave (Tr. i. 347; Phædr. 268 C, D, E).

Harmony and rhythm essential to life (Tr. i. 254; Protag. 326 B); to be out of harmony with one's self (Tr. 180; Gorg. 482 B); harmony spoken of as unseen, incorporeal, beautiful, and divine, dwelling in the well-tuned lyre (Tr. 89; Phæd. 85 E); yet it perishes when the lyre is broken, and does not live (Tr. 90; 86 A); this case is not analogous to that of the soul's reminiscence, because the harmony does not precede the existence of the lyre (Tr. 96, 97; Phæd. 92 A, B, C), for it is produced last, and perishes first (ib.); it does not take the lead of that out of which it is composed, as soul does of body (Tr. 97, 98; 93 A); nor is it ever in opposition with itself (ib.); if soul were mere harmony, it would never be at variance in its manifestations with what would result from a given state of tension, relaxation, or pitch (Tr. i. 100; 94 C); harmony and rhythm are the sequel to verbal expression (Tr. ii. 80; Rep. 398 D); they are intimately connected with natural goodness and moral elevation (Tr. 82, 83; 400 D); their bearing upon all elegance of delineation in form in embroidery, architecture, bodily development, language, while the want of them contributes to the reverse (Tr. 83; 401 A); they enter the soul and touch it forcibly in the form of music (Tr. 84; 401 D, E); ground tone, treble, and mean (Tr. 129; 443 D); belong to the bounded (Tr. iv. 33, 34; Phileb. 26 A).

Harvey's theory of the blood in part forestalled by Plato and Shakespeare, though mixed up with many erroneous conclusions, and lacking scientific worth (*see* Blood).

Hasting to be rich, zeal for money (Tr. iv. 468; Cleit. 407 B); hasting slowly; allusion to the proverb, *festina lente*, *σπεύδων μάλλον βραδύνω* (Tr. ii. 218; Rep. 528 D).

Hater, is he the same as an enemy? (Tr. i. 493; Lysis, 213 A).

Hatred between friends (Tr. i. 493; Lysis, 213 A, B, C); hatred of reasoning and hatred of men characteristic of the same temper of mind, the *μισόλογος* is *μισάνθρωπος* (Tr. i. 94, 95; Phæd. 89 D; 90 D).

Having is distinguished from possessing (Tr. i. 438; Theæt. 197 B); example taken from birds in a dovecote or aviary (Tr. 438, 439; 197 C, D).

Head is our divinest member, set on the tall flexible column of the neck, and containing the brain and chief senses (Tr. ii. 349, 350; Tim. 44 D).

Health is a due mixture of the bounded and the unbounded (Tr. iv. 33;

- Phileb. 25 E); health is the best thing, beauty next, riches third (Tr. i. 142; Gorg. 451 E); the man in health is allowed to eat and drink what he likes, but not the sick man (Tr. 207; 505 A).
- Healthy state of the soul before the judge (Tr. 231; Gorg. 526 D).
- Hearing, is there a faculty of, which does not hear sound but hears itself, like the eye may be supposed to see itself? The question is asked by way of illustration of the further inquiry, whether there is a desire which is not that of something outside itself, but only of itself and other corresponding desires (Tr. iv. 132; Charm. 167 C); sight cannot see itself, hearing hear itself, motion move itself, or heat burn itself (Tr. 134; 168 E).
- Heart is the fountain of the blood (Tr. ii. 380; Tim. 69 D); heart not set on riches (Tr. 5; Rep. 330 C).
- Heat, animal, explained (Tr. ii. 393; Tim. 79 D); heat and fire are supporters of all other things, and are produced by friction and transference, which are forms of motion (Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 153 A); the atoms of heat are described as highly attenuated, penetrating and driving asunder the particles of body, while cold, which is here made positive, is said to be made of dense molecules (Tr. vi. 161, 162; Tim. Loc. 100 E).
- Heaven and earth, gods and men, hold fellowship, friendship, and intercourse with one another, and this is called a Cosmos (Tr. i. 210, 211; Gorg. 508 A).
- Heavenly bodies are larger than they seem, of immense bulk, which is declared to admit of demonstration. Even the planets possess a wondrous size (Tr. vi. 19, 20; Epin. 983 A); the heavenly abode is a refuge from the evils of earth (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 A).
- Heavens, their description easy, because unknown; any general representation of distant objects which we do not see distinctly, is tolerated on the part of the painter; we put up with a *σκιαγραφία*, and *ἀσαφεί, καὶ ἀπατηλῇ χρώμεθα περὶ αὐτά*; but a miniature or portrait does not readily satisfy (Tr. ii. 413, 414; Critias, 107 A, B, C, D, E); the motions of the heavens ordained of old, and instinct with intelligence (Tr. vi. 18, 19; Epin. 982 C); their periods settled in times incredibly remote, proves their living nature, not, as some suppose, a lifeless order of nature (Tr. 19; 982 D, E); the glory of the choral dance of the stars (ib.).
- Heeltap speeches, made by gluing together commonplaces (Tr. iv. 187; Menex. 236 B).
- Helm of the understanding (Tr. iv. 469; Cleit. 408 A).
- Heraclides, of Clazomenæ, an instance of a foreigner set over its armies by the Athenians (Tr. iv. 307; Io. 541 C).
- Heraclitus, spoken of (Tr. i. 382, 392, 415; Theæt. 152 E; 160 D

179 E); his sun spoken of as quenched (Tr. ii. 185, 186; Rep. 498 A); he was called the obscure; said to have made fire the leading element, and denied the permanent as anything more than perpetual change (*see* Grote's Plato, vol. i. p. 28); his saying that the most beautiful of the pithecoids is ugly compared with man (Tr. iv. 227; Hipp. Maj. 289 A); and the wisest of men an ape in comparison with the gods (Tr. iv. 228; 289 B).

Hermæ, statues set up in the public ways inscribed with sentences (Tr. iv. 439, 440; Hipparch. 228 B).

Herodotus, in his Book i. 55, quotes an oracle uttered to Croesus (Tr. ii. 256; Rep. 566 C).

Heroes, the names of such often so framed as to deceive us, as if they boasted a certain ancestry, or implied some vainglorious assumption, like Eutychides, Sosias, Theophilus (Tr. iii. 309; Cratyl. 397 B); we may suppose that the origin of the term hero, who is also regarded as a demigod, is based on the idea of his having sprung from the amour of a god and mortal woman or from a goddess with a mortal man (Tr. 311; 398 D); the term is an aspirated form of the Greek word signifying "love," or is derived from another signifying "to question," or "to speak," thus making the rhetoricians and sophists an heroic class not without a touch of pleasant irony.

Hesiod, quoted :—

"Potter with potter, too, indignant rages,
And wordy war the irate minstrel wages
With brother poet; while the wretch in tatters
His fellow wretch with foul abuse bespatters"

(Tr. i. 496, 497; Lys. 215 C); referred to as a companion in the other world (Tr. 28; Apol. 41 A); he assigns to Love what belongs to Necessity (Tr. iii. 519; Symp. 195 C); declares that piety is rewarded by the gods (Tr. ii. 41, 42; Rep. 363 A); his story of Cronus and Uranus not fit for general auditors (Tr. 58; 378 A), nor for youth (Tr. 59; 378 B); he declares half to be more than the whole (Tr. 151; 466 B); his praise of brave men in death (Tr. 154; 468 E); his authority appealed to, as to the subject of metals (Tr. 236; 546 E); referred to as a wandering rhapsodist (Tr. 290; 600 D, E); quoted (Tr. iv. 461; Min. 320 C, D); spoken of (Tr. 290; Ion, 531 C; Tr. iv. 459; Min. 318 E).

Hiccough, stopped by holding the breath (Tr. iii. 500; Symp. 185 D, E); or by gargling with water, or tickling the nose with a feather to cause sneezing (*ib.*).

High spirit combined with gentleness (Tr. v. 159; Laws, 731 B); its uses both in men and beasts (Tr. ii. 55; Rep. 375 B); high spirit of

the Thracian, Scythian, and northern tribes characteristic of the individual members of the race (Tr. 120; 435 E).

Hipparchus, Hippias, Harmodius, referred to (Tr. iv. 439, 440; Hipparch. 228 B).

HIPPARCHUS. See Summary and Analysis, page 220.

Hippias, the extent of his fees as a sophist, declared by him as exceeding any earned by any two; which Socrates ironically asserts to be a proof of his wisdom (Tr. iv. 214 to 216; Hipp. Maj. 282 E; 283 B); his speech (Tr. i. 267, 268; Protag. 337 C, E); a healer of ignorance (Tr. 289; 357 E); his ill-success with the Lacedæmonians, who, though admiring his discourses, would not pay for them (Tr. iv. 215 to 221; Hipp. Maj. 283 B to 286 B); he treats the question about the beautiful as one easily to be settled (Tr. 221, 222; 286 D, E); denies the distinction between beauty in the abstract and concrete (Tr. 223; 287 D); the beautiful is a beautiful girl (Tr. 224; 287 E); is gold (Tr. 229; 289 E); but yet Phidias, a judge of beauty, did not make the eyes, or face, or hands, or feet of Athene of this material (Tr. 230; 290 B); Hippias now declares that it is the suitable or fitting (Tr. 230, 231; 290 D); that it is the attaining old age, being rich, healthy, and honoured, and splendidly buried (Tr. 233; 291 E).

HIPPIAS MAJOR and MINOR. See Analysis and Summary, page 202.

Hippocentaurs (Tr. i. 303, 304; Phædr. 229 D).

Hive, or swarm of virtues under the figure of bees; not diverse in so far as they are bees, though they may be of different sizes and countries and differently ornamented (Tr. iii. 5; Men. 72 A, B).

Hog, sacrificing not this, but a great and rare victim (Tr. ii. 58; Rep. 378 A).

Hoggish, said of ill-timed and rude remarks (Tr. i. 399, 400; Theæt. 166 C).

Holiness, is it the same with justice, τοῦ δικαίου, or a part? (Tr. i. 471, 472; Euthyphr. 12 D); what is the absolutely holy? (Tr. 462; 5 D); and the unholy? (ib.); its specific idea (ib.); not many but one (Tr. 463, 464; 6 E); that which is pleasing to the gods (ib.); but this definition breaks down if the gods quarrel among themselves (Tr. 464, 465; 7 A, B, C, D); is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is that which is loved by them holy because they love it? (Tr. 468, 469; 10 A, E; Tr. 475; 15 B); is the holy that which all the gods love, and the impious that which they all hate, or only what they hate or love in part? (Tr. 467; 9 D); essence of it apart from its accidents (Tr. 469, 470; 11 B); piety and holiness a part of justice (Tr. 470 to 472; 11 E; 12 E); duty to God and man (ib.); does holiness as a service aid and better the gods? (Tr. 472, 473, 475; 13 C; 15 A, B); the holy is that which preserves private homes and

republics (Tr. 474; 14 B); must be considered *de novo* (Tr. 476; 15 D). This dialogue of the Euthyphron concludes, leaving the whole issue in the usual uncertainty; and Socrates having convicted his collocator of being ignorant of what he professes, and on the strength of which he is about to prosecute his own father for murder, humorously twits him with having left him, Socrates, without help, as against Meletus, in his accusation of impiety.

Holiness and justice imply a likeness to deity (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 B).

Home and country, preserved by religious observances (Tr. i. 474; Euthyphr. 14 B).

Homer, his great superiority to other poets; he rouses all your sensibility (Tr. iv. 292; Ion, 532 C); acts like a magnet (Tr. 294; 533 D; Tr. 299; 536 A); Ion's extensive acquaintance with Homer (Tr. 300; 536 E); pressed to prove his knowledge and discrimination of Homer's beauties, wriggles out of it like a Proteus and goes off with a strut (Tr. 308; 541 E); mention of Homer and Hesiod (Tr. 290; Ion, 531 C); of Homer four times (Tr. 308; 542 A, B; see also Tr. i. 382, 392, 415; Theæt. 152 E; 160 D; 179 E); Homer makes kings and tyrants the chief sufferers in Hades (Tr. i. 230; Gorg. 525 D); will teach the propriety of names in the language of gods and men (Tr. iii. 297, 298; Cratyl. 391 D, E); examples are Chalcis and Cymindis (Tr. 298; 392 A); Scamandrius and Astyanax (Tr. 299; 392 D); referred to as a companion in the other world (Tr. i. 28; Apol. 41 A); he treats the soul as a diviner thing than harmony (Tr. 100; Phæd. 94 E); fitted to speak of love (Tr. iii. 519, 520; Symp. 195 D); not to be assented to in what he says, Il. xxiv. 427, and following (Tr. ii. 60; Rep. 379 D); nor in the lines about Agamemnon's dream (Tr. 64; 383 A); does not feast his heroes when on expeditions, and allows only roast meat without sauces (Tr. 86; 404 C); makes the reasoning power rebuke the emotional, Odys. iii. 4 (Tr. 126; Rep. 441 B); feasts his successful heroes with sacrificial meats and mantling cups (Tr. 154; 468 E); allusion to Homer's invocation to the Muse on the origin of the sedition among the princes at Troy (Tr. 234; 545 D); reference to his description of the lotus eaters, Odys. ix. 94 (Tr. 249, 250; 560 C); Homer, the father of tragedy (Tr. 284, 285; 595 C; Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 152 E; see Aristotle, Ars. Poet. c. 4); is not to be honoured at the expense of truth (Tr. ii. 284, 285; Rep. 595 C); his demerits (Tr. 288 to 290; 598 E to 601 A); reverence entertained for Homer, while objecting to him (Tr. 284; 595 B); as a rhapsodist (Tr. 290; 600 D, E). See under Imitation what is collected Tr. 290 to 298; 600 D, E to 608 A, B.

Homer quoted, Tr. iv. 265, 273, 274; Hipp. Mm. 365 A; 370 A, B, C, D; 371 C; Tr. 301 to 304; Io. 537 B; 538 C, D; 539 A, B, C, D; Tr. i. 495; Lys. 214 A, from Odyss. xvii. 218; Tr. iv. 73, 74; Phileb., 47 E, from Il. xviii. 107; also Tr. 101; Phileb. 62 D; Tr. i. 237, 244, 279; Protag. 309 B, twice; 315 C; 348 D; Tr. iv. 459, 460; Minos, 319 B. Homer and Hesiod more to be trusted than all the tragic poets (Tr. 459; 318 E); Tr. i. 316; Phædr. 241 C, from Il. xxii. 262; Tr. 337; 260 A, from Il. ii. 361; Il. iii. 65; Tr. iii. 47, 48; Meno. 99 E; Tr. i. 355; Phædr. 275 B; and Tr. 22; Apol. 34 D, from Odyss. xix. 163; also Tr. iii. 103; Sophist, 216 B; Tr. ii. 233; Rep. 544 D, to the same effect: "I am not born from an oak, nor oracular rock, but from man." "In three days you will be in fertile Phthia," said of death (Tr. i. 32; Crito, 44 A, from Il. ix. 363; also Tr. iii. 525; Symp. 198 C); the gods give advantages to the pious (Tr. ii. 41, 42; Rep. 363 A). We are told that the following representations ought to be expunged: Il. xvi. 856; xx. 64; xxii. 100, 262; xxiii. 103; Odyss. xi. 488; xxiv. 6 (Tr. ii. 65; Rep. 386 B); so, too, cowardly lamentations: Il. xvi. 433; xviii. 54; xxii. 168, 414; xxiv. 10 (Tr. 67; Rep. 388 A); excessive laughter unseemly, Il. i. 599 (Tr. 68; Rep. 389 A); Odyss. xvii. 383 (Tr. 69; Rep. 389 D); passages commended are: Il. i. 225, and following; iii. 8; iv. 412, 431 (Tr. 69, 70; Rep. 389 E); in what way do these favour continence? Il. xiv. 291; Odyss. viii. 266; ix. 8; xi. 342 (Tr. 70; Rep. 390 B); praise bestowed on, Odyss. xx. 17 (Tr. 70, 71; Rep. 390 D); blamed as commending bribery, Il. ix. 435, and following; xxiv. 175, and following; xix. 278, and ditto; xxii. 15, and ditto; xxii. 394; xxiii. 151, 175, and ditto (Tr. 71; Rep. 390 E); other references are: Il. iv. 412; iii. 8; iv. 431; i. 225 (Tr. 69, 70; Rep. 389 E); Il. xxi. 188 (Tr. 71; Rep. 391 C); Il. i. 131 (Tr. 189; Rep. 501 B); Odyss. x. 428 (Tr. 204; Rep. 516 D); Il. xvi. 776; Odyss. xxiv. 39 (Tr. 256; Rep. 566 D).

Homeridæ never praised Homer for his good instruction (Tr. ii. 289; Rep. 599 E); nor his son-in-law, Creophilus (Tr. 289; 600 B).

Homicide; the physician who loses his patient unwittingly is to be free from legal penalty (Tr. v. 373; Laws, 865 B); hostility of the newly slain to the homicide (Tr. 374; 865 D; Tr. 479; 927 A); the homicide must withdraw at all seasons from places familiar to his victim (Tr. 374; 865 E); returning against his will, or wrecked on the coast, he is to lose no time in getting away (Tr. 375; 866 C, D); different punishments for murder with malice prepense, and done without intent (Tr. 376; 867 B); in self-defence, a man to be absolved of all charge (Tr. 380; 869 D); or in gymnastic games (Tr. 317, 318; 831 A); cause of murder is immoderate love and wrong esti-

- mate of riches (Tr. 381, 382; 870 A, B, C); envy and cowardly fear of detection (Tr. 382, 383; 870 D); penalty of murder is to end life in a way similar to that inflicted (Tr. 383, 385, 387; 870 E; 872 E; 873 A); self-murder (Tr. 388; 873 C); case of beasts (Tr. 388; 873 E); also in minor cases (Tr. 495, 496; 936 E).
- Honour and dishonour (Tr. iv. 203; Menex. 246 C); honour among thieves (Tr. ii. 29, 30; Rep. 351 C; 352 C); impossibility of concert without it (Tr. 31; 352 D).
- Honourable is good and never evil (Tr. iv. 332, 333; Alcib. i. 116 A); our front is more honourable than our back (Tr. ii. 349, 350; Tim. 44 D).
- Honours of parents are a noble and magnificent treasure to children; but for the latter to expend this treasure and not to hand it down to posterity is base and unmanly (Tr. iv. 204; Menex. 247 C); coveted (Tr. i. 492; Lys. 211 D, E).
- Hook or by crook (Tr. ii. 160; Rep. 474 C, D); ἀμῆ γέ πῃ, ἀμῶς γέ πως, or ἀμωσγέπως (Tr. v. 408; Laws, 887 B).
- Hope beyond the grave (Tr. vi. 4; Epin. 973 C, D); is the soul's expectation of the pleasant, an anticipation of the agreeable, as the painful is of something fearful and grievous (Tr. iv 45; Phileb. 32 C).
- Hope, good, is the possession of the good man in life and death, and to him there is no evil (Tr. i. 29; Apol. 41 D; see Good hope).
- Horrors, poetic, objected to (Tr. ii. 65, 66; Rep. 386 B; 387 B); but nevertheless they are narrated by our author (Tr. 116 to 123; Phæd. 108 to 114); so, too, in the fable of Er, at the close of the Republic.
- Horse-fancier (Tr. i. 492; Lys. 211 D, E).
- Hospitality should be exercised towards the poor, who can make no return but gratitude (Tr. i. 308; Phædr. 233 D).
- Hot baths to be provided for old men by the younger men, with plenty of fuel, in well-adapted spots, where they may kindly receive and tend bodies worn down by agricultural toil and rheumatic pains (Tr. v. 207, 208; Laws, 761 C, D). We almost fancy we see here the first trace of the idea of an hospital or infirmary.
- Hot and cold partake of the unlimited (Tr. iv. 30, 31; Phileb. 24 B, C, D).
- House of correction, a place to be visited by the nocturnal commissioners for the suppression of crime by means of suitable exhortations—a sort of reformatory (Tr. v. 453, 454, 535; Laws, 909 A; 962 D).
- Human body, its sundered parts represented as always in search of their missing half (Tr. iii. 513; Symp. 192 C); not an association to be sought for the sake of sensual gratification, but through an irrepressible desire for the filling of a felt want (ib.).

Human life compared to a cask filled and emptied by large holes (Tr. i. 192, 193; Gorg. 494 B).

Human mind compared to the case of captives shut up in a deep cavern, chained neck and leg, so as to be unable to see the daylight behind them shining down the cave's mouth, or one another, but only to view certain shadows of a moving throng, or of puppets on a stage erected behind them and in front of a blazing fire (Tr. ii. 202, 203; Rep. 514 A, B; 515 A); captives so situated would give names to these shadows and attribute to them any sounds that might be uttered (Tr. 203; 515 B), as if these were real persons and things (Tr. 203; 515 C). Suppose now that either of these captives is made to face the daylight and to look at real objects, would he not deem his previous impressions the truer? (Tr. 203; 515 D); would he not be indignant and blinded if dragged into broad daylight, still more suddenly, and would he not prefer first to look at shadows, and then at reflections of the sun and objects, before his eye should be used to gaze at objects themselves? (Tr. 204; 516 A); his next advance would be to look at the heavens at night and sunset, and last of all he would venture to look at the sun itself (Tr. 204; 516 B). When thoroughly habituated to the upper light, he would acquire a feeling of pity for his fellow-captives and contempt for their estimates and rewards amongst themselves (Tr. 204, 205; 516 C, D, E). Suppose now that the liberated person should redescend into the cavern, his eyes filled with darkness, could he, until accustomed to the gloom, argue with the dwellers there without becoming a laughing-stock, or its being supposed that his eyesight had been ruined by excess of light when in the upper glare? (Tr. 204, 205; 516 E; 517 A). In the same way the region of the phenomenal is a prison; the fire that casts the shadows is there represented by the visible sun; the ascent to upper daylight is a passage to the region of the Intelligible, and the upper sun is the Good or *Ultimatum*, the last arrived at, the source of all rectitude and beautiful things (Tr. 205; 517 B, C); the redescent from divine contemplations to human miseries and ills, and the mind's confusions about the shadows of the just, here represented by the figures that cast the shadows, is analogous to the re-entrance of the cavern (Tr. 205, 206; 517 D); the sources of confusion are the passage out of darkness into light and out of light into darkness (Tr. 206 518 A); so with the soul out of the gloom of dark ignorance into the brighter atmosphere of the Good, and *vice versâ* (Tr. 206; 518 B); all this proves not that science or knowledge can be put, like sight, into the blind soul, but that if we turn to truth, it must be with the whole soul, but brought round through a circuit till it can gaze on reality (Tr. 206, 207; 518 C); this reality is the Good; its object is not

to enable the eye to see, but to see aright (Tr. 207; 518 D); our thinking may take a wrong circuit (Tr. 207; 518 E); the ascent and descent is to be made by those who would rule the state, with a view to render help to those in the gloom (Tr. 206, 207, 208; 518 C, D, E; 520, A, B, C, D, E; *see also* Tr. 222; 532 B).

Human nature, as a compound monster, is made up of the reasonable, the impulsive, and the bestial (Tr. ii. 279; Rep. 588 C, D); invested with and subject to evil necessarily (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 A).

Human sacrifices still extant among men (Tr. v. 243, 244; Laws, 782 C).

Human weight in the scale is nothingness and unmanliness measured by the standard of the divine (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 C).

Humility of the captain who has brought his passengers safe over the sea (Tr. 215; Gorg. 511 E).

Hunger and thirst (Tr. iv. 49, 50; Phileb. 34 E); are they evils when evils are destroyed, or will they exist in any case so long as animal nature lasts? (Tr. i. 504; Lys. 221 A); they are the keenest of our desires, and what is desired in their case is the quelling a want or satisfying a craving (Tr. ii. 122, 124; Rep. 437 D; 439 A).

Hunting with violence includes piracy, enslaving others, tyrannous and warlike expeditions (Tr. iii. 112; Sophist, 222 C); the general's art of hunting put on a par with that of the louse catcher, though the more showy of the two (Tr. 120; 227 B); hunting of men in war (Tr. v. 311; Laws, 823 E; Tr. iii. 76; Euthyd. 290 B); astronomers, geometers, and logicians are hunters (Tr. 76; 290 C), and generals (Tr. 77; 290 D).

—— of men, animals, and fish (Tr. 110, 113; Sophist, 221 B, C; 223 B).

Hurtful, the question is asked, whether that which is so is to be given to friends? (Tr. ii. 6, 7; Rep. 332 B).

Husbandman bestows his chief care on young plants (Tr. i. 458; Euthyp. 2 C); when the plant has sprouted, it afterwards requires great care (Tr. iv. 401 to 403; Theag. 121 B; 122 A, C, D).

Hydra, lopped and resprouting, apt image of sophistry, was too much for Hercules; and so, too, that other sophist, the crab, that has lately sailed in from the sea (Tr. iii. 86; Euthyd. 297 C).

Hypotheses are to pure ideas what reflections from smooth bodily surfaces are to corporeal things (Tr. ii. 199 to 201; Rep. 510 B, C, D; 511 A, B, C, D); the soul is compelled to use them, and cannot start from the outset wholly *a priori*, as if they were fundamental first principles, but only employs them as stepping-stones and resting-places, by means of which it may rise to the unconditioned, and thence descend again, discarding all that is merely derived from sense and employing

only ideas (Tr. 200; 511 B); the science of the real and intelligible is to be rendered clearer by means of ^{ἐν τῇ}dialectics, and not by making hypotheses fundamental or primitive assumptions (Tr. 201; 511 C); this dealing with hypotheses belongs to the province of the understanding, *διάνοια*, not that of pure reason or intellect, *νοῦς*, whose operation is *νόησις*. This *διάνοια* is only second in rank, intermediate between pure intellect and notion or opinion (Tr. 201; 511 D). The third function next in rank is *πίστις*, belief or credence; and the fourth is *εἰκασία*, or conjecture (Tr. 201, 224; 511 E; 533 E); the defect of hypotheses is, that they cannot, as a sole ground, attain to science or knowledge (Tr. 223; 533 C).

I.

Ibycus, the horse of. "While Zeno was thus speaking, Antiphon stated that Pythodorus said that he and Aristotle and the rest begged Parmenides to explain himself. That on this, Parmenides agreed that it was necessary to concede the request, observing that it seemed to him that he was experiencing what the horse of Ibycus underwent, to whom, as an old racer, and trembling for the result, when about to be harnessed for the contest, knowing the chances of the course, he, Ibycus, compared himself, and declared his unwillingness, as an old man, to be compelled to follow his love pursuits. So, too, I seem to myself to remember and dread the necessity of having at my time of life to swim through such and so boundless a sea of words" (Tr. iii. 419, 420; Parm. 136 E; 137 A; Tr. i. 318; Phædr. 242 D).

Idea of good in man and the universe, the absurdity of one who wished to realise this, and who desired a mixture the most beautiful and free from ferment, endeavouring to mingle the pleasures which attend on folly and baseness with those of the understanding (Tr. iv. 102, 103; Phileb. 63; D, E; 64 A).

Ideas are twofold, having relation to desire and opinion—the one class aiming to satisfy an inborn love of pleasure, the other looking to an acquired estimate of what is best (Tr. i. 312; Phædr. 237 D); ἀληθεῖς δόξαι sometimes represent innate ideas or intuitions (Tr. iii. 25, 28, 29; Meno. 84, C, D; 86 A, B, C, and what precedes); ideas underlying many objects, or comprehending many things externally different, are the foundation of all classification (Tr. 161; Sophist, 253 D); pure ideas unknown to us; according to Socrates, these εἶδη or class forms exist nowhere but in the soul; on which Parmenides asks, whether each of these thought conceptions is one in the mind, and can there be a notion of nothing? (Tr. 411, 412; Parm. 13. B);

if objects partake of their class notion, they must think or not be part of it (Tr. 412; 132 C); to this Socrates replies, that this partaking is only resemblance to a pattern; but Parmenides on this objects, that by virtue of this mutual resemblance there must be a reproduction of these class notions *ad infinitum*, object and pattern becoming confounded (Tr. 412; 132 D); difficulty of giving a distinct existence to ideas (Tr. 413; 133 A); if self-existent, it is not in us (Tr. 413; 133 C); and further, according to this philosopher, they are not only not in us, but they must remain unknown to us (Tr. 415; 134 B, C); and this raises a doubt whether the deity can know what takes place among us or we anything of things divine (Tr. 415, 416; 134 D); association of the εἶδος of the boy and lyre, is a result of memory (Tr. i. 73, 74; Phæd. 73 D); ideas here, ἰδέαι, stand single and alone, and the concretes included under them are the many (Tr. ii. 284; Rep. 596 B); the maker of furniture looks to the idea, but is not one who fashions that (ib.); and with such a maker he proceeds to contrast Him who is emphatically the Maker, who is not only able to make furniture, but plants and animals and himself, and earth and heavens and gods, and all things in heaven and beneath the earth (Tr. 285; 596 C); man has to understand by means of a so-called ideal form or εἶδος, derived from many sensations or perceptions, brought into a unity by reasoning, and this is a reminiscence of what we beheld in a previous state, when we journeyed with the gods, and closely surveyed existence (Tr. i. 325; Phædr. 249 B, C).

Identity, how is our personal, affected by our knowing or not knowing the same thing (Tr. i. 399; Theæt. 166 B), or undergoing any change of any other kind? (Tr. 400; 166 C); explained as not consisting in being made up of the same atoms, bones, flesh, blood, hair, which are always changing, but from the same person undergoing this continued renewal (Tr. iii. 543, 544; Symp. 207 D); it is just the same with regard to mental habitudes, opinions, desires, pleasures, and pains, which are always partly perishing, partly reproduced (Tr. 544; 207 E); identity of knowledge is preserved by memory (Tr. 544; 208 A); human identity is not like the divine, by its being unchangeably the same, but is maintained by the gradual replacement of the old with new (ib.); it is by this renewal and regeneration that the mortal partakes of immortality, and this renovation is the function of love (Tr. 545; 208 B).

Ignorance to be accounted an overwhelming evil in the state or private person, though it may not affect the artizan's skill in his particular trade, and where it exists no rule must be conceded, but only obloquy, however sharp-witted or expert in shifts the man may be (Tr. v. 98, 99; Laws, 689 B, C, D); but even ignorance is not the

worst of evils, as knowledge, with bad guidance and direction, entails worse consequences (Tr. 302; 819 A); he who is in ignorance of his own endowments is in ignorance of those of others (Tr. iv. 386; Alcib. I. 133 E); cases exist in which it may be advantageous (Tr. 383, 384; Alcib. II. 143 C); ignorance at the helm of affairs enslaves others under evil guidance (Tr. iii. 64; Euthyd. 281 D), and is as productive of mischief as intelligence of good (ib.); according to the sophistic reasoning exhibited, it is neither possible to lie nor entertain a false impression, nor to be in ignorance (Tr. 71, 72; 287 A); ignorance on the part of the strong is hateful and discreditable (Tr. iv. 77; Phileb. 49 C, E), but laughable on the part of the weak (ib.); ignorance as contrasted with the Delphic gnome (Tr. 74, 75; 48 C); threefold in respect of money, beauty, and virtue (Tr. 75; 48 E).

Ignorance of our true worth and weight, as compared with deity, is baseness (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 C); ignorance is never voluntary, but is a delusion (Tr. iii. 122; Sophist, 228 D); is a want of wise appreciation (ib.); is destructive of beauty and measure (ib.); is a disease of soul (ib.); its worst form is pretending to know when it does not know, and from this source mostly all mental error arises (Tr. 124; 229 C); is false opinion (Tr. i. 404; Theæt. 170 C; Tr. ii. 129; Rep. 443 E); ignorance in the soul is a lie (Tr. 63; 382 B); both ignorance on the one hand and knowledge on the other are distinct from opinion; the former has to do with the non-existent, the second with the existent, and the last with both (Tr. 163 to 166; Rep. 476 E; 477 A, B, C, D, E; 478 A, B, C, D).

Ignorant persons tell truth without intending it (Tr. iv. 268; Hipp. Min. 367 A); he is ignorant who cannot give an account of a matter (Tr. i. 444; Theæt. 202 C); the ignorant and bad person will desire a larger share than is his due among those who are like him or unlike (Tr. ii. 28; Rep. 350 B).

Images, reflected by glass or water, distinguished from those existing in the mind (Tr. iii. 139; Sophist, 240 A); reflections from water (Tr. ii. 204; Rep. 516 A); formed by mirrors (Tr. 84; 402 A, B; Tr. v. 445; Laws, 905 B); from water or glass (Tr. ii. 285; Rep. 596 D; Tr. 351; Tim. 46 A; Tr. 384; Tim. 72 C; Tr. i. 450; Theæt. 206 D); as in a mirror which returns images to your view (Tr. iii. 343; Cratyl. 414 C; ii. 382; Tim. 71 B); reference to a man seeing himself in the object of his love as in a mirror (Tr. i. 332; Phædr. 255 D); images of the poets (Tr. ii. 290, 291; Rep. 600 D, E; 601 C); image of the sun (Tr. v. 428; Laws, 897 D); image of the association of head and intellect (969 B); into what would the eye look if it wished to see itself? clearly a mirror (Tr. iv. 365; Alcib. I. 132

E); image of the observer in the pupil of the eye at which he looks (Tr. 366; 133 A); reversed (Tr. ii. 351; Tim. 46 A).

Imagination, its power, represented under the figure of a draughtsman who paints images in our souls, and the soul as a book written in by a penman, who is memory aided by sensation, and the affections blending the expression into a whole (Tr. iv. 58; Phileb. 39 A, B). Here is the theory of representation, as distinct from presentation. But this operation has reference to the future as well as the present and past, in respect both of what is real and imaginary (Tr. 59; 39 C). There is also a realm of fancy productive of intense gratification (Tr. 60; 40 A); to the good man, for the most part, true delineations are brought before his mind, and false to the bad man, which mimic the true in an absurd way, so that where opinions are too rashly indulged, all may prove visionary, and the man opine about what never did, nor does, nor shall exist (Tr. 60, 61; 40 B, C, D).

Imitation, or affectation of foreign manners, referred to as a thing to be guarded against in Plato's Magnetic community, it being an excellent thing that a state should be incapable, by gross imitation, of aping its enemies (Tr. v. 122; Laws, 705 C); of the virtues of deceased persons (Tr. iv. 188; Menex. 236 E); its bad effect unless good models are proposed (Tr. ii. 76; Rep. 395 C, D); the evil of imitating wrangling women or persons lamenting (ib.); imitation of evil men and cowards bad, whether in action or in words (Tr. 76; 395 E); the same is true of the imitation of madmen (Tr. 77; 396 A); or of artificers or of naval commanders (Tr. 77; 396 B); or of neighing horses, bellowing bulls, rustling rivers, and such like (ib.); no good man attempts to imitate the acts of an inferior (Tr. 77; 396 D, E; see also Tr. 78, 79; 397 A, B, C, D, E; 398 A, B); in one sense, a man can make a universe by holding up a mirror to the world spread around him, that is, he can produce a phænomenal image of it, not the thing itself (Tr. 285, 286; 596 E); the painter of animals, or he who paints furniture, is a second kind of maker (ib.); the actual furniture or cabinet-maker is a maker in a higher sense; but he does not make the *eîdos*, or special idea of chair and table (Tr. 286; 597 A); this power belongs to deity alone (ib.). Deity, couch-maker, and painter are three orders of creative agents; the first makes only what is essentially "couch," the second makes many couches, and the third imitates only the things of which the two former were artificers (Tr. 286, 287; 597 B, C, D, E). The imitator is therefore third in order, and such is the poet (ib.). The painter neither imitates the absolute pattern nor the concrete reality, but only the latter as seen by the laws of perspective, and entirely ignorant of its true material nature (Tr. 287; 598 A, B); but still

he can deceive children and ignorant persons (Tr. 287; 598 C); remarks on the folly of listening to the exaggerated praise of mountebanks, who cannot distinguish between knowledge and ignorance, truth and its imitations (Tr. 287, 288; 598 D); we are told that Homer and the poets know all arts, and how it stands with human nature as to virtue and vice, things terrestrial and divine (Tr. 288; 598 E); a good poet, as imitator, should know what he writes about (ib.); do those who praise him discern whether he speaks the truth or merely composes phantasies? (Tr. 288; 599 A); is it the main object of life to execute imaginary representations? (ib.); one who is skilled in truth will be more solicitous for deeds than for imitations (Tr. 288; 599 B); we will not ask Homer or other poets what persons they restored to health or what disciples of physic they left behind them, as this might be pressing them too hardly; but what state was ever bettered by their depicting of ennobling events? (Tr. 288, 289; 599 C, D, E); Italy and Sicily say that they were bettered by Charondas, and we by Solon; but who names Homer and his fellows amongst even the Homeridæ themselves? (Tr. 289; 599 E); what battle was ever fought under Homer as leader or counsellor? (Tr. 289; 600 A); what deeds has he done like Thales the Milesian, or Anacharsis the Scythian? what course of life styled Homeric, after the manner of the Pythagorean, has been handed down to posterity? (Tr. 289; 600 B); he was not even valued when alive (ib.); Homer would have had followers like Protagoras of Abdera, or Prodicus of Ceos, had he been able to make men better (Tr. 289, 290; 600 C); would have created a *furor* and been carried on men's heads, and not suffered to be a wandering rhapsodist, but rather richly portioned to stay at home (Tr. 290; 600 D, E). Since Homer's time all the writers of poetry have been imitators of the virtue of images (ib.); the painter imitates by colours and forms, the verse-maker colours by verbs and nouns (Tr. 290; 601 A); measure, and rhythm, and harmony give a charm to subjects or imitations otherwise worthless when stripped of the colours of music (Tr. 290, 291; 601 B); the imitator is the maker of an image, and knows only the phænomenal; but neither painter nor manufacturer knows the use of things, which is reserved for him alone who uses them (Tr. 291; 601 C); in every case there is the use, construction, and imitation, of which the first is the most important; for example, the flute-player controls the flute-maker, who must be guided by the former (Tr. 291; 601 D, E); but the imitator will neither know nor opine about the beauty or deformity of a thing (Tr. 291; 602 A); he imitates what pleases the crowd, not in earnest but in sport, and such is the writer of tragedy or the epic (Tr. 291, 292; 602 B).

The phenomenal must yield to the rationalizing or computative (Tr. 292; 602 C, D); hence imitation has a low aim and produces a corresponding result (Tr. 293; 603 B); not merely when it appeals to the eye, but to the ear (Tr. 293; 603 C); the wise and thoughtful man submits to the voice of reason and law, and represses strong outbursts of feeling in public, and this affords little handle for imitation; while the display of a temper so foreign to it is unsuited for theatrical representation (Tr. 293, 294; 603 D, E; 604 A, B, C, D, E); the poet must exhibit passion, not quietude, if he is to be popular; he is nearly related to the painter in the way of comparison, and composes trumpery for truth. Besides this, he appeals to the passionate element in the soul, and not to the rational, and so betrays the more virtuous part of his citizens, making the rabble their masters (Tr. 294, 295; 605 A, B); he confounds the real sizes of objects and fabricates shadows destitute of truth (Tr. 295; 605 C); but one bad feature is the production of inconsistency, seeing we praise, in Homer and the tragic poets, those indications of passionate grief which, as private individuals, we aim to suppress (Tr. 295; 605 D, E); and yet something is to be said in behalf of our having such an outlet for the indulgence of grief in the case of other men's sufferings, though most persons overlook the fact that our own fortitude is thereby endangered (Tr. 295, 296; 606 A, B); the same is true in regard to laughter and comedy (Tr. 296; 606 C); moreover, poetic imitation waters the growth of the concupiscent feelings instead of drying them up (Tr. 296; 606 D); only the hymns and panegyrics of the gods ought to be received in the new state, which must be selected from the rest of Homer's poetry, while we admit his greatness as a poet, and politely assent to those who laud him; but, nevertheless, we must refuse to allow the entrance of the honied muse (Tr. 296, 297; 606 E; 607 A, B); there has been an old long-standing feud between poetry and philosophy (Tr. 297; 607 C); loving poetry for her charm, we would willingly lend attentive ear to any apology offered on her behalf, fond as we are of Homer (ib.); we would recall sentence of banishment, and bring her back from exile, listen attentively to all that can be said in arrest of judgment, assured that if we can be convinced we shall be the gainers (Tr. 297; 607 D); but not even this lingering fondness and passion for an old love must be allowed to seduce us, seeing that the whole question of virtue and righteousness is involved in the issue (Tr. 297, 298; 607 E; 608 A, B); imitation represents men as doing both enforced and voluntary actions (Tr. 293; 603 C), and supposing that in doing them they have done well or ill (ib.). There is a good deal more on imitation as practised by the sophist (Sophist, 234 B to 236 E;

also Sophist, 267 A to 268 B); imitation is generally falsehood or a source of false impression; primarily human art is imitative as compared with divine; imitation is also opposed to science (Tr. iii. 130 to 134, 183 to 186, 183, 184; Sophist, 267 A, B, E).

Imitators do not strictly copy nature (Tr. iii. 132; Sophist, 235 A); compared with sophists who deal in appearances and fancies difficult to get sight of (Tr. 132 to 134; 235 A to 236 E).

Immortality of the soul; what is ceaselessly moved is immortal. Life ends when motion is extinct, but the self-moving is the fountain and source of motion to all other things. The absolute beginning is unbegotten and incorruptible. The absolute self-moving is neither begotten nor destroyed, or with it all the motion in the universe must cease. The source of all activity is therefore immortal, and this is of the essence of soul, all motion derived from without being perishable (Tr. i. 321; Phædr. 245 B, C, D); immortality in this world is not to be desired (Tr. iv. 514; Epist. vii. 334 E); the soul is immortal (Tr. 514; 335 A), but we, as a compound of body and soul, are not (Tr. 514; 334 E); life is a sojourn in this world (Tr. vi. 42; Axioch. 365 B); dreadful to rot in the grave, the food of worms (Tr. 42; 365 C). Socrates tells his friend that he unreasonably couples the phænomena of sentiency with a state of insensibility (just, we might say, as the child may dread how he shall feel in his coffin) (Tr. 42; 365 D); the soul is immortal, only the dead clay rots (Tr. 43; 366 A), while the former exults in its kindred heaven and the exchange of evil for good (Tr. 43; 366 A); there are further reasons for the soul's immortality in the fact that it is more than a match for savage beasts, that it enables men to sail the seas, build towns, survey and measure the heavens, foretel eclipses, and fix future events by prediction (Tr. 51; 370 B, C); our fathers did not pray to have immortal, but good children (Tr. iv. 204, 205; Menex. 247 D); the effect of the doctrine of the soul's immortality should be to make us as good and wise as possible (Tr. i. 116; Phæd. 107 C); to the bad, extinction or annihilation must be regarded as a blessing (ib.); immortality and its attendant happiness (Tr. 29; Apol. 41 C); is asserted of what does not die (Tr. 114; Phæd. 105 E).

Immutability of moral distinctions; a fine passage (Tr. iii. 288; Cratyl. 386 D); applies also to actions (Tr. 288, 289; 386 E; 387 A); of essential being (Tr. i. 80, 81; Phæd. 78 D; Tr. iii. 152; Sophist, 248 A).

Impact of bodies spoken of, as well as the lubricating effect of fluids and the violent commotions of the air; *ὕγραίς τε δλισθήμασιν ὑδάτων εἶτε ζάλη πνευμάτων* (Tr. ii. 348; Tim. 43 C).

- Imports and exports are only to be such as are necessary, or do not impoverish a country (Tr. v. 345, 348, 350; Laws, 847 C; 849 B; 850 A; Tr. 459, 460; 915 D, E); where further rules about trading and credit are laid down, utterly at variance with our notions of free trade. Frankincense and purple stuffs are excepted from prohibition, as needed in the service of the gods, and not indigenous.
- Impossibility of error, lying, or false opinion, according to one of the sophists (Tr. iii. 71, 72; Euthyd. 287 A).
- Improvements, public, as to roads, fountains, culverts, drains, water-levels, &c. (Tr. v. 206 to 208; Laws, 761 A, B, C, D); improvement of oratory, by knowledge and practice, is on a par with what holds good in all other cases. If a man is naturally an orator, he will become pre-eminently such by science and exercise; but as an art it will not be best exemplified by following the path of Tisias and Thrasymachus (Tr. i. 348; Phædr. 269 D).
- Impure, the, cannot attain to the pure (Tr. i. 65; Phæd. 67 A); the impure soul will be shunned in Hades, and none will be willing to be its fellow-traveller or guide (Tr. 116, 117; 108 A, B); described as wandering about wholly perplexed (Tr. 117; 108 C); opposite in this respect to the fate of the good soul (ib.).
- Inadequacy of the materialistic explanation of the act of sitting (Tr. i. 105; Phæd. 99 A).
- Incantation and charms, used like the torpedo, to render a man helpless (Tr. iii. 17, 18; Meno. 80 A); torpedo again referred to (Tr. 25; 84 B; 84 C).
- Incomprehensibility and invisibility of deity, feigned by us, as an immortal animal (Tr. i. 322; Phædr. 246 A).
- Incorporeal, ordaining power as the *κόσμος*, about to rule beautifully; the body animated by soul is an appropriate image of the present reasoning. That with which we cannot combine the notion of truth can never be truly said to have, or to have had existence (Tr. iv. 103, 104; Phileb. 64 B); it has no image (Tr. iii. 235, 236; Statesm. 285 E); is expounded by words alone (ib.).
- Indestructibility of what is immortal (Tr. i. 114, 115; Phæd. 106 B, D, E).
- Indifference to pain and pleasure, something different both from joying and grieving (Tr. iv. 46; Phileb. 33 A); not godlike (Tr. 47; 33 B); contrasted with change from the normal state (Tr. 65; 43 C); the pleasantest of all states a negative one; truth of this questioned (Tr. 66; 43 D); similarity between not being pained and being joyous (Tr. 67; 44 A); persons in fever feel greater pleasure in the relief of thirst than those in health (Tr. 68; 45 B); greatest pleasures and pains occur in an evil condition of soul and body (Tr. 70;

45 E); pleasure of scratching (Tr. 70; 46 A); dying with pleasure (Tr. 72, 73; 47 B); rage, and terror, and envy, all pains of the soul, have their boundless gratification (Tr. 73, 74; 47 E); pleasure of tears at tragic representation, and mixed pain and pleasure at the witnessing comedy (Tr. 74; 48 A).

Indistinctness of ideas or impressions, the cause of false opinion (Tr. i. 435; Theæt. 195 A); things referred to the wrong pattern (ib.).

Individual is contemplated after considering the relation of a subject to the community (Tr. ii. 47, 48; Rep. 369 A); the individual, and also the state and community, are wise, courageous, and just in a similar way (Tr. 126, 127; 441 C, D).

Indulgence is virtue, according to Callicles (Tr. i. 191; Gorg. 492 D).

Inequality. Number, weight, and measure are the counters of justice (Tr. v. 200; Laws, 757 B); which distributes more to the more worthy, less to the less, according to the Scriptural case of "To him that hath shall be given" (Tr. 200; 757 C); equality of the lot (Tr. 201; 757 E).

Infamy, the road to it easy:—

"This law supreme the immortal gods have set,
That virtue can alone be reached by sweat;
Straight is the track, and rugged at the first,
Till up the hill your steps have climbed the worst;
Easy the rest, despite the toil and pain,
The cherished prize of conquest to obtain."

(Tr. v. 144; Laws, 718 D, E.) This is the *facilis descensus Averni*.

Infant, see description of (Tr. vi. 44; Axioch. 366 D); learns by suffering; "burnt child dreads the fire" (Tr. iii. 574; Symp. 222 B).

Inferior, ought not to pay court to superior, lest his motives should be misconstrued; it is different when the sovereign honours the philosopher, since he then merely courts philosophy itself (Tr. iv. 481, 482; Epist. ii. 312 C).

Infidelity is not to be punished, though we ought to think with the legislator on the subject of the beautiful and just (Tr. v. 414; Laws, 890 B, C, D).

Infinitude in things is baffling, and puts one out of rhythm and reckoning in thinking (Tr. iv. 18; Phileb. 17 D, E); it is of no use to grasp at it at once, we must first contemplate it, not as a unit or whole, but in particulars, and thus ascend through the many to the one (Tr. 18, 19; 18 A).

Influence of situation on climate and personal character, not to be forgotten; winds, heat, cold, a barren or productive soil, propitious climate, proximity to or distance from the sea, and the means of

foreign intercourse with guardianship of the gods—all exercise their modifying action (Tr. v. 188; Laws, 747 B, C, D).

Informers are cheap (Tr. i. 33; Crit. 45 A).

Initiated, only to listen (Tr. i. 386; Theæt. 155 E).

Initiation of the philosopher. After the close of this life and the passing of sentence by the judges, which dooms the one class of souls to a thousand years of punishment in the world below, and the other to a similar term of bliss in heaven, each class returns to make choice of a second life (*see* Fable of Er; Tr. ii. 304 to 306; Rep. 614 B to 616 A). But in this transmigration he who has never seen truth cannot again recover the human form (Tr. i. 324; Phædr. 249 A, B); only by the diligent use of reasoning on phænomena can his mind be quickened to the recollection of what it formerly knew, when it gazed only on true existence. The philosopher alone employs such reminiscence, and being initiated with 'perfect rites, becomes complete, attaches himself to deity, though regarded by the crowd as a madman (Tr. 325; 249 C, D).

Injured, to be, is more disgraceful naturally than to injure, though the latter is worse by law, according to the collocutor with Socrates (Tr. i. 180, 181; Gorg. 483 A); it is the lot of a slave (Tr. 181; 483 B); this is denied at length (Tr. 187; 489 B); elsewhere it is declared that it is to be regarded as an evil greater than the good arising from doing injustice (Tr. ii. 36; Rep. 358 E); 'it is further said, that where a man cannot avoid being injured in consequence of the want of physical power, he enters into compacts to defend himself against the stronger, and thus laws are enacted (Tr. 36; 359 A). He who is injured, or believes himself to be so, seeks to ally himself with the just, and will suffer, and endure, and die the life of a dog to set himself right (Tr. 125, 126; 440 D); a case of the emotions siding with the reason, and not the lower appetitive nature (*ib.*).

Injury of enemies, declared to be right; that it is not unjust or invidious to rejoice at the misfortunes of foes (Tr. iv. 77; Phileb. 49 D); laughter, which is a pleasurable feeling, may also be indulged at the ignorance or misconception of friends (Tr. 77, 78; 49 E; 50 A); prohibited even against enemies as making them worse in lieu of better (Tr. i. 39; Crito, 49 C, D).

Injustice, the triumph of it, seen in the case of the prosperity of old evil-doers, who leave a good name to children's children, leads to imputing blame to the gods (Tr. v. 433; Laws, 899 E; 900 A); injustice is the greatest of calamities to the doer rather than to the sufferer (Tr. i. 162; Gorg. 469 B, C); far preferable is it to suffer than to commit injury (Tr. 162, 163; 469 C); doing it is less an evil than the not being compelled to pay the penalty of it (Tr. 176, 177; 479 D); he

who commits it ought at once to fly to the judge and give himself up, as the sick man to his physician (Tr. 177, 211; 480 A, B; 508 E); even the avoidance of injustice done to him is not to be the chief aim of a man of understanding (Tr. 214; 511 B); the only subject for congratulation on his part is that he has not committed it (Tr. 227; 522 C, D); the penalty of injustice is, not the flogging or death which may be awarded for it, events that may befall those who are not unjust, but what is inevitable in the degradation of soul of the perpetrator and his future doom (Tr. 411, 412; Theæt. 176 D). In the counter argument injustice is praised as more virtuous and productive of felicity than moderation, seeing it results from strength and vigour as opposed to cowardice and feebleness (Tr. 190, 191; Gorg. 492 B, C); declared to be absolutely and wholly bad (Tr. 38; Crito, 49 A); quite independently of the judgment of the crowd (Tr. 38; 49 B); is in a word doing ill to men (Tr. 38, 39; 49 C); injustice domineers over the simple-hearted and just, whose happiness is sacrificed for its benefit (Tr. ii. 20; Rep. 343 C); is said by the correspondent to insure the utmost felicity to its perpetrator, provided it be carried out effectually to the fullest extreme (Tr. 21; 344 A); but when feebly carried out, only brings odium on the doer (Tr. 21; 344 B); true, he says, the name of thief and sacrilegious person is given to the partial wrong-doer, but the thorough-going plunderer is blessed (ib.); when men reproach injustice, it is not from dislike, but from the fear of being made themselves the subjects of it (Tr. 21; 344 C); the same respondent styles it more despotic and gentlemanly than righteousness (ib.); this is again asserted by Thrasymachus (Tr. 25, 26; 348 A, B, C); declared to be not moral perversion, but clever counselling (Tr. 26; 348 D); also virtue and wisdom (Tr. 26; 348 E); on the other hand, it produces rebellions, and hatreds, and factions among freemen and slaves (Tr. 28, 29; 351 D); between two persons, both possessed with it, causes hate; in one of two, destroys his power (Tr. 29, 30; 351 E; 352 A); is a vice of soul (353 E); to do it, said to be naturally good (Tr. 36; 358 E); its punishment in Hades, according to Musæus (Tr. 42; 363 C, D); sweet to the perpetrator, but disgraceful in opinion and by law (Tr. 43; 364 A); its consequences to be evaded by necromantic arts (Tr. 43; 364 B, C); blamed through want of manliness (Tr. 46; 366 D); its place in the state (Tr. 52; 372 A); will be found in any state founded contrary to the model one (Tr. 102, 103; 420 B); in what it differs from righteousness (Tr. 111; 427 D, E); is a rebellion or state of faction among the three departments of the soul, an officious meddling of the subordinate with the ruling part, that is, the appetitive with the rational (Tr. 129; 444 B); is intemperance, ignorance,

- cowardice, and baseness (Tr. 129; 444 B); can it be advantageous, even where it provokes no punishment? (Tr. 130; 445 A); it can never be advantageous, nor that the wrong-doer should escape punishment (Tr. 282; 591 A); he who escapes becomes more depraved (Tr. 282; 591 B); the unjust man can derive no good from the gods (Tr. 303; 613 B); he is like the runner in a race, who plunges off madly and sharply at first, and falls off with drooping ears at the last, and goes away uncrowned (Tr. 303, 304; 613 C); like badness and error, it is regarded as involuntary (Tr. iv. 468, 469; Cleit. 407 D); but this fact only proves that it must be guarded against with more care (ib.).
- Inkling, no, so to speak, *ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἄπτεται αὐτῆς ὁση ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπυρία* (Tr. iii. 413; Parm. 133 A).
- Innate ideas appear to be represented by *ἀληθεὺς δόξαι* (Tr. iii. 25, 28; Meno. 84 C, D; 86 A, B, C).
- Inner beauty, that of the mental consciousness (Tr. i. 360; Phædr. 279 C).
- Innovations on popular belief are dangerous; the lawgiver who possesses the smallest share of understanding will have a care that he does not; by introducing innovations in the popular worship, subvert his own state, nor will he prohibit what national usage has sanctioned (Tr. vi. 24; Epin. 985 D).
- Insensibility is inconsistent with perception (Tr. vi. 42; Axioch. 365 D).
- Insignificance of man at his birth (Tr. iv. 401; Theag. 121 B); when we were born, says the comic poet, none of the neighbours even knew it (Tr. iv. 343, 344; Alcib. I. 121 D).
- Inspiration, as opposed to expiration (Tr. ii. 392; Tim. 78 E); inspiration of the poets, and diviners, and madmen often referred to (Tr. iv. 295, 296; Ion, 534 A, B, C).
- Instability of mixed good and evil, and of the wholly bad (Tr. iii. 277, 278; Statesm. 309 E; 310 C).
- Intellect is a good, and not akin to pleasure (Tr. iv. 96; Phileb. 60 B); Philebus asserts that joy, pleasure, and gratification are good; but Socrates insists that intellect, thought, memory, right opinion are far superior to pleasure (Tr. 3; 11 B); the supposition of intellect wholly without pleasure, and the reverse, neither of which is good for us *per se* (Tr. 23, 24; 20 C; 20 E); would anyone elect a state of utter apathy? (Tr. 26; 21 E); it is most akin to the good, and what makes this mixed life in any way preferable (Tr. 27; 22 D); fused into intimate union with the best of the senses, is the safety of each (Tr. v. 534; Laws, 961 D).
- Intelligence, coupled with the chief organs of sense in the head (Tr. v. 534; Laws, 961 D); exists in the heavenly bodies (Tr. vi. 19 to

22; Epinon. 983 A, B, C, D, E; 984 A, B); intelligence and virtue the ruling principles in the Athenian constitution, which, popular in its character, excludes none from power on account of weakness, poverty, or obscurity of birth (Tr. iv. 191, 192; Menex. 238 D, E; 239, and following). Can pure intelligence cognise our concrete nature, or we things divine? (Tr. iii. 416; Parm. 134 D, E); does the soul exist after death, and has it intelligence? (Tr. i. 69; Phæd. 70 B, C).

Intelligent man ought to be chiefly earnest about the goodness of his son (Tr. iv. 411; Theag. 127 D).

Intelligible and visible are two fundamental ruling principles—the one in the domain of thought, the other in that of the sensuous (Tr. ii. 199; Rep. 509 D); if two lines be taken to represent these, and these be in turn bisected, we shall have for the first—

Pure ideas, not representable by

diagrams or hypotheses = *a priori*.

Hypotheses = *a posteriori*.

and for the second—

Things, plants, animals, around us = corporeal matter.

Images or resemblances = adumbrations or reflections.

Intemperance is to be shunned at our fullest speed (Tr. i. 210; Gorg. 507 D); how far allowable to men past middle age, and not on official duty (Tr. v. 64, 65; Laws, 666 A, B, C).

Intemperate man is depraved, and evil, and unhappy, in contrast with the moderate or temperate man (Tr. i. 210; Gorg. 507 C); he must be punished if he is ever to be rendered happy (Tr. 210; 507 D).

Interchange of offices in the state mischievous (Tr. ii. 118, 119; Rep. 434 C).

Intercourse of the sexes, how far enjoyable in old age, with the answer of Sophocles (Tr. ii. 4; Rep. 329 C).

Interest of money lent or allowed to remain unpaid, declared illegal (Tr. v. 180, 470, 471; Laws, 742 C; 921 D).

Intermediate, things which lie between good and evil (Tr. i. 160; Gorg. 467 E); are such as sometimes partake of the one and sometimes of the other (Tr. 161; 468 A); indifferent actions are done for the sake of the good (Tr. 161; 468 A); so, too, in the case of killing and robbing (Tr. 161; 468 B, C).

Intestacy, or the reverse; case of a man dying and leaving a will made *in articulo mortis*, when not in possession of his faculties (Tr. v. 471, 472; Laws, 922 B); of a man complaining that he may not leave his property as he likes, and to those who have shown their attachment to him in sickness and old age (Tr. 472; 922 D); it is

to meet this that the common law gives him the power of absolute disposal (Tr. 472, 473; 922 E); but this is not to be so in the Magnetic community, where a man's property is to be regarded as that of the state (Tr. 473; 923 A); the sick man is not to be wheedled into leaving his money to any sycophant who takes advantage of his feebleness and disease (Tr. 473; 923 B); further rules in case of intestacy (Tr. 476, 477; 924 E; 925 A, D); hardship of compelling the next of kin to marry by nearness of relationship, where disease or uncongeniality of temper might render it undesirable (Tr. 477; 925 E).

Intestines, their use in the system is to protract the process of digestion and extrusion, and to check the tendency to gormandizing or immoderate consumption of food (Tr. ii. 383, 384; Tim. 72 A).

Invasion of Greece by Persia described at length (Tr. v. 114, 115, 113; Laws, 699 A, B, C; 698 B, C, D, E), with references to Salamis and Marathon.

Invention not always beneficial; thus, that of letters by Theuth, though dictated by a benevolent motive, has taught men to trust to writing rather than to memory, to a process of outward suggestion, and not to a strengthened faculty within themselves (Tr. i. 354, 355; Phædr. 274 E; 275 A).

Invisible has no real existence in the minds of the multitude (Tr. i. 386; Theæt. 155 E); the soul is invisible, and if any part of this offered a lucid image meeting the eye, it would stimulate a passionate love, and of all other lovely things besides (Tr. 327; Phædr. 250 D; see also Tr. vi. 16, 17; Epinom. 981 B, C, D).

Involuntary character of wickedness asserted (Tr. v. 365; Laws, 860 D; Tr. iv. 468, 469; Cleit. 407 D); difference between voluntary and involuntary injury (Tr. v. 368, 390; Laws, 862 B; 874 E); the unjust man is to be pitied (Tr. 160; 731 D).

Ion. See Summary and Analysis, page 203.

Iris, the daughter of Thaumas (Tr. i. 385, 386; Theæt. 155 D).

Iron and adamant, words of (Tr. i. 211; Gorg. 508 E); the welding of iron known (iii. 185; Sophist, 267 E); different classes of, used by the smith (Tr. 294; Cratyl. 389 D); iron spoken of as softened in the fire (Tr. ii. 93; Rep. 411 A).

Irony of Socrates (Tr. iv. 291, 292, 308; Ion, 532 B, 541 E; Tr. 215, 216, 231, 234, 235, 258; Hipp. Maj. 283 B, 291 A, 292 C, 293 A, 304 C; Tr. 270, 275, 283; Hipp. Min. 368 B, C, D, E; 372 A; 376 C); unless we are to take some of these as bespeaking his real modesty (Tr. 407; Theag. 125 A); slightly indicated (Tr. i. 474, 476; Euthyp. 14 C, D; 15 E; Tr. iii. 12; Meno. 76 B; Tr. iv. 407, 408; Theag. 125 A, B, D); in connexion with quotation from Euripides (ib.;

also Tr. ii. 13; Rep. 337 A; Tr. iii. 564; Symp. 216 E; Tr. i. 187, 188, 153, 194; Gorg. 489 E; 481 B; 461 C, D; 495 D; Tr. iii. 284; Cratyl. 384 B. See Grote's Plato, ii. 429, and Art. Socrates. The Euthydemus is full of it.)

Irrefragable, the, takes the place of certainty, and it is our duty to trust our all upon it when having no better resource (Tr. i. 89; Phæd. 85 C, D).

Irrelevancy; if the pleader does not keep to the question at issue, the magistrate is to bring him back to the point from which he has wandered (Tr. v. 512; Laws, 949 B); not wandering wildly in a variety of aims (Tr. 535, 536; 962 D).

Isles of the Blest (Tr. iv. 185; Menex. 235 C; Tr. i. 227; Gorg. 523 A); guardians of (Tr. 227, 228, 231; 523 B, 524 A; 526 C; Tr. iii. 490; Symp. 179 E, 180 B; Tr. ii. 207, 208, 231; Rep. 519 C, 540 C).

Italy, bad and luxurious mode of life there and in Sicily (Tr. iv. 502; Epist. vii. 326 B); no man leading such a life could grow up intelligently. All such states will undergo perpetual tyrannic, oligarchic, or democratic changes, and never bear the name of a just and equal polity (Tr. 503; 326 C, D).

J.

Jingle bravely, a proverb (Tr. iii. 80; Euthyd. 293 C).

Judge not until you have heard both sides (Tr. vi. 113; Demod. 383 C; see also Euripides). How is it possible that if you cannot judge the truth when one man speaks you can do so when a second is introduced who opposes all that the other has said, seeing one only can speak the truth? (Tr. 114, 115; 383 D; 384 A, B).

Judges in the lower world (Tr. vi. 53, 54; Axioch. 371 C); of the dead, were living under the reign of Zeus, and judged badly on the very day of a man's death (Tr. i. 227, 228; Gorg. 523 B); this Zeus puts a stop to (Tr. 228; 523 C); they were stultified by false and specious witnesses (Tr. 228; 523 D); covered by a veil of flesh (ib.); they are stripped of their mortal coil in order to judge the pure soul divested of friends and ornaments (Tr. 228; 523 E). Minos and Rhadamanthus came from Asia, Æacus from Europe (ib.), and they hold their seat of judgment in the meadow whence lies one road to Tartarus and the other to the Isles of the Blessed (Tr. 228; 524 A); Æacus is appointed to judge souls from Europe (Tr. 228, 231; 524 A, 526 C; Tr. 28; Apol. 41 A); Minos to be chief referee (Tr. 228; 524 A); earthly judges are convinced entirely by facts really known to eye-witnesses (Tr. 443; Theæt. 201 C); judges should not be entreated but convinced (Tr. 23; Apol. 35 C); in

Hades the judgment is true (Tr. 28; 41 A); death will not be there awarded to Socrates as a punishment (Tr. 29; 41 C); the virtuous man does not need a sleepy judge to overlook the evidence of guilt (Tr. ii. 87; Rep. 405 C); good judges will not be found among the young, for having in youth no personal knowledge of evil, they are simple and easily imposed on, while able judges must have had time and opportunity to study badness in the souls of others (Tr. 91; 409 B).

Just, the, and good, are difficult to be distinguished, far more than the discrimination of gold and silver (Tr. i. 341; Phædr. 263 A); the just and pleasant—their being kept together is at least promotive of a holy life (Tr. v. 59, 60; Laws, 663 B); the just, τὸ δίκαιον, is, according to Thrasymachus, that which confers advantage on the stronger, by which reasoning ox-beef will be just and advantageous for persons of inferior strength (Tr. ii. 14, 15; Rep. 338 C); it is admitted to be what is advantageous, but not merely for the stronger (Tr. 15, 16; 339 B); advantageous to the stronger is explained as what seems so (Tr. 16, 17; 340 B); perversely defined as a foreign good, advantageous for the stronger and injurious to the weaker, but for the happiness of the former (Tr. 20; 343 C); Thrasymachus declares the just to be what is wrong (Tr. 26; 349 A); do the just live happier than the unjust? (Tr. 31; 352 D); doing the just is the same thing as righteousness, while the not doing it is injustice (Tr. 129, 130; 444 C); is health in the soul (ib.); the question is asked, whether it is advantageous to do the just, and to acquire beautiful habits and morals, if the fact is not observed? (Tr. 130; 445 A); ought we to tolerate living with souls diseased when mere bodily disease causes us to loathe life? (Tr. 130; 445 B); the just is only to be known through the longer circuit of the "good," in common with righteousness, wisdom, moderation, and courage (Tr. 193; 504 C, D, E; 505 A); the man who commends the just says what is true in the view of him who looks to pleasure, good esteem, or advantage (Tr. 280; 589 C); he who says the contrary blames without knowledge (ib.); legal institutes as to the just are beautiful where they subject the bestial part of his nature to the divine in man, and ugly where they enthral the tamer part of him to the more savage (Tr. 280, 281; 589 D); Socrates questions Alcibiades whether he, Alcibiades, has overlooked the fact of his not knowing what is more just and more unjust, or whether he, Socrates, has overlooked his having frequented the school of a master who has taught him to discriminate this, and to whom Socrates begs to be introduced by him (Tr. iv. 321; Alcib. I. 109 D); a similar use of *προξενέω* occurs (Tr. 149; Laches, 180 C).

Just man, is it the part of, to hurt any human being? (Tr. ii. 11; Rep.

335 B); either friend or foe? (Tr. 11; 335 D); he gets less than the unjust in mutual contracts between man and man, and pays a larger share of public taxes and imposts (Tr. 20; 343 D); he also gets less of the public spoil (ib.); he always has the worst of it in any public capacity, being neglectful of his own personal interests, and reaping the hate of his friends, whom he declines to serve by perpetrating injustice (Tr. 21; 343 E); much more serviceable to be unjust than just (Tr. 21; 344 A); it is asked, whether the just man wishes to have more than another just man, or than an unjust man? (Tr. 27; 349 B); but the unjust will desire to have more than both classes (Tr. 27; 349 D); according to the objector, the just man is unlike the good and wise (ib.); he only covets more than the man who is unlike (Tr. 28; 350 B); he is allied to the wise and good, and is what he resembles (Tr. 28; 350 C); will live virtuously (Tr. 31, 32; 353 E); is blessed, and has therefore more advantage than the unjust (Tr. 32; 354 A); the opponent asserts that he would act like the unjust if left to himself, and he was not in fear of being found out (Tr. 37; 359 C); neither the so-called just or unjust would stick to righteousness if he could put on the ring of Gyges, so as to be invisible at pleasure (Tr. 38; 360 B); with such a veil it would be folly not to do wrong (Tr. 38; 360 D); he dissimulates in public when exposed to observation and scrutiny (ib.); in order to test him thoroughly, he must be stripped of his reputation for righteousness, and be supposed to be unjust (Tr. 40; 361 C); his fate will be to be scourged, tortured, broken on the wheel, to have his eyes burnt out, to be impaled (Tr. 40; 361 E); what he asserts to be wanted is not that the man should be just, but only to seem to be so (ib.); a just man only enjoys the negative advantage of not being exposed to legal penalties, but must renounce all the gains of the unjust (Tr. 45, 46; 366 A); the parallelism of the just man with the just state (Tr. 127; 441 D); we seek the pattern of the just man and of righteousness, not because they are possible, but as an ideal standard (Tr. 158; 472 C, D); like the painter's ideal (ib.); resumption of the argument about the seemingly just but really unjust man (Tr. 279; 588 B); he, the really just, will not accept gold unjustly (Tr. 280, 281; 589 D), nor be bribed to enslave his godlike part, a far more utter destruction than the case of Eriphyle, who sacrificed her husband's life for an armlet, nor to subject a son or daughter to slavery for it (Tr. 281; 590 A); just men, like skilful runners, carry off all the prizes of life, both conferred by gods and men (Tr. 302 to 304; 612 B, 613 C); they attain all that was above claimed for unjust men, get rule in the state, marry where they please, and wed their children to whom they like (Tr. 304; 613 D); the just man injures no one,

either friend or foe, and this had been stated, not once or twice (Tr. iv. 472, 473; Cleit. 410 A); though Cleitophon declares that the opposite had been maintained by Socrates (ib.).

Justice does not exist in a state where violent partizanship is ever on the watch to take advantage of the opposite party (Tr. v. 138; Laws, 715 A); Nemesis, the angel of justice, watches over the honours of parents (Tr. 142; 717 D); the man who is unjust to his own soul suffers the penalty of becoming, like evil men, cut off from the good. Experience of this kind is not justice, which is fair in all its belongings (Tr. 155; 728 C). There being many noble qualities in the life of men, to most of them there are attached, as it were, deadly cankers which pollute and defile them; but how is not justice in a pre-eminent sense a thing of beauty, which has tamed all human asperities? (Tr. 496, 497; 937 D, E); justice of injuring enemies is spoken of, and of lying to deceive them (Tr. vi. 93, 94; Just. 374 C); the things of the soul are moderation, justice, manliness, readiness to receive instruction, memory, magnanimity, and so forth (Tr. iii. 31; Men. 88 A); Socrates asks, Does any one doubt the justice of punishment when deserved? (Tr. i. 465, 466; Euthyp. 8 B); and it is replied that evil-doers always strive to escape justice, though they deny the charge (Tr. 466; 8 C); does justice co-exist with holiness? (Tr. 471, 472; 12 D); if it is a part of it, it is necessary to find out what part (ib.); piety and justice a part of holiness—the one due to God, the rest to man (Tr. 472; 12 E); justice, moderation, holiness are parts of virtue (Tr. i. 257, 258, 253, 279, 290; Protag. 329 C, D; 324 E; 325 A; 349 B, C, D; 359, A, B, C); difference between these (Tr. 260; 331 C); justice being good and beautiful, he who suffers a painful infliction at its hands is benefited, and is more happy than the man who escapes (Tr. i. 172, 173; Gorg. 476 E; 477 A); its presence absolutely necessary to him who is blessed (Tr. 210; 507 D); the justice of Aristides (Tr. 230; 526 A); the practice of it best for us in life and in death (Tr. 232; 527 E); should be real and not apparent (Tr. 411; Theæt. 176 B); the *δέον*, *ωφέλιμον*, *λυσιτελοῦν*, *κερδαλέον*, *ξυμφέρον* are inadequate as explanations of it (Tr. ii. 12; Rep. 336 D); there is a half sentiment of it among thieves, who in this respect are *ἡμιμόχθηροι* (Tr. 30, 31; 352 C); it is what in all states is advantageous to the constitution of their government (Tr. 15; 339 A); it requires obedience to the laws, whether those laws be useful or injurious ones, and calculated to harm the stronger as well as the weaker (Tr. ii. 16; 339 D); until we know what justice is we can hardly say whether it is a virtue or a vice, or whether it makes its possessor happy or unhappy (Tr. 33; 354 C).

JUSTICE. See Summary and Analysis, page 242.

K.

Keel, laying the, of a ship, as a figure of laying the keel of the soul prior to its building up and being launched on the ocean of life (Tr. v. 274, 275; Laws, 803 A).

Killing, or loss of civic privilege, no evil but to him who causes it unjustly to another (Tr. i. 17, 18; Apol. 30 C, D),

King, the great, his soul arraigned before Rhadamanthus, seamed with scourge marks, full of wounds through perjuries and injustice, stained deeply and all awry (Tr. i. 229; Gorg. 524 E; 525 A); king, tyrant, and house administrator, all of one class (Tr. iii. 192, 193; Statesm. 259 A, C); king is not produced naturally as among bees (our queen bee)* (Tr. 262, 263; 301 E); he should be better than his laws (Tr. 249; 294 A, B); king and tyrant, statesman, steward, master, moderate and just man, confounded in one class, being all rulers in common (Tr. iv. 430; Rivals, 138 C; see above Tr. iii. 192, 193; Statesm. 259 A, C).

Kingly power, its duties (Tr. iii. 269, 270; Statesm. 305 D); the general's art one with it (Tr. iii. 76, 77, 78, 79; Euthyd. 290 B); source of happiness (ib.; 291 C); what it does (291 D, E; 292 A, B, C).

Kings, tyrants, and dynasts mostly, are tortured in the other world (Tr. i. 230; Gorg. 525 D); kings in the perfect state, or model republic, to be the very best and most capable men in war and philosophy (Tr. ii. 232; Rep. 543 A); here put without any restriction.

Know, we do not, sufficiently what the good is (Tr. ii. 193; Rep. 505 A); Socrates, when asked whether the good is science, or knowledge, or pleasure, replies by questioning, whether it is right for one who does not know to speak as if he did (Tr. 195; 506 C); he can only say what he opines, which is worthless in comparison with knowledge or science, and at best a blind process, though elsewhere he assigns a higher value to $\delta\rho\theta\eta\ \delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ and $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\eta\varsigma\ \delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$; did those who are described as differing from one another in the Iliad and Odyssey know about what they squabbled? (Tr. iv. 326; Alcib. I. 112 D); Alcibiades spoken of as not knowing what he talked about before the Ecclesia (113 B); must not those who teach first know

* This idea of the bees being governed by a king retained its place in Shakespeare's time—

“They have a king, and officers of sorts.”

“Others like soldiers armed in their stings
Make boot upon the summer's velvet buds;
Which pillage they, with merry march, bring home
To the tent royal of their emperor:
Who busied in his majesty surveys
The singing masons building roofs of gold.”

King Henry V., act i. sc. 2.

what they are to teach? (Tr. 325; 111 A); you ought to know everything to the utmost of your power (Tr. 554; Epist. xiii. 362 D); what we know we can explain (Tr. 163; Lach. 190 B); but just afterwards this is contradicted (Tr. iv. 169; 194 B).

Knowing, and not merely believing (Tr. iii. 475, 476; Symp. 173 D); or thinking (Tr. ii. 23; Rep. 345 E); how promoted by discussion or pleading (Tr. vi. 112; Demod. 383 C); not knowing what to seek for, how does a man know that a particular fact is what he does not know? (Tr. 18, 19; Meno. 80 D); a questionable argument that a man should neither seek what he knows or does not, for the former is superfluous and the latter he does not know how to get at, being ignorant of it (Tr. 19; 80 E); knowing is remembering (Tr. 20; 81 C, D, E; 82 A, and following).

Knowledge, test of it; how are we to know when truth is spoken? Tell how many teeth Euthydemus has (Tr. iii. 82; Euthyd. 294 C); has universal knowledge been possessed from infancy? (Tr. 83; 295 A); and is it eternal? (ib.); this is asserted (Tr. 85; 296 D); what is well decided on is decided on by knowledge, not by numbers (Tr. iv. 155; Laches, 184 E); takes the place of money, the more scientific being the more rich (Tr. vi. 76, 77; Eryx. 402 E; 403 A); all knowledge apart from justice and the other virtues appears as craft, not wisdom (Tr. iv. 203; Menex. 246 C); knowledge of the abstract and immutable is the best, that which is exercised about being (Tr. iv. 92, 93; Phileb. 58 A); the omnipotence of knowledge (Tr. i. 288, 289; Protag. 357 C, D); the use of it in oratory (Tr. 348, 349; Phædr. 269 D, E; Tr. 350, 351; 271 C, D); necessity of it for counselling well (Tr. 312; 237 C); for speaking well (Tr. 337; 259 E; 260 A); for enabling the orator to shift his ground (Tr. 340; 262 B); knowledge is remembrance (Tr. iii. 19 to 28; Meno. 81 to 86 A throughout). Knowledge of good and evil and of self is wisdom (Tr. iv. 429; Rivals, 138 A), and is the same with righteousness or justice (ib.); knowledge or science is nothing but perception (Tr. i. 392; Theæt. 160 D); what a man does not see he has no knowledge of (Tr. 397; 164 B); open to the objection that he does not know what he remembers (ib.); knowledge of our true character is true wisdom and virtue (Tr. 411; Theæt. 176 C); other knowledge is despicable or sordid (ib.); can the highest or ultimate knowledge cognise human thoughts, or we things divine? (Tr. iii. 415, 416; Parm. 134 D); is difficult of attainment in the present life (Tr. i. 89; Phæd. 85 C); in the absence of it we ought to lay hold of what is most akin to it (ib.); knowledge has to do with the existent, essence or *ens*, while ignorance deals with the non-existent, opinion being intermediate (Tr. ii. 163 to 166; Rep. 476 D to 478 D); the know-

ledge of what we are is of manifest use (Tr. iv. 467, 468; Cleit. 407 A); self-knowledge is declared to be one with moderation or temperance, while other knowledge is the knowledge of something else than of itself; this moderation is that of itself as well as of other things (Tr. iv. 130, 131; Charm. 166 B, E); but how are we to have a knowledge of what we do not know? (Tr. 135, 142, 143; 169 D; 175 B)

L.

Labyrinth, referred to, where he says, "We were utterly ridiculous; like boys running after larks, we were always supposing that we should immediately catch each of the sciences, but these were always slipping from us. But why should I go through the many tedious details? When we got to the kingly art and pried into it, whether it is this self-same art that effects and produces happiness, there, falling into a labyrinth, as it were, and fancying we were got to the end, we had to turn about again as at the outset of the inquiry, and appeared to be and to lack the equal, just as much as when we first set out (Tr. iii. 77, 78; Euthyd. 291 B, C).

Lacedæmon, its great riches, gold always flowing in but not out (Tr. iv. 346; Alcib. I. 122 E); referred to (Tr. iv. 216, 217; Hipp. Maj. 283 E; 284 B).

Lacedæmonians, though they admired the discourses of Hippias, cared not to pay for them (Tr. iv. 216 to 220; Hipp. Maj. 283 B to 286 A); generous conduct of the Athenian troops to the Lacedæmonians in Sphagia (Tr. iv. 196; Menex. 242 C); the gods are represented as preferring the εὐφημία of the Lacedæmonians, their simple unsophisticated addresses preferable to the elaborate and blasphemously audacious service of the other Greeks (Tr. iv. 394, 395; Alcib. II. 148 D, E; 149 A; 149 B); not drunkards or revellers (Tr. 460, 461; Minoes, 320 A); referred to (Tr. 216 to 220; Hipp. Maj. 283 D; 284 B, C, E; 285 B; 286 A). There is a glowing description of the wealth and exalted qualities of the Lacedæmonians as well as Persians, with a view to lower the pretensions of Alcibiades, in the first dialogue of that name (Tr. iv. 345; 122 C).

LACHES. See Summary, page 192.

Laconian brevity displayed wisdom in short sentences, which were dedicated as the first-fruits of wisdom at Delphi, such as γνῶθι σαυτόν, μηδὲν ἄγαν (Tr. i. 273; Protag. 343 A, B); Laconian dogs (Tr. iii. 404; Parm. 128 C).

Ladies' dresses, their length and quality (Tr. iv. 555; Epis. xiii. 363 A).

Lamentation, excessive, for the dead forbidden (Tr. iv. 205, 206; Menex. 248 B).

- Lamentations** for deceased friends to be expunged from poetry (Tr. ii. 67; Rep. 388 A); danger to youth of imitating these fussy exaggerations about small troubles (Tr. 68; 388 D).
- Landscape**, easier to paint than portraits (Tr. ii. 414; Critias, 107 D); as to distant and not clearly discerned objects we are said to use *σκιαγραφία δὲ ἀσαφεὶ καὶ ἀπατηλῷ χρώμεθα περὶ αὐτά* (Tr. 414; 107 C).
- Language**, written, only puts us in remembrance; its creations stand out as if alive, but observe an awful silence, only intimating one and the same thing (Tr. i. 257; Protag. 329 A; Tr. 355, 356; Phædr. 275 D, E); but what of the utterance written in the soul by knowledge? (Tr. 356; 276 A); he who possesses the knowledge of the Just and Beautiful and Good will be on a par with the agriculturist and his seeds; he will not sow in water with pen and ink, but will write his characters in the gardens of the soul, treasuring written discourse only as a reminder against forgetfulness in old age (Tr. 356, 357; 276 B, C, D); the elements of language are few (Tr. ii. 84; Rep. 402 A, B); but must be known by grammarians and in the alphabet (ib.).
- Larks**, the catching of, spoken of, much as we should of putting salt on birds' tails (Tr. iii. 77; Euthyd. 291 B).
- Laughable orators**, philosophers engaged in law-suits or courts of law are so called (Tr. i. 407; Theæt. 172 C, D); plight of the philosopher (174 C, D); and more laughable plight of the clever man of the world before a higher tribunal in the next (Tr. 410; 175 C, D); his turning giddy and becoming the laughing-stock of Thracian damsels and all who have any sense (ib.; Tr. 411; 175 E).
- Laughed at**, the being, is mere child's play to the man of understanding; what he dreads is the missing of truth (Tr. ii. 134; Rep. 451 A).
- Laughing at truth** is not confuting it, nor is it evidence (Tr. i. 168; Gorg. 473 D, E); the being made a laughing-stock not a matter of any grave importance (Tr. i. 459; Euthyp. 3 C).
- Laughter**, spoken of as a pleasure (Tr. iv. 77, 78; Phileb. 50 A); is not becoming when violent, being accompanied with strong reaction (Tr. ii. 68; Rep. 388 E); poets ought not to represent gods or men as the subjects of it to a violent degree (Tr. 68; 389 A).
- Law**, its omnipotence; destruction is preparing for the state in which the law is overruled, but where it is absolute there is safety and all blessings (Tr. v. 138, 139; Laws, 715 D); what it is described (Tr. iv. 449, 450; Min. 313 A, B, C); the art by which legislation is embraced consists in dogmas and decrees (Tr. 450; 314 A, B); law termed a political opinion (Tr. 451; 314 C, D); law is not a

bad dogma (Tr. 451, 452; 314 E); it is a discovery of fact (Tr. 452; 315 A, B); is different in different places (Tr. 453; 315 C, D); has been settled by wise and able men (Tr. 456; 317 A); the law respects what is just (Tr. 456, 457; 317 C); that which is right is the royal law; what is not, but seems so to the ignorant, is lawlessness (ib.); he who is the most under law is the best legal disposer (Tr. 457; 317 D, E); the makers of law are shepherds (Tr. 462, 463; 321 C); the defects of law spoken of (Tr. iii. 249; Statesm. 294 A, B); its partial injustice (Tr. 250; 294 A, B, C, D); looks not to and takes no account of individual inability (Tr. 250; 294 E); it legislates for the many (Tr. 250, 251; 294 E; 295 A); partial evil of (Tr. 251; 295 A); requires to be sometimes altered (Tr. 252; 295 C, E); occasional advantage arising from such modification (Tr. 253, 254; 296 D); said to be weaker than art (Tr. 254, 260, 261; 297 A; 300 D); there is nothing wiser than law (Tr. 259; 299 C); nor must it be ignorantly tampered with, nor altered (Tr. 261, 262; 300 E; 301 A, B, C).

Law of retaliation, *lex Talionis* (Tr. v. 378 to 388, 494, 495; Laws, 868 B to 873 E; 936 B).

Law-courts, their usages. The truth of facts not an object, but probability. The truth itself may sometimes be improbable, and it will not do to urge it (Tr. i. 352; Phædr. 272 D).

Law-pleadings, termed a race for life (Tr. i. 407; Theæt. 172 E); general descriptive sketch of the proceedings in the courts (Tr. 407; 172 D, E).

Laws, what they cannot accomplish; they cannot provide wholly for the altered circumstances of the future; much will have been omitted or overlooked in their first institution which will require correction (Tr. v. 220, 221; Laws, 769 D, E); laws should be made for victors as well as vanquished, and be observed by the conquerors themselves (Tr. iv. 517, 518; Epist. vii. 337 A, B, C); laws declared to be made by the weak for their own protection, and from fear of the strong. This is the sentiment expressed by Shakespeare:—

“Conscience is but a word that cowards use,
Devised at first to keep the strong in awe.”

Richard III., act v. sc. 3.

(Tr. i. 181; Gorg. 483 C); they are to be submitted to, even where we can easily run away from punishment (Tr. 39 40; Crito, 50 A, B); they have made a joint compact with those governed by them (Tr. 40; 50 C); they have given us birth and parents (Tr. 40; 50 D); there is no right of retaliation, of giving blow for blow, or railing for railing, as respects them, any more than against a

parent (Tr. 40; 50 E); obedience is more due to them than to parents (Tr. 41; 51 C); the Athenian citizen agrees to live under Athenian rule voluntarily (Tr. 41; 51 D); he who stops in the country consents to the laws (Tr. 41; 51 E); the compact with them must not be violated (Tr. 42, 43; 52 E); particularly by one, and for the sake of one, who is an old man of seventy (ib.); the objection would be the same elsewhere, at Thebes or Megara (Tr. 43; 53 B); it will be a great advantage in the other world that the laws have been duly regarded in this (Tr. 44; 54 B); human laws are the brethren of those in Hades (Tr. 44; 54 C); it is not the laws that are in fault, but those who dispense them unfairly (Tr. 44; 54 B); songs are laws (Tr. v. 268, 269; Laws, 799 E).

Laws of motion; there is a curious reference to the revolutions of a gyrating top, which may possibly contain the principle of the composition and resolution of forces. The transference is distinguished from the rotation round an immovable axis, and though the passage is obscure, one cannot help suspecting that the writer knew that a ball impinging on an elastic cushion, or itself elastic, would rebound at the angle of incidence. Such also seems to be Cousin's view. Aristotle was acquainted with the parallelogram of forces. (See also Tr. ii. 121; Rep. 436 C, D, E; Tr. v. 419, 420; Laws, 893 C, D).

Laws. See Summary, page 230.

Lays, or lyric poetry, are composed of three parts, verbal expression, harmony and rhythm, of which the two last are a fit sequel to the first (Tr. ii. 80; Rep. 398 D).

Learning may be regarded in the light of a trade, as well as an accomplishment (Tr. i. 240; Protag. 312 B); learning should last throughout life, according to the saying of Solon, and we should get rid of the notion that old age is sure to bring wisdom by itself (Tr. iv. 160, 161; Laches, 188 A, B); in learning an art, novices are not to attempt the higher branches at once; the potter's son or apprentice does not make his first trials upon the costly vase (Tr. i. 218; Gorg. 514 E); learning is reminiscence (Tr. 77; Phæd. 76 A); Athenian love of learning is due on the grand scale to the pursuit of it in the individual, the character of states being determined by that of its members (Tr. ii. 120; Rep. 436 A; 435 E).

Left hand, not to be caught with, said of that which is difficult to attain (Tr. iii. 118; Sophist, 226 A); why, it is asked, should there be any difference to us of right or left naturally as respects the hands, when there is none such as to the feet and legs. We have been each of us maimed as to our hands by the stupidity of nurses and mothers (Tr. v. 259; Laws, 794 D).

Legislation, ought it to regulate agreements, dealings in the market, matters of scandal and abuse, questions of taxes, and so forth (Tr. ii. 109; Rep. 425 E); good men have no need of legislation (ib.); more especially if the deity keeps the existing laws safe; otherwise men will always be patching them (ib.; also Tr. 110; 426 E); folly in legislation of having recourse to quack medicines, and of being angry with those who tell men that they will be incurable unless they leave off drinking and gormandizing (Tr. 109; 426 A); obsequiousness to legislators described (Tr. 110; 426 C, D).

Legislators, if they are always extolled, will they be to blame for a high opinion of their own merits, seeing that what everybody says will be held to be true (Tr. ii. 110; Rep. 426 D); uselessness of the true legislator attempting to alter certain laws (Tr. 110; 427 A); Apollo is the highest legislator and guide (Tr. 111; 427 B, C).

Leontius, graphic account of glutting his eyes on the dead criminals (Tr. ii. 125; Rep. 439 E).

Letters are more readily comprehended than syllables or words, and this contradicts the opinion that elements are not cognisable (Tr. i. 449, 450; Theæt. 206 B).

Lex Talionis. See Law of Retaliation.

Liberty, fostered at Athens, bore a striking contrast to the irresponsible power of the Persian monarchs. In olden time men did not stamp and whistle and express approval uproariously as now, but listened in silence, while for boys there was the rod. Now the theatres are tumultuous, and there is a theocracy in place of an aristocracy of criticism (Tr. v. 116, 117; Laws, 700 C, D, E; 701 A). Compare Tr. 53, 54; 658 E; 659 A, B, C, and the remarks of Lessing in his Dramaturgy on Voltaire's obeying the summons of the house to present himself.

Liberty and equality, description of, in Athens, as due to a popular aristocracy, where the people confer the chief power on the men who are wisest and most virtuous, and yield not to one another in equality except so far as intelligence is concerned (Tr. iv. 191, 193; Menex. 238 D, E; 240 A, &c.)

Lie is an imitation or representation in words of unmixed falseness in the soul (Tr. ii. 62; Rep. 382 B); a genuine lie is hated by gods and men (Tr. 63; 382 C); a verbal lie is sometimes allowable (ib.); its utility where it strives to embody descriptive truth (Tr. 63; 382 D); is hated by philosophers (Tr. 171; 485 C); the soul may hate a deliberate voluntary lie in itself or others, while it admits and sanctions a voluntary lie when it does not own and feel indignant at its own ignorance (Tr. 226; 535 E).

Life is more efficacious than doctrine, practice is more than profession

(Tr. iv. 161; Laches, 188 C, D, E); intolerable if held on the tenure of cowardice (Tr. iv. 331, 332; Alcib. I. 115 D); is beset with difficulties from the cradle to the grave (Tr. vi. 4, 44, 45; Epin. 973 C, D; Axioch. 366 D, E; 367 A, B); is a sojourn, and when nobly spent is a ground for exultation at its close (Tr. 40; 364 B, C); a life of entire pleasure, would you think this desirable *per se* without memory or knowledge? (Tr. iv. 24, 25; Phileb. 21 A, C); without the joys of imagination or taste, and as a mere breathing viscus or mollusc? (ib.; Tr. 25, 26; 21 D); is passing through life without pain a condition of the highest pleasure? (Tr. 66; 43 D); life in plants is preserved with difficulty (Tr. 401, 402, 403; Theag. 121 B; 122 A, B, C, D); the saving of a man's life is not a benefit to him necessarily (Tr. i. 215; Gorg. 512 A); life is worthless, if Socrates repudiates all he has said about righteousness, virtue, and legality (Tr. 43; Crito, 53 C); melancholy picture of an old man preferring life to dishonour (Tr. 43; 53 D); will a man's children be less taken care of when he is dead than when he is banished? (Tr. 44; 54 A); life in the other world is prejudiced by disobedience to the laws in this (Tr. 44; 54 B, C); a life which gives birth to death and *vice versa* (Tr. 70 to 72; Phæd. 70 E to 72 C); life spoken of as insufficient for the discussion of some particular subjects or arguments (Tr. i. 117; 108 D).

Like and same are attributes of the divine (Tr. iii. 210, 211; Statesm. 269 E; 270 A; Tr. 152; Sophist, 248 A); is friendly to like (Tr. i. 495; Lysis, 214 A, B); not so with the wicked (Tr. 495; 214 C); and the good man is self-sufficient (Tr. 496; 215 A); like hostile to like (Tr. 497; 215 C).

Likeness of deity, we ought to strive to attain it (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 B); consists in our being just, holy, and intelligent (ib.).

Likeness, as a portrait, Socrates thinks that his dandified interlocutor wishes a sketch of himself (Tr. iii. 18; Meno. 80 C).

Limit, its nature; is an edge or boundary (Tr. iii. 9, 10; Meno. 75 B, D).

Limited and unlimited (Tr. iv. 30, 36, 41; Phileb. 24 A; 27 C; 30 B); the limited or bounded is that which admits of equality, measure, equimultiple or submultiple and number (Tr. 31, 36, 41; 25 B and 27 C; 30 B).

Lion, to shave a, said as a proverbial expression, like our bearding a lion (Tr. ii. 18; Rep. 341 C).

Liquefaction explained (Tr. ii. 370; Tim. 60 E).

Little and good is better than what is much and indifferent (Tr. iv. 83, 93; Phileb. 53 B; 58 C); this is true as applied to white and to colour generally (ib.); little and good is preferable to much that is imperfect (Tr. i. 425; Theæt. 187 E).

- Liver**, its divining faculty reflecting images from its glossy dark surface (Tr. ii. 382, 383; Tim. 70 D; 71 E); this is revealed to our consciousness during sleep, and it can be in no other way if it loses this power after death.
- Living persons** not to be praised in odes; this may be lawful for those who have attained the end of life, when they have brought it to an honourable close (Tr. v. 272, 273; Laws, 801 E; 802 A); living well is of far higher value than merely living (Tr. i. 37; Crito, 48 B); living as near to death as possible commended (Tr. 66; Phæd. 67 D, E).
- Λόγος**, its meaning (Tr. i. 450; Theæt. 206 C); is threefold (ib.); utterance, order of arrangement of the parts of a whole, power of assigning *differentia* (Tr. 455; 210 B, and preceding).
- Long life**, not the chief aim of a man of understanding (Tr. i. 214 to 216; Gorg. 511 B, 512 E).
- Long rounded periods**, not so far objectionable, unless it can be shown that shorter ones would have rendered the listeners more thoroughly masters of the argument (Tr. iii. 237; Statesm. 286 E).
- Long speeches** of Protagoras complained of by Socrates, who demands short, sharp, quick replies. He is asked to concede somewhat, while Protagoras is not to strain every rope and fly out of sight of shore into a sea of words (Tr. i. 266 to 268, 256; Protag. 335 D; 337 C, E; 328 A). Before the dialogue concludes, Socrates forgets his own rule.
- as opposed to question and answer, are alluded to (Tr. iii. 104, 117, 185; Sophist, 217 C; 225 B; 268 B). Socrates elsewhere declares his inability to make long harangues (Tr. iv. 314; Alcib. I. 106 A), or to listen to them (Tr. 276, 277; Hipp. Min. 373 A). See also on the futility of long answer and reply, Tr. 453; Min. 315 E; see further on, prolixity, and the limitations it needs, Tr. iii. 236, 237; Statesm. 286 B, C, D, E; 287 A.
- Look out**, commanding an extensive view, like a watch tower (Tr. ii. 130, 131; Rep. 445 C).
- Loom**, and instruments for weaving, casually referred to (Tr. i. 487, 488; Lysis, 208 A, B, C, D, E).
- Loss and gain**, spoken of ambiguously, are those greedy of lucre so, knowing it to be of no worth or ignorant? (Tr. iv. 435; Hipparch. 225 A); the interlocutor declares the lovers of gain to be rogues and pickpockets, but Socrates thinks that men cheat themselves with what is cheap and nasty through not knowing better (Tr. 435; 225 B); the greedy of gain desire, through insatiable avarice, things of no value (Tr. 437; 226 D); but ignorantly (Tr. 437; 226 E); gain, according to Socrates, is a good (Tr. 438; 227 A); applicable

to all men, that they are greedy (Tr. 438; 227 C); that man is a slave of Mammon who makes gain from that which honourable persons would not touch (Tr. 439; 227 D); are men injured by gain or by loss? (Tr. 439; 227 E); by both (*ib.*); is any good thing an evil? (*ib.*); but gain is contrary to loss, which is an evil (Tr. 439; 228 A). The question is left unsettled, or in a contradictory phase.

Lotus-eaters (Tr. ii. 249, 250; Rep. 560 C, D, E).

Love, its blindness as to the thing loved, discerning but indifferently the just, the good, and the fair (Tr. v. 160; Laws, 731 E); excessive self-love is the source of all the faults of men (*ib.*); we ought to love not ourselves or what appertains to us, but what is just, whether done by oneself or preferably by another (Tr. 161; 732 A); selfishness described (Tr. 227; 773 B, C); yet he speaks of life as that in each man's case which is nearest and dearest to him, and which must not be taken by his own hand (Tr. 387, 388; 873 C).

Love for children is consistent with our laying on them many restraints (Tr. i. 487, 488; Lys. 207 E; 208 A, B, C, D, E); unless both love, neither is a friend, according to one view (Tr. 493; 212 D); it is necessary to love what is naturally allied to us (Tr. 506; 222 A).

Love affairs, the skill of Socrates in them asserted by himself, that on this subject he is a match for any man past or present (Tr. iv. 412; Theag. 128 A); this statement is repeated (Tr. iii. 485, 486; Symp. 177 E), and withdrawn after Agathon's speech (Tr. 525; 198 D). See also Tr. 555, 563; 212 B; 216 C; Tr. i. 302, 333, 482, 483; Phædr. 227 E; 257 A; Lys. 204 B; which last five references I have added from Grote.

Love, when it is virtuous, is preferable to family relationships, wealth, or honours (Tr. iii. 487, 488; Symp. 178 C); it produces modesty and honourable ambition, without which nothing great is achieved (*ib.*); a state should be composed of lovers and loved (Tr. 488; 178 D, E), who, though few in number, would, by their union and energy, conquer all men (Tr. 489; 179 A); the cases of Alcestis, Orpheus, and Achilles (Tr. 489, 490; 179 B, C, D, E); Love is the oldest, most honourable, and powerful of the gods (Tr. 490; 180 B); all love is not worthy of praise, but loving nobly (Tr. 491; 181 A); love as Aphrodite, vulgar and trivial (Tr. 492; 181 B); is a passion for the bodies, not the souls of the objects loved (*ib.*); vulgar or sensual love is under the tutelage of a younger goddess, who is a female; the celestial or higher love being masculine and stronger and more powerful in intellect (Tr. 492; 181 C); is not permitted to persons of unformed character (Tr. 493; 181 E); vows of love are not binding (Tr. 496; 183 B, C); the love of the goddess Urania

contributes to virtue in the lover and in the loved (Tr. 499; 185 B); its two-fold nature accepted by Euryximachus, and made the basis of a physical theory (Tr. 500; 186 A, B); its wide influence in human and divine affairs (Tr. 501; 186 A); impletion and depletion of body, or of love invoking the co-operation of its opposite, is exemplified in physic (Tr. 501; 186 B, C); is the concord of sharp and grave in music (Tr. 503; 187 A, C); in the case of the seasons it is love that makes them fruitful (Tr. 505; 188 A); the contrary case alluded to (Tr. 506; 188 C); sacrifices and divinations have to do with it (ib.); impiety results from its non-gratification when well ordered (ib.); its universally beneficent influence (Tr. 506; 188 D); its influence is mightiest when good is its object, and it is perfected with moderation and righteousness (ib.); men have not sufficiently raised altars and temples to this most philanthropic of the gods (Tr. 507, 508; 189 A, B, C, D); what he is in himself, not in his gifts (Tr. 518; 194 E; 195 A); he is the happiest, most beautiful, best, and youngest of the gods (ib.); he flies from and hates old age (Tr. 519; 195 B, C); is not more ancient than Cronus (ib.); this supposition of great antiquity applies to Necessity, not to Love (ib.); he requires a Homer to sing his praises (Tr. 520; 195 D); he dwells among the softest things, and in the well-affected souls of gods and men (Tr. 520; 195 E); he is supple and impalpable (Tr. 520; 196 A); he wages internecine war with slovenliness and inelegance, while his food is flowers, and his resting-place as well (Tr. 521; 196 B); he inflicts no harm, "worketh no ill to his neighbour," partakes of the utmost moderation, and subdues pleasures and lusts (Tr. 521; 196 C); he surpasses Arès in courage (Tr. 522; 196 D); is possessed of wisdom, and is a wise poet (Tr. 522; 196 E), as well as makes others such (ib.); he has displayed his wisdom in making all animals and in rendering men skilful (Tr. 522; 197 A); Apollo, the Muses, Hephæstus, Athene, Zeus, are all inspired by Love (Tr. 523; 197 B); he does not dwell with ugliness (ib.); he is most beautiful and best, and the cause of these qualities in others (Tr. 523; 197 C); he is the source of festivity and gentleness, is steersman, soldier, supporter, saviour, and ornament of gods and men (Tr. 524; 197 D, E); an account is given of the applause which followed on the conclusion of Agathon's panegyric (Tr. 525; 198 A); the truth of this encomiastic exhibition of the dramatic poet is impugned by Socrates (Tr. 526, 527; 198 B, C, D, E; 199 A, B); he asks what is love the love of (Tr. 528; 199 D); does it love what it does not possess? (Tr. 528 to 530; 200 A, B, C, D, E; 201 A); he states, as a dilemma, that if love is a love of beauty, it must be because it does not possess it, or why should it

long for what it already has? (Tr. 530; 201 B); nor can it possess goodness if it seeks goodness, for the same reason (Tr. 531; 201 C); the fable of Diotima, in which love is declared to be not beautiful nor good, any more than the opposite (Tr. 532, 533; 201 E; 202 A, B); if love desires the good and beautiful, how can it be portionless of them? (Tr. 533; 202 D); Love is asserted to be a great dæmon and interpreting power between gods and men, by bearing their prayers to heaven, and bringing down heaven's blessings to men (Tr. 534; 202 E); it lies at the basis of priesthood, vaticination, and witchcraft (ib.); the deity mixes with men only through the dæmons, of whom Love is one (Tr. 534; 203 A). Love is a son of Plenty and Poverty, poor and not beautiful, nor delicate (Tr. 535; 203 B C); he is rough, sunburnt, unshod, homeless, the bare ground his bed, and the sky his canopy (Tr. 536; 203 D); he is always a plotter, intriguer, philosophizer, quack and sophist (ib.); he lives and dies in the same day (Tr. 536; 203 E); he is always leaking out, and in a muddle half way between wisdom and folly (ib.); it is asked, What are the uses of love to men? (Tr. 537; 204 D); the reply is, that they love the beautiful in order that it may be theirs (Tr. 538; 205 A), and for the sake of happiness, though all do not love (Tr. 539; 205 B, D); love is the desire of engendering in a beautiful thing, whether body or soul (Tr. 540; 206 B); has an intense repulsion to the ugly (Tr. 541; 206 D); this love of engendering in the beautiful is explained as proving the desire of immortality (Tr. 542, 543; 206 E; 207 A, B); how is this applicable in the case of the brute creation? (ib.); this generating is the only method of providing for perpetuity and immortality (Tr. 543; 207 C); the love of undying reputation is stronger than that of children or even life (Tr. 545; 208 C); it is this aspiration which explains the love of Alcestis, Achilles, and Codrus (Tr. 546; 208 D); women are loved for the sake of immortality (Tr. 546; 208 E); the love existing between souls is the love of that with which they ought to teem and be impregnate (Tr. 547; 209 A); parallel case of mental love for a noble, well-born, and graceful soul, begetting beautiful and immortal offspring (Tr. 548; 209 B, C); the full mysteries of this love are attained to, first, through access to beautiful bodies in youth (Tr. 549; 210 A); then by discovering that beauty in one body is the same as that in another; and then that there is an abstract species of the beautiful (Tr. 550; 210 B); the beauty of the soul is more priceless than that of the body, and is independent of corporeal bloom (ib.); there is beauty in the laws and customs of our country (Tr. 551; 210 C); then the wide ocean of beauty is spoken of (Tr. 552; 210 D), stimulating to the utter-

ance of high thoughts in a boundless philosophy, and culminating in the science of absolute beauty (Tr. 552; 210 D); this is the end of all erotics, a rise upwards through the beauty of nature to the ultimate source and ideal of all that is good and fair (ib.); that which is most deserving of love will be the most beautiful (Tr. ii. 84, 85; Rep. 402 D); this love does not exist amongst those who are discordant in soul (ib.), but mere bodily defect does not necessarily impair it (ib.); true love springs from loving moderately and musically what is orderly and beautiful (Tr. 85; 403 A); there is nothing in it which partakes of or admits excess (ib.). The madness of love is dwelt on as ending in ecstatic enjoyment of the object of passion, and though it is second in degree in the case of the philotimic temper of soul, and falls short of the philosophical standard, it has no small reward, certainly far beyond its desert. The passage runs thus: "These two, then, are dear to each other, yet less than those before described, but pass their time during their period of mutual love, and when the storm of passion has passed, in the belief that they have given to and received the most solemn assurances from one another, such as can never by their being broken admit of their coming to enmity. At the last, though destitute of wings, but burning to burst into feather, they quit the body, and thus bear off no trivial prize of their erotic madness." And he then adds, as if in solemn eulogy of the departed: "For it is not appointed to those who have already set out on their subcelestial journey ever to pass into darkness, and to enter on a subterranean career, but to be in bliss and live a life bright and lustrous in each other's company, and when the time for it arrives, to become winged together for the sake of or by virtue of their love" (Tr. i. 333; Phædr. 256 D, E). True love is said to have no participation with excess (Tr. ii. 85; Rep. 403 A), and is to touch its object only as a son for the sake of beautiful consequences (Tr. 85; 403 B).

Loved and lover contrasted (Tr. i. 302, 303; Phædr. 228 D); the loved desired by the lover without reference to knowledge of temper or congeniality (Tr. 307; 232 E); lovers praise what you do and say contrary to what is best, swayed by unworthy motives (Tr. 307; 233 A). Phædrus, quoting Lysias, declares that if trusted he will not associate as a slave for present pleasure, but for future advantage and a long enduring friendship (Tr. 307; 233 B); the faults of a lover (Tr. 313, 314; 238 E); he is not a desirable protector (Tr. 314; 239 C); his selfishness and illiberality (Tr. 315; 239 E); his jealousy (ib.); disgust at having for a lover one who is an old man and ugly (Tr. 315; 240 D); it is to be expected that he will change his mind and ignore his oaths and protestations (Tr. 316; 241 A); the

necessity of a loved object abandoning himself to one who is faithless, harsh, envious, unpleasant, hurtful to his substance, hurtful to his body, but infinitely more hurtful to his soul's instruction, than which neither to men nor gods is there in truth anything more priceless (Tr. 316; 241 C. "As wolves love lambs so lovers, too, their loves," Il. xxii. 262). Socrates now recants his abuse of love, and exhibits the other side of the picture (Tr. 318; 243 A); description of one who is a bore, and will weary Socrates to death about the object of his passion if only long enough in his company; bad enough when he only talks about it, but when he writes verses about it or sings them in an impassioned strain, or mawkishly reiterates the name in his cups, more intolerable still (Tr. 483; Lys. 204 C, D). According to a certain reasoning, the lover is not the friend but the beloved, and the hated is the enemy not the hater. Many are loved by their enemies and hated by their friends (Tr. 493; Lys. 213 A); what is to be the conclusion? (Tr. 494; 213 B, C, and following).

Lover, said to be more divine than the loved, and more cherished by the gods, when the loved one fondles the lover, than in the reverse case (Tr. iii. 490; Symp. 180 B); the lover, when he is under the influence of a pure passion, attaches himself to intellectual objects (Tr. 493; 181 E); his oaths may be broken with impunity (Tr. 496; 183 B, C); a man is a bad man if he loves body rather than soul (Tr. 497; 183 E); he belies his assurances and promises when beauty takes to flight (ib.). Diotima supposes Socrates to think the object loved more lovely than he who loves (Tr. 537; 204 C); and through a mental confusion of this sort that beauty was attributed to love (ib.); a man should only consort with the object of his love for the sake of beautiful consequences, viz., those which spring from virtue and order (Tr. ii. 85; Rep. 403 B); if he oversteps this limit he is destitute of music and the sentiment of the beautiful (ib.); he must love not in part but in whole (Tr. 160; 474 C); the lover always praises a deformity in the beloved object with the affection felt for the person as a whole (Tr. 161; 474 D, E; 475 A); and in the same way, connoisseurs in wine, or persons fond of rank, will lay great stress on marks the most trifling (ib.).

Lucky falsehood; Socrates declares that it will be such if his declaration that he does not know where a teacher of virtue is to be met with is disproved by Menon and Gorgias (Tr. iii. 4, 5; Meno. 71 D).

Lucre, one who is greedy of (Tr. iv. 435, 440; Hipparch. 225 A to 228 and C).

Lungs, the physiology of (Tr. ii. 382; Tim. 70 C).

Lusts have an enslaving power; the avaricious man, poor in his soul, hears not warning, or if he hears, does so with ridicule, and impu-

dently seizes from on all sides, like a wild beast, what he thinks he can eat or drink, or contributes to an enslaving and joyless sensuality (Tr. iv. 515; Epist. vii. 335 B, C); lusts unchastised are an intolerable evil, and make a man lead a bandit's life (Tr. i. 210; Gorg. 507 D).

Luxurious feeding is allied to excess in the matter of harmonies in lyric poetry, and is injurious to moderation and health, just as elaborate rhythmic variety is injurious to the soul's moderation (Tr. ii. 87; Rep. 404 E); it contributes to the increase of litigation, and necessitates the establishment of courts of law and dispensaries for medicine (Tr. 87; 405 A).

Luxury, license and intemperance praised by Callicles (Tr. i. 190, 191; Gorg. 492 B, C); confer virtue and felicity (ib.); on the other hand, must be chastised (Tr. 210; 507 D).

Lyre, when broken, its divine harmony perishes; applied to disprove the soul's immortality by the interlocutor (Tr. 89, 90; Phæd. 86 A); lyre and harp are the favourite instruments of Apollo, and are said to be preferable to the pipe of Marsyas (Tr. ii. 81, 82; Rep. 399 E).

Lysias referred to (Tr. i. 301, 302, 303, 319, 335, 340, 342, 352; Phæd. 227 A, B, C, D; 228 A, E; 242 D; 243 D, E; 258 C, D; 262 C, D; 263 D *bis*; 272 C); is it to be thought that Phædrus could recall to mind what Lysias, the readiest of our modern writers, took a long time to compose at leisure? (Tr. 302; 228 A). Lysias would not have thought it enough to look to the rhetoric of a composition, merely to its turned and polished periods (Tr. 309; 234 E).

Lysis, loved by Hippothales (Tr. 483; Lys. 204 C).

Lysis. See Summary, page 96.

M.

Macrocosm is a type of the microcosm; does the universal fire depend on our human fire, or does ours spring from it? (Tr. iv. 39 to 41; Phileb. 29 C, D, E; 30 A, B).

Made-up speeches (Tr. iv. 187; Menex. 236 B).

Madman; are arms, though his own, to be given to him, or truth to be told him? (Tr. ii. 6, 7; Rep. 331 C).

Madness is declared to be superior to wisdom, inasmuch as what is divine transcends what is human (Tr. i. 320; Phædr. 244 B, C); the madness of the Muses is such, that the poetry of the madman surpasses that of the sober-minded (Tr. 321; 245 A); this *furor* is given by the gods as a mark of good fortune (Tr. 319, 321; 244 A; 245 B, C, D); is of two sorts, from divine impulse and from bodily disease (Tr. 343; 265 A); madness is allied to inspiration (Tr. ii

383; Tim. 71 E); but the power of expounding does not belong to the inspired madman (Tr. 384; 72 A); fools are mad (Tr. iv. 377, 378; Alcib. II. 139 C).

"And so with great imagination
Proper to madmen, led his powers to death,
And winking leaped into destruction."

SHAKESPEARE, 2 *Henry IV.*, act i. sc. 3.

Divine madness is coupled with human wisdom as conferring no greater good than the philosophic triumph over passion, while a secondary prize of madness is attributed to the philotimic temper of soul in connexion with unrestrained sensuality in the enjoyment of its object (Tr. i. 333; Phædr. 256 C, D). The last is erotic madness, and is allowed to recover its wings in another world, and to find a congenial heaven.

Magistrates, how to be chosen, and who (Tr. v. 190; Laws, 751 C, D); do those who are truly such assume office willingly? (Tr. ii. 23; Rep. 345 E); they do not desire to meddle with public matters unless it be for pay, or honour, or to avoid being fined for refusing (Tr. 24; 347 A); but for a really good man these considerations have little weight, and therefore he will decline to serve (Tr. 25; 347 A, B, C); they are compelled to accept office under the dread of penalties, the worst of which is the fear of having to be governed by others of inferior morality and ability (ib.).

Magnanimity as one of the virtues (Tr. iii. 31; Meno. 88 A).

Magnet, its power of making other bodies magnetic instanced by the long string of rings made to form a chain (Tr. iv. 294; 299; Ion, 533 D; 536 A; 535 E).

Magnetes, city of, the name given to the ideal or model state delineated in the Laws (Tr. v. 365, 467, 547; 860 E; 919 D; 969 A).

Magnificent sight is the man in whose soul beautiful morals exist, in true accordance with the highest exemplars (Tr. ii. 84, 85; Rep. 402 D).

Maker and cause are one; nothing exists without a cause (Tr. iv. 35; Phileb. 26 E).

Malady of body is a drawback, as causing pain (Tr. i. 207; Gorg. 505 A).

Malice prepense (Tr. v. 377; Laws, 867 B, C).

Man is a plaything of the gods, or constructed with some earnest intent (Tr. v. 32, 275; Laws, 644 D, E; 803 C); his insignificance in the scale of being (Tr. 440; 903 C, D), and yet he shall never be neglected (Tr. 443; 904 E); man is an animal, tame when well nurtured, most savage of all animals if badly reared (Tr. 215, 249; 765 E; 766 A;

788 B, C); man will not be the measure of all things, but only God (Tr. 140; 716 C); description of war as man-hunting (Tr. 311; 823 E); he speaks of men as bad boilers, as if they were peas or pulse (Tr. 352; 853 C, D); the definition of man; he is something different from his body, and yet he uses it; but this can only be said of soul (Tr. iv. 360; Alcib. I. 129 E); is neither his body nor his compound nature (Tr. 361; 130 C); to man alone belongs the power of numbering (Tr. vi. 12; Epin. 978 C); man is the measure of all things according to Protagoras (Tr. i. 381, 392, 393; Theæt. 152 A; 160 D; 161 C); a position which is refuted (Tr. 405; 171 A; Tr. iii. 287; Cratyl. 386 A, B, C); man's superiority to the brutes is not proved, according to Protagoras, but is only probable (Tr. i. 395; Theæt. 162 E); can man be omniscient? (Tr. iii. 129; Sophist, 233 A); if he were so he would be blessed (ib.); without knowledge can make no sufficient reply (ib.); a better man cannot really be injured by a worse (Tr. i. 17, 18; Apol. 30 C, D); man is called *ἄνθρωπος*, in Greek, from his attentively considering what he sees. The word is formed by contracting a sentence into one word (Tr. iii. 313; Cratyl. 399 C); men are described as living under a sea of fog and vapour, and unable to look into the bright open planetary spaces (Tr. i. 118; Phædr. 109 B, C, D); they are unable to gaze at the true heaven and unclouded light, and are surrounded by objects corrupted and corroded by the sea and damp atmosphere, in places filled with fissures, sand, and mud (Tr. 119; 110 A); men love the Good (Tr. iii. 539, 540; Symp. 205 C), and desire to have it ever (Tr. 540; 206 A); men are not naturally good (Tr. iii. 32, 33; Meno. 89, A, B); the men of former times happier than those of the present day (Tr. 213; States. 271 C); they were, when deserted of the dæmons, reduced to great straits (Tr. 218; 274 B, C).

μανία, *μάντις*, their etymological connexion pointed out, where *μανικὴν* and *μαντικὴν* are declared the same with the addition of *τ* (Tr. i. 320; Phædr. 244 C); spoken of (Tr. 316, 318, 319; 241 A; 242 C; 244 A); he derives also *οἰωνιστική*, augury, from *οἴησις*, *νοῦς*, and *ἵστορία*, forming, *οἰωνοῖστική*, and a subsequent lengthening of the short omicron (Tr. 320; 244 C).

Mankind, study of; Socrates thinks this best accomplished in towns, as country and trees teach nothing; he could not therefore have held that there were sermons in stones (Tr. 305; Phædr. 230 D); a reference is made to this sedentary or stay-at-home habit, where he is declared to have deliberated well in not voyaging or travelling to foreign parts, or, with his trick of confutation, he would have been turned away neck and crop as an impostor (Tr. iii. 18; Meno. 80 B).

Manliness or fortitude not admitted to be patient endurance, *καρτερία*,

because fortitude, *ανδολία*, is beautiful (Tr. iv. 167; Lach. 192 D); is a wise and prudent endurance (ib.); disputed (Tr. 168; 193 B).

Many, the, the crowd or multitude; their corrupting influence on public men, the popular sophists, and those who mistake for wisdom this subserviency to the views of the people, and the outcry of the million (Tr. ii. 178 to 181; Rep. 492 A, B, C, D; 493 A, B, C, D); they will never believe that there is what is absolutely beautiful (Tr. 181; 493 E); they cannot be philosophic, but will censure pursuits of this nature (Tr. 181; 494 A); they have never listened to beautiful, but only to disputable statements (Tr. 187; 499 A); there is a species of acquirement that comes from the multitude, not through formal teaching (Tr. iv. 323; Alcib. I. 110 D); the bad teaching of the multitude and disagreement with themselves and one another touched on (Tr. 325; 112 A); they are not fit to teach and are without political science, which only the few possess (Tr. iii. 254, 261; Statesm. 297 C; 300 E); generally spoken of with contempt or pity, or a reference to their want of intelligence. The *οἱ πολλοί* differ from the *ὄχλος*, which last term applies rather to the assembled tumultuary moving throng, somewhat as *πλήθος*. Thus *ὄχλος* is a crowd of spectators (Tr. i. 203, 204; Gorg. 502 A), or has the qualifying adjectives *πολύς* *πλείστος* put before it (Tr. ii. 204; 502 C; Tr. 78; Rep. 397 D).

Many and one both coexist in an individual who comprises many qualities in his single person (Tr. iii. 156, 157; Sophist, 251 A); apparent impossibility and contradiction of this (Tr. 157; 251 B); it is declared that there is no such thing as a "good man," but that "good" is "good," and "man" is "man" merely (ib.); many are one and one many, a saying that has passed into a proverb (Tr. iv. 9 to 15; Phileb. 14 C to 16 C); we must not attempt to grasp the infinite, but strive to understand the one through the medium of the many (Tr. 18, 19; 18 A).

Many and one, as the designations of two theories, are opposed (Tr. iii. 404; Parm. 128 A, B). The Parmenides of Plato purports to be an account of a conversation between the philosopher of that name and Zeno and Socrates. Zeno admits that he asserts the inconsistency of assuming the existence of the "many" (Tr. 403; 127 E). According to Socrates, Zeno and Parmenides have written the same things though in a different form, the first denying the existence of the many and the last affirming that of the one (Tr. 404; 128 A, B). Zeno is represented as explaining that Socrates does not quite understand though he is on the right scent (Tr. 405; 128 B, C, D); his treatise was written to show that the hypothesis of the "many" is open to greater objections than that of the "one," that what he had written had been published surreptitiously (Tr. 406; 128 E), and

was rather disputative than serious (Tr. 406; 128 E). Socrates hereupon asks whether there do not exist certain forms of similitude and dissimilitude of which the many in nature are participant? (Tr. 406; 129 A); it is true similars do not become dissimilars nor the reverse (Tr. iii. 406; 129 B); it would be wonderful if "one" could be "many" or "many" "one" (Tr. 406; 129 C); there is, however, nothing wonderful in saying that a man is one and many, if by the latter is meant that right differs from left, or front from back, or up from down, and that as a man he is one (Tr. 407; 129 D); were he to point to wood and stones as both many and one, this would not be to assert the identity and convertibility of the "one" and the "many" (ib.); opposites cannot coexist both separate and mixed (Tr. 407; 129 E); if it is difficult to expound the formal idea of species in things visible, how much more so in the intelligible (Tr. 407; 130 A). Hereupon Parmenides attacks Socrates' doctrine of abstract forms, $\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$, as distinct from their concretes, and asks whether there is a similitude which is something over and above that similitude which the object itself possesses, or whether there is a form of the Just, the Beautiful, and the Good, or of man, fire, water, hair, clay, mud, &c., distinct from the individual before us (Tr. 408; 130 B, C, D). Socrates admits that he is not always consistent in his opinion and fears, lest he should fall into a bottomless gulf of trifling (ib.). Being pressed for further explanation, he declares that there are general ideas by partaking in which things are what they are declared to be; great from partaking of greatness; good, beautiful, and just, from partaking of the conception belonging to these respectively (Tr. 409; 131 A, B). Parmenides asks, Can one and the same thing be in many places? just as if a number of men were covered with a sail cloth, and it should be said there was one whole over many (Tr. 409; 131 B); and he objects to Socrates' explanation, that it would make general ideas divisible, so that only a part of the idea, not the whole, would be in each of the many (Tr. 410; 131 C). Socrates submits to be cross-examined (Tr. 411; 131 D, E; 132 A), and is then pressed with the objection, that if the ideal greatness is compared with the great in other groups of concretes, reference must be made to some higher abstract embracing them all, and so on *ad infinitum* (Tr. 412; 132 B). Here Socrates reminds Parmenides that all these concepts have no existence out of the mind, and are essentially one, and is asked if there is a mental conception of nothing? (ib.). These ideas are patterns in nature (Tr. 412; 132 C, D). Parmenides dwells on the difficulty of this severance of the formal idea from the given object (Tr. 413; 133 A, B, C); that these ideas do not dwell in us (Tr. 413; 133 C); if ideas exist.

they exist in reference to themselves alone and not to concrete objects, and so of objects (Tr. 414, 415; 133 E; 134 A), and so on. It would hence appear that Parmenides would admit both the objects of the intelligible as well as the material outer world, each in their own distinct sphere and for themselves respectively; and this leads to questioning whether any mutual cognisance can exist between gods and men, and, shortly, further on, Parmenides alludes to a discourse which he had heard between Socrates and Aristotle (one of the Thirty) (Tr. 418 to 421; 135 D; 136 E; 137 C), who is selected to carry on the dialogue with Parmenides. Zeno is further referred to (Tr. 418 to 421; 135 E; 136 A, D, E; 137 B); he joins Socrates in entreating Parmenides, notwithstanding his age, to continue the discussion (Tr. 419; 136 D, E); resumption of the question of the "one" and "many" (Tr. 421; 137 C, D). The "one" is infinite (Tr. 421; 137 E); neither straight nor circular (Tr. 421; 138 A); it is in and surrounds itself, and is therefore not in space (Tr. 422; 138 B); nor is it moved (Tr. 422; 138 C); nor changed by transference, or rotation, or being in any thing (Tr. 422, 423; 138 C, D, E; 139 A); it is never in the same, and is neither still nor moved (Tr. 424; 139 B); neither the same with itself nor different, and is not what it is but different (Tr. 424; 139 C); that which becomes the same with many things must become many and not one (Tr. 424; 139 D); one will not be one (Tr. 425; 139 E); cannot be similar to another or to itself (Tr. 425; 140 A); nor dissimilar either to another or itself (Tr. 425; 140 B); nor is it equal to itself or another (Tr. 426; 140 C); nor greater or less (Tr. 426; 140 D); nor older nor younger (Tr. 426; 140 E); nor of the same age (Tr. 427; 141 A, B, C); does not participate in time, is not, has not been, shall not be (Tr. 428; 141 D, E); there is no name for it, nor discourse, nor any means of perceiving it or opining respecting it (Tr. 429; 142 A). These contradictions or antinomies are brought to a conclusion thus; a third class having been imported into the argument under the head of "the others" or "the rest." One not being in the rest, the rest are neither many nor one (Tr. 468; 165 E); for the rest have no participancy in any way whatever with things non-existent (4 negs.), nor is there any thing of things not existent present to any of "the rest," for there is no part to things not existing. True. Nor is there opinion nor fancy of the non-existent present in the "rest" (Tr. 468; 166 A); if, then, the one is not, the rest neither are, nor are opined to be one or many, nor like nor unlike, nor same nor different, nor in contact nor apart, nor do they appear (Tr. 469; 166 B); if one is not, nothing is, but whether one is or is not, the same and the rest with reference to themselves or each other are and are not, and appear and do not

appear wholly (Tr. 469; 166 C). St. Paul has made a noble religious application of the doctrine of the "one" and "many," 1 Corinth. xii. 12 and following. There can be no doubt, I think, that he was following in the track of some philosophical speculations which were to receive a new adaptation in Christian experience. Thus we have, *διαίρεσεις, ενεργημάτων, ενεργῶν τα πάντα, τὸ συμφέρον, λόγος σοφίας, λόγος γνώσεως, πίστις, δυνάμεις*, all more or less Platonic, or in use in the schools of philosophy. Then follows the admirable description of ἀγάπη, which recalls, though it soars infinitely higher, Agathon's panegyric in the Symposium. The doctrine of the "one" and "many" is canvassed in some of its theological aspects in Mansell's "Bampton Lectures" and Maurice's "What is Revelation?"

Marine molluscs, the life of an oyster or breathing viscous spoken of as resembling the case of a man without memory or joyousness (Tr. iv. 25; Phileb. 21 C).

Marriage; a man is to marry between thirty and thirty-five, or be fined in money or loss of civic privilege (Tr. v. 148; Laws, 721 A, B); opportunities of judging of the charms and dispositions of the contracting parties must be afforded (Tr. 224, 225; 772 A); rich not to marry with rich (Tr. 227; 773 C); its purpose to rear children as servants of the gods in our own stead (Tr. 228; 744 A); married men to hand life from hand to hand, like the torch in the torch-race (Tr. 232; 776 A, B); if any is indicted for a breach of matrimonial law, if he cannot obtain a favourable judgment in court, let him or her go to no wedding nor solemnization in respect of children on pain of incurring a beating from any one who meets the delinquent, whether man or woman (Tr. 247, 248; 784 D, E); marriage between unequal ranks said not to be regarded with favour (Tr. i. 215; Gorg. 512 C).

Marrow, assigned as the seat of the inferior concupiscent soul, stretching its ramifications like so many hawsers closed in and strengthened by a bony envelope (Tr. ii. 385; Tim. 73 C). The globular marrow of the head is the seat of the diviner element of soul (ib.).

Materialistic hypotheses, quite inadequate to explain the means of voluntary action (Tr. i. 105; Phædr. 99 A); they take no account of that diviner exertion of force which does what is done for the best (Tr. 105; 99 C).

μάθημα differs from other words signifying knowledge, in being knowledge resulting from study or discipline or doctrinal teaching, and as such it is in the plural applied specially to mathematics, which is acquired under scholastic training. The process by which μάθημα is acquired is μάθησις, and it may be directed to acquiring letters, or music, or gymnastics, or other arts and sciences, or even the know

ledge of righteousness. It is often associated with *μελέτη*, "careful study," and its family of words.

Mathematical education, nothing so good as the study of numbers, good for stirring and rousing up the memory and the wits (Tr. v. 188; Laws, 747 B); number, weight, and measure are the counters of justice (Tr. 200; 757 B). See also Geometry. Three subjects remain contributing to a liberal education; computation, the art of measuring geometrical solids, and that of its applications to physical astronomy (Tr. 300; 817 E). All need not be profound, but it is disgraceful not to know the more useful practical parts (Tr. 301; 818 A, B). Games are described for children to teach the most necessary elements (Tr. 302, 303; 819 B, C, D).

Matter, *ἕλη*, is immortal, but receptive of form by the divine will; what envelopes body which is divisible and has the nature of diverseness is another kind of *ἕλη*, place or space (Tr. vi. 147, 148; Tim. Locr. 94 A); the Cosmos made out of *ἕλη* (Tr. 149; 94 D); and is styled *μονογενής* (ib.; see also Tr. ii. 409; Tim. 92 C); this created sphere is accurately fashioned, most incomparable and *ἀπαρεχχείρητον* (Tr. vi. 149; Tim. Locr. 94 D, E); first principle of created things is matter as substratum and form (Tr. 156, 157; 97 E); cannot suffer increase or decrease (Tr. ii. 336, 337; Tim. 33 B); may exist as solid, liquid, or gaseous (Tr. 355; 49 C).

Means and ends; when we consider a thing for the sake of some ultimate end, the deliberation is in fact about that end, not about the means (Tr. iv. 157; Lach. 185 D).

Measure of all things is man, was the celebrated dictum of Protagoras (Tr. i. 381, 393; Theæt. 152 A; 160 D; 161 C). On the contrary, God is said to be the measure of all things (Tr. v. 140; Laws, 716 C, D); measure is spoken of in connexion with weight and number, see Geometry. Measure, moderation, and symmetry are found in connexion; a compound is spoiled by excess in one of the ingredients, and becomes a medley or muddle, but measurableness and symmetry are everywhere a beauty (Tr. iv. 104; Phileb. 64 D, E). Pleasure is not the first ingredient, nor even the second; the foremost place is occupied by measure, moderation, fitness, and all those qualities which are eternal; the second place is due to symmetry, beauty, and perfect accomplishment (Tr. 107; 66 A, B); and moderation and beauty belong to mind (Tr. 106; 65 D).

Measurement, the power of, in enabling us to judge of appearances. Objects appear large or small as we approach to or recede from them, and thus confuse our judgment of their relative importance; it is the power of measuring that corrects this false estimate (Tr. i. 287;

Protag. 356 C, D); science is that which forms our safeguard (Tr. 288; 357 A).

Meats for the body are better assigned by the physician than by the cook (Tr. i. 157; Gorg. 464 D).

Mechanist saves whole cities, but does not boast about it, like the rhetoricians (Tr. i. 215; Gorg. 512 B); nor does he decry all other pursuits (ib.); he would be despised, notwithstanding the value of his labours (Tr. 215; 512 C).

μηδὲν ἔργον (Tr. iv. 440, 441; Hipparch. 228 E).

Medicine of fear; it is suggested that there should be some drug whose administration should be able to put a man into every possible situation of horror or dread as a test of fortitude (Tr. v. 38; Laws, 647 E); its bad effects in a general way when used too freely; we are not to weaken our constitutions by quack treatment (Tr. ii. 405; Tim. 89 C).

Medley and muddle (Tr. iv. 104; Phileb. 64 D, E).

Meeting of waters, the letting in of the sciences pure and impure, just as a doorkeeper, forced back by the pressure of a crowd, when forced to let fly the doors, gives entrance to them pell-mell, spoken of as the Homeric *μισγαγκείας ὑποδοχήν* (Tr. iv. 101; Phileb. 62 D).

Megara, spoken of as well governed (Tr. i. 43; Crito, 53 B).

Meletus, his false accusation of Socrates (Tr. i. 12, 13; Apol. 26 A, D); contradicts himself and tries to test the acuteness of the defendant (Tr. 14; 27 A); if he and Anytus succeed in bringing about the death of Socrates they will harm themselves more than their undeserving victim (Tr. 18; 30 C, D); his false charges (Tr. 21; 34 A, B); described as being a Pitthean, with lank hair, straggling beard, and aquiline nose (Tr. 458; Euthyp. 2 B).

Members of the body are not cherished by us, when diseased or requiring amputation, but only for the sake of that in them which is good (Tr. iii. 539, 540; Symp. 205 E).

Memory spoken of as weakened by letters (Tr. 354, 355; Phædr. 274 E; 275 A); is a revived impression of what took place in an antecedent state of existence (Tr. 325; 249 A, B); a reference to the beautiful on the part of the charioteer of the soul or the ruling intellect (Tr. 330; 254 B); one of the attributes of soul (Tr. iii. 31; Meno. 88 A); memory and sense write words in the soul, and when what is true is written, true opinion is the result, or false in the reverse case (Tr. iv. 58; Phileb. 39 A); if we possess neither memory, science, nor true opinion, we cannot know whether we are or are not joyous (Tr. 24; 21 B); memory, intelligence, science, true opinion are of one and the same class (Tr. 97; 60 D, E); memory is the preservation of perception or sensible impression, recollection

is the repetition of the process in the second derived order (Tr. 48; 34 B), while perception is something in which body and soul concur (Tr. 48; 34 A); what is memory? (Tr. i. 399; Theæt. 166 B); it is essential to science or knowledge (Tr. 73; Phæd. 73 C).

MENEXENUS. See Summary, page 200.

MENON. See Summary, page 133.

Mental qualifications, wisdom or prudence, a moderate or temperate habit of soul coupled with understanding, are superior to health, beauty, and strength (Tr. v. 11; Laws, 631 B, C); morals, customs, acts of will, computations, true estimates, earnest pursuits, memories must have existed prior to length, breadth, depth, and strength of bodies, if soul is prior to body (Tr. 426; 896 C, D); to the motions of the soul we give the following names: to will, to ponder, to watch anxiously, to counsel, to estimate rightly or wrongly, to exult, to grieve, to dare, to fear, to hate, to love, after which the affections of body are enumerated (Tr. 427; 897 A); mental and bodily perceptions distinguished (Tr. i. 422; Theæt. 185 D); the mind supplies what sense cannot (ib.).

Mercenaries are numerous, according to Tyrtaeus, who boldly march and face death in battle, of whom the majority are daring, unjust, insolent, and reckless of all consequences (Tr. v. 9; Laws, 630 B).

Mess tables of the Lacedæmonians, and gymnastic exercises, have two bad results; the first give occasion to the raising seditious plots and factions, and the last to some intolerable abuses from the exposure of the person (Tr. v. 19; Laws, 636 A, B). The bearing of all this in the case of women, who will at first resist living openly, is shown (Tr. ii. 138 to 145; Rep. 454 E to 460 C, D, E).

Metaphors and new-coined phrases shot at you as from a quiver (Tr. i. 415; Theæt. 180 A).

Metempsychosis; the human soul passes into the life of a beast, when a thousand years has elapsed, after sentence in the other world, and again from a beast into a man if he had formerly been a man (Tr. i. 325; Phædr. 249 A, B); from having been men into women, beasts, swine, birds, and fish, according to the inferiority of moral character; after death, those who have lived as they ought return to pass a blessed existence in their cognate star, but otherwise become, in a second generation, women, and so on (Tr. ii. 341, 407, 408, 409; Tim. 38 A, B; 90 E; 91 E; 92 B).

Midwifery of Socrates, an art by which he expedites the bringing forth ideas from the minds of men, and which distinguishes shadows and falsehoods from truth (Tr. i. 379; Theæt. 150 C); he declares that he has never delivered himself of wisdom (ib.; see also Tr. 394; 161 E).

- Midwives** excite the pains of labour by drugs and incantations, and mitigate the same or cause abortion (Tr. i. 378; Theæt. 149 C); they are good match-makers (Tr. 378; 149 D); the cutting the umbilical chord is the least of their endowments, but they know the best seed and the best soil suited to it (ib.; Tr. 378; 149 E); their work is less arduous than that of Socrates (Tr. 379; 150 A, B), which is to deliver men's soul, not their bodies (ib.).
- Mimetic poetry**, is it to be admitted into the state? (Tr. ii. 75; Rep. 394 D). *See* Imitation.
- Mind** is akin to cause, and almost the same in species (Tr. iv. 43; Phileb. 31 A). Memory, intelligence, science, true opinion are of the same class; what are all these without conscious enjoyment? (Tr. 97; 60 D, E); mind said to be beautiful, beyond anything that is without thought (Tr. ii. 334; Tim. 30 B); mind is not visible, even to the keenest of our bodily senses (Tr. i. 327; Phædr. 250 D); mind considered as a waxen tablet, susceptible of impressions (Tr. 433; Theæt. 193 C); pure and deep (Tr. 434; 194 C); impure and filthy (Tr. 435; 194 E; Tr. 438, 439; 197 D); mind compared to a dovecote or aviary, where thoughts and ideas sit perched and solitary, or range on the wing (Tr. 438, 439; 197 D); mind is, according to Anaxagoras, the disposing cause of all things (Tr. 103, 104; Phædr. 97 C, D, E; 98 A, B); his inconsistency pointed out in having recourse, notwithstanding, to material secondary mediate causes (Tr. 104, 105; 98 C, D).
- "Mine"** and **"not mine"** are expressions which should never be heard together in a community (Tr. ii. 147; Rep. 462 C); this entire oneness of interest is a test of good government (ib.; Tr. 147; 462 D; also Tr. 149, 148; 464 B, C, D; 463 E).
- Minerva** spoken of (Tr. iii. 218; Statesm. 274 B, C); the representation of Minerva or Pallas Athene as an armed figure shows that in the early ages women shared with men the labours of war (Tr. ii. 417; Critias, 110 B).
- Minos** was the chief judge and arbiter in Hades (Tr. i. 228, 231; Gorg. 524 A; 526 C); he is spoken of by Homer as chief assessor, with a golden sceptre (Tr. 28; Apol. 41 A).
- MINOS.** *See* Summary, page 221.
- Mint-marked**; we should have had those among us who would have stamped a mark on us, were any men good by nature (Tr. iii. 33; Meno. 89 B).
- Mirrors, theory of.** It is easy, it is said, to explain the formation of images from mirrors and all bright smooth surfaces, as all such necessarily originate from the common or conjoint action of an inner and outer fire on each other, there being a condensation, *ἐμπυρῆς*, result-

ing from the light which flows from the mirror, or is reflected by it, meeting that which surrounds the face or comes from the spectator's eye. There is here at least the vague notion that the mirror is itself an eye, though the image seen in it affects only the eye of the observer (Tr. ii. 349, 350, 351; Tim. 44 D; 45 D; 46 A). *See* Images, where the analogy of the eye seeing itself in another eye as a mirror is pointed out. *See* particularly Tr. iv. 365, 366; Alcib. I. 132 D, E; 133 A.

Mixed monarchy; speaking of Sparta, it is said that the deity watched over it, implanting there a double line of kings sprung from one (*μονογενοῦς*) stock (Tr. v. 103; Laws, 691 E); he qualified the audacious confidence of birth with the wiser power of old age, equalizing the kingly power with that of the twenty-eight senators, and the third check of the Ephors, bringing it thus more to the elective character. Thus the kingly power becoming mixed, itself preserved, became the source of preservation to others (Tr. 103; 692 A). One might fancy the writer was eulogizing the British constitution. He next contrasts with it the absolute despotism of Persia, and the extreme democracy of Athens, in what follows. This brings in the whole story of the Persian invasion of Greece, and the sources of its weakness (Tr. 112; 697 D, E); against the Grecian unanimity (Tr. 114, 115; 699 A, B, C; 700 A, B); the mixed is one of the four divisions into limited, limitless, mixed and causal (Tr. iv. 36, 41; Phileb. 27 C, 30 B).

Mnemonics, artificial, a system of, is referred to (Tr. iv. 220, 221; Hipp. Maj. 286 A; Tr. 271; Hipp. Min. 368 D).

Mob judgments spoken of, and the debasing effect of setting up a theocracy in matters of poetic dramatic literature. A false opinion of men's wisdom and a lax freedom are the result. The audience become fearless, as if their judgments were correct, and thus a want of reverence begets impudence (Tr. v. 117, 53, 54, 55; Laws, 701 A; 658 E; 659 A, B, C; 660 A). Lessing, in his "Dramaturgy," has some good remarks on Voltaire, who first debased his art in modern times by appearing on the stage at the call of the audience.

Moderate offerings to be made to the gods (Tr. 522, 523; Laws, 955 E); the same thing, however, is not to be offered a second time to the deities (ib.); the moderate man will not be a thief, or traitor, or spoiler of temples, nor adulterer, nor despiser of parents, nor of God's service (Tr. ii. 128; Rep. 443 A); all his inner powers do their own work (Tr. 128; 443 B); moderate exertions cause the body to be in a healthy state (Tr. iv. 423, 424; Rivals, 134 B); so, too, in the case of soul, the moderate, not the many, are advantageous (Tr. 424; 134 D). *See* on excess and defect Tr. iii. 232; Statesm. 283 C, D, E; 284 A;

Tr. 287; Protag. 356 A; and the art of dispensing in measure is termed the safeguard of life (Tr. 288; 356 D.)

Moderation, *σωφροσύνη*, temperance, is one of the cardinal virtues usually enumerated with wisdom or prudence, courage or manliness or fortitude, and justice or righteousness. When opinion, aiming at the best, leads and sways us by reason, we give the name of moderation to this conquest (Tr. i. 312, 316; Phædr. 237 D; 241 A); these virtues are only resemblances, which have none of the living light of their great celestial types. Only a few attain a deeper insight, our organs are dull, and we, as it were, incased in a shell (Tr. 326; 250 B, C); prayer to possess moderation (Tr. 360; 279 C); moderation is one of the characteristics of the good horse of the soul (Tr. 330; 253 D); and this personified property is looked up to by the charioteer or reasoning power of the tripartite soul, as fixed on a firm pedestal (Tr. 330; 254 B); again spoken of (Tr. iii. 31; Meno. 88 A); moderation is defined as a readiness to obey, and endurance (Tr. vi. 167; Tim. Locr. 104 B); quietness as a definition is defective (Tr. iv. 122; Charm. 160 B); moderation the result of beautiful reasons (Tr. 118 to 123; 157 A, D; 158 B, C, D; 159 A, B, C, D; 160 B, C, D, E, and following). Moderation does not consist in a man's being a jack-of-all-trades (Tr. 124; 161 E); is an evidence of goodness (Tr. 124, 163 E), and of self-knowledge (ib.); is the science of knowing what we don't know (Tr. 131, 132; 167 A); and then follows a long discussion about abstracts, abstract sight and hearing and desire, will, love, dread, whether these can be entirely thought about apart from an object (Tr. 132, 133; 167 C, D, E); moderation is defined as order and virtue and goodness (Tr. i. 209; Gorg. 507 A); its opposite its folly and intemperance (ib.); the man of moderation alone does what is fitting, both with regard to gods and men (ib.); and is just and holy and courageous (Tr. 210; 507 B); he undergoes pain when it is proper that he should do so (ib.); is perfectly good and happy (Tr. 210; 507 C, D); he has no communion with excessive pleasure (Tr. ii. 85; Rep. 402 E), nor with insolence and self-indulgence (ib.); moderation is akin to concord and harmony, and renders the man superior to himself (Tr. 114, 115; 430 E); defence of this last expression (Tr. 115; 431 A); applicable to states as well as to individuals (Tr. 115; 431 B); moderation is the agreement of the ruling and subordinate faculties of the soul both in the individual and in the community or state (Tr. 128; 442 D); put to the test (Tr. 128; 442 E); distinguished from *σοφία* (Tr. 193; 504 C); is only to be estimated fully in the idea of the Good (Tr. 193; 504 D, E; 505 A); we ought to watch who are bastards and who are sons in respect of moderation, magnanimity and courage, nor should

- lame or bastard persons be employed as friends or rulers (Tr. 226; 536 A, B). Are justice, moderation, and holiness parts of virtue, or are these names for the same thing? (Tr. i. 257; Protag. 329 C, D). Modesty is apt to lead to inaction (Tr. iii. 278, 279; Statesm. 310 D).
- Molecules of matter, spoken of as being so small that they are invisible. See Atoms (Tr. ii. 364; Tim. 56 C).
- Mollusc, marine (Tr. iv. 25; Phileb. 21 C).
- Molten gold, to pour, expression used by Thrasymachus (Tr. ii. 133, 134; Rep. 450 B).
- Momentum spoken of, as proportional to weight (Tr. iv. 454; Minos, 316 A.)
- Monarchy, when accompanied with good laws, is the best government (Tr. iii. 264; Statesm. 302 E). Plato had no love for a thorough democracy, all his preference was for limited monarchy.
- Money, the love of, is classed with those evils by which a man dishonours his soul, his most divine possession after the gods, as being his own in a peculiar sense (Tr. v. 154; Laws, 728 A); if a man acquires money dishonourably, or does not feel disquieted when he has so acquired it, he barter his soul's glory and reputation for a bit of gold, and all the gold within the earth is no equivalent for virtue (ib.); this love of money absorbs men wholly, leaving no time for other pursuits; they will do anything dishonourable to acquire it, and thus the state can pursue no noble aim (Tr. 318; 831 C, D, E); he who takes care of his money neither takes care of himself nor the things of himself (Tr. iv. 362, 363; Alcib. I. 131 B); money would be useless, if a man could live without food or drink (Tr. vi. 74; Eryx. 401 D); though money is properly paid for advice on most subjects, notwithstanding Socrates' perpetual reference to the sums of money exacted by the sophists, in a tone of sarcasm, it is still disgraceful to refuse your advice on matters of the highest and pressing moment for want of a fee (Tr. i. 225; Gorg. 520 E); it is disgraceful to set money above the duties of friendship or the claims of friends (Tr. 32, 33; Crito, 44 C); there is an utter inability in money to produce virtue, but it may itself be due to virtue like all other human blessings (Tr. 17; Apol. 30 A, B); the love of money on the part of the Egyptians and Phœnicians owed its existence as a state characteristic to its belonging to the individuals composing it (Tr. ii. 109; Rep. 435 E).
- Monsters referred to: Hippocentaurs, Chimerae, Gorgons, Pegasi (Tr. i. 303; Phædr. 229 D).
- Moral distinctions confounded by Euthydemus (Tr. iii. 288; Cratyl. 386 D); immutability of moral distinctions which exist essentially

in the nature of things (Tr. iii. 288; Cratyl. 386 D); these apply to actions as well (Tr. 288, 289; 386 E; 387 A).

Mortal things declared to be harder of description than heavenly things, inasmuch as the more remote and indistinct they are, the more readily will the delineation be accepted (Tr. ii. 413, 414; Critias, 107 A, B, C, D).

—— body, the soul's entrance therein (Tr. i. 325; Phædr. 249 A).

Mother alluded to, as beating a meddlesome child who pulled about her working implements for spinning and weaving (Tr. i. 487, 488; Lys. 207 E; 208 A, B, C, D, E).

Motion of a spinning top alluded to, how the larger and lesser circles in its tapering construction are carried with greater and less velocity, how it revolves round an immovable axis, or combines a motion of transference with that (Tr. v. 419; Laws, 893 C, D; Tr. ii. 121; Rep. 436 C, D, E); voluntary motion is different from inertia; the first can move other things, the other cannot originate movement; what moves itself, according to laws of composition, resolution, augmentation, production, and decay, is different from a mere capability of being moved (Tr. v. 421, 422; Laws, 894 B); the first is ten thousand times superior to the last (Tr. 422; 894 D); where one body sets a second in motion and this a third, there must be a prime mover, and this is the cause of all the motions (Tr. 423; 895 A); if we saw motion suddenly existing in earth or fluid or flame, should we not say it lives? (Tr. 424; 895 C); what is motion able to move itself other than soul? (896 A); the tendency to perpetual motion in young animals is dwelt on (Tr. 45; 653 D, E); but human beings have in addition the sense of order and rhythm (Tr. 45; 654 A); all bodies benefited by motion (Tr. 251, 252; 789 E); babes are danced and dandled (Tr. 253; 790 D); when we rejoice we cannot keep still, and this is the theory of dancing (Tr. 51, 76; 657 C, D; 673 D). Motion is again spoken of as the principle of life; what is ceaselessly moved is immortal; when motion ceases, either in the mover or the moved, death ensues (Tr. i. 321; Phædr. 245 B, C, D); is there a motion which moves itself? (Tr. iv. 134; Charm. 168 E); motion implies a mover, it is not inherent in smoothness or what is homogeneous, nor is it possible to conceive of it as existing without a cause to disturb the state of equilibrium (Tr. ii. 366; Tim. 57 E); motions of the heavenly bodies are the data for computation, and have enabled us to number and calculate the lengths of days, months, years, &c. (Tr. vi. 12; Epin. 978 C, D, E), and seasons (Tr. 13; 979 A); motion is allied with seeming to be and becoming (Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 153 A); with transference of place, and with friction (ib.); as applied to mind, is synonymous with study and care, and is both conservative

and productive equally (Tr. 382; 153 B); is good for body and soul (Tr. 383; 153 C); calms and absence of winds cause putrescence (ib.); the motion of the heavens preserves gods and men (Tr. 383; 153 D); it is of two kinds, each infinite in number, active and passive (Tr. 386; 156 A); the mutual attritions of these give rise to infinite productions, also to perception and what is perceived and all the phenomena of sentiency (Tr. 386; 156 B); colour, sight, sound, and hearing, &c. (ib.); motions may be fast or slow, and far off, or near (Tr. 386; 156 C, D); Protagoras's principle of motion (Tr. 415; 179 D); its disciples as unsettled as their principle (179 E); the motion of rotation and transference is impossible to the "One" (Tr. iii. 415; Parm. 138 A, B, C, D); motion of transference distinguished from that of rotation in the same place (Tr. i. 417; Theæt. 181 C); can motion be predicated of gradual decay, or rust, or change of colour by fading? (Tr. 417; 181 D); the universality of motion (Tr. 418; 182 A); the doctrine of perpetual motion negatives any permanency in our perceptions, as well as the identity of science or knowledge with perception (Tr. 417 to 424; 182 A to 186 C); motion and rest, are they both moved or both at rest? (Tr. iii. 155; Sophist, 250 A, B); can both be said to exist, if existence implies rest? (ib.); existence and soul are both different from motion, but include both (Tr. 156; 250 C); motion cannot be at rest, nor rest in motion (Tr. 159; 252 D).

μουσεῖα λογῶν, viz., *διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνῶμολογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν*, what are we to say of Polus's curiosities of words, his duplications, his sententiousness, his word imagery? (Tr. i. 346; Phædr. 267 C).

Moving what is immovable, said of the advocates of perpetual flux (Tr. i. 416; Theæt. 181 A, B).

Mules, the breeding between horses and asses is alluded to as indicating the need for a certain classification (Tr. iii. 203; Statesm. 265 E).

Multiple of square, what is its side in different cases? discussed (Tr. iii. 21, 22; Meno. 82 B, C, D, E).

Multitude are bad teachers (Tr. iv. 323; Alcib. I. 110 E); who can know a moment's happiness who lives for the multitude, now clapped and applauded as the people's pet, and again ejected, hissed, fined, and led to death? (Tr. vi. 48; Axioch. 368 C, D); the ignorance of the multitude (Tr. i. 245; Protag. 317 A); the multitude pursue seeming virtue as their chief end (Tr. 411; Theæt. 176 B); its perverseness; the many will misconceive and misrepresent sadly what is spoken before them (Tr. v. 74; Laws, 672 A).

"That the blunt monster, with uncounted heads,
The still discordant wavering multitude."

SHAKESP., *Henry IV.* (2nd Part), Intro.

Murders committed by freemen and slaves (Tr. v. 380, 381; Laws, 869 D); their origin is lust domineering over a soul infuriated with desires, particularly among the mass, where there is the most unlimited and strenuous eagerness for money (Tr. 381; 870 A); but for this passion for riches murders would cease (Tr. 382; 870 B, C); and murder is often committed to prevent exposure on the part of some one cognisant of a crime (Tr. 383; 870 D). *See also* Tr. 318; 831 C.

Musæus spoken of as a desirable companion in the other world (Tr. i. 28; Apol. 41 A); his praise of righteousness (Tr. ii. 42; Rep. 363 C, D).

Muscular system, from the description given of it, its contractility and peculiar mechanical action was unknown in Plato's time (Tr. ii. 386; Tim. 73 E).

Muses, places sacred to, graphic description of one of these outside the walls of Athens (Tr. i. 304; Phædr. 230 B); madness or possession of the Muses seizes on and transports the tender and stainless soul, elevating and transporting it by odes. A man is not to approach their poetic threshold, believing that he can become a poet by technical rules (Tr. 320, 321; 245 A); the cicadæ said to have been men before the birth of the Muses (Tr. 336; 259 A, C); died from excess of absorption in the beauty of their songs, to whom the boon was given of continuing to chirp and sing till they again died, after which they were to report to the Nine who were their most exemplary votaries (ib.). *See also* Tr. 340; 262 D.

Music, as a training for the mind (Tr. ii. 83, 84; Rep. 376 E); a nurse for it in the form of harmony and rhythm promoting elegance and grace (Tr. 84; 401 D); the quickening of the moral perceptions under its influence described (Tr. 84; 401 E); we must first recognise the forms of moderation, courage, freedom, magnanimity, if we are to know it aright (Tr. 84; 402 C); the lovers of the first of these must love virtue (Tr. 85; 402 D); its proper end is the passion for the beautiful (Tr. 85; 403 C); music precedes gymnastics (Tr. 86; 403 D); the best gymnastics are akin to it (Tr. 86; 404 B); excessive variety of musical rhythm is akin to self-indulgence, while simplicity in music is allied to health (Tr. 87; 404 E); simple music will render men shy of courts of judicature (Tr. 92; 410 A); it ravishes the soul as do the sounds of a flute, poured through the ears as a pipe, and softens it as iron is softened in the fire (Tr. 93; 411 A); when pursued too far it melts it, dries up the spirit and extirpates the nerves (Tr. 94; 411 B); ferocity results from the neglect of music (Tr. 94; 411 D, E); it is not meant for body alone, nor for soul alone (Tr. 94; 411 E); its value is shown in testing character (Tr. 96, 97; 413 D); time and

tune are synonymous with perfect education (Tr. 96, 97; 413 D); its forms cannot be changed without changing the most important laws of the constitution (Tr. 107, 108; 424 C); lawlessness from this source creeps in unawares and at last becomes subversive (Tr. 108; 424 D, E); through music regard for law is introduced (Tr. 108; 425 A); gymnastics also subserve the same end, the one nourishing by beautiful doctrines, the other soothing, relaxing, and softening by beautiful rhythm (Tr. 127; 441 E; 442 A); its transporting power (Tr. i. 320, 321; Phædr. 245 A).

Musical art is effected by admixture of the limited and unlimited, the limited numbers of harmony and symmetry with the unlimited gradations of tone (Tr. iv. 33, 34; Phileb. 26 A).

Musician, the, who follows gymnastics will try so to follow them as to need as little physic as possible, to stimulate not merely bodily strength, but the impulsive part of his mental nature (Tr. ii. 92; Rep. 410 B); he is the perfect musician who mixes gymnastics with his pursuit of music (Tr. 94, 95; 412 A).

Mutilations practised mutually by the Gods in the early mythologies due to Necessity not to Love (Tr. iii. 519, 523; Symp. 195 C; 197 B).

Mutiny in the fortress of the soul with an internal ventriloquist, *see* Domestic foe. So Shakespeare speaks of "mutinies in a man's bosom," Rich. III., act i. sc. 4.

Mysteries, the being conversant with them (Tr. i. 68; Phæd. 69 C, D).

Plato would seem to have had no very profound respect for the mysteries and the diviners who quote from the books of Musæus and Orpheus, the descendants of the Moon and the Muses, and who induce mortals to seek release and purification in what they call mysteries, and in which, if they do not do sacrifice, a dire fate awaits them (Tr. ii. 44 to 46; Rep. 365 A; 366 A). Döllinger, "Gentile and Jew," i. 157, speaks of these Orpheotelests, and quotes Tr. ii. 43; Rep. 364 B; also where he divides dancing, and speaks of certain rites with which the names of Bacchantes, termed Nymphs and Pans, and Silenuses and Satyrs are associated (Tr. v. 295, 296; Laws, 815 A, B, C). Again in describing the varieties of madness, that of the priestesses at Delphi and Dodona, the Sibyl, &c., where purifications and mysteries are resorted to (Tr. i. 319, 320; Phædr. 244 A, B, C, D, E); Musæus and his son Eumolpus, founder of the Eleusinian rites, from whom the Eumolpidæ derive their name, are spoken of (Tr. ii. 42; Rep. 363 C); τέλειος αἰὲν τελετὰς τελουμένος τέλειος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται (Tr. i. 325; Phædr. 249 C); τελετή (Tr. 329, 330; 253 C). In the first of these passages this more perfect initiation is contrasted with what takes place in the Eleusinian rites.

Myths are alluded to (Tr. i. 303, 304; Phædr. 229 D); Socrates protests against believing the story of Zeus putting Cronus in chains for swallowing his own children (Tr. 462; Euthyp. 5 E; 6 A); is it to be thought that there is war among the gods such as is narrated by the poets and represented in embroidery on the robe borne in procession to the Acropolis, at the great Panathenaic festival? (Tr. 463; 6 B).

N.

ναί *μή*, not negative like *μή*, but used with the sense of "yes" (Tr. ii. 54, 55; Rep. 574 C).

Names, are there not, appropriate to every existing thing, not the minute vocal utterance conventionally assigned, but such as are the same for Greeks and foreigners? (Tr. iii. 283; Cratyl. 383 B); are the names of persons those by which they pass? (ib.); this is not a trifling or unimportant business (Tr. 284; 384 B); truth can be had by paying for it (ib.); Hermogenes thinks that names are only conventional (Tr. 285; 384 D); in that case they may be always changed arbitrarily (ib.); we change the names of our servants just as it pleases us (ib.); the name of a thing is that by which for the time being it is called (Tr. 285, 286; 384 D; 385 A, D); names are the smallest parts of a discourse, and these, like the discourse of which they form a part, may be true or false (Tr. 286; 385 A, D); names, if they are to stand for any thing, must not be given wilfully (Tr. 290; 387 D); they require to be appropriate, like tools for cutting, weaving, or boring (Tr. 291; 387 E; 388 A, B); names are instruments (Tr. 292; 388 C); the original authority for names mostly unknown (Tr. 292; 388 D); they have been handed down by custom and tradition, (ib.); it is not every man's province to impose names, but that of the word-coiner, who is rare among men (Tr. 293; 389 A); the word-maker has a view to use when he frames names (ib.); he requires knowledge in order to discharge this function well, and may use different media, as the smith uses different sorts of iron (Tr. 294; 389 D); the dialectician should be called in to assist the word-maker (Tr. 296; 390 D); this is not an unimportant business, nor one suited for a man of inferior capacity (ib.); when it is said, that it may be learned from the sophists for money, this is doubtless ironical and in the usual vein of Socrates (Tr. 297; 391 B, C); it may be learnt from Homer and the poets (Tr. 298; 391 D); the name Astyanax is one properly applied to the son of a saviour of the city (Tr. 299, 300; 392 E); Hector was properly so termed from *κρατέω*, to be a king or ruler (Tr. 300; 393 B); if a horse produce a calf it is to be called a calf and not a foal (Tr. 301; 393 C); but slight syllabic variations are to

be allowed (Tr. 302; 394 A, B); the notion of command is contained and conveyed in some names, such as Agis, Polemarchus, Eupolemus, and of healing in others, as Iatrocles and Acesimbrotus (Tr. 303; 394 C); a bad son ought not to be called after the name of a good father (Tr. 303; 394 D); he should not be designated as Theophilus, Mnesitheos, but by some such name as Orestes, signifying savage and mountainous (Tr. 304; 394 E); the names of heroes are often derived from those of ancestors, or they express some boastful or proud assumption of glory (Tr. 309; 397 B); names have in some cases been imposed by a diviner power than that of men (Tr. 309; 397 B); why have the gods been termed *θεοί*? (Tr. 309; 397 C); examples furnished where by an alteration of accent, quantity or breathing, or by a process of contraction or opening out, we can trace an existing word as a derivative from some older form of word or sentence (Tr. 312; 399 A, B); the names of the gods not understood by us (Tr. 316; 400 D, E), nor are they themselves known to us; all that we recognise is, that what they term themselves is true, and that they should be so religiously addressed (ib.); we have a perfect right to consider and speculate on the names they have imposed on men (ib.). See further under Etymologies, Tr. 332 to 354; 408 E to 419 B; also Cratylus in the Analysis, page 155.

Narrative, direct and oblique, as distinguished from dramatic impersonation or dialogue, *διήγησις* and *μιμήσις*, including under the latter Homer's Epic impersonation (Tr. ii. 73, 74; Rep. 392 D, E; 393 A, B, C, D, E; 394 A); the difference between this narrative epic and tragedy and comedy is that the narrative between the speeches is left out (Tr. 75; 394 B); dithyrambic poetry is wholly narrative, where the poet only speaks, while epic is a mixture of what is spoken by the poet and his heroes in their own person (ib.).

Narrator spoken of as sinking himself, and making the collocutor speak directly without using the oblique oration; "that he said" or "that he did not assent" being thus got rid of (Tr. i. 370; Theæt. 143 C).

Natural acquisition of language. Socrates observes that he has often heard Alcibiades as a boy fuming about justice and injustice among his playmates. But whence could he have learnt anything about them? It must have been when he was ignorant of them, not when he knew (Tr. iv. 322, 323; Alcib. I. 110 A, B, C). Alcibiades replies that he learnt them from the many, who taught him to speak and act like a Greek (Tr. 323; 110 D, E); opposition of the classes, natural and legal (Tr. i. 180, 181; Gorg. 483 A); natural gifts referred to (Tr. 369, 371, 385; Theæt. 142 C; 143 E; 144 A; 155 D; Tr. 8; Apol. 22 C); natural history studied by Socrates in the shape of natural philosophy, who declares that when he was young he marvel-

lously thirsted for this wisdom, which they term inquiry into nature, admirably adapted as it seemed to him to teach the causes of each event, how it is produced, why it exists and perishes, how heat and cold produce living germs from rottenness, or whether we think by means of the blood, &c. (Tr. 102; Phæd. 96 A, B).

Nature asserts that the stronger ought to have more than the weaker (Tr. i. 181; Gorg. 483 D); just as great conquerors assert the right of the stronger, nature teaches us not to render tame the strongest of our youth, and not to tell them that equality is beautiful and just (Tr. 181; 483 E); all such limitations should be broken through and cast aside (Tr. 181; 484 A).

Natures of a higher order are those which are fitted to guide the masses, the best are those which have been produced with the most difficulty and are of the greatest utility, and these keep the multitude in check by preserving alive all the duties of piety, and the honours of virtue (Tr. vi. 30, 31; Epin. 989 B, C, D).

Navigation, the art of, saves life and is less pompous and intrusive than rhetoric (Tr. i. 214, 215; Gorg. 511 C, D, E); the fare for a voyage from Egypt or Pontus stated as two drachmæ, that from Ægina as two obols (Tr. 215; 511 E); its astronomical and meteorological requirements (Tr. ii. 174, 175; Rep. 488 B, C, D, E).

Necessity of studying to please mankind; let it not escape you that to accomplish much you must please men, but self-will has its dwelling in the desert (Tr. iv. 495; Epist. iv. 321 B); Necessity, not Love, is the cause of suffering and disorder (Tr. iii. 519, 523; Symp. 195 C; 197 B). Mr. Grote has noted that Necessity as spoken of in Plato is a principle more akin to that wild mundane disorder that characterised the reign of Chaos and Old Night, than the philosophical fatality of the Greek tragedians, or our notion of an inevitable order of succession.

Necromancy strangely declared to have efficacy in reconciling the gods to misdeeds, according to the professors of the art. Quacks and diviners proceeding to the gates of the rich persuade them that a power has been given to them by the gods, by means of sacrifices and incantations, of atoning for personal sins or the sins of ancestors (Tr. ii. 43; Rep. 364 B, C); and that the dead may be released from the consequences of their crimes by certain rites (Tr. 44; 365 A).

Negation, absolute or conditional, does not assert the opposite of a proposition, but only negatives the word or statement of fact which follows (Tr. iii. 167, 168; Sophist, 257 C).

Negative procedure is one abundantly illustrated in the method of Socrates, who rarely or never determines affirmatively any of the questions which he submits for inquiry, or which he hears advanced

by others, his object being rather to show the amount of our ignorance on these points, and to proclaim his own, as a preparative for some future rediscussion.

Negatives, accumulation of (Tr. i. 415; Theæt. 180 A; Tr. iii. 154; Sophist, 249 B; Tr. 468; Parm. 166 A; Tr. 284, 285; Cratyl. 384 D; Tr. ii. 182; Rep. 495 B; Tr. i. 311; Phædr. 236 E, where five occur successively; also Tr. iv. 19; Phileb. 18 B, four times).

Nervous system is referred to, where our affections are spoken of as being like imbedded nerves and ropes which pull and drag us in opposite directions, being resisted by contrary forces, and between these are the limits of virtue and vice. One of these drawings resisted by other nerves is by the sacred and golden chord of reason (Tr. v. 32; Laws, 644 D, E); but there is nothing here akin to the modern physiological character in which the nerve is only the medium of transmission of a force, and is not the rope which pulls, an office which is discharged by the muscular strain.

Nestor, his character in Homer; he has made Achilles bravest, Nestor wisest, and Ulysses the most wily of all who went to Troy (Tr. iv. 264; Hipp. Min. 364 C).

Net, a logical device to enclose the sophist (Tr. iii. 132; Sophist, 235 B); involved in an entanglement of words (Tr. 83, 84; Euthyd. 295 D); inveigled and caught as in a net (Tr. 92, 93; 302 B).

New creation of the bad man into a good one proposed. If they the sophists know how to destroy men and make them good and thoughtful, let them try their hands on the youngster present, or if the juveniles are afraid, let the experiment be made on the old body of me, Socrates, by this modern Medea the Colchian (Tr. iii. 69; Euthyd. 285 A, B).

Nightingale does not lament any more than the swan, or hoopoe, or swallow, when it sings its plaint; this singing is a mark of pleasure rather than of pain (Tr. i. 88; Phæd. 85 A).

No one thing declared to be any thing, by Protagoras (Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 152 D); it is asserted that specific names are of no use (ib.).

Nominalist and realist controversy exhibited in the Parmenides in one or other of its shapes, throughout, and to its close (Tr. iii. 468; 166 A, B); this applies also to the earlier portions of the Cratylus.

Nonentity declared to be inconceivable, unutterable, unpronounceable, unreasonable (Tr. iii. 137, 138, 141; Sophist, 238 C, E; 239 A; 241 A); he who confutes it is obliged to assume the contrary supposition in his own mind, at least for the time being (Tr. 137; 238 D); it cannot be said to exist, nor to be qualified by the additions "one" or "many" (Tr. 138; 239 B); non-existence spoken of as existing, and existence as not existing, by false reasonings (Tr. 141; 241 A, D);

further discussion of the point (Tr. 167, 168; 257 C); nonentity alleged to have an existence as much as entity (Tr. 175; 262 C); nonentity, when attaching to what is discoursed on or opined, produces false opinion, and the Sophist, if he says that no one can think or speak about nonentity, denies the possibility of falsehood (Tr. 167 to 175; 257 C to 262 B).

νοούμενα. It is asked whether fire exists *per se*, whether all we see by the bodily senses is what alone possesses truth, and whether it is absurd to speak of any form cognisable by the intellect only? If intellect and true sense perception both exist, each are to a certain extent independent, and there are ideal forms, *νοούμενα*. But if these be one and the same, as some affirm, there is no true distinction between what is phænomenal and what is intelligible, and our bodily sensations must be fixed on the securest basis (Tr. ii. 357, 358; Tim. 51 B, C, D). Here, too, *δέξα* is distinguished from *νοῦς*, as natural impression opposed to a pure intellectual judgment.

Nothing is absolutely self-existent (Tr. i. 383, 387; Theæt. 153 E; 154 A; 157 A); only a perpetual producing, not being (ib.); we speak of "being" only in accordance with custom (Tr. 387; 157 B; neither the "Ego" nor anything else has fixedness (ib.); all is produced, effected, changes, perishes, and in speaking collectively of "man" or "stone" or any other genus this must be kept in mind (ib.; Tr. 388; 157 C); can there be a notion in the mind of "nothing" as a typical idea? (Tr. iii. 411, 412; Parm. 132 B); nothing is, if the one is not (Tr. 469; 166 C).

Nothingness *οὐδενία* of humanity weighed by the divine standard (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 C; Tr. 309; Phædr. 235 A).

Nouns by themselves, as lion, stag, horse, imply neither entity nor non-entity until a verb is added, when discourse is produced, no matter how short (Tr. iii. 175; Sophist, 262 C, D).

νοῦς signifies the pure intellect or reason. It is that which, as presiding over the universe, ordains and is the cause of all, though not independent of *ψυχή*, life (Tr. iv. 41, 42; Phileb. 30 C); it is the attribute of deity and the higher class of men, and is closely associated with *ἐπιστήμη* and *φρονήσις*, but it has also the more ordinary signification of mind in its practical every-day bearings. Its function is *νόησις* and its product is *νόημα*, while the lack of it is expressed by *ἄνοους*, *ἄνοια*, though these last often imply misdirection or derangement of intellect. It enters largely into combination and has a considerable family of cognates, of which *διάνοια*, mediate intelligence, or understanding of the actual relations of things, through the joint operations of sensation and reflection, is the chief. There are also *εὐνοια*, benevolent sentiment, *πρόνοια*, forethought. (See Etymology of *νόησις* as *τοῦ νέου*

ἔσις, Tr. iii. 337; Cratyl. 411 D). *voûs* has its own objects apart from sense, hence termed *νοούμενα*, and Plato, distinguishing between the intellectual conception and the sensible diagram, in geometry, observes that "no man of mind will ever confound in one and the same class the things perceived by the reason and these in respect of their unchangeableness with what are delineated in diagrams" (Tr. iv. 525, 526; Epist. vii. 343 A).

Number, or the gift of computation, is akin to reason (Tr. vi. 78; Epin. 976 A, B); it is the cause of all good things (Tr. 11; 978 A); he that is destitute of it is evil, and will not be able to attain just views of the good and fair. What is irrational, disorderly, formless, un-rhythmical, and ill harmonized lacks it (Tr. 11; 978 B); what part of it is even? (Tr. i. 471, 472; Euthyp. 12 D); number is common to all arts, that of war particularly (Tr. ii. 211, 214; Rep. 522 C, E; 525 B); Palamedes in the tragedy that goes by this name makes Agamemnon ridiculous, as if he did not know how to count his feet (Tr. 211; 522 D); number is in the class of things which relate to the intellect and leads to essential existence, *οὐσία*, though not always rightly employed (Tr. 211; 523 A); it is necessary to the philosopher for laying hold of *οὐσία*, when emerging from the sphere of the mutable *γένεσις* (Tr. 214; 525 B); number is not to be studied as hucksters do, for the sake of buying and selling, but by means of *νόησις*, and for the soul's sake in distinguishing *οὐσία* from *γένεσις* (Tr. 214; 525 C, D); number must not have to do with concrete visible numbers (ib.); clever reasoners will not allow of the division of the absolute one into parts (Tr. 215; 525 E); number here spoken of is only such as can be mentally conceived, and leads to pure truth (Tr. 215; 526 A); it quickens the wits of even the slow witted (Tr. 215; 526 B); it must be laboriously studied by the best intellects (Tr. 215; 526 C). The perfect number is discoursed on thus: "Now the dissolution is this. Not only to terrene plants, but also animals, a period of productiveness or motivity and the opposite, of soul and body happens, when the cycles attain their outer limit, cycles quickly run through by the short-lived, and slowly by the long." Even the wise, however, do not study to secure for their offspring a good horoscope. That which is divinely begotten is comprehended in the period of the perfect number, not so that which is human (Tr. ii. 235; Rep. 546 A, B, C, D). See also what is said on the number 729 (Tr. 278; Rep. 587 D, E); the powers of numbers are referred to (Tr. 361, 362; Tim. 54 B; Tr. i. 375, 376; Theæt. 147 D; 148 B; Tr. vi. 33; Epin. 990 E; Tr. iii. 204; Statesm. 266 B; Tr. vi. 157; Tim. Locr. 98 A; Tr. ii. 278; Rep. 587 D). See Ast's Lex.

Numbers, the multitude are not of chief account, all wealth and

numbers yield to virtue as shown in battle (Tr. iv. 194; Menex. 240 D).

Numbness produced by the electric torpedo (Tr. iii. 17, 18, 25; Meno. 80 A, C; 84 B, C).

Nurses. "Do you want us to tell with a smile how we are prescribing laws that a woman while *enceinte* is to walk about and to fashion her embryo like wax that is supple, and to keep her infant in baby clothes till it is two years old, or how we shall further compel nurses, by law, under fine, to be constantly carrying their babies into the fields or to the temples, or to call on their gossips, until they are well able to stand, and then, too, taking care that their limbs while they are still tender be not bent under the strong pressure of their weight, and thus to toil in carrying them till the children have completed their third year, it being provided that these nurses shall be as strong as possible (Tr. v. 251, 252; Laws, 789 E); nurses are to be provided for the children of the state (Tr. ii. 144; Rep. 460 C, D).

Nutriments, when bodies take most exercise they most need the support of food (Tr. v. 250; Laws, 789 A; Tr. iv. 189, 190; Menex. 237 E).

νυμφόληπτος, excited to phrensy, "Listen to me, then, in silence, truly the locality seems divine, so that if I become maddened as the discourse proceeds do not wonder, for what I am now uttering is no longer far removed from dithyrambs" (Tr. i. 313; Phædr. 238 D).

Nymphs. "By Juno it is a beautiful retirement. The plane tree itself is wide, embracing and lofty, and the height of the *Agnus castus* with its dense shade is very inviting, and as it is in the perfection of flowering, so it scents the whole place most fragrantly. Right under the plane tree, too, there flows a most delicious spring of cold water, as you may be convinced by wetting your foot. It seems also to be a place sacred to some of the nymphs and to Achelous from the number of figures and statues. Or if you prefer it, contemplate the freshness of the spot, how lovely and excessively pleasant it is, and how it is all resonant, summer-like and shrill, with the chorus of cicadæ; but the thing to glory in most of all is the grass, because, being disposed in a gentle slope, it is naturally fitted to enable a person to reline his head on it with ease and comfort" (Tr. i. 304; Phædr. 230 B, C). So unusual is this kind of love of scenery with Socrates, that Phædrus attributes the passing transport to this circumstance, and adds, "Yes, but you, my remarkable friend, are such a very strange and uncommon person. In what you say you are positively like *ξαναγουμένω τινι* και *οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ*, one who is shown about by a friend as a stranger, and not a resident of the country, so little do you ever travel beyond the bounds of the city or territory, or even seldom go outside

the walls." Socrates replies, "Pardon me, I am a diligent student, to whom country and trees teach nothing, but only men in their social capacity" (Tr. 305; 230 D, E).

O.

Oak of Dodona, said to be vocal, a quotation from *Odyss.* xix. 163, *οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἔσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης*, of which Plato is very fond: "It was sufficient for the men of that day to hear sounds from an oak or the rocky cavern, if only such spoke truth, because of their simplicity (Tr. i. 355; *Phædr.* 275 B; Tr. 22; *Apol.* 34 D; Tr. iii. 103; *Sophist.* 216 B; Tr. ii. 21, 22; *Rep.* 544 D). "I am not made of stone."—*Shak.*, *Rich.* III., act iii. sc. 7.

οἰριστής (Tr. iv. 460; *Minos*, 319 E).

Object and subject unfriendly; "if neither the loved nor the loving, neither the similar nor dissimilar, neither the good nor those related to them are friendly, I have no more to say" (Tr. i. 507; *Lys.* 222 E).

Observance of law is a source of safety; when laws are once imposed all security is placed in their observance. If the conquerors show themselves subject to the laws more than the conquered, all things will be full of safety and happiness, and there will be a means of escape from all evils (Tr. iv. 518; *Epist.* vii. 337 C, D).

Ocean, the source from whence all the gods derive their origin. Socrates is showing how Protagoras, in private, taught his particular disciples what he did not openly teach, that out of transference and motion and mixture with one another all things are produced; that when we speak of them as existing we do not speak correctly, for nothing ever is, but only becomes, on which all the wise men but Parmenides are agreed, Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and the chief writers of both sorts of poetry, as Epicharmus in comedy and Homer in tragedy, when he speaks of Ocean and Tethys as the source and mother of the gods, implying that all things spring from flow and movement (Tr. i. 382; *Theæt.* 152 D, E); how many cups of water there are in the ocean, said by way of illustration. The leaders in philosophy do not from infancy know their way to the forum, nor where the courts or senate-house are, nor any other common place of assembly in the city. As to laws or decrees, either spoken or written, they neither see nor hear them; while as to electioneering partizanships and synods and suppers and revels with piping women, to frequent such never occurs to them even in a dream. Whether a man has been born in the city, of good or base parentage, or what blot there is in his scutcheon from his ancestors, is more thoroughly unknown

to them than how many cups of water there are in the ocean, as the saying goes. Their body only has its lair in the city, while their minds, accounting all these things small and nothing, and utterly despising them, are borne on the wing, according to Pindar, measuring the things below the earth or on its surface by geometry, and looking to the heavens above through astronomy, and busied with the investigation of the whole of nature, nor ever lowering their contemplations to things near (Tr. i. 408, 409; Theæt. 173 D, E; 174 A).

Odd and even, their difference. Three is three, and odd, but the numerical designation and the oddness and evenness are not to be confounded (Tr. i. 111; Phæd. 103 E; Tr. 111; 104 A, B); the odd will cease to be, rather than become even, though not so the number when made even, nor are two contrary to three (Tr. 112, 113; 104 C, D, E; 105 A, B, C); followed by the inconsequent application of this rubbish to the doctrine of the soul's immortality, though the objection to which it is subjected that, when odd takes the place of even, the even perishes, is admitted (Tr. 115; 106 C); the even and odd are frequently spoken of by Plato as synonymous with the whole of arithmetical computation, almost of the reasoning faculty. Thus in connexion with *μετρητικὴ τέχνη*, "but what if the safety of life consisted in the choice of odd and even, when it behoved to choose rightly the more or the less or the same in relation to the same, and the different to the different, whether near or far off, what is it would preserve our lives? is it not knowledge, the art of mensuration, and seeing that it is that of even and odd is this not arithmetic?" Tr. 288; Protag. 356 E; 357 A; Tr. 141 to 144; Gorg. 451 A, B, C; 453 E; 454 A). In the Laws, in the selection of half a number of persons, we are directed, when the number is odd, to subtract one (Tr. v. 506; Laws, 946 A, B). It belongs to soul to be invisible, cognisant and intellectually apprehended, participant of memory and the power of calculation in the changes of even and odd (Tr. vi. 16, 17; Epin. 981 B, C).

Offences great, mostly spring from the possession of unlimited power (Tr. i. 230; Gorg. 525 D).

Offspring to be provided with mother's milk. Nature takes care that this shall be the case. Every thing that begets has abundant sustenance for that which it may bring forth, by which circumstance the mother who is really such can be distinguished from her who is not but falsely claims to be such, if she has no source of nutriment for the offspring (Tr. iv. 189, 190; Menex. 237 E).

Oil is injurious to plants and the hair of every animal but man (Tr. i. 252; Protag. 324 B).

οιονδιστική, its etymology (Tr. i. 320; Phædr. 244 C, B).

οἶων for ὥστε by attraction with a preceding genitive followed by ζητεῖν (Tr. ii. 187; Rep. 499 A).

οἷας omitted after τοῖαςδε (Tr. 293; Rep. 603 E).

οὔποτε by attraction, οὐκοῦν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ δμοίου ἔρχηται οὔποτε δ βέλτιστος (Tr. ii. 281; Rep. 590 C); though Stallbaum treats this as a case of the preposition omitted, and adds ἐκ τινων ἄλλων ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται (Tr. i. 14; Apol. 27 D; also Tr. 144, 220; Gorg. 453 E; 516 C; Tr. 78; Phæd. 76 D).

Old age. It is a shameful and God-aborred thing to see an insult inflicted by a young man on one who is older. It is seemly for every young man when struck by an old one to check his anger by conceding this measure of respect to old age (Tr. v. 397, 398; Laws, 879 C); old age is an obstacle to travelling. Plato observes, "I am incapacitated from want of bodily power, and by reason of my time of life, from running about and encountering all the hazards one meets with by land and sea, and at present there is nothing but danger in travelling (Tr. iv. 548; Epist. xi. 358 E); much is to be learnt from those who have preceded us on the same road that we have to pursue (Tr. ii. 3; Rep. 328 E); we should inquire what sort of road it is, whether rough and impracticable, or smooth and easily traversed (ib.); and from you I should like to know what it appears to you who are already, as the poets say, on the threshold of old age (ib.). I will tell you, Socrates, how it appears to me, for often some of us of similar age assemble at the same spot, making good the old proverb (birds of a feather). Most of us when congregated indulge a strain of complaint, desiring the pleasures of a youth that is gone irrecoverably and recalling to mind all about our amours and the drinking bouts and banquetings and all their attendant excesses, and are indignant as if we had been robbed of some great good and had then lived a jovial life, but now can no longer be said to live (Tr. 3, 4; 329 A); but some bewail the insults which old age has to endure from relatives, and in keeping with this indulge a strain which makes old age the cause of I know not how many ills. These seem to me, however, Socrates, not to blame the right cause, for, were it so, I, too, should have experienced the same by reason of age, and all others who have attained the same period of years. But I have met with others who have not been thus affected, and I was present once when Sophocles the poet was questioned by some one (Tr. 4; 329 B), 'How is it with you as to the pleasures of female intercourse; can you associate with the sex as formerly?' 'Hush,' said he, 'man; this is what I have avoided with the most absolute satisfaction, as I would a fierce and frantic master.' It appeared to me that he answered well at that time, and my opinion is still unchanged, for in old age there is alto-

gether much peace and freedom from such passions, seeing that when the desires cease to be upon the stretch and come to be unstrung, the remark of Sophocles holds good (Tr. 4; 329 C); it is to be freed from very many and furious masters. But as respects these and what was alleged against relatives, there is one reason, and that not old age, Socrates, but the turn and temper of the men. Were they scrupulously careful in their habits and free from irritability, even old age would be only moderately burdensome, but otherwise old age and youth become unbearable in the same way" (Tr. 4; 329 D). In what follows it is discussed, what poverty and riches have to do with increasing or lessening its hardships (Tr. 5; 329 E); the case of Themistocles is cited, who answered a certain Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that it was not through his own merits but the glory of his city that he had gained a good name, by observing that neither would this have been the case had he been a Seriphian, nor would the Seriphian have become famous had he been an Athenian (Tr. 5; 330 A); the man when dying or near his end has thoughts and fears for a hereafter which are intensified by the weakness of old age. This leads him to recall to mind whom he has injured, and to start up in his dreams; while to the man who is conscious to himself of no wrong, as Pindar says, sweet hope, the nurse of his old age, shedding her blandishments round his heart, is his companion, she who most of all steers the ever-shifting rudder of the thought of mortals (Tr. 5, 6; 330 D, E; 331 A); old age is not favourable to learning or other activity, as Solon declares, but geometry, arithmetic, and the whole propædæutic for dialectics is to be urged upon youth (Tr. 226, 227; 536 D), but not enforced (ib.; Tr. 227; 536 E).

Old follies and reign of sensuality. The abandonment of these well described. When the former man of pleasure has acquired another ruling power in himself, intelligence and moderation in place of love and madness, he has become another person unknown to the object of his earlier affections, who demands the fulfilment of his promises. But for shame he dares not explain the change nor that he holds the oaths and protestations of the former senseless reign to be incompatible with his newly-acquired mental qualifications (Tr. i. 316; Phædr. 241 A, B).

Old men are to act prudently before the young; we ought to leave our children much modesty, not much gold. We think that by rebuking young persons when they act disgracefully we shall leave them this. But this is not to be accomplished by mere precept directly enjoined. The wise lawgiver will rather exhort older men to act modestly before the young, and to be specially cautious above all things that no younger man ever sees or hears them doing or saying anything dis-

reputable (Tr. v. 156; Laws, 729 A, B); where old men are modest, there young men will be more so. The best education both for the young and for themselves is not advice merely, but that what a man may say when he admonishes another he should be seen to do through life (Tr. 157; 729 C); old men spoken of as no better than children (Tr. i. 38; Crito, 49 A).

Old wives referred to as shaking their wise heads and crying "good," "good," while chatting and gossiping together (Tr. ii. 28, 29; Rep. 350 E).

Olden time. Socrates asks, "What is the cause, Hippias, that those ancients whose names are accounted great by virtue of their wisdom, Pittacus, Bias, Thales, and their successors, down to Anaxagoras, either all or most of them appear to have abstained from mixing in public affairs? What else, think you, Socrates, than that they were unfit and incompetent to attain by their intelligence both kinds of excellency, public and private? Is it, then, by Zeus, says Socrates, that just as other arts have grown, and as the men of old were despicable by the side of the moderns, we must say that that of you sophists has improved, and that your fathers were nought in wisdom compared with you?" (Tr. iv. 212; Hipp. Maj. 281 C, D).

Oligarchy and democracy, what (Tr. iii. 245, 246; Statesm. 291 D, E); described as based upon the census of property, where the rich rule and the poor have no share of power (Tr. ii. 239; Rep. 550 C); the change out of a timarchy is effected by gold and silver and stores of wealth and an expensive style of living (Tr. 239; 550 D); the love of virtue declines, as the love of wealth usurps its place (Tr. 239, 240; 550 E; 551 A); when men require captains for ships, they do not appoint them on the ground of their being rich, but they choose out those who are the best sailors, however poor. Seeing, however, that a state is of far more consequence than a ship, *a fortiori* we stand in need of good rulers not rich ones (Tr. 240; 551 C); a state, where the rich are thus privileged above the poor, will be two, and be made up of hostile factions scheming against each other (Tr. 241; 551 D, E); under such a polity, one man may buy up or sell the chattels of his fellow-men (Tr. 241; 552 A); magistrates who are spendthrifts and are only seeming and specious are drones in the hive and the curse of the swarm, and being without stings themselves are exposed to the fearful stings of some of the soldier bees (Tr. 241; 552 C); this latter class are mischievous, and wherever beggars exist there are sure to be among them thieves, cutpurses, and sacrilegious persons (Tr. 242; 552 D); these always constitute the majority in an oligarchy (Tr. 242; 552 E); objections to such a polity (Tr. 242;

553 A); how the oligarchic man has been changed from the timocratic by seeing his father's fortunes wrecked, and that that father is proscribed, banished, or condemned to death (Tr. 242, 243; 553 B, C); he sets up a throne and a king in his mind bedecked with tiaras and jewelled swords, passing rapidly from ambition or love of honour to avarice or love of wealth (Tr. 243; 553 D); the oligarchic man sets up a blind Plutus in himself as the guide of his troop of desires which are dronish (Tr. 243; 554 A, B); he plunders orphans, and where he does good only does so from fear, while he assumes a mere semblance of virtue (Tr. 244; 554 C, D, E); he is a parsimonious and money-making man (Tr. 244; 555 A).

One regarded as many. Socrates calls attention to the natural wonder that has passed into a proverb, that one is many and the many one (Tr. iv. 9, 10; Phileb. 14 C). Protarchus asks, if he alludes to the case, for instance, of himself being naturally one, and yet bearing ten thousand relations to others. This, says Socrates, is the popular marvel about the one and many, but by universal consent regarded as unnecessary, childish, and confusing (Tr. 10; 14 D); we need not confute the allegation of oneness in things not susceptible of birth or decay, but when it is attempted to lay down one man, one ox, and one good and fair, about such unities a very zealous scrutiny with all its minute divisions is requisite (Tr. 11; 15 A); for first, if we are to assume such monads as really existing, we have to inquire as to these, how each one being always the same, and neither admitting production nor decay, is at the same time most fixedly one; and after this, in the case again of things produced and infinite in number, whether it is to be asserted that this oneness exists dispersed and having become many, or that it is in itself a whole separately, and, as seems most impossible, is the same and one at the same time, both in the one and the many (Tr. 12; 15 B, C, D). See Tr. iii. 224; Statesm. 278 C, on this dispersion or distribution. As an example of the one and many, the voice is brought forward as having this unity, with infinitude of difference of pitch and variety in the same person or different individuals (Tr. 16, 17 B); the infinite is baffling, we must ascend through the many to the one (Tr. 18; 18 A). The application of this to the original matter of inquiry is next introduced. "Was not our argument at the outset about intelligence and pleasure, which of them was to be made choice of? and we said indeed that each of them was one? but how is each of them one and many, and how are they not directly infinite but each of a specific number?" (Tr. 20; 18 E); the one will not be many and is neither part nor whole. If it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle, nor end; it is therefore infinite and without figure and nowhere, nor can it exist in time, nor

partake of being, nor even be thought. Looked at in the other way all these assertions suffer contradiction, and like Kant's antinomies devour one another, or wage eternal war (Tr. iii. 420 to 469; Parmen. 137 A to 166 C); the one, as non-existent, partakes as it would seem of equality, magnitude, smallness, and also of existence (Tr. 468; 161 E); "one" is not "the others" nor "the many," nor *vice versâ* (Tr. 468; 165 E); the one not being in the rest or the others, neither the many nor the one are the others; nor do they appear one or many, seeing that the rest or "others" have no participation at all with any of non-existences, nor is any of non-existences present with any of the "others," there being no part to non-existences. Nor is there any more an opinion or notion nor fancy of the non-existent present to the "others," nor is it opined in the case of the "others" (Tr. 468; 166 A); whether the one is or is not, both it and "the others" are altogether all things with relation to themselves and "the others," and are not, and appear, and do not appear (Tr. 469; 166 C); the difficulty of conceiving how one by halving can become two (Tr. i. 103, 108; Phæd. 97 A, B; 101 C, D).

ὄρα and *ὕρα* (Tr. iv. 23, 106; Phileb. 20 C; 65 E; Tr. iii. 223, 225; Statesm. 277 D; 278 E; Tr. i. 389; Theæt. 158 B, D; Tr. ii. 63, 164, 209, 223, 264, 265; Rep. 382 E; 476 C, D; 520 C, D; 533 C; 574 E; 576 A; Tr. v. 548; Laws, 969 D); Shakespeare, 2 Hen. VI.

Opinion, true and false: Philebus asserts that joy and pleasure and gratification are in all cases a good, but our present concern is with being thoughtful, intelligent, and of strong memory, added to correct opinion and true reasoning, which are far more desirable (Tr. iv. 3; Phileb. 11 B); without true opinion and memory you would not know whether you were joyous or not (Tr. 24, 25; 21 B); nor could you fancy nor calculate that you ever would be, but would live like an oyster (Tr. 25; 21 C). Protarchus asks, How can pleasures be true or false? to which the reply is, And how, Protarchus, could fears be true or false, or expectations or opinions? (Tr. 52, 53; 36 C); opinions may be true or false but not the feelings (Tr. 53; 36 D); how is it that opinion is false or true, and pleasure only true? (Tr. 54, 55; 37 B); are falsehood and truth both attributes of opinion? (Tr. 55; 37 C); if correctness be added to opinion it becomes correct opinion (Tr. 55; 37 D); pleasures often co-exist with false opinion (Tr. 56; 37 E); but we do not in the same way speak of false pleasure (Tr. 56; 38 A); memory and the senses and affections write words in our souls which, when true, produce true opinions, when false, false (Tr. 58; 39 A); a draughtsman succeeds to the penman and draws images in our souls (Tr. 59; 39 B); memory, intelligence, science, true opinion are of the same class (Tr. 97; 60 D, E); there are false pleasures in the

mind which mimic the true, and opinion may be so freely indulged that the man may opine what has not been, is not, nor ever shall be (Tr. 60, 61; 40 O, D); a pattern is described as that which is rightly conceived by opinion, which can enable us to form a true opinion of itself or its original, it is that which brings together into one what exists distributed in both (Tr. iii. 224; Statesm. 278 C; Tr. iv. 11, 12; Philebus 15 B); true opinion of the beautiful and just and good and their opposites, when really existing with fixity, I speak of as being a divine sentiment in a divine race, when it occurs in souls (Tr. iii. 276; Statesm. 309 C); how can any one proceeding from false opinion arrive at the least particle of truth? (Tr. 225; 278 D, E); the good horse of the tripartite soul has true opinion (Tr. i. 330; Phædr. 253 D); a man would still be a good guide if he had correct opinion, though he might never have travelled a certain road. This true opinion, then, is not inferior to knowledge in such a case (Tr. iii. 44, 45; Meno. 97 B, C; 98 B, C); true opinions when chained like the statutes of Dædalus are admirable (Tr. 44; 97 D); knowledge differs from true opinion by the chain (Tr. 44; 97 E); further references (Tr. 45, 47; 98 C; 99 A, B; case of Themistocles and other gifted men who did not govern by knowledge (Tr. 47; 99 C, D); it is in this same way that virtue is present to us (Tr. 48; 99 E; 100 B); in the questions applied to elicit the latent capability of the boy carried on (Tr. 25, 26; 84 D, E; 85 A, B), Socrates elicits only his, the boy's, own opinion. This was not knowledge but true opinion, which may exist in an ignorant person in a dreamy way (Tr. 25; 84 C); these true opinions are latent and may be roused by questioning (Tr. 28; 86 A). Opinion true and false are referred to (Tr. i. 425; Theæt. 187 C); the question is asked whether science or knowledge is true opinion? (ib.; Tr. 425 to 433; 187 E to 193 C); an example given of false opinion (Tr. 433; 193 C); objects seen at a distance are often confounded and interchanged with one another (ib.); true opinion is beautiful, false opinion is ugly (Tr. 434; 194 O); opinion is either the one or the other according as the mental wax is pure or well-tempered, or the opposite (Tr. 435; 194 E; 195 A); the rhetorician's art aims at true opinion, not knowledge (Tr. 443; 201 A); true opinion becomes the latter when conjoined with reason (Tr. 443, 444; 201 B; 202 C); a true opinion may be had of composites, but not of elements (Tr. 444; 202 B); true opinion involves a knowledge of difference or distinctive character (Tr. 453, 454, 455; 208 E; 209 D; 210 B); false opinion is the greatest misfortune (Tr. 186; Gorg. 488, B); true opinion or notion is intermediate between ignorance and knowledge (Tr. iii. 532; Symp. 202 A); employed to illustrate the character of love (ib.); importance of right opinion in the warrior

- class (Tr. ii. 114; Rep. 430 A, B, C); the worthlessness of the opinion of the multitude (Tr. i. 32, 33; Crito, 44 C); opinion of the crowd about the Just and Good (Tr. 36; 47 D); does opinion originate in the senses? (Tr. 102; Phæd. 96 B); false opinion is opposed to true thought as ignorance to wisdom (Tr. 404; Theæt. 170 C); opinion is intermediate, distinct both from ignorance and knowledge or science (Tr. ii. 163, 164 to 166; Rep. 476 E; 477 A, B, C, D, E; 478 A, B, C, D); opinion is not necessarily about the non-existent, yet is it more shadowy than knowledge, more bright than ignorance (ib.; Tr. 167; 479 D, E); admirable account of the soul as garrisoned by false opinions and presumptuous reasonings (Tr. 249, 250; 560 C, D, E).
- Opinions spoken of as a blind groping in the dark compared with science in its brightness and beauty (Tr. ii. 195; Rep. 506 C, D).
- Opposite and related, if neither of these is friendly, no more can be said (Tr. i. 507; Lys. 222 E); the opposite is only one (Tr. 262, 263; Protog. 332 D; 333 A, B).
- Opposites and dissimilars full of friendship, poor man to the rich, weak to the strong, the sick man to his doctor, the ignorant to the knowing, and generally opposites to opposites, as dry to moist, heat to cold, bitter to sweet, sharp to blunt, empty to full, &c. (Tr. i. 497; Lys. 215 C, D, E); opposites are not to be confounded (Tr. iv. 6; Phileb. 12 E); opposites become the same according to the doctrine of Protagoras (Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 152 E); the compatibility and incompatibility of opposites being in the same thing at the same time (Tr. 109, 110; Phædo, 102 B, C, D, E); it is asked whether what is now said does not conflict with the law previously laid down, that life originates from death? (Tr. 110; 103 A); Socrates declares that it is rather the coexistence in us and in nature of two opposite or contradictory conditions at one and the same time (Tr. 110; 103 B); heat differs from fire and so does cold from snow, and fire goes out when cold approaches (Tr. 111; 103 D); desire of opposites (Tr. iii. 501; Symp. 186 B); antagonism to be reconciled (Tr. 501; 186 D); the parallel cases of physic and music, the latter implanting a love between acute and grave (Tr. 503; 187 A, C); the impossibility of the coexistence of opposites is a test of identity or difference (Tr. ii. 121, 122; Rep. 436 E; 437 A); examples of this are assent and dissent, catching at and shrinking from, attraction and repulsion (Tr. 122; 437 B, C); we are attracted to what we desire, repelled, where not willing or wishing or desiring (ib.). *See Thirst and Thirsty.*
- Opposition, there is a law of it in all production and reproduction, that of beauty from deformity and life from death, both in plants and animals (Tr. i. 70 to 72; Phædo, 70 E to 72 A); were it not for this law, if change operated only in one direction, all would be annihilated

(Tr. 72; 72 B); case of sleeping and waking (Tr. 72; 7½ O); if sleeping were perpetual, the story of Endymion would be a joke (ib.) Oracle chaunters, seers, and poets to be spoken of as persons inspired, who are merely the medium of unconsciously-uttered truths (Tr. iii. 47; Meno. 99 C); what designation have Bacis, and the Sibyl, and our countryman Amphilytus? what other, Socrates, than oracle chaunters? (Tr. iv. 406, 407; Theag. 124 D).

Oral utterance spoken of as a stream of speech and reason; those who disposed our fabric in the way it is now disposed furnished the organ of the mouth with teeth, and tongue, and lips, for the sake of what was necessary, and in order to produce a perfect result, contriving that it should be an entrance for the due support of our bodies by food, and the channel of exit for the mind's best utterance. All which enters it to give nutriment to the body may be termed necessary, but the stream of speech and reason that flows outwards, and is the hand-maid of intellect, is the noblest and best of streams (Tr. ii. 388; Tim. 75 E). So Cicero: "*Jam vero domina rerum (ut vos soletis dicere) eloquendi vis, quam est præclara, quamque divina? quæ primum efficit ut ea quæ ignoramus, discere et ea quæ scimus alios docere possimus. Deinde hac cohortamur, hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos, hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes comprimimus, hac cupiditates iracundias que restinguimus, hæc nos juris, legum, urbium societate devinxit; hæc a vita immani et fera segregavit.*" Cio. de Nat. Deor. lib. ii. 59, 148. Speaking of the tongue, Shakespeare says:

"Where like a sweet melodious bird it sung
Sweet varied notes, enchanting every ear."

Tit. Andron., act iii. sc. 1.

Orator speaking when ignorant of his subject. Were I, says Socrates to Alcibiades, to lay hold of you when about to mount the Bema on occasion of the Athenians being about to consult, and to ask are you going to join the debate, and is it because you are better informed than these, what would be your answer? (Tr. iv. 316; Alcib. I. 106 E); was it not then said that as regards what is just and unjust, Alcibiades, the beautiful son of Clinias, did not know, but supposed he knew, and ventured to go to the Ecclesia to give his advice to the Athenians on points of which he knew nothing? (Tr. 327; 113 B); what further special difference is there between the orator and the well-informed individual in such a meeting, than that the former would sway the masses and the latter convince some one? (Tr. 329, 330; 114 D); the orator ought to know how to discern souls; since the power of reasoning draws the soul, it is requisite for him who is to be an orator to know how many forms of soul there are. The orator

must in fact understand the temper of his hearers (Tr. i. 351; Phædr. 271 C, D); Gorgias declares that he can make a man an orator (Tr. 150; Gorg. 458 E); the same will be more persuasive even than a physician on matters of health (Tr. 150, 147; 459 A; 456 B); among those who know no better (Tr. 150; 459 A); the orator or rhetorician declared to be of no value (Tr. 158; 466 B); is said to have no power (ib.); the orator like the tyrant kills, banishes, and robs whom he likes (Tr. 159; 466 C); he cannot attain what he wants but only what seems to be best (Tr. 159; 466 D, E; 467 A); he is superior to the man who cannot speak (Tr. i. 313, 314; Phædr. 238 E).

Orators who speak but cannot compose speeches. "I see, said he, some makers of speeches who know not how to use the speeches they themselves make, just as lyre-makers with their lyres, but here we have others able to use what the former have elaborated, while they themselves are incapable of composing" (Tr. iii. 75; Euthyd. 289 D). This distinction is dwelt on (Tr. 97; 305 B, C); the men who make speeches seem to be excessively wise, and their art a certain divinely-inspired and lofty one, when I am in their presence. Nor is this wonderful. It is a department of the art of incantations, but little inferior thereto, seeing that the art of incantation is a charming of vipers, tarantulas, and scorpions and other venomous beasts and diseases, while that of judges and members of the Ecclesia is likewise a charming and assuaging (Tr. 76; 290 A). Socrates describes the effect which the orators have on him, to which Menexenus replies, "You are always quizzing the orators, Socrates" (Tr. iv. 185; Menex. 235 B, C, D).

Oratory is a species of incantation (Tr. iii. 76; Euthyd. 290 A); is better than gold (Tr. i. 302; Phædr. 228 A); the man unskilled in it is inferior to the orator (Tr. 313, 314; 238 E); when an orator ignorant of what is good or evil undertakes to persuade a community that is similarly circumstanced, not elaborating the praise of an ass's shadow, as if it were a horse, but representing evil as good and assiduously courting the opinions of the crowd, would persuade them to do evil in lieu of good, what fruit, seeing what is sowed, do you suppose the oratory will hereafter reap? (Tr. 337, 338; 260 C); but Oratory may retort, "Have we not, my good friend, abused the art of speaking somewhat too coarsely?" and she would say, "Why do you wisecracks play the fool? I compel no one ignorant of truth to learn public speaking, but under my advice, if a man possesses that gift he thereupon has recourse to me. I say this emphatically, that without me the man who knows the truth will not the more be able to persuade by art" (Tr. 338; 260 D); objection that oratory is no art, but an inartificial expertness (Tr. 338; 260 E); will not special pleading in courts be an

- art which makes the same thing to appear to the same persons at one time, just, and when it wishes, unjust? do we not know that Palamedes of Elea (Zeno) spoke by art so as to make like and unlike, one and many, bodies at rest and in motion appear the same to his auditors? (Tr. 339, 353; 261 D; 273 B); no art of speaking is worth the name that does not grasp the true (Tr. 338; 260 E); the capability of becoming perfect in speaking reasonably and of necessity holds the same as in other things. If you are naturally an orator you will become pre-eminently so by the addition of science and practice, but in so far as you lack these you will be imperfect. With respect to its character as an art the method of it will not, as I fancy, be exemplified by following the path of Tisias and Thrasymachus (Tr. 348; 269 D); is oratory based on truth, or is it mere rounded phraseology? (Tr. 309; 234 E); apparent repetition and redundancy for the sake of display (Tr. 309; 235 A); every speech should be consistent, like an animal having its own entire body, so as to be neither without head or feet, but to have intermediate members as well as extremities adapted to each other and composed for a total effect (Tr. 342, 343; 264 C).
- Order, its beauty makes the soul good (Tr. i. 210; Gorg. 507 D, E); it is moderation (Tr. 209; 507 A).
- Orders, various, are enumerated, such as plantigrade, biped, quadruped winged, apterous, &c. (Tr. iii. 206; Statesm. 266 E).
- Ornamental and sacred spots occupied by statuary (Tr. i. 304; Phædr. 230 B).
- Orphans, sympathetic feeling for their deserted state on the part of the supreme deities and their dead parents (Tr. v. 480; Laws, 927 A, B).
- Orpheus as companion in the other world (Tr. i. 28; Apol. 41 A).
- Orphic, some modes of life were so termed by virtue of their employing only food without life, and abstaining from all living creatures (Laws, 782 D); various references to these institutes occur elsewhere. *See* Art. Mysteries.
- ἄσπουπερ, by attraction with τοῦ ἴσου, in lieu of an adverbial form (Tr. iii. 77, 78; Euthyd. 291 C).
- ᾗτι, with accusative and infinitive. *See* my "Syntax of the Relative Pronoun," page 84 (Tr. ii. 258; Rep. 568 B).
- οὐ, οὐκ, postponed and the subject of the sentence put first (Tr. ii. 281; Rep. 590 B); three times repeated, οὐκοῦν, though the conjunction thus accented has no negative force, and the passage in which it is found admits of the question being put affirmatively; where an affirmative answer is expected, we generally in English introduce "not" in this case: *ex.* "does it not?" answer, "yes." *See* Tr 283; Rep. 592 A, for one example out of many.

οὐδένας and its cases used in the plural (Tr. iv. 394; Alcib. II. 148 C, E; Tr. ii. 322, 323; Tim. 20 B).

οὐδενίᾳ, Socrates speaks of his nothingness (Tr. i. 309; Phædr. 234 E; Tr. 411; Theæt. 176 C).

Ourselves, we are not born for, but for our country. "But it behoves you to consider this also, that each of us is not born for himself alone, but that our country has a share of our birth, and our parents another, and our friends the rest. Much, too, is given to the occasions which occur in our lives, and when our country calls us to share in its emergencies it is perhaps absurd not to listen to her, for at the same time it happens that we leave the country to inferior men, who accede to power, not for its best interests" (Tr. iv. 547; Epist. ix. 358 A, B.)

Outline drawings not coloured, spoken of (Tr. iii. 223; Statesm. 277 C).

Oversight of the gods. "We must not liken the deities to charioteers equipped for the race who allow themselves to be bribed to give up the victory to others. Are they not the greatest of all guardians, and over our best interests? And dare we say that those who are the guardians of the weightiest affairs, and conspicuously such in their oversight, are worse than dogs or ordinary men who would scorn to receive bribes unholily offered by bad men?" (Tr. v. 448; Laws, 906 E).

Oxen and horses and asses made to butt and bite and kick, prove very bad training and superintendence (Tr. i. 219, 220; Gorg. 516 A); parallel to the case of the Athenians under Pericles (ib.).

Oyster, to live the life of, enclosed in a shell, or like a breathing *viscus* (Tr. i. 326; Phædr. 250 C).

P.

Pain, are we to call him who is conquered by it a bad man, or rather him who is conquered by pleasure? The reply is that the victim of the latter is inferior to himself in a more reprehensible degree than he who is overcome by pain (Tr. v. 15; Laws, 633 E); a discipline to school us in bearing up against pleasure is as necessary as one which trains us to endure pain (Tr. 17; 635 B); men who cannot resist pleasure will be on a par with those who are subdued by pain, and become the slaves of bad men who can turn a deaf ear to what is pleasurable (Tr. 18; 635 D); lawgivers always have reference to pleasures and pains in making laws (Tr. 19, 20; 636 D); the mortal animal absolutely dependent on pleasure and pain (Tr. 162; 732 E); pain accompanies sensibility; we do not wish to live for pleasures, to attain which we must first suffer pain, which is almost always the case with our bodily senses (Tr. i. 335, 336;

Phædr. 258 E); pain is a loosened harmony (Tr. iv. 43, 44; Phileb. 31 D); hope is the antecedent of pleasure, fear and grief are precursors of pain (Tr. 45; 32 C); pain and pleasure as resulting from change from or to the normal state and from a state of indifference. Great changes cause pain and pleasure, small ones produce neither (Tr. 65; 43 C); absence of pain regarded as pleasure (Tr. 66; 43 D); but surely it is erroneous to identify not being in pain with a state of joy (Tr. 67; 44 A); persons in fever have a greater pleasure in relieving their thirst than persons in health (Tr. ii. 275; Rep. 585 B; Tr. iv. 68, 69; 45 B); if this be so, pain and pleasure are most marked in diseased souls and bodies (Tr. 70; 45 E); the satisfaction of scratching is adduced (Tr. 70; 46 A); of dying with pleasure (Tr. 72, 73; 47 B); rage much sweeter than drops of honey (Tr. 73, 74; 47 E); the pain and pleasure of tears at tragic representation (Tr. 74, 78; 48 A; 50 B, C); we do not feel pain in forgetfulness (Tr. 81; 52 B); small pleasure free from pain is preferable to great pleasure (Tr. 83; 53 C); pain and pleasure not entities, but are only always being produced (ib.); there are those who would not accept life without hunger and thirst and all their consequences (Tr. 86; 54 E); what is contrary to nature and violent, is in our experience painful (Tr. ii. 374, 375; Tim. 64 D); pain when it is shunned as a means of bodily cure is, as in the case of the soul's flying from punishment, fatal to its happiness (Tr. i. 176; Gorg. 479 A, B, D); pain and pleasure, their marvellous correlation (Tr. 57; Phæd. 60 B); joined by one head as it were (ib.); sketch of a fable on the subject, after the manner of Æsop (Tr. 57; 60 C); they nail the soul to the body as it were and materialize it (Tr. 87; 83 D); both are painful when excessive (Tr. ii. 85; Rep. 402 E); pain is the opposite of pleasure, and the negation of joy, or pain is an intermediate condition or state of rest. Sick persons declare that nothing is so delightful as the return to health, though previously they were unconscious of its being such a state of enjoyment (Tr. 273; 583 C); persons who have been suffering from acute pain say the same of the mere cessation from pain, or rest, though the pleasure is not positive (Tr. 274; 583 D); the rest from joy or pleasure should by the same rule be painful, and the state of rest is therefore both agreeable and the reverse (Tr. 274; 583 E); can a state which is neither become both? (ib.); the pleasant and the painful are both stimulants to the soul (ib.); how can the absence of pain or joy be either sweet or noxious? (Tr. 274; 584 A); it is the contrast only that is so, and the fancying that the condition has any positive character is a juggle (ib.); look now at pleasures which do not spring from contrasts, for example that of smell (Tr. 274; 584 B); pure

pains and pleasures are more than contrasts, though the most of these communicated to the soul through the medium of the body only originate in this way, and this is true of expectations prior to the events they anticipate (Tr. 275; 584 C); illustration from upper, lower and mean. A man situated half way between two extremes would consider himself above or below, according as he had moved from one or the other (Tr. 275; 584 D, E); it is just so with pain (Tr. 275; 585 A); he who never had seen white might regard a dull grey as the contrasted opposite of black (ib.); hunger and thirst are mere vacuities in the body, easily filled by food. So, too, ignorance and folly are *lacunæ* in the soul, filled by means of the understanding, but which of these is the truer filling? (Tr. 275, 276; 585 B, D); the greater or truer is that which partakes of uniformity, immortality, and truth, and in proportion as a thing partakes of truth does it partake of essential being and the reverse (Tr. 276; 585 C); what belongs to the body has less truth than what belongs to the soul (Tr. 276; 585 D); the truest filling gives rise to the truest pleasure (Tr. 276; 585 E); men of low desires look downward, browsing and feeding and kicking and goading, devouring husks as it were with no taste of realities (Tr. 276; 586 A). See Tr. i. 191; Gorg. 493 A, B, and Stallbaum's note. Men will fight for shadows, as the image of Helen was fought over by those at Troy (Tr. ii. 276, 277; Rep. 586 B, C); what is true of the intellect is true of the emotional part of a man's nature, the *θυμοειδές*. Bad passions are a source of the painful; those which are on the side of reason and knowledge, or science and of wisdom, lead to true pleasure, and the more they are a man's own, the better for him (Tr. 277, 281; 586 C, D; 590 D); when what is not a man's own is in the ascendant he can reap no pleasure, and others are compelled to pursue what is foreign and untrue, and what is most repugnant to reason and philosophy most produces this effect (Tr. 277; 587 A); these are tyrannous and passionate lusts (ib.); but the kingly and well-ordered impulses are the reverse (Tr. 278; 587 B); the tyrant therefore is most removed from pleasure and the king the least, and the disparity is shown by a geometrical and arithmetical scheme to be as 1 to 729. This is the third demonstration of the superior happiness of the king over that of the tyrant (Tr. 278; 587 C, D, E). See also State. This number 729 with one added is the double of 365, the days in a year (Tr. 279; 588 A). Pain and pleasure will reign in the state, in place of law and reason, if the poets be allowed to remain in it (Tr. 297; 607 A, B).

Painful, those movements which do violence to nature may be so termed, while those which restore her to herself are termed pleasurable (Tr. vi. 160 Tim. Locr. 100 B).

Painter finds it easier to paint landscapes than portraits of men. The pictures of painters that have for their subject divine or celestial bodies easily satisfy, in that these last seem to those who look at them to be adequately represented, and we shall also see, that as to land, mountains, rivers, woods, the sky, and all that moves to and fro in it, we are content, if the artist is able to copy them indifferently so far as resemblance goes. Further, we neither criticise nor arraign what is painted, as knowing nothing exactly about such representations, but put up with an indistinct and deceptive sketch of them, σκιαγραφία δὲ ἀσαφεῖ καὶ ἀπατηλῇ χρώμεθα περὶ αὐτά. When, however, any one tries to paint our bodies, as we quickly perceive what is wanting, in consequence of our attention having been always called thereto, we become severe judges, where the artist does not faithfully render every minute resemblance. It is the same in reasonings. We are content with what is spoken of heavenly and divine things, even though barely probable, but we scrutinize with precision mortal and human things (Tr. ii. 414; Critias, 107 C, D, E); painters do not draw or model objects as they are, but as they appear under the laws of perspective, the proportions not being real but apparent. It is the same with some departments of sculpture (Tr. iii. 133; Sophist, 236 A). The painter who delineates gods and heroes totally unlike what they should be (Tr. ii. 58; Rep. 377 E); painters who paint goat-stags (Tr. 174; 488 A); the painter will, like the man who plans a commonwealth, try to make his ideal better than what can be realised in practice; we seek to know what righteousness and the just man are, but we are not bound to discover more than the nearest approach to this standard. Think you that a man would be a less excellent painter who, when he wanted to paint a pattern of what the most beautiful man should be, crowded all into his canvas that might contribute to realise his ideal, though he could nowhere find such a man? (Tr. 158; 472 D).

Palamedes of Elea, supposed to represent Zeno the Eleate, who is said to have made by his art, like to appear unlike, one to appear many, bodies at rest to be in motion (Tr. i. 339; Phædr. 261 D); delight of meeting him in the other world (Tr. 28; Apol. 41 A).

Pan, prayer addressed to him for the boon of internal beauty, consistency, and moderation (Tr. 360; Phædr. 279 C).

Panathenaic festival, at which the embroidered robe, or πέπλος, was borne in procession to the Acropolis (Tr. i. 463; Euthyp. 6 B; Tr. iii. 403; Parm. 127 B).

Parasite, a monster and great bane (Tr. i. 315; Phædr. 240 B).

πάρεργος, casual, by the way as a mere concomitant (Tr. i. 95; Phæd. 91 A).

Parent may be known by its being provided with the means of suckling its young (Tr. iv. 189, 190; Menex. 237 E); after the duties of piety to the gods follow those due to living parents, seeing it is but right for a man to repay the first and greatest and oldest of all obligations, and to think that all his property belongs to those who begot and reared him, thus repaying the interest of that capital which they laid out in fostering care and painful labour for his good. We must address them with respect, bear their anger calmly, and honour them with moderate and appropriate obsequies at death, taking care to decorate their tombs on the anniversary of that event (Tr. v. 142; Laws, 717 B, C, D, E); no image is more revered by the gods than that of a parent or ancestor worn-out by age, nor is there a more powerful intercessor. Wondrous surely is the pre-eminence of these living parental statues over those wrought in stone. The former when ministered to by us, being in life, do on each occasion pray with us, and when dishonoured render those prayers inefficacious. Mere lifeless representations do neither. So that if a man used rightly his father and grandfather and all such, he would have in possession the most operative of all statues for the effecting a god-beloved lot in life (Tr. 486 to 488; 931 A, C, D, E).

Parmenides spoken of (Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 152 E); he puts Love in place of Necessity (Tr. iii. 519; Symp. 195 C); he reminds Socrates of his youth, and that Philosophy has not yet encircled him in her embrace (Tr. iii. 408; Parm. 130 E).

PARMENIDES. See Summary, page 157.

Party spirit, those in the ascendant become such vehement partizans that they concede no share of office to the beaten faction, neither to the men themselves, nor to their children. Those are no politics nor just laws that have not been instituted for the good of the whole state in common. All those which have been settled for the advantage of a party are states of faction (Tr. v. 137; Laws, 715 A, B).

Passion, the limits of virtue and vice depend largely on our being indifferent to, or wholly ruled by our passions (Tr. vi. 165; Tim. Locr. 103 A).

Patroclus loved by Achilles, not, as Æschylus says, Achilles by Patroclus (Tr. iii. 490; Symp. 180 A).

Peace. "No one can be an approved lawgiver unless he enjoins war for the sake of peace, rather than peace for the sake of war" (Tr. v. 7; Laws, 628 D, E).

Pegasi (Tr. i. 303, 304; Phædr. 229 D).

Pelops, so called because he could only see what was near, the object of revenge (Tr. iii. 305; Cratyl. 395 C).

Penalty of injustice is not flogging or death, which are sometimes

evaded, but what is more inevitable (Tr. i. 411, 412; Theæt. 176 D), viz., the being conformed in life to the depraved standard of the unjust man (Tr. 412; 176 E); it is a man's being made miserable in himself (ib.), and continuing to maintain the same character and associations in the world to come (Tr. 412; 177 A).

Penelope, the web of, alluded to, as figurative of a retrogression (Tr. i. 87; Phæd. 84 A).

Penny reading, *see* Tr. iii. 283, 284; Cratyl. 384 B.

Perception, said to fail from insufficient force. "Of the internal organs, some are for nutriment, others for preservation. Of the movements originated from without some are conveyed to the thinking seat of sensibility, while others not falling under perception, fail to be felt, either because the bodies which are the subject of them are of too earthy a mould, or that the impressions are too weak" (Tr. vi. 160; Tim. Locr. 100 B). He does not specially notice our not perceiving most of the functional involuntary operations, but these are not movements obviously originated from without, except so far as they depend on light and air. The man is compelled to understand according to what are called appearances, resulting from many perceptions blended into one in the rational process, and this is a recollection of those things which our soul formerly beheld when it journeyed with deity and disregarded what we now say exists, and looked with ardent gaze on true existence (Tr. i. 325; Phædr. 249 B); we shall want to inquire the nature of perception prior to that of memory (Tr. iv. 47; Phileb. 33 C); the soul and body then being acted on and stirred in common in one and the same experience is what you would probably name perception (Tr. 48; 34 A); perception and the thing or appearance perceived spring from motion active and passive (Tr. i. 386; Theæt. 156 A, B, C); according to Theætetus perception is knowledge or science (Tr. 392; 160 D), and sight (Tr. 396, 397; 164 A); the power of perception of each man is his own individual property (Tr. 400; 166 D); it is asked, whether the perception of colours and sounds is the same in all, and whether each has its appropriate sense in every case where a perception is referred to body? (Tr. 421; 184 D, E); there is no interchange of function between the several sense organs (Tr. 422; 185 A); sounds and colours both exist under relations of sameness and difference with themselves (ib.); they are collectively two, but separately one (Tr. 422; 185 B); but how do we comprehend what is common to them and to all other things? (Tr. 422; 185 B, C); it must be by some third faculty, not hearing or sight (Tr. 422; 185 B). In dreaming and states of disease and madness or abnormal conditions of hearing and seeing, our sensations are utterly false,

and often correspond to no real existence (Tr. 388; 158 A); how, then, can we prove that we are not dreaming even while we talk, or what is the criterion which assures us we are not asleep? (Tr. 389; 158 B, C, D); a man in health, too, has different perceptions from the same man ill. Sweetness and bitterness arise to the same percipient, from the same outer cause, according to his state (Tr. 390, 391; 159 B, C, D, E; 160 A, B); all is relative, nor must we say that anything exists or is produced of itself (Tr. 392; 160 C); if the opinion that results from perception is only true to the individual who experiences it, why need we pay heavy fees to Protagoras? We need not confute any man's whims or fancies, if the truth of Protagoras is true (Tr. 394; 161 E; 162 A).

Pericles possessed of elevation of mind and universal perfection of accomplishment, in addition to splendid natural abilities (Tr. i. 348, 349; Phædr. 269 E); he advised the building of the middle wall at Athens (Tr. 147; Gorg. 455 E); did he not corrupt the Athenians? (Tr. 219; 515 E; 516 A); said to have made them butt and bite and kick (Tr. 220; 516 A).

Perjury. "It is a truly a sad thing to know that as to the many legal suits that take place in the city, nearly half those who engage in them are perjured, in consequence of the facility with which associations are formed at the mess-table and in other societies and private clubs" (Tr. v. 511; Laws, 948 E).

Permanency and fixity are requisite for knowledge, for how otherwise can we have any assurance respecting things? (Tr. iv. 95, 96; Phileb. 59 D.)

Perpetual sleep of death, spoken of as a gain (Tr. i. 28; Apol. 40 C, D, E).

Perseverance, its value; since we have once taken the matters in hand there is no flinching till we get to the end of them (Tr. iii. 190; Statesm. 257 C).

Persian monarchs trace their genealogy through Achæmenes up to Zeus. Their splendour, riches, and lavishness described. Their mode of rearing the heir to the throne (Tr. iv. 343, 344; Alcib. I. 121 B, C, D, E).

Perspective, its effects clearly alluded to: "Those who fashion or paint great objects do not keep the true proportions. Were they to do so with regard to beautiful objects you know that the parts above would appear too small, and those below too large, from our being nearer the one and farther from the other. The artists therefore let the truth alone and paint only according to appearances, so as to render them beautiful" (Tr. iii. 133; Sophist, 236 A; 235 E). In a drawing, however, the reverse would seem to be the fact, that if we

made the more distant portions equal to the real object they would look too large, but it is the practice in lofty works of sculpture or those set at great height above the eye to exaggerate some of the dimensions, to allow for foreshortening, or the eye not being favourably situated.

Persuasion is of two kinds, the one causing belief without knowledge, the other producing knowledge or science (Tr. i. 145; Gorg. 454 E); persuasion among the ill-informed is better accomplished by the ignorant man than by the well-informed (Tr. 150; 459 A); the being able to persuade the judges in the law courts, the senators in the senate, and the Ecclesiasts in the Ecclesia, is in truth the greatest good, at the same time the cause of freedom to men themselves, and also of their being able to rule others, according to Gorgias (Tr. 142, 143; 452 D); even the physician and master of the schools will through it become your slave and the very money-lender (Tr. 143; 452 E); can you, asks Socrates, say more of rhetoric than that it is for the sake of causing persuasion in the souls of the hearers? (Tr. 143; 453 A); is rhetoric the only art that persuades? does not arithmetic and he who teaches it persuade? (Tr. 144; 453 E); declared to be the art of teaching what is just and unjust in the courts of law and popular assemblies (Tr. 144; 454 A); persons who have learned and been convinced are persuaded (Tr. 145, 146; 454 E); rhetoric appears to be that which produces a trusting persuasion, but not scientific instruction (Tr. 146; 455 A); examples of persuasion effected by Themistocles and Pericles (Tr. 147; 455 E; 456 A); sick men persuaded to take their medicine better by the rhetor than by the physician (Tr. 147; 456 B); he will beat all competitors by this power (Tr. 147; 456 C); the abuse of an art no argument against its use (Tr. 147; 456 C); rhetoric excels other arts in persuasion (Tr. 148; 457 A), but it does not on this account lessen the necessity for medical men or other professions and arts (Tr. 148; 457 B); Socrates desires to know whether this power of persuasion is operative further than on the crowd and those who are deficient in knowledge (Tr. 150; 459 A); only among the masses is the ignorant man more persuasive than the man who knows his own art, so that persuasion is after all but a machinery by which the ignorant man appears to know more than the well-informed (Tr. 151; 459 C, D).

PHÆDON. See Summary, page 17.

PHÆDRUS. See Summary, page 60.

Phænomenal world of each man is different (Tr. i. 400; Theæt. 166 D); what is phænomenal does not rightly represent objects. Thus they look larger when near, less when more remote, a stick will seem to be bent when part is immersed in water, and a dexterous employ-

ment of coloured shading will make a flat surface look convex or concave (Tr. ii. 292, 295; Rep. 602 C; 605 B); painting appeals only to the phænomenal, being the art of sketching shadows, and cajoles us. Thus it draws on our love of wonder, and the only antidote and counteractive for this is the art of numbering, measuring, weighing, which overrules it (Tr. 292; 602 D); this art is in other words reasoning, which rectifies all disputes arising out of mere appearance. That which is opposed to reasoning is akin to what is base in us, a principle which at once lowers the pretensions of painting and the imitative arts (Tr. 292, 293; 602 E; 603 A, B); sight gives us contradictory impressions about the same objects, and this is the case too with the imaginative faculty in the soul, which leads us to entertain contradictory opinions, the soul being, by what has been admitted, full of contradictions (Tr. 293; 603 C, D).

Phanosthenes of Andros, one of three foreigners named as having been generals of Athenian armies (Tr. iv. 307; Ion, 541 C).

PHILEBUS. See Summary, page 174.

Philosopher represented as having wings which he had previously lost, but as first in rank of those who fall to earth (Tr. i. 324; Phædr. 248 C, D, E); the philosopher may recover his wings in three thousand years (Tr. 325; 249 A, B); only the philosopher thus regains early possession of his wings, but is deemed mad by the multitude (Tr. 325, 326; 249 C, D); dwells on primal truths, by diligent exercise of memory becomes thoroughly initiated, and stands off from human pursuits and is inspired (ib.); he recalls his earlier simple, unchangeable, and joyous visions when pure and divested of body (Tr. 326; 250 B, C); said of philosophers that they trifle, and men are spoken of with contempt who indulge astronomical fooleries (Tr. iv. 419, 420; Riv. 132 B); the party questioned declares that he will no longer deem himself a man when he accounts philosophizing disgraceful (Tr. 420; 133 B). As Solon observes—

“ While age creeps on I’m always learning much,”

so one who acts the philosopher should be always acquiring (Tr. 422; 133 C). Socrates asks, “Do you imagine philosophy to be only a beautiful thing, or is it also a Good?” Here he takes occasion to praise the moderate above the many (Tr. 424; 134 D); the philosopher need not be supposed to know each art like the professor of it, but only requires to be able to take a general grasp of it and to be the wisest of the bystanders (Tr. 425; 135 D); this is always to obtain the second prize in all arts (Tr. 426; 136 A); is the philosopher a useful or useless person, seeing he is second in knowledge? (Tr. 427; 136 B, C); would a man in a storm at sea trust to the

philosopher rather than the captain? (Tr. 427; 136 D); to busy oneself about manual arts and to live fussing, and peering into small details, or cramming oneself with superficial acquirements, is not to play the philosopher (Tr. 428; 137 B). Without general knowledge a man can neither know himself nor others. There is a common virtue in king, tyrant, statesman, steward, master, moderate and just man. Will it not be discreditable to the philosopher, not to be able to follow what the physician says or to confer about what is uttered by a judge or king or the several classes just named? (Tr. 429, 430; 138 A to D), and should he not be a good arbiter among friends? To be a philosopher is different from being erudite, or mechanical (Tr. 431; 138 E; 139 A). The philosopher must rule mankind; the race of men will never cease from evils till those who possess the chief power in states philosophize truly with divine help (Tr. iv. 502; Epist. vii. 326 A, B); philosopher, who is synonymous with the virtuous man, is favourably judged in Hades (Tr. i. 231; Gorg. 526 C); his domain is that of wonder (Tr. i. 385, 386; Theæt. 155 D); he is contrasted with the knowing man of the world (Tr. 408, 409; Theæt. 173 C, D, E; 174 A, B, C); he knows nothing of electioneering, nor of the forum, nor of common scandal (ib.); his body has its lair in the city, but his mind is measuring what is under the earth or among the stars and the things of the universe (ib.); story of Thales (Tr. 409; 174 A, B, C); he has a contemptuous opinion of a few acres of land, or of a line of ancestors, but thinks of them in contrast with the whole earth, or the myriads of predecessors, kings, beggars, barbarians, slaves, who handed down the succession of his race (Tr. 409, 410; 174 E; 175 A); his transcendent superiority when truth and justice are the question (Tr. 410; 175 C, D); he knows how to dispose the folds of his robe, the harmony of language, and how to hymn the true life of gods and men (Tr. 411; 175 E); he is divine though not a god, and not easy to distinguish (Tr. iii. 103, 104; Sophist, 216 C); is the philosopher one with sophist and statesmen? (Tr. 104; 217 A); he is different from the sophist (Tr. 161; 253 E); he is one who clings to the existent, and is readily seen from the dazzling splendour in which he moves, though the crowd does not endure to gaze on the divine (Tr. 162; 254 A); the philosopher ought not to fear death (Tr. i. 66; Phæd. 67 D, E; 68 A); it is absurd if he alone should exhibit this fear when brave men who are not philosophers face it (Tr. 67; 68 D); philosophers are initiated worshippers, not wand-bearers in the mysteries of truth (Tr. 68; 69 C, D); they only attain to the gods, and are careless of the loss of money and civic honour (Tr. 85; 82 C); the philosopher does not resist the release of his soul from its bodily

prison (Tr. 86; 83 B); he is eager for the whole of wisdom (Tr. ii. 161; Rep. 475 B); he is the only fit ruler (Tr. 159, 160; 473 C, D, E; 474 A, B, C. *See* Tr. iv. 502; Epist. vii. 326 A, B, quoted above. He is one who has an unquenchable thirst for information (Tr. ii. 161, 162; Rep. 475 C); who are not philosophers (ib.); flighty and feather-headed persons who let out their ears to hire, for shows and trumpery, are only would-be philosophers (Tr. 162; 475 D, E); the true are to be distinguished from the false, just as in any other case (Tr. 163; 476 A); there may be in common men fondness for colour and form, while the mind is unable to appreciate the nature of the beautiful, which is the lot of the few (Tr. 163; 476 B, C); he who only knows beauty in the concrete, dreams (Tr. 163; 476 C, D), or mistakes the resemblance of it for the reality (ib.); the true philosopher possesses *γνώμη*, the would-be, only *δόξα*. Those who embrace things as they really are in the abstract are alone philosophers and not philodoxers (Tr. 168; 480 A); the philosophers have to do with the fixed and invariable (Tr. 169, 170; 484 B); persons unable to scrutinize or discriminate well are as it were blind (Tr. 170; 484 C); philosophers seek the ever-subsistent not the decaying, and the former in its entirety (Tr. 171, 160; 485 B; 474 C); they are truth-loving and haters of lies (Tr. 171; 485 C); sham philosophers are distinguished from true by seeking pleasure of body, not of soul (Tr. 171; 485 D); they do not fear death as dreadful (Tr. 171; 486 B); nor do they love money (Tr. 172; 485 E); the philosopher cannot be one who is a coward (Tr. 172; 486 B), nor a boaster, nor breaker of pledges, but one who is just and gentle, not incommunicable nor fierce, and is also quick at learning (ib.); no one who learns with pain or who is forgetful is such (Tr. 172; 486 C); he who is museless and informal will be out of measure. Then the qualities opposed to this in the philosophic ruler are enumerated (Tr. 172; 486 D; 487 A); Adimantus objects that philosophers are useless in states (Tr. 173; 487 D, E); how is it true, then, that states will never cease from ills for lack of them? (*See* Tr. 159; 473 B.) The answer is expressed in a simile (Tr. 174; 488 A); the hardships of the men of virtue both severe and incongruous, like ideal or pictorial combinations of goat and stag (ib.); comparison with the case of scientific ships' captains called star-gazers and boobies by their rebellious crews (Tr. 174, 175; 488 B, C, D, E); it is not wonderful that philosophers are not honoured, the wonder would be greater if they were (Tr. 175; 489 A); they are useless in the opinion of the many (Tr. 175; 489 B); the wise captain does not entreat his crew, nor does the wise man fawn on the rich (ib.); yet both, however poor or rich they may be, have recourse to a physician when sick

(Tr. 175 ; 489 C) ; however they may be sneered at as useless and transcendentalists, they are on a par in this respect with the scientific pilots (ib.) ; the worst slur brought on philosophy is by those who pretend to pursue it (Tr. 176 ; 489 D) ; depravity of such (Tr. 176 ; 490 A) ; the pursuit of reality with unblunted mental edge is again recurred to, as characterising true philosophers (Tr. 176 ; 490 A, B) ; detestation of falsehood (Tr. 177 ; 490 C) ; recapitulation of their virtues and the objections to their uselessness and alleged vileness, and examination into the grounds of these assertions (Tr. 177 ; 490 D) ; few are complete philosophers (Tr. 177 ; 491 A) ; there are others, again, who in attempting to imitate what is beyond their power bring a reproach upon the name (ib.) ; even courage and moderation or their synonymes, fortitude and temperance, may lead the soul astray (Tr. 177 ; 491 B) ; so, too, it is with beauty, wealth, strength (Tr. 178 ; 491 C), particularly if they fall like good seed into bad ground (Tr. 178 ; 491 D) ; the best gifts with bad culture produce the worst effects (ib.) ; noble souls badly educated are pre-eminently bad (Tr. 178 ; 491 E) ; the philosopher, if he gets good instruction and is reared in a soil fitting for him, will arrive at all virtue, but not otherwise, unless God help him (Tr. 178 ; 492 A) ; the philosophers are, when young men, corrupted by the sophists (Tr. 179 ; 492 B, C) ; the marks of a philosopher are the faculty of acquiring easily, memory, courage, magnanimity (494 B ; see also Tr. 176, 177 ; 490 A, B, C, D) ; he is desired when he grows older for the conduct of public affairs (ib.) ; the adulation offered the young aspirant, if like Alcibiades he is handsome, noble, and wealthy (Tr. 181 ; 494 C) ; his exaggerated hopes and lofty airs (Tr. 182 ; 494 D) ; will he believe, when told that he has no understanding ? (ib.) ; he will be intrigued against to prevent his passing over to the service of philosophy (Tr. 182 ; 494 E) ; partial endowments fatal (Tr. 182 ; 495 A, B), and mischievous (ib.) ; only a very small band prove to be genuine (Tr. 183 ; 496 B) ; the great soul of a philosopher spoken of as undervaluing and overlooking state distinctions, while a small section have deserted renown in other arts to become philosophers (ib.) ; feeble health has induced others, like Theages, to abandon politics for the pursuits of wisdom (Tr. 183, 184 ; 496 C) ; he who has tasted the bliss of being a philosopher, and is free from the madness of the many, keeps out of the storm of dust and spray, where he will perish before he can be of use, and is glad if he can live his time here without injustice and die in good hope (Tr. 184 ; 496 D, E) ; the populace are incredulous because they have never seen a consummately virtuous statesman (Tr. 186 ; 498 E) ; there is no perfect state unless it be the one ruled by the true philosopher (Tr.

187; 499 B; *see* 473, 474, quoted above; also *Epist.* vii. 326 A, B); or one ruled by an inspired dynast (*Tr.* 187; 499 B); philosophers will look to realities, not to petty interests and passions; they will be conformed to the likeness of that after which they reach, and become the patterns of an order all but divine, to men (*Tr.* 188; 500 C); if these philosophers study to render men's morals conformable to divine standards, will not men be reconciled to them? (*Tr.* 188 to 190; 500 B, C, D, E; 501 C); comparison made between them, and painters painting a pattern on a pure ground, and obliterating and putting in and retouching their colours till they have perfectly succeeded in their design (*Tr.* 189; 501 B); popular opposition overcome (*Tr.* 190; 501 C, D); at the sight of the splendid picture (*ib.*), the populace altogether convinced (*ib.*); philosophers must be supreme, if ills are to cease (*Tr.* 190, 173, 159, 161; 501 E; 487 D, E; 473, 474); it is difficult but not impossible for the offspring of kings and dynasts to be philosophers (*Tr.* 190, 191; 502 A, B, C); they are the only reliable custodians (*Tr.* 191; 503 B); the qualifications seldom all found naturally in one individual (*ib.*); sharp and retentive minds are often unstable and impetuous (*Tr.* 192; 503 C); solid and trustworthy tempers often too drowsy (*Tr.* 192; 503 D); these qualifications must be tested by severe application (*Tr.* 192; 503 E); what are the severe studies in which they are to be exercised? (*Tr.* 192; 504 A); the philosopher is not always to live learning, as if in the Islands of the Blest (*Tr.* 207, 208; 519 C); he must descend again into the gloom of the cavern and help his old fellow-captives (*Tr.* 207; 518 D); this is doing philosophers no wrong, since the general good is to be consulted (*Tr.* 208; 519 E); they are not to do as they like but to watch over other matters. In foreign states they may spring up spontaneously and not be compelled to pay the price of their rearing, but in our model state we have begotten them as leaders and emperor bees of the swarms, and they must re-enter the gloom and so be better able to discriminate the shadows when accustomed to the darkness (*Tr.* 208, 209; 520 A, B, C); philosophers will not refuse to share the labours of the community, or require to be always living aloft in the sublime atmosphere of philosophy (*Tr.* 209; 520 D); the philosopher is proved to be as closely related to the happiest form of government and ruler, *viz.* the kingly, as the victim of low desires and views is to that of the most wretched form, tyranny and the tyrannic ruler (*Tr.* 270 to 278; 580 C to 587 E. *See* also articles *Pain*, *Pleasure*, *State*. In the *Sophist*, Plato proposed to consider the nature of the Philosopher as well as the Statesman and Sophist, the second and third having been treated of in the two dialogues bearing those titles. The first

he did not execute, and it is possible he considered that this had been done sufficiently in what he has advanced on the subject in the references given above.

Philosophic or philomathic, the philonicic or philotimic, and the philochromatic or philocercic, are three divisions of human nature (Tr. ii. 271; Rep. 581 A, B); the philosophic temper produces mildness, but when pushed too far it may give rise to effeminacy, and it ought to be possessed by our guardians under due restrictions and adaptations (Tr. 93; 410 E); it is not fond of untruth (Tr. 170; 485 A); it has nothing about it that is illiberal, but grasps in their totality things human and divine, and is too magnanimous to value human life greatly (Tr. 171; 486 A).

Philosophical discussions, the pleasure and profit of them spoken of (Tr. iii. 475; Symp. 173 C).

Philosophizing is a study of death (Tr. i. 475; Phæd. 80 E).

Philosophy is the stable and faithful and sound, all other ingenious qualities and tendencies may be rightly termed pretentious clevernesses (Tr. iv. 548; Epist. x. 358 C; philosophy is decried by the interlocutor as dangerous, though doubtless graceful (Tr. i. 182; Gorg. 484 C); said to make men awkward and ridiculous in state or other emergencies (Tr. 182, 183; 484 D, E; 485 D, E; 486 A); its exhibitions in the law courts (Tr. 407; Theæt. 172 C, D); the value of early philosophical discipline admitted, but not suited to maturer age (Tr. 182; Gorg. 485 A); its want of *savoir faire* in matters of the world, and its lack of common sense well sketched in the person of Socrates (Tr. 184; 486 B); it will help a man to dwell in an empty house, and to forfeit many good things (Tr. 184; 486 C); description of the power of philosophy over a soul bound and glued to the body (Tr. 86; Phæd. 82 E; 83 A; philosophy represented as deserted and incomplete, and as bereft of kindred; is declared to be disgraced and reproached through the worthlessness or wickedness of those who range themselves nominally on her side (Tr. ii. 182; Rep. 495 C); trumpery persons, seeing her deserted but full of noble titles and ornamental adjuncts, abandon their own insignificant arts in order to pursue her, like those fugitives from gaols who take refuge in sanctuaries (Tr. 183; 495 D); imperfect natures are eager for the rank she confers, though their souls have been crushed and debilitated by low pursuits (ib.); comparison with the monied artizan seeking to marry his master's daughter (Tr. 183; 495 E); the issue of such a marriage is vile and does not partake of true intelligence (Tr. 183; 496 A); ill-health may lead to the choice of philosophy as a pursuit, or dæmonic suggestion, as in the case of Socrates (Tr. 184; 496 C); no existing state is adapted to the philosophic nature

(Tr. 185; 497 B); therefore she is distorted, grows out of shape, and is conquered by the bad soil in which she is planted (ib.); she will shine forth divinely in a pre-eminently good polity (Tr. 185; 497 C); how is a state to handle philosophy so as not to be destroyed? (Tr. 185; 497 D); this must be done in a way opposite to what is done now (Tr. 185; 497 E); the study abandoned now at the critical moment, when reasoning has just been brought into action; or, on the other hand, where the young are induced to listen, they think too exclusively about her, and become good for nought in old age (Tr. 186; 498 A); in youth the body is to be prepared for philosophy by every appliance for promoting its vigour; after this the soul is to be exercised; and when the period of effective strength for war and politics is gone by, then philosophy is to be the sole business of mature life (Tr. 186; 498 B, C); she is an outwork for our safety in the life to come (Tr. 186; 498 D); incredulity of the mass of mankind on this point (ib.); true philosophy is the only thing that despises political ascendancy and is fit to be entrusted with rule (Tr. 209; 521 B); description of a return into the sunshine of reality, out of the cavern's gloom (Tr. 209, 210; 521 C); from Hades to the Gods (ib.); what is the scientific doctrine that draws the soul from mere generation, or becoming, to essential being? (Tr. 210; 521 D); this is not gymnastics (Tr. 210; 521 E), nor music (Tr. 210; 522 A, B), but numbers, arithmetic, or computation (Tr. 211; 522 C); philosophy as now handled looks earthwards rather than upwards (Tr. 218; 529 A); it is not to be pursued exclusively by rulers (Tr. 225, 226; 535 D); but if unsound rulers are chosen she will be heaped with disgrace (Tr. 226; 536 B, C); Socrates, too, is indignant at the supposed insult offered to her (Tr. 226; 536 C); is the possession of science (Tr. iii. 73, 74; Euthyd. 288 D).

φρήν, literally the region of the heart as the seat of the emotional soul, often used for mind, though not much by Plato, in this sense. It is cognate with a family of words, such as *ἄφρων*, *εὐφρων*, *σώφρων*; whence *ἀφροσύνη*, *εὐφροσύνη*, *σωφροσύνη*; also *φρόνημα*, temper of mind, pride; *φρόνησις*, intelligence, knowledge of truth; *φρονίμος*, wise and thoughtful, and generally connected with what is *ἀγαθός*, or *σώφρων*, or *ἐπιστήμων*; also with *φρονᾶ*, to think, to ponder on; *φροντίς*, anxious thought; *φροντίζω*, to meditate, to be solicitous for. Phrensy, a man in it. The question is asked whether arms belonging to one thus affected should be restored to him? (Tr. ii. 7; Rep. 331).

φρόνησις, by some rendered "knowledge of truth." See its etymology from *φροῦς νόσις* (Tr. iii. 337; Cratyl. 411 D). It is said to make virtue effective: "In a word, do not all the enterprises and

strong efforts of the soul end in happiness when intelligence is present and takes the lead, and in the opposite, when folly takes the rein?" (Tr. 32; Meno. 88 C, D; 89 A).

Phrygian harmonies are to be retained along with Dorian, which excite a brave man to enthusiasm (Tr. ii. 80; Rep. 399 A); they are styled forcible (Tr. 81; 399 C).

Physic, is it what is desired by him who calls for it, or the health it procures? (Tr. i. 160; Gorg. 467 D); it is the science of the erotics of the body or its natural requirements, that of impletion and depletion (Tr. iii. 501; Symp. 186 C); is a necessary evil commensurate with defects in our mode of living (Tr. ii. 87; Rep. 405 A); its remedies are emetics, purges, cautery, the knife, diet, keeping the head warm (Tr. 88; 406 D); impletion and depletion (Tr. 89; 407 D); charms and amulets (Tr. 109; 426 A).

Physician. There is a curious passage in the Laws which we will quote as a whole: "There being both slaves and freemen who are sick in our towns, a servile class of doctors, or nearly so, for the most part prescribe for the slaves, gadding about or gossiping in the dispensaries, and none of such practitioners either gives or receives any account of each patient, or the several diseases of his fellow domestics, but orders what his experience suggests, as if thoroughly conversant with the cases, while he goes in full confidence as though his authority was absolute, bounding about from one sick servant to another, and thus relieves his master physician from any superintendence of these humbler patients. But the freeman's or gentleman's doctor for the most part heals and inspects the maladies of the free, scrutinizing these from the first symptoms and classifying them according to their nature, besides conferring with the sufferer and his friends at the same time. Thus he learns something from the patient, and also, as far as he is able, instructs himself personally, nor does he lay down the course of treatment till he has first convinced his patient of its expediency. Having thus rendered him submissive by persuasion, he finishes by trying to restore him to health" (Tr. v. 146, 147; Laws, 720 B, C, D, E). Again he says: "We made no unsuitable comparison when we likened those who are put under laws to slaves attended by slave doctors, for we may be well assured of this, that a medical empiric who exercised his art without reasoning about it, if he found a freeman's doctor chatting with his gentlemanly patient, conversing in all but philosophic language with him, and touching on all the symptoms of his disease from their commencement, recapitulating also the natural properties of bodies, would laugh violently outright, and would not express himself otherwise than men of his stamp are ready to do most

so-called physicians. He would say 'Blockhead, you are not curing the sick man, but putting him under a course of instruction, as if he needed to become a doctor, and not to be restored to health' " (Tr. 359, 360; 857 C, D, E). Physicians are said not to treat the part affected topically, but to aim at bettering the whole constitution of the patient; they strive to put the whole head into a good state rather than the eyes, and the whole body rather than the head. In like manner, it is of little use to cure the body without the soul (Tr. iv. 117, 122; Charm. 156 A, B, E; 160 A). Physicians and captains should be compelled to render an account of what they do (Tr. iii. 258; Statesm. 299 A); the physician would die of starvation in competition with the cook, were the judgment to be left to unreasoning appetite (Tr. i. 156, 157; Gorg. 464 B, C, E); the supposition of a physician being accused by a cook before a number of boys as judges (Tr. 226; 521 E; 522 A); is the physician a grasper of fees or a healer of the sick? (Tr. ii. 18; Rep. 341 C); it is disgraceful that the clever descendants of Æsculapius should have to name, not real diseases, but those which result from excess of living, such as catarrhs and dropsies, which are mere disturbances of the system, like lakes thrown into commotion by sudden blasts or torrents (Tr. 87; 405 D); the early physicians prescribed differently from the moderns, and left lingering diseases to themselves and nature, knowing that in a state no one had time to be sick (Tr. 88; 406 A, B); the difference in this respect between the artizan and rich man (ib.; Tr. 88; 406 D); the former has no leisure to be sick (ib.); he either gets well or dies (Tr. 89; 406 E); even to the rich man this perpetual attention to bodily health is a hindrance (Tr. 89; 407 A); physicians ought not to be employed in cases of intemperance, however tempting the fee (Tr. 90; 408 B); ought not practitioners of great experience to be employed in the state? (Tr. 90; 408 C); they should have had intercourse from boyhood with all sorts of tempers and dispositions, and known in their own persons what bad health is (Tr. 91; 408 E); this last assertion is doubted (Tr. 91, 92; 409 A, B, C, D, E); physicians are to be established by law in states (Tr. 92; 410 A); the subjects of bodily defects should be allowed quietly to die, while worse examples of active evil should be killed (ib.).

Physics of Plato are principally contained in the *Timæus*, *Timæus* the *Loerian*, *Critias*, and *Epinomis*, but they crop up occasionally in the *Republic* and *Laws*, and elsewhere. Some of them are interesting as containing the germ of some modern theories, but others are mystical and make use of the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, as if endowed with a creating and disposing power. They will however for the most part be forgotten by the side of his *Ethics* and *Dialectics*, and

scrutiny into the meaning of general notions or abstracts, or the charms of his imagery and style and casual illustration. In the last of these particulars few writers, ancient or modern, will compare with Plato, and few books are more readable or better sustain their interest even where the subject-matter is practically worthless to us as a thing to be adopted.

Picked propositions and ornaments of style contrasted with the practice of calling things by their right names (Tr. i. 3; Apol. 17 B).

Pig, spoken of playfully as a measure of all things (Tr. i. 393; Theæt. 161 C); alluded to as an objectionable sneer (Tr. 399; 166 C).

Pindar referred to (Tr. i. 301; Phædr. 227 B; Tr. iii. 11, 19, 20; Meno. 76 C; 81 A, B, C); also quoted (Tr. i. 408; Theæt. 173 E; Tr. ii. 141, 6; Rep. 457 B; 331 A).

Pious are loved by the gods (Tr. iv. 59, 60; Phileb. 39 E); to the pious true delineations are held up by reason of their being beloved by the gods, put interrogatively in both cases (Tr. 60; 40 B). *See* Righteousness, Holiness, Justice.

Piping and dancing girls (Tr. i. 277; Protag. 347 D).

Piræus, the north wall of it adjoined the place where criminals were executed (Tr. ii. 125; Rep. 439 E).

Pisistratidæ, reference to the story of (Tr. iv. 439, 440; Hipparch. 228 B).

Pittacus referred to (Tr. i. 269, 270; Protag. 339 A, B, C, D; 340 B).

Places sacred to the Muses and Nymphs (Tr. i. 304; Phædr. 230 B).

Planets. We are not to busy ourselves too deeply in scrutinizing causes because it is presumptuous and unholy. The Greeks belie the great Gods, the sun, and moon, by asserting that they never follow the same track, and we add to them other stars, calling them planets. "By Zeus, O stranger, you say true, for I have often during my life seen the evening and morning star and some others not moving in the same course, but altogether wandering, and we know that the sun and moon are continually so doing" (Tr. v. 306, 307; Laws, 821 A, B, C). "The same planet is at one time the evening star, when it follows the sun so far off as not to be lost in the splendour of its rays, and at another the morning star, when it precedes and rises before him at daybreak. Venus then is often the morning star, in consequence of its orbit not greatly differing from that of the sun, though not always, as many other stars and planets are so" (Tr. vi. 154, 155; Tim. Loc. 96 E); out of the two motions, diurnal and annual, the sun moves in a spiral (Tr. 156; 97 C). Some account of the planetary spheres according to the views of Pythagoras and Plato, or at least the latter, though here the earth is made the centre

of the universe, contrary to what is generally attributed to the former, will be found (Tr. ii. 306 to 308; Rep. 616 C to 617 C). Plato is supposed to have represented the view of the world taken by Philolaus. How far the central fire of the earlier philosopher anticipated the doctrine of the sun being the centre of the universe does not appear. In the *Phædrus* we are told that *Ἑστία*, the "hearth" or "central fire," is alone in the house of the gods (Tr. i. 323; 247 A). Professor Thompson says there is no foundation for the opinion that Pythagoras knew the true theory of the solar system. In the *Timæus*, from Tr. ii. 338 to 343; 34 C to 39 E, we get some of these speculations, where see Stallbaum's notes. From Tr. 341 to 343; 38 B to 39 E, the five planets and the sun and moon, and their orbital revolutions, are spoken of. Again, in *Timæus* the Locrian, the planets Mercury and Juno, otherwise Venus, are spoken of in their right order, as of equal velocity with the sun; and the sun is made to produce day and night by revolving round the earth (Tr. vi. 154 to 157; Tim. Locr. 96 E to 97 E); where the earth is placed in the centre, and made the oldest, the foundation and basis of the system. See further Mr. Grote's note to his Plato, iii. 454, who thinks that our author never gave expression to any view that contradicted that of the heliocentric position of the earth, though in the *Epinomis* some trace of the notion that the earth may revolve round a central universal axis would seem discoverable. With this may be compared what is said on the relative velocities of the orbs, and how the whole is turned on the spindle of necessity in the Fable of Er (Tr. ii. 306, 307; Rep. 616 C to 617 C, alluded to above), where the spindle is said to have been driven right through the eighth of the concentric spherical cups set like casks within one another, but the names of the spheres are not enumerated.

Plants and animals from roots and seeds, whether are they self-produced without thought, or by a working deity? (Tr. iii. 180; *Sophist*, 265 C).

Pleasant and just. The speaker in the *Laws* would impose a fine on any one who dared say that bad men live pleasantly, or who drew a distinction between things as more advantageous than just. Which are the happier, those who live the juster or the pleasanter life? The question is absurd, for the good and the pleasant are the same (Tr. v. 58; *Laws*, 662 B, C, D); advantages of not separating the pleasant and just, or the good and beautiful (Tr. 59, 60; 663 B); the same life has been declared by the gods to be both most pleasant and best (Tr. 62; 664 B, C). How are the pleasant and good the same? (Tr. i. 193, 194; *Gorg.* 495 A).

Pleasure; whether is he who is conquered by pain, a bad man, or he

who is overcome by pleasure? (Tr. v. 15; Laws, 633 E); a discipline to enable men to bear up against pleasure, quite as necessary as one against pain (Tr. 17; 635 B, C, D); declared to be a good (Tr. iv. 3; Phileb. 11 B); what is it that makes all pleasures good? (Tr. 7; 13 A, C); cannot be wholly a good if not unbounded both in number and degree (Tr. 37; 27 E); the different estimate of it by different persons (Tr. 6; 12 C, D); many pleasures are evil (Tr. 7; 13 A); laughable to term them good (Tr. 86; 54 E); intellect more akin to good than pleasure (Tr. 96; 60 B); how can pleasure be dissimilar to pleasure? (Tr. 6; 12 E); whether is intellect or pleasure best? (Tr. 9, 23; 14 B; 20 C); is unbounded (Tr. 20; 18 E; 31 A); is not a good (Tr. 23; 20 C); nor is the existence of intellect or pleasure, to the exclusion of either, a good (Tr. 23, 24; 20 E); pleasure is threefold (Tr. 65, 66; 43 D); the pleasure of soul comes through memory and perception (Tr. 47; 33 C); shall we speak of pleasures and pains as true and false? (Tr. 52, 53; 36 C; 36 E); how is pleasure only true, while opinions may be false? (Tr. 54, 55; 37 B); pleasure belongs even to imaginary feelings as well as to real (Tr. 59; 39 C); has reference to things past, present, and future (Tr. 59; 39 C); pleasure and pain arise from change to and from a normal state (Tr. 65; 43 C); pleasure is the absence of pain (Tr. 66; 43 D); again, cannot be altogether one with it (Tr. 67, 79; 44 A; 50 E; Tr. 79; 51 A); the greatest pleasures occur in disease (Tr. 69, 70; 45 B, E); pleasure of rage, envy, &c. (Tr. 73 to 78; 47 E; 48 B; 49 D; 50 A); of scratching (Tr. 72; 46 E); dying with pleasure (Tr. 73; 47 B); the pleasure of tragic and comic representation (Tr. 74, 78; 48 A; 50 B); pleasure at witnessing a friend's ignorance (Tr. 77; 50 A); of laughter (*ib.*); pleasure and pain in body and soul apart (Tr. 78; 50 D); the absolute pleasure of pure colours, sounds, smells (Tr. 80; 51 C, D); that of smell less divine than the rest (Tr. 80; 51 E; Tr. ii. 274; Rep. 584 B); the pleasure of acquiring knowledge (Tr. iv. 81; 52 B); is unknown to the crowd (*ib.*); small pleasures free from pain are better than great pleasures with it (Tr. 83; 53 C); pleasure is not a real *Ens* (Tr. 83; 53 C; Tr. ii. 274; Rep. 584 A); pleasure is dependent on something else to which it clings for support (Tr. iv. 85; 54 C); belongs to the producible and changeable (Tr. 86; 54 D); what it would be without recollection (Tr. 97; 60 D, E); when left to itself (Tr. 102; 63 B, C), pleasure acts as an obstacle and source of destruction to mind and its products (Tr. 103; 63 D, E); pleasure when pure is more akin to mind (Tr. 103; 63 D, E; 64 A); that of health, virtue, and moderation is akin to mind (*ib.*); pleasure is not first nor second in rank (Tr. 106, 107; 66 A); is known by contrast with pain (Tr. 43; 31 B). *See also* Art.

Pain and Pleasure. In themselves pleasures are said to be good (Tr. i. 282, 284; Protag. 351 E; 353 D); why they are evil (Tr. 285; 354 D); to be mastered by them implies ignorance (Tr. 289; 357 E). Pleasure is defined to be what is agreeable to nature, and pain what is violent and contrary to it (Tr. ii. 374, 375; Tim. 64 D); the love of inborn pleasure is spoken of, as sometimes in conflict with a desire for the best (Tr. i. 312; Phædr. 237 D). Are pleasure and knowledge or science the same? (Tr. 194; Gorg. 495 C); or pleasure and courage? (ib.; Tr. 194; 495 D); to be worsted by pleasure (Tr. iv. 468, 469; Cleit. 407 D); excessive pleasure is the characteristic of insolence rather than moderation (Tr. ii. 85; Rep. 402 E); pleasure and pain again examined (Tr. 273; 583 C, D); hunger and thirst (Tr. 275; 585 B). *See also* Tr. iv. 67, 68; Philebus, 44 A; 45 B.

Pluck, its value in keeping danger at a distance; men hold off from a determined front (Tr. iii. 572; Symp. 221 A, B).

Plural article referring to a participle in the singular (Tr. ii. 263; Rep. 573 E).

Pluton (*see* Tr. i. 227; Gorg. 523 B), helmet of (Tr. ii. 302; Rep. 612 B).

Pluton. In the *Cratylus* this designation is regarded as borrowed from *πλοῦτος*, "wealth," because riches are dug from the Earth. Hades takes its derivation from *αἰδής*, "the unseen," or "unseemly," and it is argued that Desire is a stronger bond than that of Necessity. This leads to further surmising that Pluton may take his title from his affluence of wisdom, and Hades from a verb of "knowledge." The etymologies of the *Cratylus* are usually word plays of this sort, and leave you a choice of alternatives. Names become thus only a text for fanciful suggestions (Tr. iii. 319, 320; Crat. 403 A, C, D, E).

Poets are not to be trusted, nor the games and musical education of children to be left to them (Tr. v. 49; Laws, 656 C); corrupted by theatrical applause, which makes them write for the popular taste (Tr. 54; 659 C); do not then Cretans and Lacedæmonians compel their poets to pronounce the wise and just man happy in all cases? (Tr. 56; 660 E); and to instruct youth in suitable rhythm and harmony? (Tr. 57; 661 C); fine to be inflicted on all poets who dare to speak of bad men being happy (Tr. 58; 662 B, C); the poets jumble all together and tear asunder rhythm and form from their lyrics, using music without words, like mere piping or harping, so that it is difficult to know what the rhythm and harmony mean (Tr. 71; 669 E); the poets in length of time became the leaders of the unmusical lawlessness of the theatre, jumbling dirges with hymns, pæans with dithyrambs, imitating the strains of the flute on the lyre, and introducing

a theocracy rather than an aristocracy of criticism (Tr. 116, 117; 700 B, C, D, E; 701 A); Plato or his Athenian impersonator, who is never tired at having a fling at the poets, asks, "Is the legislator to permit them to do as they like?" and observes that in their phrensy they often contradict themselves (Tr. 145; 719 B, C). Songs are laws, and sacred and popular melodies are not to be changed. The poets should be taught to know that prayers are requests to the gods, and they should take care not to ask as a good what is evil (Tr. 271, 268; 801 A; 799 E); no poet to compose a line either beautiful or good, in opposition to the state belief, or before approved by the censors of the press (Tr. 272; 801 C, D); there are persons who insist that our youth should be taught to repeat whole pages of the poets and to be saturated with them, so to speak (Tr. 288; 811 A); much knowledge of their writings is fraught with danger to children (Tr. 288; 811 B); let no one be misled by the poets and mythologers to believe that when a man steals or commits violence he does not act more disgracefully than the gods themselves, or that god or hero can act unjustly. The lawgiver should know on this point more than a herd of poets (Tr. 499; 941 B); poets spoken of as enraged with the actor who renders the dramatic situation badly (Tr. iv. 125; Charm. 162 D); most poets write in riddles (Tr. 392; Alcib. II. 147 C). Poets are like winged bees (Tr. 296; Ion, 534 B); the enthusiasm inspired by poetry is compared to the magnetic chain (Tr. 294; 533 D), and this rapture as catching (Tr. 298; 535 E); the poets are the interpreters of the gods (Tr. 297; 534 E); lack of wisdom on the part of the poets (Tr. i. 8; Apol. 22 C); they are inspired, like soothsayers and diviners (*ib.*); they utter beautiful sayings without knowing what they say, and they think themselves the wisest of men (*ib.*); they are perpetually trolling out that we neither see nor hear exactly (Tr. 63; Phæd. 65 B); the name not given to all makers, but only in connection with music (Tr. iii. 537; Symp. 204 C); they prize their own poems as being the fathers of them (Tr. ii. 5; Rep. 330 C); their misrepresentations (Tr. 58, 59; 377 E; 378 A, B), and their dangerous character (Tr. 59; 378 C, D; *see above*, Tr. v. 288; Laws, 811 B; 656 C); rules for the conduct of the poets (Tr. ii. 60; Rep. 379 A); poets censured (Tr. 60; Rep. 379 D; Tr. 61 to 72; 380 A, B; 381 E; 383 A; 386 A; 387 B; 388 A, D; 391 D, E); poets and mythologers tell mischievous stories about men (Tr. 72; 392 A, B), who visit states in order to exhibit their power of imitation and versatility, only to be dismissed courteously in favour of more austere ones (Tr. 77 to 79; 396 E; 397 A, B, C, D, E; 398 A, B); balsams are to be poured on their heads, and the latter decked with fillets of wool (*ib.*); surveillance over

them (Tr. 83; 401 B); poets of tragedy are not to be admitted into the model state, as praisers of tyranny (Tr. 258; 568 B); their gadding about and drawing politics into democracies and tyrannies (Tr. 258; 568 C); poets are in the pay of tyrants (*ib.*); are word colourists (Tr. 290; 601 A), and imitators (Tr. 284 to 290; 595 A to 601 A).

Poets are to be read (Tr. i. 254; Protag. 325 E); or, according to another view, left unread (Tr. 278; 348 A); the imitative poet has nothing to do with the encouraging a rational and sober indulgence of grief or passion, if he is to retain his good name among the crowd, but must have recourse to the sensational, which is always the more easy of imitation (Tr. ii. 294; Rep. 605 A); he cultivates, not the best part of the soul, but seeks to destroy the reasoning and governing power, and to let in the rabble desires (Tr. 295; 605 B); as it is between real and phænomenal, so great and small, and near and far, are not discriminated (Tr. 295; 605 C; also Tr. 292; 602 C); he cultivates the sensual and concupiscent feelings and the irascible (Tr. 296; 606 D); pain and pleasure will have too entirely the rule in a community where Homer and the tragic poets are allowed to enter in lieu of law and reason (Tr. 296; 606 E; 607 A).

Poetic style. The connexion of felicity of expression, harmony, and rhythmical elegance with what is naturally good and the moral excellence of the reflective powers of the soul (Tr. ii. 82, 83; Rep. 400 D); poetical enthusiasm likened to the influence of a magnet on a chain of rings which are each made to cling to one another (Tr. iv. 294; Ion, 533 D); and its inspiration as infectious (Tr. 298; 535 E).

Poetry is not to be taught by technical rules but is a madness (Tr. i. 320; Phædr. 245 A); ranks sixth after the pure painless pleasurable sensations which are in the fifth class, science being in the fourth, understanding and intelligence in the third, symmetry in the second, and measure in the first (Tr. iv. 106, 107; Phileb. 66 A, B, C); poetry, so far as it is imitative or mimetic, is not to be allowed in the model state; though he, Socrates, does not propose to tell this to the makers of tragedy, or to the dramatists, and he stands in awe of applying it to Homer (Tr. ii. 284; Rep. 595 A, B; *see* Imitation, Tr. 288 to 289; 598 E to 600 A, B); there has been an old feud betwixt poetry and philosophy (Tr. 297; Rep. 607 B, C); we are willing to hear her apology (Tr. 297; 607 C), and to admit her soothing, charming character (Tr. 297; 607 D); but we will deny and repudiate our old love, if the defence is inadequate (Tr. 297, 298; 607 E; 608 A, B).

Poisoning or drugging for purposes of witchcraft in connexion with wax images affixed to doors, or in cross-roads or on the tombs of parents (Tr. v. 490; Laws, 933 B, C).

- Politics are to the soul what physic and gymnastics are to the body (Tr. i. 156; Gorg. 464 B); physic is the correlative to righteousness in respect of them (ib.); the steepest pitch of politics is spoken of figuratively, where, for lack of breath, honour cannot follow (Tr. ii. 258; Rep. 568 C); politics are the art of governing (Tr. iv. 469; Cleit. 408 A); and of judicial decision and righteousness (ib.).
- Politics require to be framed with knowledge (Tr. iii. 248; Statesm. 293 D); what right politics are (ib.); every one fancies himself competent to meddle with them (Tr. iii. 248; Protag. 319 D). *See* State.
- Polus, a sophist (Tr. iv. 412; Theag. 128 A); thinks a sufficient answer as good as a better (Tr. i. 137; Gorg. 448 A); is hot-headed and young (Tr. 156; 463 E); is an adept in the sayings of Anaxagoras (Tr. 157; 465 D).
- Pond. It is observed that it is equally necessary to swim in a small pond as in the midst of the largest sea, if a man would escape drowning (Tr. ii. 137; Rep. 453 D).
- Poor and rich contrasted (Tr. i. 302; Phædr. 227 D); the poor man has no leisure to be ill, he therefore dismisses his doctor, having work to do which it is death to him to neglect (Tr. ii. 88; Rep. 406 D, E).
- Popular estimate is to a large extent correct. It is said that the multitude are not altogether mistaken as to what virtue substantially is, so far as judging who of others are evil and useless is concerned. Even the bad have a divine instinct and clearness of aim. Accordingly many that are evil easily discriminate in word and sentiments the better and worse of mankind. Hence in most states the exhortation is a good one to regard the good opinion of the crowd (Tr. v. 514; Laws, 950 B, C); popular scandals are dreadful accusers (Tr. i. 4; Apol. 18 B, C); the corrupting effect of popular arts and opinions (Tr. ii. 178 to 181; Rep. 492 A to 494 A).
- Potentates are the most depraved (Tr. i. 230; Gorg. 525 E); when they are not so, then are they most admirable (Tr. 230; 526 A); the case of Aristides (ib.).
- Potter, learning the art of, in the costly vase, not usual (Tr. i. 218; Gorg. 514 E; Tr. iv. 159; Lach. 187 B); potter with potter fights (Tr. i. 496; Lys. 215 C).
- Poverty. All those who as indigent persons are prepared to join in an attack on the property of the wealthy should be sent away as colonists (Tr. v. 167; Laws, 735 E; 736 A).
- is an advantage to a state in war, seeing that no foe will care to fight with lean and hardy dogs, with little prospect of spoil (Tr. ii. 105; Rep. 422 D); it is of especial use in alliances, where the possession of gold and silver is renounced by the party suing for the connexion (ib.).

Power is not to be given to wealth and strength, but to him who is most amenable to the appointed laws (Tr. v. 138; Laws, 715 B, C); what power is good for its possessor (Tr. i. 158; Gorg. 466 B); the power of not doing what a man chooses (Tr. 159; 466 E; 467 A); power is to be praised when good follows its exercise, but not when punishment (Tr. 163, 164; 469 E; 470 A, C); where power is exhibited, there the presence of existence or *Ens* is demonstrated (Tr. iii. 151; Sophist, 247 E). Powers of numbers, *see* Art. Numbers.

Praising that pursuit in which we excel from self-esteem (Tr. i. 182; Gorg. 484 E).

Prayer is dangerous if always to be granted. A father would often pray the gods not to grant what a son prays for, as in the case of Theseus and Hippolytus. The man should only pray that his wishes may square with what intelligence would dictate (Tr. v. 96, 97; Laws, 687 D, E; 688 A, B); hazardous without a sound mind (*ib.*); is to be addressed to the gods on great occasions, as well as small (Tr. ii. 331; Tim. 27 C); the duty of hymning and honouring and praying to the gods dwelt on at length (Tr. vi. 14 to 16; Epin. 980 A, B, C, D, E); the gods sometimes give, and sometimes not, what we pray for. A man may, like Œdipus, pray for great calamities (Tr. iv. 375; Alcib. II. 138 B); further discussion of the point (Tr. 380; 141 A); prayer to the gods to be made a grammarian or a musician a mark of imbecility (Tr. vi. 69, 70; Eryx. 398 C; 398 E); prayers for children have been put up, and when the request has been granted they have proved a curse (Tr. iv. 382; Alcib. II. 142 B); quotes with approval the following:

"Thou sovereign Zeus, on us good gifts bestow
Prayerless, or at thy footstool bending low,
But what thy wisdom knows would prove our hurt,
Deaf to entreaty, let thy power avert "

(Tr. 383; 143 A); the gods preferred the Lacedæmonian *εὐφρομία*, or simple prayer, to the solemn rites of the Greeks, their oxen with gilded horns and petitions for good and evil alike, which they regard as blasphemous (Tr. 395; 149 B, C). So Homer:

"Sweet was the smell, but vain the purpose all,
The gods immortal feast not at the call;
The sacred Troy, and Troy's imperious lord,
And spear-armed host of Priam are abhorred "

(Tr. 395, 27; 149 D). There is a reference to the frequency with which prayers were addressed to the gods, where the Athenian in the Laws speaks of young children from their mothers' milk being constant witnesses to the prayers addressed by Greeks and barbarians,

- at the time of the rising and setting of the sun and moon, and their prostrations and reverences in all occurrences of good or ill fortune, as inculcating the truth of the existence of the gods (Tr. v. 410; Laws, 887 E); all persons with the least spark of moderation, in every small or great crisis, call upon God (Tr. ii. 331; Tim. 27 C).
- Predictions of dying men are true (Tr. i. 27; Apol. 39 C). So Shak.: "Holy men at their death have good inspirations."—*Merch. of Ven.*, act i. sc. 2.
- Preface said to be long, for one eager to hear (Tr. ii. 117; Rep. 433 A).
- Preference of self. "Somehow or other every one is naturally drawn to that which most resembles himself," and this prevails in the case of rich and noble marriages which are confined to their own class (Tr. v. 227, 228; Laws, 773 B, D, E).
- Prejudice, its baneful influence upon the trial of Socrates (Tr. i. 4, 15; Apol. 18 B, C; 28 A).
- Preludes to laws. The fourth book of the Laws is brought to a close by an attempt to establish the importance of laying down preludes to the laws, by which the writer may be supposed to mean, reasons expounding their origin, their reasonableness, their mutual interdependence, as something superadded and introductory, or persuasive, beyond the mere letter of the requirements (Tr. 149; Laws, 722 A, and following).
- Preparation for meeting the Judge (Tr. i. 231; Gorg. 526 D).
- Presents from the bad; to receive presents from an abandoned person is neither right for a good man nor for a god (Tr. v. 141; Laws, 716 E).
- Primary elements can only be named (Tr. i. 444; Theæt. 202 B); they are not cognised or defined, only perceived, though their composites may be (ib.).
- Principles of classification (Tr. iii. 175, 183; Statesm. 262 D; 267 B).
- Prison cut of hair, as respects the soul (Tr. iv. 340; Alcib. I. 120 A, B).
- Prisoner making his escape from gaol and catching up the disguise that first comes to hand (Tr. i. 43; Crito, 53 D); helping to rivet his own chains (Tr. 86; Phæd. 82 E).
- Private life among the Athenians only, is compatible with safety, if a man dares to do what is just (Tr. i. 19; Apol. 31 E).
- man; shall we put him who rules his own affairs well, in the class of king? (Tr. iii. 195; Statesm. 260 E).
- Probabilities made of more value than facts, in courts of law (Tr. i. 352; Phædr. 272 D); probability is not admitted as a basis for mathematical deduction (Tr. 395; Theæt. 162 E); must be accepted in the absence of certainty (Tr. 89; Phæd. 85 C); when it is based on

superficial resemblance, not to be relied on in geometry or elsewhere (Tr. 97; 92 D).

Probable is said to be better than the true (Tr. i. 345, 346; Phædr. 267 A, B).

Procession of the *πέπλος* into the Acropolis (Tr. i. 462; Euthyp. 5 E; 6 B).

Prodicus a wise and divine man (Tr. i. 244; Protag. 316 A); a healer of ignorance (Tr. 289; 357 E); spoken of as a sophist (Tr. iv. 412; Theag. 128 A; Tr. ii. 289; Rep. 600 C).

Profiles or half faces and tali (Tr. iii. 514; Symp. 193 A).

Proximity (Tr. i. 153; Gorg. 461 C, D); gives the right to another not to be compelled to hear it out (Tr. 153, 157; 461 D; 465 B, E; Tr. iii. 104, 105, 117; Sophist, 217 D; 218 A; 225 B).

προμήθεια, used by a species of punning in reference to Prometheus (Tr. i. 293; Protag. 361 A, B, C, D, E). Other examples of this kind are the play on Gorgias and Gorgon further on; *αἱ αἱ* and Ajax; see Wunder's *Soph. Aj.* 422; *δμηρος* and *μηρός*, Eurip. *Bacch.* 288 to 295; Pentheus and *πενθεῖν* in the same play; *ἐλέπτολις* and Helen, *Æsch. Ag.* 626; Polynices and *νεῖκος*, Eurip. *Phœn.* 645, 1508; also Columbus Carolus, and Greek words for "sailing" and "losing a head."

Prometheus, story of, referred to (Tr. iv. 14; Phileb. 16 C; Tr. iii. 218; Statesm. 274 B, C); fable of Prometheus and Epimetheus (Tr. i. 248 to 251; Protag. 320, 321, 322 throughout; also Tr. 293, 294; 361 A, B, C, D, E); ordered to stop the judges in Hades from knowing anything beforehand of the death of those coming up for judgment (Tr. 228; Gorg. 523 D).

Proof, confutation, *ἐλεγχος*, one of the principal designations of the Socratic method of testing truth. See Art. *Elenchus*.

Properties of solids, surfaces, and ratios (Tr. vi. 32; *Epin.* 990 C).

Property; what are its advantages? (Tr. ii. 5; Rep. 330 D); one of them is the being able to make reparation and to give both gods and men their due (Tr. 6; 330 E; 331 A).

Prophetic power of the soul (Tr. i. 317; Phædr. 242 C).

Proportion was assigned to matter by the deity. As regards its molecules, their proportions, numbers, movements, and the forces which act on them, these have been fitted into just relations and their uses assigned by the divine being (Tr. ii. 364; Tim. 56 C); things compounded according to the best analogy neither suffer undue augmentation nor diminution, but continue in a well-compacted indissoluble connexion (Tr. vi. 149; Tim. *Locr.* 95 B); atomic proportion (*ib.*).

Propositions that mutually exclude one another, when either is true,

assert the existent to be non-existent, and *vice versâ* (Tr. iii. 176; Sophist, 263 B).

Prose poetry, its bad effects in education are spoken of under the designation of lyreless effusions of the poets, committed to writing, some in metre, others destitute of rhythmical divisions, such as can only be spoken of as mere prose, from which all rhythm and harmony have leaked out, or disappointing, misguiding compositions left behind them by a few out of many such men (Tr. v. 286; Laws, 810 B, C).

Protagoras (*see* Tr. i. 239 to 246; Protag. 310 E; 313 A, B, C, D, E; 314 A, B; 315 B; 318 A); compares himself with others (Tr. 246, 247; 318 A, D, E); returns fees if the pupils are dissatisfied (Tr. 256; 328 C); he is a healer of ignorance like Prodicus (Tr. 289; 357 E); not an envious person (Tr. 293; 361 A, B, C, D, E); his wealth (Tr. iii. 36; Meno. 91 D); compared to the case of cobblers and old-clothes men (*ib.*); makes his pupils worse than when they came to him (*ib.*); was Protagoras a man of universal wisdom? (Tr. i. 381; Theæt. 152 C); did he speak in enigmas to the crowd? (*ib.*); his dictum of "man the measure of all things" (Tr. 381, 392, 393, 400; 152 A; 160 D; 161 C; 166 D; Tr. iii. 287; Cratyl. 386 A); represented as talking for popularity (Tr. i. 394; Theæt. 161 E); as speaking in play from the inmost oracular shrine of his book (*ib.*); he answers Socrates (Tr. 400; 166 C, D); Protagoras is truth for no one (Tr. 405; 171 A); his enormous gains (Tr. iii. 36; Meno. 91 D; Tr. ii. 289; Rep. 600 C).

PROTAGORAS. *See* Summary, page 51.

Protarchus is represented as saying that the science of dialectics would object if we gave the palm to any other but her (Tr. iv. 92; Phileb. 57 E).

Proteus, the type of a shifty reasoner who wriggles up and down and slips from you with an air of comic defiance (Tr. iv. 308; Ion, 541 E; referred to (Tr. iii. 73; Euthyd. 288 C, D; Tr. i. 476; Euthyp. 15 D, E).

Protreptic, that which tends to effect a mental conversion, thus *προτρεπτικός* (Tr. iv. 470, 473; Cleit. 408 B; 410 D); *προτετραμμένος* (Tr. 474; 410 E, D; 408 D); *προτροπή* (Tr. 470; 408 D); *προτρέπειν* (Tr. 470, 473; 408 D, E; 410 B).

Proverbs or idiomatic phrases often introduced by τὸ λεγόμενον, or λεγόμενον, simply, or ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, are common in Plato, thus:

"It is as easy as to boil a stone" (Tr. vi. 81; Eryx. 405 E).

"The untruthfulness of the poets is notorious" (Tr. 93; On Justice, 374 A).

- "A bad man can never appreciate the laws" (Tr. v. 179; Laws, 741 D).
- "The beginning is half of the whole" (Tr. 194; Laws, 753 E. Compare with this Tr. ii. 57, 151; Rep. 377 A; 466 C).
- "Why should we fly when no one pursues" (Tr. v. 408; Laws, 887 B).
- "To put the Colophon to a thing" (Tr. v. 77, 78; Laws, 673 D; 674 C. Compare Tr. iii. 92; Euthyd. 301 E; Tr. i. 383; Theæt. 153 C; Tr. iv. 491; Epist. iii. 318 B); and also the "putting a head to a discourse" (Tr. ii. 380; Tim. 69 B).
- "To learn the potter's art on the costly vase" (Tr. iv. 159; Lach. 187 B. Compare Tr. i. 218; Gorg. 514 E).
- "Beauty is a dainty or difficult thing" (Tr. iv. 259; Hipp. Maj. 304 E. Compare with this Tr. i. 498; Lys. 216 D; Tr. ii. 120; Rep. 435 C; Tr. iii. 284; 384 B).
- "What is good is worth repeating" (Tr. iv. 96; Phileb. 60 A).
- "Even a pig or an infant might know" (Tr. iv. 172; Lach. 196 D. Compare Tr. iii. 91; Euthyd. 301 C).
- "Let the murder be on my head as upon a vile Carian" (Tr. iv. 159; Lach. 187 B; Tr. iii. 69; Euthyd. 285 C).
- "Ours is not what we wish, but what we can" (Tr. iv. 252; Hipp. Maj. 301 C).
- "A crafty brute not to be caught with the left hand" (Tr. iii. 118; Sophist, 226 A).
- "Such a man will never take a city" (or set the Thames on fire) (Tr. iii. 173; Sophist, 261 C).
- "It is no easy matter to escape all" (or run the gauntlet) (Tr. iii. 126; Sophist, 231 C).
- "To make more haste than good speed" (Tr. iii. 200; Statesm. 264 B).
- "It is a risk to go to a feast unbidden" (Tr. iii. 477; Symp. 174 B, C, D).
- "To learn like a fool by suffering" (burnt child dreads the fire), (Tr. iii. 574; Symp. 222 B).
- "To have a domestic foe and ventriloquist in one's inside" (Tr. iii. 159; Sophist, 252 C).
- "Sown, or earth sprung" (Tr. iii. 151; Sophist, 247 C).
- "Clear even to a blind man" (Tr. iii. 142; Sophist, 241 D. With this compare Tr. ii. 150, 170; Rep. 465 D; 484 C).
- "Seizing rocks and oaks or pulling the stars from their spheres" (Tr. iii. 149; Sophist, 246 A).
- "Unsettling all things, even the solid world" (Tr. iii. 154; Sophist,

- 249 D). Compare with this what is said of "The Thessalian witches who draw down the moon" (Tr. i. 216; Gorg. 513 A).
- "To put on the lion's skin" (Tr. iii. 336; Cratyl. 411 A).
- "He that is giddy thinks the world turns round" (Tr. iii. 336; Crat. 411 B).
- "To go out of bounds or jump over the trenches (traces)" (Tr. iii. 341; Crat. 413 A; also 343; Crat. 414 B).
- "To begin from Hestia" (at home) (Tr. iii. 316; Crat. 401 A).
- "To do one's best" (Tr. iii. 367; Crat. 425 C).
- "Good things are scarce" (Tr. iii. 96; Euthyd. 304 B).
- "To run after larks like children" (to put salt on their tails) (Tr. iii. 77; Euthyd. 291 B).
- "To fall into a labyrinth" (Tr. iii. 77; Euthyd. 291 B).
- "To put great gates on the ears" (Tr. iii. 567; Symp. 218 B).
- "When wine is in the wit is out" (a drunken man speaks truth) (Tr. iii. 566; Symp. 217 E).
- "You destroy all my castles in the air" *καλὰ δὲ παταγεῖς* (Tr. iii. 80; Euthyd. 293 D).
- "To escape all risks" (to go through fire and water) (Tr. iii. 126; Sophist, 231 C).
- "To shave or beard a lion" (Tr. ii. 18; Rep. 341 C).
- "To give a handle" (Tr. ii. 233; Rep. 544 B. Compare Tr. i. 310; Phædr. 236 C; also Tr. v. 89; Laws, 682 E).
- "Birds of a feather" (Tr. ii. 4; Rep. 329 A. So Tr. i. 315; Phædr. 240 C).
- "The property of friends is common" (Tr. ii. 107; Rep. 424 A).
- "By hook or by crook" (Tr. ii. 160; Rep. 474 C, D).
- "Our next-door neighbour was no wiser" (when we first saw the light) (Tr. iv. 343; Alcib. I. 121 D).
- "Cart before the horse" (*ἄσπερον πρότερον*) (Tr. ii. 207; Rep. 518 D).
- "The rich have many consolations" (Tr. ii. 5; Rep. 329 E).
- "Like old crones telling tales and wagging their heads" (Tr. ii. 29; Rep. 350 E).
- "To play at kingdoms" (Tr. ii. 105; Rep. 422 E).
- "Like master (mistress) like man or dog" (Tr. ii. 253; Rep. 563 C).
- "Out of smoke into flame" (out of the frying-pan into the fire) (Tr. ii. 259; Rep. 569 C).
- "To tell the cups in the sea" (to count the sands) (Tr. i. 408; Theæt. 173 D).
- "Old wives' trash" (Tr. i. 411; Theæt. 176 C; Tr. 231; Gorg. 527 A).
- "A day after the fair" (Tr. i. 136; Gorg. 447 A.)

- "Not to have the slightest conception" (Tr. i. 64; Phæd. 66 C); or make the least progress.
- "To be afraid of one's own shadow" (Tr. i. 108; Phæd. 101 D).
- "All would be higgledy-piggledy" (Tr. i. 388; Theæt. 153 D).
- "Plunged into a well" (Tr. i. 398; Theæt. 165 B).
- "Chip of the old block" (Tr. i. 216; Gorg. 513 B).
- "To bandy words like the rascally comedians" (Tr. i. 311; Phædr. 236 C).
- "The tables are turned" (Tr. i. 410; Theæt. 175 D).
- "As wolves love lambs" (Tr. i. 317; Phædr. 241 D).
- "To sweeten one's mouth" (or to wash a salt ear with a fresh-water or drinkable discourse) (Tr. i. 319; Phædr. 243 D).
- "Not Hercules can contend against two" (Tr. i. 93; Phæd. 89 C).
- "To put our dearest interests to the hazard of the die" (Tr. i. 242; Protag. 314 A).
- "To strain every rope and make all sail" (Tr. i. 268; Protag. 338 A).
- "Not even the gods fight with necessity" (Tr. i. 276; Protag. 345 D).
- "To write in water" (Tr. i. 356; Phædr. 276 C).
- "To become rich in a dream" (to dream of wealth) (Tr. i. 501; Lys. 218 C, D).
- "What we learn as children we rarely forget" (Tr. ii. 330; Tim. 26 B).
- "Child's play" (or turn of the die) (Tr. ii. 210; Rep. 521 C).

Many others might be easily collected. Elsewhere I have quoted examples of the use of *ὑπαρ* and *ὑπαρ*, the Delphic gnomes, and pillar apothegms, living the life of an oyster, &c., &c. The phrase *ὁ λεγόμενος* is found perpetually attached to other words in the sense of "the so termed." See also Ast's "Lexicon" and Stallbaum's "Indices," from which I have borrowed where necessary, but most of the examples have been noted by myself, though the reference has not always been at hand when wanting.

Prytaneum, a residence in it more due to Socrates than to the conquerors at Olympia (Tr. i. 24; Apol. 36 D); used figuratively as the seat of wisdom and culture of Athens (Tr. 267; Protag. 337 D).

Psyche, *ψυχή*, the soul, considered as distinct from the body and capable of existing apart, attributed to men and animals, or even plants. In the Timæus three souls are spoken of: the rational soul, situated in the head; the emotional, energetic, or irascible, in the thorax; the concupiscent, or appetitive, in the stomach. This tripartite arrangement is recognised in the Phædrus, and also in the Re-

- public** (Tr. ii. 279; 588 C, D). Each of these may be developed at the expense of the other, so that the man partakes of the nature of that which is most developed. The rational part is the immortal and divine, the lower is corrupt and mortal. In the Cratylus soul is explained as that which refreshes or refrigerates the body, enabling it to respire, from ψυχος, "cold." It is more than our modern "animal life," and is distinct from all the terms used to express the soul's functions, such as νοῦς, φρήν, διάνοια, all which relate to mind, not in its personal substratum, but rather to its endowments or faculties. Derivatives are ἐμψυχος, εὖψυχος, εὖψυχια, &c. Professor Thompson would translate πᾶσα ψυχή by "universal soul" (Tr. i. 321; Phædr. 245 B), and possibly (Tr. 326; 249 E); while πᾶσα ἡ ψυχή he terms "soul in its entirety" (Tr. 322; 246 B).
- Psychology and physiology of soul and body** (Tr. ii. 380; Tim. 69 D, and following).
- Public improvements**, the defence of territory, suitable modes of ingress, egress, and transport of cattle, proper drainage, dams, and culverts, water levels, water supply, conduits for the temples, hot and cold baths, &c., are dwelt on (Tr. v. 189, 190; Laws, 751 A, B, C, D); the public are to have a voice in decisions upon state offences (Tr. 218; 768 A); public life is in some respects injurious and seductive; he who can do as he likes and is not restrained by wisdom is in a dangerous position. He is like the sick man who is his own physician (Tr. iv. 369; Alcib. I. 134 E); pensioners of the public are spoken of as provided for in the Prytaneum (Tr. i. 24; Apol. 36 D).
- Pugilist**; one who has been trained for the profession would easily encounter two untaught opponents, particularly if rich and fat (Tr. ii. 105; Rep. 422 B); would knock down many foes by feigning flight and then turning round and attacking them in succession (Tr. 105; 422 C); rich men possess less knowledge of war than even of boxing (ib.).
- Punished**, he who is so treated for wrong-doing is quieted and tamed as to his bestial nature, and has his gentler part emancipated (Tr. ii. 282; Rep. 591 B); he thereby acquires moderation, righteousness, and intelligence, all which are better than health and strength of body, by how much the soul excels the body (ib.).
- Punishment**, the greatest is the being made, like evil men, to shun all that is good and being rendered one with them (Tr. v. 154, 155; Laws, 728 B); the object of punishment is not the infliction of evil (Tr. 354; 854 D); in the world to come inexorable punishments are imposed on the unholy and polluted (Tr. vi. 167, 168; Tim. Loc. 104 D); it is contended that punishment is unjust if virtue cannot be taught (Tr. i. 251; Protag. 323 A); its object is stated (Tr. 252; 324

A, B); as applied to boys (Tr. 254; 325 D); punishment where needed is essential to happiness (Tr. 210; Gorg. 507 D); it is twofold, partly for improvement, partly as an example to others (Tr. 229, 230; 525 B); ancient punishments were torture, cutting or burning out the eyes, inflicted on wife and children as well, impaling and setting on fire after the delinquent had been well smeared with pitch (Tr. 167, 168; Gorg. 473 C; Tr. ii. 40, 303, 304; Rep. 361 E; 362 A; 613 B, C, D, E).

Punning, or playing on the names of Gorgias and Gorgon by Socrates (Tr. iii. 525; Symp. 198 C). So *προμήθεια*, in reference to Prometheus; also *κῆρ* and *κνός* (Tr. i. 434; Theæt. 194 A, B; also Tr. i. 293; Protag. 361 A, B, C), where the name of Callias is played on. See above at *προμήθεια*.

Pupil of the eye, the image in it (Tr. iv. 365; Alcib. I. 132 D).

Puppy, youth causes a man to be this, though otherwise good and fair (Tr. iii. 54; Euthyd. 273 A).

Pure, a little white, if pure, is better than much not so (Tr. iv. 93; Phileb. 58 C); the pure of reason and intelligence (Tr. 94; 58 D); the firm, pure, true, and unmixed (Tr. 95; 59 C); said also of the upper earth (Tr. i. 118; Phæd. 109 B), and of the sun (Tr. 314; Phædr. 239 C).

Purification of soul from body (Tr. i. 65, 66; Phæd. 67 C); truth is a purification (Tr. 68; 69 B); purification from blood (Tr. v. 386; Laws, 872 E); of bodies and of souls (Tr. iii. 119, 120; Sophist, 226 D, E; 227 C); the Elenchus is the greatest of purifications (Tr. 125, 126; 230 B, C, D; 231 A, B, C).

Purity of understanding and intelligence are desirable (Tr. iv. 93; Phileb. 58 D; 59 C).

Pyramid is the type or emblem of fire (Tr. ii. 364; Tim. 56 B); and thus the great structures of antiquity may be remains of a fire worship.

Pyrrhic dances, which shun all thrusts and blows by stepping aside, and other evasive movements, such as leaping up and crouching down (Tr. v. 295; Laws, 815 A); the description would suit well with the modern fencing match.

Pythagoras, his mundane system and its relation to the musical scale (Tr. ii. 306, 307; Rep. 616 C, D, E; 617 A, B).

Q.

Quail fancier. "One man desires to possess horses, another dogs, another gold, a fourth honours. But I hold lightly by all these, though I stick passionately to the acquisition of friends, and would

rather be blest in this respect than have the best quail or cock among men, nay, by Zeus, more than horse or dog" (Tr. i. 492; Lys. 211 D, E); quail breeders (Tr. iii. 76; Euthyd. 290 B).

Quail trainer, such as Meidias, with a gallows look of soul about him, as the women would say (Tr. iv. 340; Alcib. I. 120 A, B).

Qualities, sensible. After expounding the reason of liquefaction as due to the large size of the molecules of water which force themselves through the interstices of earths not very compact, he endeavours to explain the phenomena of hardness, softness, &c. (Tr. ii. 370; Tim. 60 E; 61 A). Can the qualities of a thing, in various relations, be asserted of it absolutely, as real? (Tr. i. 381; Theæt. 152 B); as in the case of what is cold to one, but is not so to another (ib.); or is the wind both cold and not cold? (ib.). The endowments or qualities of the human nature are thus spoken of: "There are many admirable additional reasons for the soul's immortality. For never could a mortal nature have been raised so high in greatness of achievement as to set at naught the surpassing strength of wild beasts, to sail over oceans and seas, to build cities, to establish forms of government, to look upwards to the heavens, and to see the motions of the stars in their courses, the paths of the sun and moon, the risings and settings of the Pleiades, the eclipses and swift returns in their orbits of the major luminaries, to speculate on the equality of days and nights in equinox, and the changes of length at the tropics during the winter and summer solstice, on tempests of wind and the descent of storms, and the disastrous tracks of fiery meteors, and to dare to fix by astronomical prediction the events of the world ages before their occurrence, if there were not really a divine life existing in the soul by which it possesses the comprehension and knowledge of such things" (Tr. vi. 51; Axioch. 370 B, C).

Quality spoken of personally, for example, "Courage deriding a want of manliness" (Tr. iv. 169; Lach. 194 A). This figure is not uncommon in Shakespeare and Cervantes, where nothing is said to be more miserable unless misery itself. So Tr. 132, 133; Charmides, 167 C, D, E; 168 A; a sight which sees itself, a fear which fears itself: "None so unhappy unless unhappiness itself," Eurip. Hecub. 774.

Queen bee of the moderns was a king to a late period in history. Mr. Grote refers to Xenop. Cyrop. i. 24; but Plato speaks of the chief of the bees as βασιλεύς (Tr. iii. 262; Statesm. 301 E; Tr. ii. 208; Rep. 520. B). So Virgil, Georgics, iv. 68, 75, 95, 106. So Shakesp., Henry V., act i. sc. 2: "They have a king," "to the tent royal of their emperor."

Queens of Persia, their allowance of whole provinces for particular departments of their personal attire (Tr. iv. 347; Alcib. I. 123 B, C).

Quenched, more than the sun of Heracleitus, so as never to be reilluminated, used figuratively (Tr. ii. 185, 186; Rep. 498 A).

Question and answer, leads, according to Adimantus, insensibly to defeat, its effect not being obvious till the accumulated result of the trivial admissions appears. It might be compared to the slow progress of sap and siege by a besieging force. So the skilful backgammon-player shuts his opponent out of the possibility of a move on the board (Tr. ii. 173; Rep. 487 B, C, D); elsewhere the colloquutor describes himself as forced, not persuaded (Tr. iv. 446; Hipparch. 232 B); and the process is strenuously resisted by Protagoras, *see* Art. Long Speeches. This method of Socrates is also complained of by innuendo, where he is charged with mincing arguments, by what may be termed a species of kermatology, reducing them to sawdust and shavings and clippings (Tr. 258; Hipp. Maj. 304 A, B). The effect of attrition produced by question and answer as assisting in causing intelligence to flash forth is spoken of (Tr. iv. 528; Epist. vii. 344 B).

Questioning, the delight and happiness of conversing with and interrogating departed heroes on our arrival in the next world, referred to (Tr. i. 29; Apol. 41 B, C).

Quibbles of the sophists. After an exhibition of this quibbling, Socrates comes to the rescue and strips off the flimsy disguise. The sophists are described as dancing like Corybantes or savages round their victim, and as gesticulating madly. They ask whether men learn what they do know or do not know, and by such trifling they upset a conclusion, like those who pull from under them the chairs of those who are about to sit, and then shout and laugh when they see them prostrate (Tr. iii. 53, 60, 61; Euthyd. 272 B; 278 B, C, D). Further examples of the sophistical method are adduced, and Socrates observes, "If they know so to destroy men as to make them good and thoughtful from having been bad and thoughtless, let them try it at once on this youth or on my old body" (Tr. 69; 285 A, B, C). "Such reasoning seems marvellous, not only upsetting the conclusions of others but subverting itself, when it is declared impossible to say what is false, or to be ignorant or capable of error" (Tr. 71; 286 C; 287 A); the sophists are like snake-charmers, and certain inquirers, himself included, are like boys trying to put salt on larks' tails (Tr. 75 to 77; 289 E; 290 A; 291 B). Socrates being in a difficulty calls lustily for help against the overwhelming billow with which he is threatened, and the two sophists come to the rescue (Tr. 79; 293 A); a sample of their reasoning is given: "If you know, you know all things, for if there is anything you don't know, you are unknowing, and thus are not the same person." "If a man knows he always knew,

not only when a boy, but when he was born, and before he existed, and before heaven and earth were" (Tr. 80 to 85; 293 C, D, E; 294 A, B, C; 295 A; 296 D). The sophist is like the hydra who thrusts out another head when one is lopped, or like some monster crab who comes from the sea by way of reinforcement (Tr. 86; 297 C); they not only sew up men's mouths but sew up their own (Tr. 95; 303 D); they seek for victory by depreciating their opponents (Tr. 97; 305 D); the father dreads to allow his son to study philosophy in the face of these reproaches (Tr. 98; 306 D, E). Dionysodorus is asked if he knows how to stich shoes and to number the stars and sands, and declares that he does, and that there is nothing that he does not know (Tr. 82; 294 B, C). It is the business of a cook to cut throats, and skin a carcase, and to minte it and boil it, and this being proper it is proper for any one to treat the cook in the same way (Tr. 92; 301 D). If you are a father you are the father of all other men (Tr. 87; 298 C), and horses and marine echini (Tr. 88; 298 D); and the brother of swine and gudgeons (ib.). It is good to drink medicine, and therefore the more you drink the better (Tr. 88; 299 B). The beautiful is that to which beauty is present; is the man to whom an ox is present beefy? or an ox? (Tr. 91; 301 A).

Quick-witted people with strong memories are mostly irascible and without ballast (Tr. i. 371; Theæt. 144 A); they are furious rather than brave (ib.).

Quid. *A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.* Mr. Grote notes the frequency with which this species of faulty logic is employed (Tr. iv. 350; Alcib. I. 125 B; see i. 339).

Quiet, to keep so, is to disobey the gods, if it is done for the sake of human gratification (Tr. i. 25; Apol. 37 E).

R.

Raft on which our all is to be embarked should be a reasoning at least answerable, if certainty cannot be had (Tr. i. 89; Phæd. 85 D).

Ratios, illustrated (Tr. iii. 449; Parm. 154 D). The effect of adding an equal amount of years to an older and younger age will cause the more and less to differ by a less proportion than they did before the addition of the equal, at least this is what I understand by the passage.

Reading small print at a distance (Tr. ii. 48; Rep. 368 D).

Reality is denied by many to what is not visible, unlike the ideologers who would in our day deny it to the visible (Tr. i. 386; Theæt. 155 E); do motion and rest partake of real existence, or does nothing participate with anything else? (Tr. iii. 158; Sophist, 252 A).

Rearing plants and men is difficult (Tr. iv. 401; Theag. 121 B). Dæmocodocus describes his anxiety and doubt about his son, who wants to become wise (Tr. 402; 121 D); but going to the sophists is a matter for hesitation (Tr. 402; 122 A), and the father wants Socrates to advise him. Socrates observes that conferring is said to be a divine thing, and there is no more important occasion for it than on a question of education (Tr. 402; 122 B); it is the duty of citizens to repay the price of their rearing to their country (Tr. ii. 208; Rep. 520 B).

Reasoning, because it is sometimes bad, gives no occasion for rejecting truth and knowledge, where they exist (Tr. i. 95; Phæd. 90 D); reason may get the better of appetite by being allied with emotion (Tr. ii. 125 to 127; Rep. 440 B, E; 441 E). The reasoning and the emotional power are the great safeguards of a state, as they take the shape of wisdom and courage, as also of the knowledge of what conduces to the right exercise of each and all the functions of the soul (Tr. ii. 128; Rep. 442 C). The pure reason is *vous*, the faculty of reasoning or intelligence is that of the higher and immortal soul, whose seat is in the head, and which guides the two inferior horses of the soul, the emotional, impulsive, and high spirited, and the concupiscent, appetitive, and lawless. See under Art. Soul, and the various designations of Intelligence; also Tr. ii. 125, 270, 279, 280; Rep. 439 D, E; 580 D, E; 588 B, C, D, E; Tr. i. 322; Phædr. 246 B.

Recantation of Socrates of the dishonour done by him to Love, which palinode is sung in a wrapt strain of poetic enthusiasm, whose wild licence is more than dithyrambic, and would have seemed so to the Plato of the Laws, when every unlawful passion had ceased to disturb his soul's repose. There is a remarkable contrast, too, between this rhapsody and the tone of Socrates in the Symposium (Tr. i. 318; Phædr. 242 C, D, and following).

Recapitulation of the Athenian annals, and the merits of the Athenian constitution (Tr. iv. 191 to 206; Menex. 238 D to 248 B); to put a head or finale to what has been said by a short *résumé* (Tr. 108; Phileb. 66 D.)

Recollection is said to differ from memory. This difference is explained (Tr. iv. 48; Phileb. 34 B).

Reflexions of letters from water or mirrors would be known or recognised only by previous acquaintance with their forms (Tr. ii. 84; Rep. 402 A, B); reflexions of magnanimity, courage, &c. (Tr. 84; 402 C); known by art and study (ib.); hypotheses are to pure ideas what reflexions are to visible things (Tr. 200; 510 B, D); diagrams a case in point (Tr. 200, 204; 510 C, D, E; 516 A, B).

Refutation. It is not less pleasant to be refuted than to refute (Tr. i.

149; Gorg. 457 E). The *elenchus* is the technical term for this logical or dialectical process, which *see*. Refutation is equally called for, whether the opponent is scoffing or telling his real mind (Tr. ii. 26; Rep. 349 A).

Relative, the, is only made out by vision and the other senses, imperfectly. Moreover, we have but one sense appropriated for the detection of hardness and softness, levity and weight. In all these cases, the soul has to invite and excite reflection to its aid, in order to determine whether the body that at different times exhibits these different qualities is or is not, one and the same (Tr. ii. 212, 213, 123; Rep. 523 E; 524 A, B, C; 438 B, C, D); up and down, means and extreme, are only relative (Tr. ii. 275; Rep. 584 E; 585 A).

Relative pronoun, redundant or coupled with the antecedent in its own clause, *οὗς τοὺς μὲν δίκαιους* (Tr. ii. 305; Rep. 614 C); case of attraction (Tr. 304; 614 A); relative omitted (Tr. 293; 603 E).

Religion declared to be a trick of the lawgiver by objectors, in the thorough spirit of modern infidelity. The passage before us deserves to be quoted as a whole. "They say that fire, water, earth, and air are all by nature and chance, and that none of these are by contrivance; also that the bodies next to these, viz., of the earth, sun, moon and stars, have originated wholly from the former, as being entirely without life; and that each of the latter following the impulse of chance, inherent as an influence in each, and fitting it for the position assigned to it by this fortuitous concourse, hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard, and all qualities commingled necessarily in this chance-medley of opposites, have in this way and by this process given birth to the whole heaven and all that is in heaven (Tr. v. 412; Laws, 889 A, B, C). And they say, further, that all animals and plants and seasons, having been produced from these, are not the result of mind, nor of the divine will nor contrivance, but are due, as we say, to nature and chance. They say that contrivance arose subsequently as a sequel to these, mortal itself, and of mortal origin, and in a later stage producing instruction, or precepts not largely partaking of truth, but shadowy ideas akin to themselves, such as painting, music, and certain rival arts allied to them, produce. Such they assert are those which originate any important art, all those that have linked themselves with nature's forces, like physic, agriculture, and gymnastics. Moreover, they declare, that politics participate in a small measure in nature, and much in art, and that thus all law appointment is not by nature, but purely artificial, and that its utterances are not true. How say you? These, my good fellow, tell us that the gods are not first by nature, but by mere laws which differ in different places, according to compromises peculiar to each among the

law-makers themselves; that what is just is not so wholly by nature; that men continue to dispute about it and to change it among themselves; and that what they so change becomes valid when and where they choose, based on art and law, but resting on no natural grounds (Tr. 413; 889 D, E). These are all the *dicta* of persons reputed wise among young men, private speculators and poets, who declare that to be the most just which any one can obtain by superior force. Hence the impious conclusions of young men, that it is not necessary to believe in gods, such as the law enjoins," &c. (Tr. 414; 890 A, B).

Remembrance is one with knowledge. The soul then as being immortal and oftentimes born, and having seen the things of another world, and the things in Hades and all others, there is nothing which it has not at some time acquired, so that it is not surprising that with respect to virtue and other matters, it is able to recall to mind what it formerly knew. Being of a nature wholly akin, and having learnt all that pertains to soul, nothing prevents him who has the recollection of any single thing which men call learning, from investigating all other branches of knowledge, if a man is brave and seeks industriously. This search and acquisition wholly hangs on remembrance (Tr. iii. 20; Meno. 81 C, D, E; 82 A); proof that learning is remembrance (Tr. 21; 82 E, and following; Tr. 44; 98 A).

Reminiscence is caused by objects like and unlike. This is our doctrine of association of ideas (Tr. i. 74; Phæd. 74 A). What has been said in Art. Remembrance, above, is the celebrated so-called theory of reminiscence, one of the most characteristic and striking of the Platonic doctrines. Our learning is only reminiscence (Tr. i. 72, 74, 77, 97, 325; Phæd. 72 E; 73 D, E; 76 A; 92 D; Phædr. 249 C; Tr. v. 161; Laws, 732 B). Other references given by Ast are Tr. i. 73, 75, 96, 97; Phæd. 73 C; 74 D; 91 E; 92 C; Tr. iv. 48; Phileb. 34 B; Tr. ii. 294; Rep. 604 D).

"Perhaps I lived before

In some strange world, where first my soul was shaped,
And all this passionate love and joy and pain
That come, I know not whence, and sway my deeds,
Are dim, yet mastering memories."—*Span. Gypsy*, 108.

Renown, men of, in great crises. "It is in this way mostly that cities have in past time been furnished with all their appliances, and have been afterwards prosperously peopled, during the occurrence of great events that have arisen in war and other complications, when in such critical times there may have arisen a man of renown and courage, who possessed great power" (Tr. iv. 549; Epist. xi. 359 B).

Renowned children, better than immortal ones (Tr. iv. 204; Menex. 247 D).

- Repetition needless.** Socrates objects this charge to the speech of Lysias (Tr. i. 309; Phædr. 234 E).
- Representation, theory of.** "Believe now that there is another operator at that time working in our souls. Whom? A draughtsman who paints images of what has been named in the mind, after the penman" (Tr. iv. 58; Phileb. 39 B).
- Reproach of preferring riches to reputation, honour, intellect, and truth, and the good of the soul** (Tr. i. 17; Apol. 29 D, E).
- Republic.** See Art. State.
- REPUBLIC.** See Summary, page 99.
- Resemblances, to be conducted through them, by little and little, to conclusions the opposite to those previously held** (Tr. i. 340; Phædr. 262 B).
- Resolution needed, not deliberation** (Tr. i. 34; Crito, 46 A).
 ——— of forces known to Aristotle, if not to Plato. See Laws of motion.
- Respect towards another should be founded on the extent of his education, not on casual acquaintanceship, διὰ βαναύσου φιλότητος** (Tr. iv. 513; Epist. vii. 334 B).
- Rest is said to belong to "not being" and "perishing"** (Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 153 A); as idleness, produces dissolution (Tr. 382; 153 B); rest exists as well as motion (Tr. iii. 155; Sophist. 250 A); are both moved or both at rest? (Tr. 156; 250 B); neither partakes of existence, if nothing whatever partakes of anything else (Tr. 158; 252 A).
- Retaliation is inconsistent with what is just** (Tr. i. 38 to 40; Crito, 49 C; 50 E; 51 A).
- Revellers break in at the conclusion of the Symposium** (Tr. iii. 574 to 576; Symp. 222 E; 223 A, B, C, D).
- Revolution on an axis** (Tr. iii. 211; Statesm. 269 E; 270 A, B); revolutions of a gyrating top (Tr. ii. 121; Rep. 436 D, E; Tr. v. 419; Laws, 893 C, D); revolution of the heavens and spheres round the spindle of Necessity, or by its means (Tr. ii. 306, 307; Rep. 616 C; 617 C); change of revolution of the heavenly orbs (Tr. iii. 212, 216; Statesm. 270 C, D; 273 A).
- Rhadamanthus is spoken of as one of the judges in the lower world** (Tr. iv. 459 to 461; Minos, 318 D, E; 320 E; 321 A); he is assigned to Asia (Tr. i. 228, 229; Gorg. 524 A, E; Tr. 28; Apol. 41 A).
- Rhapsodists described as reciting for fees, and as inspiring their hearers with the very sentiments of the author whose poems they are repeating.** If they do not succeed in setting them in tears, or set them laughing instead, the reciters will have to howl for their fees (Tr. iv. 298; Ion, 535 E); are the expositors of the poets (Tr. 288; 530 C);

Socrates, who throughout is indulging a laugh at the exaggerated pretensions of this class of men, asks Ion if the Greeks have more need of a rhapsodist bedizened with a golden crown or of a general, seeing he professes to be both (Tr. iv. 307; 541 B).

Rhetoric is the science of words (Tr. i. 139; Gorg. 449 E); not of all words, but of what belongs to speaking rightly (Tr. 140; *ib.*; 450 B); not of geometry or logic (Tr. 140; *ib.*; 450 D); it pertains to the greatest and best of human interests (Tr. 141; 451 D); this is disputable (Tr. 142; 451 E); it is only an art of persuasion, though other arts beside it persuade (Tr. 143, 144; 453 A, B, D; 454 A); it is of use in popular assemblies (Tr. 144; 454 A); it produces belief, not science or knowledge (Tr. 145, 146; 454 E; 455 A); does not teach justice (Tr. 146; 455 A); is a heaven-born thing, as a source of political influence (Tr. 147; 456 A); comprises all other powers (Tr. 147; 456 B); it is an art not to be abused or employed without judgment any more than that of the boxer (Tr. 148; 456 D, E; 457 A, B); it does not require knowledge, but makes its appeals to the ignorant (Tr. 150; 459 C); it is asked whether it supposes a knowledge of justice or beauty in the party to whom it is addressed; or whether this is got by the study of it? (Tr. 151; 459 D; 460 A); Gorgias asserts that it does, through fear of the opposite admission (Tr. 153; 461 B); Polus ridicules this (*ib.*); according to Socrates it is not an art (Tr. 154, 155; 462 B; 463 A), but a skill in effecting pleasure, like cookery (Tr. 154, 157; 462 B, C, D; 465 A); though it is not cookery (Tr. 155; 462 E), but flattery, and like cookery sophistical (Tr. 155; 463 A); said to be an image, and ugly (Tr. 156; 463 D, E), as well as useless (Tr. 177; 480 A); unless for helping an enemy to go unpunished, as the worst thing that could befall him (Tr. 178; 481 A); or influencing children, women, and slaves (Tr. 204; 502 D); as being flattery, it is not worthy of esteem (*ib.*); what is it among the Athenians, and in popular constitutions? (Tr. 204; 502 D, E); does it not aim to gratify, not to do what is best? (Tr. 205; 502 E); said to curry favour with children (*ib.*); is twofold, according as it flatters or attempts to advise well, but the last is a case which seldom or never arises (Tr. 205; 503 A); it may secure us in the courts of law, but is not the thing to aim most at (Tr. 214; 511 B); its pomposity (Tr. 214; 511 C); the loss of life through lack of it is no evil (Tr. 227; 522 D); its futility (Tr. 232; 527 C).

Rhetoricians, their art makes converts, not by teaching, but by causing people to opine (Tr. i. 443; *Thææt.* 201 A, B); they are unable to show the truth adequately, to those not eye-witnesses of an event, during the time allotted for speaking (*ib.*).

Rhythm and melody are the foundation of the dance (Tr. v. 77; *Laws*,

673 D, E); rhythm and harmony are essential to life (Tr. i. 254; Protag. 326 B); what rhythms are to be allowed to remain in the model state? (Tr. ii. 82; Rep. 400 A, B); connexion of rhythm with emphasis, cadence, quantity, and the employment of the metrical feet, iambus, trochee, and dactyl; also, what scansion suits illiberality and insolence? (ib.); elegance is wholly dependent thereon (Tr. 82; 400 C), and on its being assimilated to the beautiful in diction (Tr. 83; 400 D); whether well harmonized or not (ib.), words are not to follow the rhythm, but rhythm the words (ib.). See also Article *Harmony and Rhythm*.

Rich men and bankers, their talk worthless (Tr. iii. 475; Symp. 173 C); the rich man has time to employ and retain a physician, not so the poorer artizan (Tr. ii. 88, 89; Rep. 406 D, E; 407 A); he is not a good warrior, and a real champion would dispose of many such foes (Tr. 105; 422 C); the really rich man is not he that is so in gold, but in a good and soundly-intelligent life (Tr. 209, 222; 521 A; 532 B, C).

Richer, if the sciences bring about such a result, they appear to take the place of money with as much reason as gold or silver. Those possessing such sciences are the richer, the better informed will sometimes be so (Tr. vi. 76; Eryx. 402 E; 403 A).

Riches are not to be valued in comparison with virtue (Tr. iv. 194; Menex. 240 D); the honours of parents are a treasure of riches and glory to children (Tr. 204; 247 C); to get riches in a dream (Tr. i. 500; Lys. 218 C); riches do not bring glory to their possessor who is destitute of manliness; such a man is rich for another, and not for himself (Tr. iv. 203; Menex. 246 E); riches despised by Socrates (Tr. iii. 563; Symp. 216 D); they are more prized by those who have laboured for them than by those who have inherited them (Tr. ii. 5; Rep. 330 C); as being their own work (ib.), they are not good for a bad man, but only for the good (Tr. 6; 331 A); they contribute to righteousness (Tr. 7; 331 C), which is more precious than gold (Tr. 7 to 13; 332 B to 336 E); riches and poverty have both a bad influence on human well-being (Tr. 104; 421 D); a rich potter will be idle and neglectful (ib.); if too poor to buy tools, he will make inferior ware, and his pupils will turn out bad workmen (Tr. 104; 421 E); riches do not qualify the craftsman to meddle in state affairs (Tr. 118; 434 B); though, as in our day, they may enable the successful artizan to aspire to the hand of his master's daughter (Tr. 183; 495 E).

Ridicule, on the part of so-called clever and crafty persons, of the threatenings of unhappiness in a future state (Tr. i. 412; Theæt. 177 A).

Right, what is, is worthy to be reiterated twice or thrice (Tr. v. 525; Laws, 957 A).

— and left hand, why should there be any difference, but for the stupidity of nurses and mothers? (Tr. 258; Laws, 793 E); right and left as a ground of classification (Tr. i. 344; Phædr. 266 A); the reflections from water or mirrors are noticed as making a change from left to right (Tr. ii. 351; Tim. 46 B); right put in place of left sandal (Tr. i. 433; Theæt. 193 C); right for left in reflection from mirrors (ib.).

— of jury challenge: foreigners are to receive the oaths from foreigners (Tr. v. 512; Laws, 949 B, C).

Righteousness, *δικαιοσύνη*, formed like *σωφροσύνη*, *ἀγαθοσύνη* (Gal. v. 22), *ἀγιωσύνη* (1 Thess. iii. 13), *μεγαλοφροσύνη* (Symp. 194 B), (*ἀγαθοσύνη*) *ταπεινοφροσύνη* (Ephes. iv. 2), from the adjective, implying the practical exercise of the quality indicated, is usually translated by "justice," which is hardly sufficiently precise, and does not express the personal attribution. There is the same difficulty with the other parts of virtue, temperance, and fortitude, neither of which exactly convey the meaning of *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία*. The question is asked, whether righteousness is the same with truth, and giving every one their due, or is it an acting according to circumstances for the best? (Tr. ii. 6; Rep. 331 C); is it the doing good to friends and harm to enemies? (Tr. 8; 332 D); its utility in war (Tr. 8; 332 E); and also in peace, for making contracts and taking care of money (Tr. 9; 333 A); when money is useless (Tr. 9; 333 D); being thus made out to be useful for useless things (Tr. 9; 333 E); it is asserted that a clever guardian of property ought to be clever at stealing it (Tr. 10; 334 A); the first definition is repeated (Tr. 10; 334 B); when friends and foes are spoken of, are real or seeming friends and foes meant? (Tr. 10; 334 C, D, E; 335 A); it is now said to be the doing good to a good friend and evil to an evil enemy (ib.); it is a human virtue (Tr. 11; 335 C); more precious than gold, and no stretch of courtesy or politeness should hinder our continued search for it (Tr. 12; 336 E); it is less despotic and illiberal than injustice (Tr. 21; 344 C); declared by the traducer to be not quite a vice, but a respectable weakness (Tr. 26; 348 D); at this observation Socrates expresses his wonder (Tr. 26; 348 E); if it is wisdom and virtue, it will be a stronger thing than injustice (Tr. 29; 351 A); can a city retain its power without righteousness? (Tr. 29; 351 B); it produces concord and friendship (Tr. 30; 351 D); belongs to the good, and is sought on its own account, and for its results (Tr. 35; 358 A); recapitulation of Thrasymachus's argument (Tr. 36; 358 C); that it is practised reluctantly, not as a good (Tr. 36;

358 E); that it is only what law, the device of the weaker, has settled to be lawful and just (358 E; see Tr. i. 180, 181; Gorgias, 482 C, D, E; 483 A, B, C, D); that if all men had the ring of Gyges, none would be so made of adamant as to adhere to it (Tr. ii. 38; Rep. 360 B; Tr. 302; 612 B); it is declared that dissimulation is practised with respect to it (Tr. 39; 360 D); on the other hand, it commands the approbation of the gods (Tr. 41; 363 A); according to Musæus, its rewards in Hades are eternal festivity and the handing down a name to children's children (Tr. 42; 363 D); it is praised by the poets as noble, but difficult and laborious (Tr. 43; 364 A); how it is to be defended (Tr. 46; 366 C); not praised for its own sake (Tr. 46; 366 C); we are asked to show what it does by its own intrinsic power (Tr. 47; 367 B); what is its place in the state? (Tr. 52; 372 A); how does it originate, and how is it fostered? (Tr. 56; 376 C); the poets pronounce it to be a foreign or alien good (Tr. 72; 392 A, B), but a personal loss (ib.); we must first know what it is (Tr. 72; 392 C); it will be found in the model state (Tr. 102; 420 B); in what it differs from injustice (Tr. 111; 427 D, E); how we are to discover it (Tr. 114; 430 D); graphic account of the search for it in the language of the hunting field (Tr. 116, 117; 432 B, C, D); it is defined to be sticking to one's own business (Tr. 117, 118, 128; 433 A, D; 434 A; 443 B); it contributes to the abiding maintenance of moderation, courage, and wisdom in the state (Tr. 117; 433 B); it is hard to say which of the four requisites of virtue renders most service to the state (Tr. 118; 433 C); these are here re-enumerated (ib.); it rivals in efficacy of virtue the other three, wisdom, moderation, and courage (Tr. 118, 119; 433 D, E; 435 B); when present in the individual man (Tr. 119; 434 D, E); it sheds light, as fire from flint, on what is present in the state (Tr. 119; 435 A); further parallelism of individual moderation, courage, and wisdom, with that of the state (Tr. 119; 435 B); it is a doing one's own work, not in external acts merely, but in harmonizing the functions of the soul (Tr. 129; 443 C, D, E); righteousness and injustice are to the soul what health and disease are to the body (Tr. 130; 444 D); the former is the qualification of the just man (Tr. 158; 472 B); it is sought as a pattern (Tr. 158; 472 C) and ideal, for estimating that which most nearly approaches it, not as possible, any more than the painter's ideal (Tr. 158; 472 C, D); it requires a long circuit to estimate it fully (Tr. 193; 504 C); there is one essential *Ens* which is greater than it (Tr. 193; 504 D), viz., "the good," by which the "just" and all other endowments are rendered useful (Tr. 193; 505 A); it is very important to make use of exact research in matters of the highest moment (Tr. 193; 504 E);

righteousness and injustice, with their tendency to happiness or misery, are to be viewed in the examination of the several forms of politics and their embodiment in the individual (Tr. 234; 545 A); righteousness is involved in the question about poetic imitation (Tr. 298; 608 B); having stripped it of its rewards and esteem, and not complicated the argument with these, as Homer and Hesiod are said to have done (Tr. 39 to 42; 361 A, B; 360 B; 363 D), it is found to be absolutely best for the soul, whether the man possesses the ring of Gyges and helmet of Pluton or not (Tr. 301; 611 B); we shall no longer grudge her her rewards from men and gods, living and dying, and Socrates demands the interest of his Principal, where he allowed the just man to seem unjust, and the unjust man just, as matters immaterial to the controversy (Tr. 303; 612 C, D); righteousness does not lie hid from the gods (Tr. 303; 612 C, E); to the god-beloved all that they confer happens for the best, if no taint attaches from former transgressions (Tr. 303; 613 A); poverty, disease, and seeming ill all issue in certain good to the righteous, living or dead (Tr. 303; 613 A). Compare "all things work together for good" of Scripture. They are never neglected by the gods, whom they strive to resemble as much as possible (ib.); the unjust man is in the opposite predicament (Tr. 303; 613 B); let us now look at rewards on the human side from men (Tr. 303; 612 C; 613 B); the just are fleet runners, who come in well at last, crowned, and carrying off the prize in all the affairs of life (Tr. 304; 613 C); but the highest human honours are nothing to those in a future state (Tr. 304; 614 A). The speaker now proceeds to narrate the fable of Er, who, while in a swoon, journeys to the other world, and brings back an account of the final judgment (Tr. 304 to 312; 614 B to 621 C); these final rewards depend on our accepting the doctrine of the soul's immortality, our passing the river of Lethe unpolluted, and striving to look constantly upwards, with a view to the attainment of all good, as friends to ourselves and the gods, both here and hereafter. After this we shall, like victors bearing palms, be led round by assembled crowds of friends, and carry off the rewards of holy living, and there, in our thousand years' journey, the narrator prays that we may fare well (Tr. 312; 621 C, D); teachers of righteousness are spoken of (Tr. iv. 468; Cleit. 407 B); if like virtue, it is to be taught (ib.); according to what is here said, it is the part of righteousness to injure enemies and to do good to friends (Tr. 472; 410 A), but this is again denied, as it operates for the good of all men (ib.); said by an objector to be praised without being known (Tr. 473; 410 C). Plato has several times enforced the Christian precept of doing good to enemies as well as friends.

Ring seal impressed on the tablet of the mind (Tr. i. 433; Theæt. 193 C); ring of Gyges (Tr. ii. 38; Rep. 359 D, E; 360 A, B); supposition of two such (ib.); also further application of the figure (Tr. 302; 612 B).

Ringling crockery, to see if it is sound (Tr. i. 415; Theæt. 179 D); or metal (Tr. iv. 87; Phileb. 55 C).

Rites, purifications, mysteries are disparaged by the side of moderation, righteousness, manliness, and wisdom, which are more effective as preparatives or purifiers. He who is uninitiated, and has not been perfectly complete in these, will indeed lie in the mud gulf in Hades. There are many rod bearers, but few inspired mystæ (Tr. i. 68; Phæd. 69 B, C, D; see also Tr. 320; 244 A, B, C, D, E; Tr. v. 296; Laws, 815 A, B, C; Tr. ii. 44, 45; Rep. 365 A; 366 A).

RIVALS. See Summary, page 216.

Roads, public, to be made and kept in good order (Tr. v. 206; Laws, 761 A).

Robbers, will they hold together without justice among themselves? (Tr. ii. 29, 30; Rep. 351 C; 352 C).

Rock, oracular (Tr. i. 355; Phædr. 275 B; Tr. 22; Apol. 34 D; Tr. ii. 233; Rep. 544 D).

Rod bearers in the mysteries are many as compared with the true worshippers (Tr. i. 68; Phæd. 69 C, D).

Rulers, or guardians, are to have the power of judging about suits, so that no one may acquire the property of another, or be deprived of his own (Tr. ii. 118; Rep. 433 E); they require exalted powers to discharge their duties (Tr. 143; 459 C); they may employ falsehood for the benefit of the ruled (ib.); they are to keep secret all their arrangements for the intercourse of the sexes (Tr. 144; 459 E); *κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων*, the footing of rulers has to be redetailed (Tr. 191; 502 E); they are to be fond of their states, exercised in pleasures and pains, tried, like gold in the fire (Tr. 191; 503 A); they are to be honoured, living and dead (ib.); they will accede to power in our model state as to a necessary duty, and as having higher views than merely to rule (Tr. 209; 520 E); they are to be rich, not in gold, but truly in the graces of life (Tr. 209, 100; 521 A; 416 D, E); it is impossible for beggars and persons hungering after private advantage to accede to the helm of affairs, and to snatch thence the Good. Love of rule, *per se*, is fatal to the man and to those he rules (ib.); those who do not love power are those who should attain it, not those who fight for it (Tr. 209; 521 B); mere stereotyped characters, who are destitute of the power of question and reply, are not to be masters over men (Tr. 224; 534 D); dialectics, and the studies which lead to a knowledge of Being and the Good, should be enforced upon those

who are reliable, courageous, and well-formed (Tr. 225; 535 A); and on souls well born, severe in morals, quick at learning, who are more dismayed at study than at bodily toils (Tr. 225; 535 B); on those who have quick memories, are persevering, laborious, studious, and highly endowed, while the want of these qualities has brought reproach on philosophy (Tr. 225; 535 C); the good ruler is not one who loves bodily or mental labour exclusively (Tr. 226; 535 D); he must not be lame, bastard in respect of moderation, courage, and magnanimity (Tr. 226; 536 A, B); if such as are not sound of limb and intellect are selected, reproach is heaped on philosophy (Tr. 226; 536 B, C); rulers must compel the community and individuals to labour at philosophy, but when occasion demands, to toil in political labours as a necessary and not merely honourable duty, and to train up and rear others to fill their place (Tr. 230; 540 B); at death rulers are to be honoured with sacrifices, as dæmons, or blessed and divine persons (Tr. 231; 540 C); they may be both male and female, and are, while in command, to have no private houses or property as guardians (Tr. 232; 543 B; *see also* Tr. 100; 416 C, D, E).

Ruling power is more ancient and honourable than that which is ruled, and the guiding power than that which is guided (Tr. vi. 16; *Epin.* 980 E). Rural guardians are to have the care of things connected with agriculture (Tr. v. 208; *Laws*, 762 A).

S.

Sacrifices, unbloody. After touching the doctrine of development and of spontaneous generation, and asking whether there was a time in which animals did not devour one another, he alludes to the still extant practice of human sacrifice, contrasted with a period when men abstained from flesh as a thing unholy to be eaten, and as polluting the altars of the gods; and some lives, he says, were called Orphic, by virtue of their employing only things without life (Tr. v. 243; *Laws*, 782 B, C, D).

Sailor is not such from the love of sailing, but for the wealth it procures (Tr. i. 160; *Gorg.* 467 D); a sailor is not such because he sails in a ship, but because he understands his profession (Tr. ii. 18; *Rep.* 341 D); their loose, low-life habits (Tr. i. 319; *Phædr.* 243 C).

Same, that which is always so is uncreated. "Things being thus, we must admit that there is one thing, or a unity possessing a permanent character, uncreated and indissoluble, that receives into itself no other nature from any quarter, nor is ever absorbed in any other, is invisible, and in no other way perceivable by sense, and which intellect alone can cognise. There is, on the other hand, that which is like named, resembling it, which is sensible, created, always

in motion, born in one place, perishing in another, appreciable only to sense and perception through the senses; while there is a third existence, that of space, indissoluble, and furnishing a seat for all things generated, itself not an object of sense, but apprehended by a sort of pseudo reasoning, to which we trust with effort, and which we look on as a sort of dreamy existence, asserting at the same time that whatever is produced must of necessity be wholly in some spot and occupy space" (Tr. ii. 358, 359; Tim. 52 A, B).

Same and like are attributes of the divine (Tr. iii. 211; Statesm. 269 E; 270 A).

Sameness, is it characteristic of the existent? (Tr. iii. 154; Sophist, 249 B); is allied to standing still (Tr. 154; 249 C); the soul's relation to it (ib.); invariable as a characteristic of existence, but falls to the ground if nothing partakes of anything else (Tr. 158; 252 A).

Satyrical drama (Tr. iii. 574; Symp. 222 D).

Scandal has generally some foundation (Tr. i. 5; Apol. 19 C).

Scattered to the winds in these few days (Tr. i. 38; Crito, 49 A).

Scepticism as to the soul's separate existence (Tr. i. 69; Phæd. 70 A. See Religion).

Science or knowledge, *ἐπιστήμη*, is said to be like itself, or otherwise our argument would go for naught, while we ourselves are only saved on a plank of the shipwrecked reasoning (Tr. iv. 8; Phileb. 14 A); arts and right opinions hold the fourth place (Tr. 107; 66 C); science is either theory or practice (Tr. iii. 191; Statesm. 258 E); injunctory or critical (Tr. 194; 260 B, C, D); science, when not the highest and best, is injurious (Tr. iv. 390; Alcib. II. 146 E); it improves oratory (Tr. i. 348; Phædr. 269 D); false science distinguished from true (Tr. 145; Gorg. 454 D, E); what it is, defined. Theodorus the mathematician teaches, and so do the arts of other artisans (Tr. 374; Theæt. 146 D); this is not what we want to know, but what pure abstract science is in itself (Tr. 375; 146 E); is it the same as perception? (Tr. 381, 424; 151 E; 152 A; 186 C, D); is it true opinion? (Tr. 425; 187 C); it cannot exist without a perception of difference between things, and this implies memory (Tr. 73; Phædo, 73 C); it does not look to the advantage of the stronger, but rather of the weaker (Tr. ii. 19; Rep. 342 C); is the great preserver (Tr. i. 288; Protag. 357 A).

Sea described as impassable and viscous where Atlantis subsided (Tr. ii. 415; Critias, 108 E).

—— captain does not boast when he has landed his passengers safely (Tr. i. 215; Gorg. 512 B).

—— ports, their objectionableness and advantageousness (Tr. v. 121; Laws, 705 A, B).

Sea sickness, in which men give themselves up to be trod on, or to any usage (Tr. i. 430; Theæt. 191 A).

Seal, to set one on anything choice (Tr. iii. 191; Statesm. 258 C); ring seals (Tr. i. 433; Theæt. 193 C).

Second childhood (Tr. vi. 45; Axioch. 367 B).

Secondary causes, ascent from them to a first cause (Tr. vi. 16; Epinom. 981 A); secondary functions of bodies, such as growth, decay, resolution and composition, and qualities such as hot, cold, light, heavy, hard, soft, &c., contrasted with those primary functions of soul which are expressed by to will, to ponder, to watch anxiously, to counsel, to think, to feel (Tr. v. 426; Laws, 897 A).

Seeking truth insisted on (Tr. iii. 28; Meno. 86 B, C).

Seeming health of body and soul (Tr. i. 156; Gorg. 463 E; 464 A); seeming to be wise, or thinking oneself wise (Tr. 7, 8; Apol. 21 C; 21 E); those who seemed to have the highest reputation or to be somewhat said to be the most destitute of wisdom, and those of inferior reputation far more intelligent (Tr. 8; 22 A).

Selection of breeding stock (Tr. v. 167; Laws, 735 E); selection of rulers (Tr. ii. 224; Rep. 534 D, and following; also Tr. 86; 404, and following, and elsewhere).

Self, conquest of, is the best of all conquests (Tr. v. 4; Laws, 626 E); shall we not cause the man to come off victor in a struggle with his own passions, and by fighting against his customary habits, and gaining the mastery over them, thus to become complete in courage, who otherwise would never be half himself on the side of virtue? (Tr. 37; 647 D); self-murder highly reprehensible (Tr. 387; 873 C); self-interest or regard is the source of all a man's faults (Tr. 160; 731 E); if a man rules the state as irresponsible, or only self amenable, he will never cherish the common good, but follow his own. His mortal nature will always impel him to avarice, and self-interest causing him to shun pain unreasonably will make him prefer personal ease to what is juster and better (Tr. 390; 875 A, B, C); pleasures, pains, and desires characterise us as human beings, and a man is not to play the deserter in the battle of life (Tr. 162; 732 E; 733 A); most persons are drawn to that which most resembles themselves (Tr. 227; 773 B, C); self-knowledge declared to be difficult (Tr. iv. 358; Alcib. I. 129 A); the Delphic precept "Know thyself" (Tr. iv. 439; Hipparch. 228 B; Tr. i. 273; Protag. 343 B; Tr. iv. 128; Charm. 164 D; Tr. iv. 74; Phileb. 48 C; Tr. i. 304; Phædr. 229 E; Tr. iv. 429; Rivals, 138 A).

Sensations unfelt (Tr. vi. 160; Tim. Loc. 100 B).

Senses, each of them only excite in us one kind of sentiency (Tr. i. 423; Theæt. 186 B); what is common to the sense perceptions is only

known by reflection and comparison, by reasoning and deduction, and by repeated experience, both in men and beasts (Tr. 424; 186 C), whereas sentiency begins at birth (ib.); sensuous perception is not knowledge or science (Tr. 424; 186 D). Truth only got at by syllogistic deduction (ib.); the senses will not distinguish differences in large numbers or masses, only thought (Tr. 436; 195 E); do the senses impart truth to men? (Tr. 63; Phæd. 65 B); what ground of exactness or distinctness have we elsewhere? (ib.); can they recognise the Good and Fair? (Tr. 64; 65 D); can you touch magnitude, health, strength, or any real existence with your hands? (ib.); do brain and senses eliminate thought? (Tr. 102; 96 B); the intimations of the senses in many cases make no call on the intellect for their consideration, while in other cases the appeal is wholly to the intellect, where the senses are no true or sound test (Tr. ii. 210; Rep. 522 B); the opponent wrongly supposes that distant or shadowy objects are referred to (ib.); Socrates explains that where the sense impression is simple and does not call up a feeling of opposition, no aid is got from the intellect, but that this is called in when we conceive of it as one or many, or near or far off (Tr. 212, 213; 523 C; 524 E); a finger is merely a finger, whether little or middle or second, or thick or thin, or placed at the extremity or near at hand. The soul of the masses is not compelled to question the intellect as to what constitutes a finger (Tr. 212; 523 D); when, however, the relative conditions of size, distance, place, thickness and hardness are considered, does the sense faculty alone enable us to judge of these? (Tr. 212; 523 E); the same faculty of sense conveys the impression of these opposite states in the same body, and the intellect alone can decide whether they are one or two (Tr. 213, 212; 524 A, B, C, D; 523 E); to which of these classes do number and unity belong? (ib.); a visible unity or tangible unity cannot lead to essential existence any more than the bare sight or touch of a finger (Tr. 213; 524 D); reflection is called into play when two opposed impressions are placed side by side (Tr. 214; 524 E; also Tr. 212; 523 C); it is thus, too, when we ask ourselves what absolute oneness is, leading us to contemplate reality (ib.); vision exhibits objects as one or many, and computation has to do wholly with number (Tr. 214; 525 A).

Sensible qualities described (Tr. vi. 160; Tim. Locr. 100 B, D); touch the chief agent in determining them (ib.); what is recognised by its sensible properties is what is created and decays (Tr. ii. 332; Tim. 28 A). Sepulchres not to be so large as to cumber the land and lessen the earth's productiveness (Tr. v. 528, 529; Laws, 958 D, E; 959 A). Seriphian, the answer made by Themistocles to his carping objection (Tr. ii. 5; Rep. 330 A).

Serpents, the charming of (Tr. ii. 35 ; Rep. 358 B).

— and stones less divine than men (Tr. iv. 459 ; Minos, 319 A ; Tr. iii. 77 ; Euthyd. 291 B).

Serum of the blood, bile, phlegm, tears, sweat (Tr. ii. 396 ; Tim. 82 A).

Servants and masters. He who has never been a servant can never become a praiseworthy master. We must be servants to the laws, the service of the gods, and to our seniors (Tr. v. 210 ; Laws, 762 D, E) ; a master or mistress should be up before his servants (Tr. 283 ; 808 A, B, C) ; change of servants' names made arbitrarily as with us (Tr. iii. 284 ; Cratyl. 384 D).

Service, divine, uses of ; does it make the gods better ? (Tr. i. 472 ; Euthyp. 13 C) ; what are its effects ? (Tr. 473, 474 ; 13 E ; 14 C, D, E).

Seven wise men of Greece (Tr. i. 273 ; Protag. 343 A).

Sex and its instincts (Tr. v. 245 ; Laws, 783 A).

Sexual gratification is the keenest and most maddening of the passions (Tr. ii. 85 ; Rep. 403 A).

Shadows, to fight with (Tr. i. 4 ; Apol. 18 D).

Shadow of an ass (Phædr. 260 C) ; shadowy sketch (Tr. iii. 467 ; Parm. 165 C ; Tr. i. 68 ; Phæd. 69 B ; Tr. ii. 44, 292 ; Rep. 365 C ; 602 D ; Tr. ii. 414 ; Critias, 107 C).

Shame exists with fear, not necessarily *vice versâ* (Tr. i. 471 ; Euthyp. 12 C).

Shepherd's pipe of reed (Tr. ii. 81 ; Rep. 399 D) ; Apollo's instrument preferred to the pipe of Marsyas (Tr. 82 ; 399 E).

Shifting one's ground in a representation or argument (Tr. i. 340 ; Phædr. 262 A, B) ; ground said to shift from under a man (Tr. 469 ; Euthyp. 11 B) ; or like the statues of Dædalus, arguments take to their heels (Tr. 470 ; 11 C, D).

Ship before the gale (Tr. i. 268 ; Protag. 337 E ; Tr. vi. 103 ; Sisyp. 389 C) ; too much sail to ships (Tr. v. 102 ; Laws, 691 C, D).

Short speeches (Tr. iii. 237 ; Statesm. 286 E) ; short apothegms (Tr. i. 273 ; Protag. 343 A, B ; see Arts. Gnones, γνῶσι σάυρον) ; Socrates prefers short speeches (Tr. 264 ; Protag. 334 D, E) ; we need not at present value short speaking more than length, for it would be absurd to prefer the shorter and vile before the best (Tr. v. 408 ; Laws, 887 B).

Sibyl, named (Tr. i. 319 ; Phædr. 244 B ; Tr. iv. 407 ; Theag. 124 E).

Sick man is not allowed by his doctor to eat or drink what he pleases (Tr. i. 207 ; Gorg. 505 A).

Side of the double of a square, what ? (Tr. iii. 21 to 23 ; Meno. 82 B, C, D, E ; 83 A, B, C ; Tr. vi. 102 ; Sisyp. 388 E).

- Sight, its keenness (Tr. i. 327; Phædr. 250 D); sight, in the abstract, as capable of self-seeing (Tr. iv. 132, 134; Charm. 167 C; 168 E; Tr. 365; Alcib. I. 132 D). Shak., "that most keen spirit of sense."
- Similes are apt to mislead (Tr. iii. 126; Sophist, 231 A).
- Simonides, referred to (Tr. i. 269, 270, 272, 273; Protag. 339 A, B, C, D, E; 340 B; 342 A; 343 C); translation from (Tr. 275; 345 C).
- Simplicity is content with truth, whether from oracular oak or rock (Tr. i. 355; Phædr. 275 B); quotation from Homer (Odys. xix. 163).
- Sin, its sources and remedies; soul is the cause of good and evil, beauty and deformity, just and unjust. We will at least insist on two souls, one which acts as a benefactress, the other as a malignant principle (Tr. v. 426, 427; Laws, 896 E; 897 B); is cured by suffering, both here and in Hades (Tr. i. 229; Gorg. 525 B); but extreme sin is not curable, and its doom is of use as a warning (Tr. i. 230; 525 C).
- Sirens seated on the planetary spheres each utter a note of the chord, making the inaudible music of the spheres (Tr. ii. 307; Rep. 617 B); are accompanied by the Fates (Tr. 308; 617 C).
- are spoken of not only as accompanying the motions of the spheres and singing as they roll in conjunction with the Fates, but as themselves charmed (Tr. ii. 308; Rep. 617 B, C), so as to prefer in the lower world to listen to the *wealth* of words and wisdom of *Pluton* (Tr. iii. 320; Cratyl. 403 D, E). We have here a very striking and characteristic instance of the way in which the etymologies of the Cratylus are made suggestive. Plato's aim is clearly to make room for a pregnant thought rather than to play the mere grammarian. See *Pluton*.
- Sisters can only, in the system of communism, cohabit with brothers when this has been settled by lot or the oracle (Tr. ii. 146; Rep. 461 D).
- SISYPHUS. See Summary, page 243.
- Sketches in pencil viewed as one and similar by those who stand at a distance (Tr. iii. 467; Parm. 165 C).
- Skill without teaching (Tr. iv. 157; Laches, 185 E).
- Skilled persons only command a hearing (Tr. i. 248; Protag. 319 C).
- Skin deep only and trifling (Tr. i. 191; Gorg. 492 C).
- Slaves and slavery. We should acquire slaves as good and well-disposed as possible, for many slaves being better than some brothers and sons, have proved the salvation of their masters, their possessions, and their whole families. On the other hand, it has been said that nothing is sound in the soul of a slave, and that no confidence should be reposed in them—

"Wide seeing Zeus has stripped of half their mind
The men to slavery's hopeless lot consigned"

(Tr. v. 233; *Laws*, 776 D, E; 777 A); relations of master and slave (Tr. 234; 777 B); provisions about them (Tr. 235; 777 D, E); we are not to play or trifle with them (Tr. 235; 778 A); punishment of slaves (Tr. 378; 868 B); where a slave is killed or wronged by another (Tr. 385; 872 C); rules respecting the purchase of slaves when unsound (Tr. 461; 916 A); but no warranty is to be given to a physician or gymnast, who can judge for themselves (Tr. 461; 916 B).

Sleep of death, without dreams, a great gain, particularly to the bad man (Tr. i. 28; *Apol.* 40 C, D, E).

Snares, to escape all, not easy, a proverb (Tr. iii. 126; *Sophist*, 231 C).

Society, its antiquity and slow growth (Tr. v. 81; *Laws*, 677 E); originally there was an infinite solitude and land unbounded. Few were the earth's inhabitants; simple in character, without artificial wants, or any temptations to injustice, they were religious, unsuspecting, artless, and brave, without written laws (Tr. 84; 679 E; Tr. 84; 680 A, and following).

Socrates, a spiritualist by aid of his *dæmon*, which put him on a par in this respect with the most approved modern thaumaturgists (Tr. iv. 412; *Theag.* 128 D); fatal examples of not listening to his warnings were Charmides, son of Glaucus, Timarchus, brother of Cleitomarchus, the destruction of the army in Sicily, Samnio (Tr. 413 to 416; 128 E to 131 A); spoken of as a corrupter of youth, and indicted therefor (Tr. i. 458; *Euthyp.* 2 C); injuring Socrates is a violence done to the city in its very vitals, at the heart and core (Tr. 459; 3 A); charged with being a maker of gods (Tr. 459; 3 B), and a despiser of the old (*ib.*); his *dæmon* (*ib.*); the Athenians will pardon his wisdom but not his teaching, though he does not regard being made a laughing-stock (Tr. 459; 3 C); teaches without fee indiscriminately. This impeachment is more than a laughing matter, and may tax the foresight of the prophets (Tr. 460; 3 D); specimens of his humour (Tr. 474 to 476; 14 C, D; 15 E); of his irony (Tr. iv. 407, 408; *Theag.* 125 A, D); will prove a cleverer artist than *Dædalus* (Tr. i. 470; *Euthyp.* 11 D); he declares that he knows most of the science of love matters (Tr. iv. 412; *Theag.* 128 A); his detection of *Phædrus* with the speech of *Lysias* in his pocket, primed for reciting it (Tr. i. 303; *Phædr.* 228 E); allusion to his ignorance of the country and preference for a town life (Tr. 304, 305; 230 B, D); his inattention (Tr. 308; 234 D); his pretended ignorance, being like a vase filled from other fountains than his own (Tr. 310; 235 D; so Tr. iv. 412; *Theag.* 128 A); his want of volubility (Tr. i. 313; *Phædr.* 238 C); his recantation of what he has said derogatory of Love (Tr. 318; 243 A); his desire to view all sides of a question (*ib.*);

further irony (Tr. iii. 11; Meno, 76 B); self-depreciation (ib.); stationary habits (Tr. 18; 80 B; Tr. i. 304; Phædr. 230 B); commendation of his moral influence, and the charm of his conversation (Tr. iv. 412; Theag. 128 C); further praise of him (Tr. iv. 150, 162; Lach. 181 B; 189 B); the justest man of his time (Tr. 500; Epist. vii. 324 E); praise of a consistent life like his in all its harmony and Doric simplicity (Tr. 161; Lach. 188 C, D); Socrates is charged with mincing arguments (Tr. 251; Hipp. Maj. 300 E); with producing sawdust and clippings (Tr. 258; 304 A, B); weaving webs of words and handling matters piecemeal (Tr. 272; Hipp. Min. 369 C); his alleged indecision and bewilderment (Tr. 283; 376 C); ditto, and his exposure of himself to the mud peltings of such wise men as the sophists (Tr. 258; Hipp. Maj. 304 C, D); at times he seems to change places with the sophists (Tr. 253; 302 A); as also in that paradox about the good man doing evil voluntarily, and the evil man involuntarily (Tr. 283; Hipp. Min. 376 A, B); characteristic specimens of the Socratic dialogue (Tr. 455, 456; Minos, 316 D, E; 317 D, E); Socrates declares that he does not object to be refuted (Tr. i. 149; Gorg. 457 E); his pleasant irony against Polus (Tr. 153; 461 C, D); apologises for prosing (Tr. 158; 465 E); humorously spoken of as having come from Foxland (Tr. 194; 495 D); he is reproached for not taking part in politics (Tr. 218; 515 A); his prophetic insight into character (Tr. 369; Theæt. 142 C); the snubness of his nose and protrusion of his eyes (Tr. 371; 143 E); he makes men doubt (Tr. 377; 149 A); he is not allowed to beget wisdom himself, but only to deliver others (Tr. 379; 150 D); his method enables the ignorant to conceive and bring forth, but not to learn from himself directly (ib.); he describes his hesitation, as to whether there is anything which is one and the same in relation to all the individuals of a class, or whether such classes or special types exist (Tr. iii. 407; Parm. 130 A); he cautions his opponent to note whether these abstract ideas do not exist wholly in the mind, and nowhere else (Tr. 412; 132 C); his irony towards Hermogenes (Tr. 284; Cratyl. 384 B); his great poverty (Tr. ii. 14; Rep. 338 B); the charm of his discourse (Tr. iv. 467; Cleit. 407 A; Tr. 412; Theag. 128 C); said to be of great use to one who needs encouragement, but an obstacle to one who has received it (Tr. 474; Cleit. 410 E); he plays the sophist (*see* Grote, vol. i. 394, on Hipp. Min.); the effects of public prejudice against Socrates (Tr. i. 4; Apol. 18 B, C); said to be wise, and to ponder things under the earth, and to make the worse appear the better reason (Tr. 9; ib.; 23 D); his supposed atheism (ib.); a man must be a comic poet, like Aristophanes, to know and be able to pronounce certain charges (Tr. 4; 18 D); he is

accused by Aristophanes of walking the air, and of other unintelligible fooleries (Tr. 5; 19 C); this charge is denied (Tr. 5; 19 E); he takes no fees (ib.); most scandal said to have a basis (Tr. 5; 19 C); he is hated because he showed others to be unwise (Tr. 7; 21 C), or that they pretended to be what they were not, while he in a similar case acknowledged his ignorance (ib.); he may not be as wise as the artizans, but he prefers his own state of mind to theirs (Tr. 8; 22 D); Socrates a model of just self-estimate (Tr. 9; 23 A); he seeks the wise man in concert with deity (Tr. 9; 23 B); his infinite poverty as a consequence (ib.; Tr. 18; 31 B; Tr. ii. 14; Rep. 338 B); mania of the young men for imitating Socrates (Tr. i. 9; 23 C); abuse of Socrates (Tr. 9; 23 D); false charges against him (Tr. 10; 23 E); he does not corrupt the young, or, if he does, he does so unwittingly (Tr. 12; 26 A); false imputations of Meletus continued (Tr. 13; 26 D); he is accused of saying that the sun is a stone, and that the moon is made of earth (Tr. 13; 26 D); in reply, it is declared that a belief of dæmons, as children of the gods, is not atheism (Tr. 14; 27 D; 27 E); he will probably die a victim of envy (Tr. 15; 28 A); he prefers duty to avoiding death or danger in war, or disobeying the gods (Tr. 16; 28 E; 29 A); he makes a noble declaration of his obligation and resolve to obey God rather than man (Tr. 17; 29 C, D, E); he declares that neither Anytus nor Meletus can hurt him (Tr. 18; 30 C, D); he says he is more anxious for his accusers than for himself, lest they should despise God's gift (ib.); described as a horse or gad fly, to rouse the Athenians out of lethargy (Tr. 18; 30 E); he acts unlike other men, for no profit, and neglects his personal interests (Tr. 18; 31 B), in not taking fees (ib.); allusion to his dæmon (Tr. 19; 31 D), which always stops him when about to do anything (ib.); his cause is espoused by the uncorrupt in morals, not by the flagitious (Tr. 21; 34 A, B); the difference between him and other men (Tr. 22; 35 A); he wishes not to persuade, but to convince his judges (Tr. 23; 35 C, D); his orthodoxy (Tr. 23; 35 D); he asks what desert belongs to him for abstaining from all intrigues? (Tr. 24; 36 B), and claims a residence in the Prytaneum, as a public pensioner (Tr. 24; 36 D); were he to keep silent, it would be to disobey the gods (Tr. 25; 37 E); he declines expedients for shunning death (Tr. 26; 38 E; Tr. 26; 39 A, B); he predicts retributive vengeance on his accusers (Tr. 27; 39 C), and prays that his country will punish his sons if they do not walk in his steps (Tr. 29; 41 E); Socrates describes himself as a fellow-servant of the singing swans (Tr. 89; Phæd. 85 B); he opposes the materialistic theory of the soul's nature (Tr. 102; 96 A, B), alleges his fondness

for natural philosophy and history (Tr. 102; 96 A); accepts Anaxagoras's principle, that mind has disposed all things (Tr. 103, 104; 97 C, D, E; 98 A, B); but objects to his inconsistency in his materialistic way of working it out (Tr. 104; 98 C, D); he declares how he wishes to be buried, or rather expresses his indifference when asked how (Tr. 124; 115 C); thinks the question a laughable one, seeing that when the soul is fled the man no more remains (Tr. 125; 115 D, E). His praise of the courtesy and gentleness of his executioner (Tr. 125; 116 D); he reproaches his friends for weeping like women (Tr. 127; 117 D); he is said to have been the most just and pre-eminently the wisest of men (Tr. 127; 118 A. Comp. Tr. iv. 500; Epist. vii. 324 E). Like Lord Brougham in youth, could outdo all drinkers by strength of head (Tr. iii. 482, 559, 570, 575; Symp. 176 C; 214 A; 219 E; 220 A; 223 A, B, C); he professes to be versed in nothing but love (Tr. 485; 177 E. Comp. Tr. iv. 412; Theag. 128 A); he recalls this boast after Agathon's eulogium (Tr. iii. 525; Symp. 198 D); he puns on the names of Gorgias and Gorgo (Tr. 525; 198 C); Socrates objects to the want of truth in Agathon's eulogium of love (Tr. 526; Symp. 198 E); his initiation into the erotics of soul (Tr. 549; 210 A); but not into the deepest mysteries (ib.); he is the conqueror of all men in discourse (Tr. 558; 213 E); like the figures of Silenus and the Satyrs, which open and show a deity within (Tr. 561; 215 B); he is like Marsyas, a good flautist, not by means of a pipe, but words (Tr. 561; 215 C); he throws other orators into the shade (ib.; Tr. 562; 215 D, E; 216 A); he is more powerful as a speaker than Pericles (Tr. 563; 216 B); he is a Silenus in externals, but inwardly filled with wondrous moderation (Tr. 563; 216 D); he despises beauty and riches, but is divine, golden, and glorious within (Tr. 564; 216 E); he is tempted by Alcibiades (Tr. 565 to 568; 217 A, B, C, D, E; 218 A, B, C, D); his reply (Tr. 568; 218 D, E); he despises and scoffs at the tempter's beauty (Tr. 569; 219 C); his admirable purity (ib.); he is more invulnerable to money than Ajax to steel (Tr. 570; 219 E); goes on the expedition to Potidæa, and surpasses all in endurance (ib.); though he cares not for drinking, he can outdrink all others without being intoxicated (Tr. 570; 220 A); he is able to endure all weathers without extra clothing (Tr. 570; 220 B); his absence of mind (Tr. 571; 220 C, D); his deserving the prize of courage, and refusing it (Tr. 571; 220 E); his valour in the retreat from Delium (Tr. 572; 221 A, B); he rises far beyond all other men of the olden time save the Silenuses and Satyrs (Tr. 573; 221 D); his remarkable speeches, their outward mannerism but divine inner sense (Tr. 573; 221 E; 222 A); maintains that the qualifications for a writer of comedy are the same with

those of the tragic writer (Tr. 576; 223 D); compare the opposite statement (Tr. ii. 75; Rep. 394 E; 395 A). Socrates, at the end of the drinking bout, is left last of the company, none the worse for his computations (Tr. iii. 576; Symp. 223 D); his similes of smiths, tanners, shoemakers are laughable to those only who do not look to the sense underlying them (Tr. 573; Symp. 221 E; 222 A; *see also* Tr. i. 189, 193; Gorg. 491 A, B, C; 494 B, C, where this mannerism is touched on).

Socratic dialogue well described by Adimantus as not easily admitting reply when the cumulative effect of the gradual admissions is brought out. The effect is likened to that of a skilful dice player or draught or backgammon player shutting his opponent out of the board (Tr. ii. 173; Rep. 487 B, C, D. *See examples*, Tr. iv. 455, 457; Minos, 316 D, E; 317 D, E).

Soil spoken of as overcoming the goodness of the seed, and causing it to degenerate. This is figuratively applied to philosophy overcome by the rankness of the soil (Tr. ii. 184; Rep. 497 B).

Soldiers are auxiliaries (Tr. ii. 151; Rep. 466 A).

— who leave the ranks or fling away their arms are to be degraded to the artizan class, and those who fall alive into the hands of the enemy must be left to their fate (Tr. ii. 153; Rep. 468 A); brave and victorious ones are to receive the right hand of fellowship and to kiss whom they please (Tr. 153; 468 B); more free intercourse with women, for the propagation of children, is to be allowed to these (Tr. 153; 468 C); Homer confers this distinction when he honours bravery (Tr. 154; 468 E); those who die fighting he makes "the golden race" (ib.); they are to be treated as divine and inspired persons (Tr. 154; 469 A); their sepulchres are to be honoured (Tr. 154; 469 B); Greek soldiers not to enslave Greeks, nor to allow others to do so (ib.); no Greek should be made a slave, nor should corpses be despoiled of armour, the doing which has led to many a defeat (Tr. 155; 469 C, D); to do so is to act like the dog who snarls at the stone thrown at him (Tr. 155; 469 E).

Solids, geometrical, described (Tr. vi. 157, 158; Tim. Locr. 98 A, B, C, D).

Solon grows old, always learning much (Tr. iv. 422; Rivals, 133 C).

SOPHIST. *See Summary*, page 139.

Sophists are fond of fees (Tr. i. 256, 279, 239, 240; Protag. 328 C; 349 A; 310 E; 311 B, C, D, E); are dangerous teachers (Tr. 240 to 242; 312 C; 313 A, B, C); are not easily seen through (ib.); claim to be persons who make clever speakers (Tr. 241; 312 D, E); are hawkers (Tr. 242; 313 D); stand out for fees, and are expensive (Tr. iv. 402; Theag. 122 A, C, D); Prodicus, Polus, and Gorgias are

recommended by Socrates (Tr. 412; 128 A); sophists are not so much mad as those who fee them (Tr. iii. 36; Meno. 92 A, B); deserve to be banished (ib.); a harsh judgment is pronounced upon them by Anytus (Tr. 35, 37; 91 C; 92 A, B, E); sophists are often confounded with rhetoricians (Tr. i. 157; Gorg. 465 C); described as coming to loggerheads with one another (Tr. 384; Theæt. 154 D); as making proof of each other's skill (ib.); different classes sometimes included under the name (Tr. iii. 106; Sophist, 218 O); they are compared to fishermen (Tr. 112; 222 C); to hunters of men (ib.); quality of the sophist set forth (Tr. 113, 115, 118; 223 B; 224 D; 226 A); he is a mottled beast, not to be caught with the left hand—"catch a weasel asleep" (Tr. 118, 132; 226 A; 235 B); a sixth explanation of sophistry makes it a vain opinionativeness, and this is declared to be noble (Tr. 126; 231 B); is marvellously effective in making young men who know nothing self-conceited (Tr. 129; 233 B); it possesses not true science, but only a presumption (Tr. 129; 233 C); the sophist makes God and the universe in a twinkling, and sells them for a trumpery coin (Tr. 130; 234 A); his omniscience a jest (ib.); the art of the sophist is word-painting, and a cajoling through distance, so as to produce the impression that the sophist is a universal paragon of wisdom (Tr. 131; 234 C); he is a juggler and mimic (Tr. 132; 235 A); is different from the philosopher (Tr. 161; 253 E); he skulks into the darkness of the non-existent, and is hard to find in the gloom (Tr. 161; 254 A); he is of two kinds, one long-winded, in public rather demagogue than politician, the other wise, and by short dialogue confuting his opponent, and making him contradict himself (Tr. 185; 268 B); not absolutely wise (Tr. 186; 268 C); but the real sophist aims to imitate the controversial ironical part of what belongs to opinion, and is a manufacturer of images neither human nor divine (Tr. 186; 268 D); do not the sophists make victims of the young men? and are not the Athenians the greatest of all sophists in the tumultuous praise and blame they confer in camp, Ecclesia, law-court, and theatre? (Tr. ii. 178; Rep. 492 B, C); all sophists think they must teach what is popular, study the great monster public, and call things good or evil or necessary just as the beast requires or wishes them to do (Tr. 179, 180; 493 A, B, C); they are the cause of the discredit of philosophy with the masses (Tr. 188; 500 B). Humorous references are made throughout the dialogue of that name to the subtle subterfuges, shifts, and evasions of the sophist, his lurkings in the darkness of nonentity, and his retiring within a fresh palisade, which he throws up as fast as the *enceinte* is in the hands of the enemy (Tr. iii. 173; Soph. 261 B). The name of sophist is associated with quack and

drug compounder (Tr. 534; Symp. 203 A, B, C); again, with that of quack and impostor (Tr. 141; Sophist, 241 D).

Sophistry, a nobler species of, is the art of confutation (Tr. iii. 126; Soph. 231 B, C); is said to subvert itself (Tr. 70; Euthyd. 286 C).

Sophocles, his reply to the question, how it fared with him in old age (Tr. ii. 4; Rep. 329 C); a passage of his is attributed to Euripides (Tr. iv. 407; Theag. 125 B; see Tr. ii. 258; Rep. 568 A, B); alluded to (Tr. i. 347; Phædr. 268 C, D).

Soul is the oldest of things, and divinest (Tr. v. 543; Laws, 966 E); has been the entire disposer, in the shape of mind (Tr. 544; 967 B); it cares for the whole universe (Tr. 427; 897 C); is intensely brilliant and blinding to look on (Tr. 428; 897 D); we do not see the soul of the sun (Tr. 430; 898 D); if the objector cannot disprove the existence of soul as a first principle, he must concede that of the gods and their superintending providence (Tr. 432; 899 C); is next after God, is the cause of good and evil, of beauty and deformity, the just and unjust, and disposes the heavens (Tr. 426; 896 D, E); is at least two in number (ib.); the soul, according as it participates in virtue or vice, shifts its residence to an appropriate abode (Tr. 443; 904 D); leads everything in heaven, earth, and sea by its own motions (Tr. 426; Laws, 896 E; 897 A); to which we give the names to will, to reflect, to ponder, to resolve, to think rightly or wrongly, to rejoice, grieve, confide, fear, hate, love (ib.); and gives rise to a second series, that of augmentation, decay, separation, compounding, heat, cold, weight, levity, hard, soft, white, black, sour, sweet, bitter, and all which the soul, as a god, in conjunction with divine reason, effects rightly, or wrongly, when it is conjoined with *ἀνοία* (Tr. 427, 428; 897 B, D). Let us not make answer as though looking full at the sun, and thus blinding ourselves with its mid-day beams, and bringing on darkness by excess of light, since we are never likely to see or know mind sufficiently with our mortal eyes, but let us look at the reflection only of that brilliant nature (Tr. 428; 897 D, E); is the most divine possession to a man after that of the gods (Tr. 153; 726 A); we must reverence it after them (Tr. 154; 727 A, B); soul is more noble than body (Tr. 154; 727 E); to love gold or disobey the legislator is to dishonour and disgrace the soul (Tr. 154; 728 A, B); the soul unveiled is alone able to know the evil and the good (Tr. iv. 397; Alcib. II. 150 D); can we speak of anything more divine? (Tr. 366; Alcib. I. 133 C); soul spoken of as well grown (Tr. 115; Charm. 154 D, E); the soul is the source of bodily evils and blessings (Tr. 117; 156 E); soul is of two or three kinds, mortal and immortal (Tr. ii. 380; Tim. 69 D); is created, one part reasonable, the other mindless, partaking either the nature of

the unchangeable or the mutable (Tr. vi. 159; Tim. Loocr. 99 D, E); distributed in the head, thorax, and below the midriff (ib.); is too large for the body, or too little (Tr. ii. 403, 404; Tim. 87 C; 88 A); preparation is necessary to soul (Tr. 406; 89 E); is more ancient than body (Tr. vi. 15; Epin. 980 D); soul's divinity and immortality (Tr. 51, 52; Axioch. 370 B, C, D); immortality and activity (Tr. i. 321; Phædr. 245 B, C, D; Tr. iii. 28; Meno. 86 B); is self-moving (Tr. i. 321; Phædr. 245 B, C, D); description of it (Tr. 322; 246 A); its threefold nature, as two horses and charioteer (ib.; also, Tr. 330; 253 D; see Tr. vi. 159; Tim. Loocr. 99 D, E); its career in space (Tr. i. 322; Phædr. 246 A); its beatific visions in heaven in an antecedent state (Tr. 322, 326, 333; 246 A; 250 B; 256 D, E); its absolute science (Tr. 323; 247 D); place of doom (Tr. 325; 249 A), and of bliss (ib.); its entrance into a mortal body (Tr. 325; 249 A), and mode of perception (ib.); its remembrance of the past (ib.); its prophetic power (Tr. 317; 242 C); is invisible (Tr. 327; 250 D); its instruction is priceless (Tr. 316; 241 C); this immortality is further insisted on (Tr. iii. 19, 20, 28; Meno. 81 A, B, C; 86 B); it is born and dies, but does not perish (ib.); has seen things in a prior state, and in Hades (Tr. 20; 81 D, E); soul is like a book (Tr. iv. 58; Phileb. 38 E); is superior to the body and its wants (Tr. 462; Minos, 321 C; Tr. i. 241; Protag. 313 A, B, C); is eternal (Tr. iii. 276; Statesm. 309 C); the soul, as the president over the body, prevents the weighing all things by pleasure (Tr. i. 157; Gorg. 465 D); soul spoken of as made of gold, and requiring a touchstone (Tr. 184; 486 D); when it is unjust or unholy it is to be restrained, and not left to the mercy of its lusts, and the chastisement of it is better than intemperance (Tr. 207; 505 B); when diseased, renders the man unfit to live (Tr. 215; 512 A); is of far higher value than body (ib.); loses, when dead, none of the characteristics which it had in life (Tr. 229; 524 D); description of a soul stained, perjured, and contorted by insolence and luxury, and doomed to drain the last dregs of suffering. (Tr. 229; 525 A); it can only enjoy wholesome food when convicted of not knowing what it pretends to know, and being put to the blush (Tr. iii. 125; Sophist, 230 C, D); is of more value than the body (Tr. i. 17; Apol. 30 A, B. Compare above, Tr. 215; Gorg. 512 A). Some have discredited its immortality and separate existence (Tr. 69; Phæd. 70 A), and say that it perishes, like smoke, at death, and is no longer anywhere (ib.). The soul, or *ψυχή*, said by Plato to be so called in Greek from *ψύχος*, cold, or refreshment, because without breathing, cooling, and refreshing, the body pines (Tr. iii. 313; Cratyl. 399 E); and another explanation is suggested from *φύσιν ἔχων*, possessing or sustaining nature (Tr. 314;

400 A, B); the separate existence of the soul is vouched for, first by tradition, and the law that the living spring from the dead (Tr. i. 69; Phæd. 70 C, D); exposition of this law of mutual production between opposites (Tr. 70; 70 E; 71 A, B, C); so it is between life and death, of which we know that the latter is a truth, and nature's integrity requires that life should spring from it (Tr. 71; 71 E; 72 A); statement of the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence, all learning being, in fact, reminiscence (Tr. 72; 72 E); it was immortal before it became mortal (ib.); the proof of this is to be found in the soul's possession of right notions and science, and its ability to reason upon diagrams (Tr. i. 73; 73 A, B); all science implies memory (Tr. 73; 73 C); our abstract ideas of the good and beautiful point to the fact that they were possessed before or at birth (Tr. 74 to 78; 74 A to 76 D); *i.e.*, they are pre-nate, innate, or connate, but real, and therefore the soul has pre-existed (Tr. 78; 77 A); this pre-existence, however, is no guarantee that it will continue to exist in the future (Tr. 79; 77 B); the disputant falls back on the principle of contrariety for his proof that it will (Tr. 79; 77 C, D); is the soul a thing fit to be dissipated? (Tr. 80; 78 B); is not aptness for dissolution the property of a compound body which can be separated into parts? (Tr. 80; 78 C); simplicity is a pledge of permanency (Tr. 80; 78 D); soul is more allied to what is unseen (Tr. 82; 79 C); its flight to the pure and always existent and continuous is insisted on, and its keeping to the one standard of wisdom (ib.); the person of dullest comprehension admits this alliance with the permanent (Tr. 82; 79 E); the soul resembles a divine and ruling principle (Tr. 82; 80 A); that which is immortal, intelligent, indissoluble, and constantly the same (Tr. 83; 80 B); it is wholly indestructible (Tr. 83; 80 B, C); if even the body does not instantly decay at death, how much more shall the pure unseen soul, which is present with deity, not decay or be blown to the winds? (Tr. 83; 80 D); nor drag with it the body? (Tr. 83; 80 E); the soul, freed from errors, folly, and fierce passions, will pass its time among the gods (Tr. 84; 81 A); it cannot be pure while cajoled by the body, and thinking that the material only is true (Tr. 84; 81 B); being enveloped by the corporeal, it is apt to grow one with it, through continual familiarity, and thus becomes ponderous, earthy, visible, and is dragged down to a visible place (Tr. 84; 81 C, D); it flits about graveyards and monuments, where such shadowy soul spectres are sometimes seen, having visible forms, because not perfectly released from matter (ib.); such are not the souls of good but of bad men (ib.); the soul of the glutton seeks the body of an ass, that of the tyrant the body of a wolf or hawk (Tr. 85; 81 E); souls not thoroughly philosophic, yet

exercising popular and political virtue, would assume the shape of bees or ants (Tr. 86; 82 E); the worst evil that can afflict the soul is to believe that the passions and emotions which occupy it are the matters most deserving its regard (Tr. 86; 83 C); it is nailed to the body by pain and pleasure (Tr. 87; 83 D); it seeks another body at dissolution, and is disinherited of its participation of essence (ib.); weaving the web of Penelope (Tr. 87; 84 A), it contemplates the true and divine, and not opinion (ib.); reference again made to its being dissipated by the winds (Tr. 87; 84 B); since harmony perishes when the lyre is broken or its chords cut, why should not the soul? (Tr. 90; 86 A, B); analogy of the case with that of soul and body (ib.; Tr. 90; 86 C); it may wear out many bodies, as the weaver does garments (Tr. 91; 87 C, D); this will not prove its immortality, according to the objector (Tr. 91; 87 E); though strong and lasting, it may undergo many births, but still wear out at last (Tr. 92; 88 A); what becomes of it is not within the reach of observation, and there is ground for fearing that it may perish (Tr. 92; 88 B); but, it is replied, the soul is more than harmony, because it precedes the body, because it is never in opposition with itself, unlike harmony, and because, instead of being a sequence, it takes the lead (Tr. 96 to 100; 92 A, B, C, D; 93 A, B; 94 B, C, E); the soul having pre-existed, its entrance into the body is the beginning of death, if it really ever dies (Tr. 101; 95 A, C, D). The soul's immortality is demonstrated by the existence of the absolutely beautiful, good, and great (Tr. 106; 100 B); and by the impossibility of that which confers life admitting the opposite incompatible condition of permanent death (Tr. 113; 105 D); the fallacy of the argument, or its inadequacy, admitted (Tr. 115; 106 C); it is quite true that the notion of life and the divine and that which is devoid of death is inconsistent with that of a thing perishable, but this will not wholly remove incredulity as to the fact at issue (Tr. 115, 116; 107 A, B); but if we admit the high probability of the soul's immortal nature, what are the moral lessons taught? (Tr. 116; 107 C); grounds of confidence in respect of his soul exist to a man who has in life renounced his body and has been adorned with righteousness, truth, and moderation (Tr. 124; 114 E); to exercise forethought and rule well is a virtue of the soul, as to do these badly is a vice (Tr. ii. 32; Rep. 353 D, E); a good soul can make the body good, but not *vice versa* (Tr. 85; 403 D); the soul must supply the mould or model for the best disposition of the body (ib.); soul is to be ruled by soul, not by personal experience of and contact with evil, such as is requisite in the case of the physician who must have known disease in his own person (Tr. 91; 409 A); it is asked whether the whole soul con-

spires in every act, or are the intellectual, emotional, and concupiscent faculties distinct in their exercise? (Tr. 120; 436 A); a test will be that contradictories cannot coexist (Tr. 120 to 125; 436 B, C, D, E; 438 A, B, C, D; 437 D; 439 A, B, C, D, E); the soul's reflective powers are different from, and antagonistic to, the emotional and appetitive (Tr. 125; 439 D, E). Story of Leontius (Tr. 125; 439 E; 440 A), whose feelings were at war with his desires (ib.); the soul reproaches itself when the desires get the better of reason (Tr. 125; 440 B); the emotional more commonly sides with the rational than with the concupiscent (ib.); examples (Tr. 126; 440 C, D, E); this gives rise to a new classification of the rational and concupiscent as an alternative (ib.); this is rejected for the triple division (Tr. 126; 441 A, B); line quoted from Homer (ib.); the concupiscent, the most developed of the three orders in the soul, is conquered by the nurture of the other two (Tr. 127; 442 A), and must be kept down (Tr. 127; 442 B); the noblest souls, when badly trained, become the most depraved (Tr. 178; 491 E); the soul is maimed by admitting the involuntary lie (Tr. 226; 535 E); the purifying and rekindling the soul when expiring and blinded by other pursuits is a process or organon better than myriads of eyes (Tr. 217; 527 D); is superior to the body (Tr. 282; 591 B); the soul of the man of understanding will honour philosophic and virtuous doctrines, and will not commit its bodily adjunct to bestial pleasure (Tr. 282; 591 C); it values wisdom above health (ib.); the aim of harmony in the body is to produce concordance in the soul (Tr. 282; 591 D); the soul is full of innumerable contradictions (Tr. 293; 603 D); the lot and choice of souls in the future world (Tr. 304 to 312; 614 B to 621 D). The soul's need of a physician is touched on by Shakespeare (2 Henry IV., act ii. sc. 2). The soul's immortality is doubted, and Socrates challenged to prove it (Tr. ii. 298; Rep. 608 D); things are only destroyed by their own innate defect and depravity (Tr. 299; 608 E; 609 A); that which is good never destroys anything, nor that which is neither evil nor good. The partial occasional evil in the soul is not its own, and being alien cannot destroy it, like a canker can the body (Tr. 299; 609 B, C); even the body does not perish by bad food, though this may be instrumental in producing disease (Tr. 300; 609 E; 610 A); no mutilation of the body can make the soul unholy or unjust, nor can any alien evil (Tr. 300; 610 B); nor does death accomplish this (Tr. 300; 610 C); yet if anything can do this it will be injustice, and if this is so deadly, the consequences will not be so painful, as it will soon cause a cessation of all evils (Tr. 300; 610 D); injustice however, on the contrary, kills others, but makes its possessor fully alive,

and is not sufficient to destroy the soul. Thus the latter being exposed to danger neither from within nor from without, will be eternal, and if eternal, then immortal (Tr. 301; 610 E); the soul is also immutable, simple, and uncompounded (Tr. 301; 611 A, B); to judge of it we must view it uncontaminated by communion with the body, and he who does so will see its beauty and know the difference between righteousness and injustice (Tr. 301; 611 C); is like a Glaucus bruised and maimed by the sea, stuck all over with shells, seaweed, and pebbles (Tr. 301; 611 C, D); we must view it in its philosophical elevation, lifted from the sea bottom, and feeding in a blissful pasturage (Tr. 302; 611 E; 612 A); he who does not know how to use it, had better be silent in death, or subject to another's guidance (Tr. iv. 469; Cleit. 408 A); mention is made of an art for the virtue of soul (Tr. 471; 409 A); for its sake all other labours are endured (Tr. 473; 410 D).

Sounds, acute and grave, quick and slow, are instanced, as if these were equivalent, as we know them to be in respect of rapidity of vibration (Tr. vi. 162; Tim. Locr. 101 B).

Sovereignty is not worth accepting if it is a power of wrong-doing (Tr. i. 162; Gorg. 469 C).

Space, account of it, as that which is indissoluble, and furnishes a seat for all that is generated, though a kind of dreamy existence (Tr. ii. 360; Tim. 53 A); its phænomenal nature (ib.).

Spartan temperance (Tr. v. 20; Laws, 637 A, B).

Special pleading. There is a certain baneful subject of reproach, which is shielded under the specious name of art, in reference to law procedure, when it is alleged that it is lawful to get the upper hand in a litigation, and to be a party to a cause quite irrespective of the justice of the case, or its being fairly conducted (Tr. 497; Laws, 937 D; 938 A).

Species distinguished from its part (Tr. iii. 198; Statesm. 263 B); from genus (Tr. 200; 264 C); division into cloven-footed and solid-hoofed (Tr. 203; 265 D); is there any species or general form of mud, dirt, hair, apart from what we handle? (Tr. 408; Parm. 130 C, D); said to be, by one party, in all and at the same time one and the same (Tr. 409; 131 A, B); illustration from the instance of "Day," or a number of persons covered over in one group by a sail cloth (Tr. 409; 131 B); these species or general forms exist in the mind (Tr. 411; 132 B); Parmenides replies, that if they are only mental, and yet applied to objects, this requires the latter to partake of thought or to be without it, though they do so partake (Tr. 413; 133 A, B, C); if an object is similar to its species or special ideal the species is similar to the object which is to reproduce species *ad infinitum* (Tr. 412;

132 D); they are established in nature as patterns, of which other things are resemblances (Tr. 412; 132 D); the difficulty of the doctrine is pressed (Tr. 414; 133 E); the ideality of species and the names they bear is alluded to; case of master and slave and mastery and slavery (ib.); it is not possible, according to our philosopher, to have species, for pure ideas are unknown in their nature (Tr. 414; 134 A); so, too, is it the case with ultimate science and beauty, which belong to deity (ib.); if unknown, the doctrine will require great ability to establish them, still more to teach them to the crowd (Tr. 416, 417; 135 A, B; *see* Abstracts).

Speculations on the origin of thought, whether material or otherwise, are very baffling (Tr. i. 102; Phædr. 96 C, D, E).

Speeches, short (Tr. iii. 237; Statesm. 286 E); should be consistent as a whole (Tr. i. 342; Phædr. 264 C; *see* also Long Speeches).

Spontaneous generation. Are we to believe that vines appeared, not having previously existed, and olives, and the gifts of Ceres and her daughter, or that any Triptolemus was the furnisher of these things? (Tr. v. 243; Laws, 782 B).

Sports, where lawful (Tr. v. 311; Laws, 823 E; 824 A, &c.).

Sprouting of the soul's wings is described, producing irritation, much like that of teething (Tr. i. 328, 332; Phædr. 251 B, C, D; 255 D).

Stammering and playfulness agreeable in young children (Tr. i. 183; Gorg. 485 B); but intolerable in grown men (Tr. 183; 485 C, D).

Stand still, those who are advocates for this in nature, and get no more forward in their arguments (Tr. i. 416; Theæt. 181 A, B).

Stasinus, a poet, who was the son-in-law of Homer, quoted for the following—

"But Zeus the maker and effective cause
Of all that springs obedient to his laws,
You will not dare pronounce that sacred name,
For where fear harbours, there is likewise shame"

(Tr. i. 471; Euthyp. 12 A, B).

State is a mother to us (Tr. i. 458; Euthyp. 2 C); the hearth of the state (Tr. 459; 3 A); it takes its origin in the fact that no man is self-sufficient (Tr. ii. 49; Rep. 369 B); it results from our necessities (Tr. 49; 369 C); there is an urgent need to us of houses and clothes, and a state must at least consist of four or five persons to minister to these wants (369 D); principle of the division of labour in a state (Tr. 49; 369 E; 370 A); it is asked whether every member of it is to practise several trades? (Tr. 50; 370 B); but this would be to defer the execution of anything earnestly wanted to a time inconveniently remote (ib.); there will, in fact, be wanting many more

than four or five persons, in short, numerous artizans (Tr. 50; 370 C, D); there will be the cultivation of lands and import trade to be looked after (Tr. 50; 370 E); merchants, sailors, markets, and currency will be needed (Tr. 51; 371 A, B); also warehousemen and storekeepers (Tr. 51; 371 D), and paid labourers (Tr. 52; 371 E); the infant community will at least want figs, peas, beans, myrtle berries, and roasted beech nuts (Tr. 52; 372 C); such provision will hardly suffice anything but a sty of pigs (Tr. 52; 372 D); couches, tables, and luxuries will be needed (Tr. 53; 373 A); also artists, poets, and dressmakers (Tr. 54; 373 B); medical men, too, and increased supplies of food (Tr. 54; 373 D); such a state must grasp at territorial aggrandisement (ib.); hence there will be war (Tr. 54; 373 E); and for this trained soldiers will be needed (Tr. 54; 55, 374 A, B, C, D, E); noble and high-spirited youths will have to keep careful watch (Tr. 55; 375 A, B); who must be trained to guard the state like dogs (Tr. 55, 56; 375 C, D, E; 376 A, B, C); which must be purged of luxurious redundancies (Tr. 81; 399 E); what are the rhythms which should be retained? (Tr. 82; 400 A, B); laws should be enacted to regulate the intercourse of lover with loved, in accordance with virtuous aims (Tr. 85; 403 B); the nature of a happy intercourse (Tr. 103; 420 C); but how are the community to war without money? (Tr. 104; 422 A); it is difficult for a poor state to wage war with one rich, though less so with two such (ib.); a state in which the possession of gold and silver is illegal will get plenty of alliances, because all spoil of this kind will fall to the lot of the party that accepts the alliance (Tr. 105; 422 D); there is danger in the case of one overwhelming state that is the banker of many (ib.); the essential unity of any but the model state is denied (Tr. 105; 422 E); in all others there are at least two communities, those of poor and rich, who are hostile to one another (ib.); in each of these the communities are many, and you will find the want of unity, but if you treat them as many, you can, by conferring the money and power that belongs to the richer members on the mass, have the many for allies and the few for enemies (Tr. 106; 423 A); a state which is wisely and moderately ruled may be a very great one, though it comprise only a thousand warriors (ib.); amongst Greeks and barbarians there is scarcely such a state (Tr. 106; 423 B); a state may grow to the extent that does not impair its unity (Tr. 106, 98; 423 C; 415 B); each man in it must keep to his own calling (Tr. 107; 423 D); good training and entire communism will be wanted (Tr. 107; 423 E); if the polity of the state sets out well, it goes on, like a wheel at an accelerating speed, and produces an improved breed of subjects (Tr. 107 424 A); our state, if rightly

organised, will be perfectly good, wise, moderate, just, and courageous (Tr. 111; 427 E); but whence comes good counsel? (Tr. 112; 428 B); from perfect guardians (Tr. 112; 428 D), who are the smallest class (Tr. 112; 428 E); courage must be supplied and be inherent in the warrior class (Tr. 113; 429 B); an example, for the sake of illustration, is taken from the art of the dyer (Tr. 113, 114; 429 D, E; 430 A, B); moderation is treated of (Tr. 114, 115; 430 D, E; 431 A, B); this is met with only in the few who control the many and vile (Tr. 115; 431 C); a state superior to itself is such as this, and there is a concurrence of opinion in it as to whom it behoves to rule (Tr. 115; 431 D); moderation will exist both in rulers and ruled (Tr. 116; 431 E); it affects the whole state (Tr. 116; 432 A); the fourth in order of the virtues required is righteousness or justice (Tr. 116; 432 B, C); it is declared to be the same as each man doing his own business (Tr. 117; 433 A, D; *see also* Tr. 49; 369 D); it is not certain which of the four is most conducive to the interests of the state (Tr. 117; 433 C); those craftsmen who have become rich are not on that account to meddle with state affairs, for which they are unfit, this multifariousness of pursuit being an evil (Tr. 118; 434 B); an interchange and confusion of the classes is detrimental (Tr. 118; 434 C); the class has the same species and habits as the individual (Tr. 120, 126; 435 E; 441 C); so it is with the wise and just and courageous man, and the wise and just and courageous state (Tr. 127; 441 C, D); reason is the ruling power (Tr. 127; 441 E); the influence of music and gymnastics in softening the wildness of character is dwelt on (Tr. 127; 442 A); there are as many vices of soul as there are vicious polities (Tr. 130; 445 C); these are five in number (Tr. 131, 233; 445 D; 544 A, B, C, D); what has already been considered is one polity under two names, monarchic and aristocratic, which will not disturb any fundamental law of the state (ib.); a state is well governed where all think and feel alike (Tr. 147, 149; 462 C, D; 464 B, C, D); the model state is compared with despotic and democratic ones, where the governors are rulers and the people slaves (Tr. 147; 463 A); such are not saviours, helpers, or guardians in common (Tr. 148; 463 B); the model state will be Greek; acting with moderation, not enslaving or exterminating, or burning houses and wasting lands, or treating women and children and dead men as enemies (Tr. 156; 471 A, B); is such a state possible? (471 C, D); let this be admitted, and the good results will be seen to be far beyond what is stated (Tr. 157; 471 E); the question is again urged, is it possible? (Tr. 158; 472 A, B); Socrates defends the ideal assumption (Tr. 158; 472 B, C, D); perfect righteousness and injustice are conceived of as a standard

apart from their possibility, just like the painter's ideal figure on the canvas (Tr. 158 ; 472 B, C, D, E) ; we must strive to come as near to it as we may (Tr. 159 ; 473 A) ; there will be no cessation of ills where philosophers do not rule in states, or rulers philosophize ; *i. e.*, political power and philosophy must not be sundered (Tr. 159 ; 473 C, D) ; this position is defended (Tr. 159 ; 473 E) ; a further definition of the fitness of philosophers for ruling is wanted (Tr. 160 ; 474 B) ; no existing state is philosophic (Tr. 184 ; 497 B) ; no state or individual will be perfect till the rare and undepraved philosopher rules it and him, or dynasts acquire the love of philosophy by inspiration (Tr. 187 ; 499 B) ; when those who have scaled the heights of philosophy, either in the infinite past, or present or future, are at the head of affairs, our state will be possible (Tr. 187 ; 499 C, D) ; people may be reconciled to this conviction (Tr. 187 ; 499 E ; Tr. 188 ; 500 A) ; sophists are the cause of the discredit of philosophy (Tr. 188 ; 500 B) ; the guidance of the state is not to be undertaken by undisciplined persons, nor those inexperienced in truth, nor by those who do nothing but learn all their days, who fancy that they are already in the Islands of the Blest. We must compel our best natural dispositions to learn and to make the toilsome ascent to the Good, and then return again, not to benefit themselves, but to make others happy (Tr. 207, 208 ; 519 C, D, E) ; states are best colonised where rulers are not eager for power, and are free from party bitterness (Tr. 209 ; 520 D) ; geometry and arithmetic must be studied in the state (Tr. 214, 216 ; 525 B ; 527 C), also astronomy (Tr. 217 ; 527 D), notwithstanding the popular neglect of these studies, and the difficulty of persuading those who are not susceptible of conviction on this head (Tr. 217 ; 527 E) ; the growing taste for these should be fostered (Tr. 218 ; 528 C) ; such a state as the one proposed will not be impossible if philosophers rule in it, who think only of rectitude and justice (Tr. 231 ; 540 D, E) ; to bring it about, let all above ten years of age be sent into the country out of town, and let the children be withdrawn from the influence of the habits now possessed by their parents (Tr. 231 ; 541 A) ; in this way, if in any, the public happiness would best be secured (*ib.* ; Tr. 231 ; 541 B) ; conditions binding on rulers of states are named (Tr. 232, 233 ; 543 B, C, D) ; one of the five forms proposed (Tr. 131 ; 445 C, D), having been disposed of, and the man who resembles it, four remain to be discussed, and the men who resemble them (Tr. 233 ; 544 A) ; mistakes are made in states. The question is asked, Is the best man the happiest, and the worst the most miserable ? (Tr. 233 ; 544 A) ; the four forms spoken of immediately above are the Cretan or Laconian, answering to monarchy or aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and, worst

of all, tyranny (Tr. 233; 544 C); intermediate to the first and second best, is what he calls the timocratic or timarchic, making up five polities, corresponding to five persons like them (Tr. 233; 544 D); the Laconian answers to this timarchic polity (ib.); the consideration of the nature and origin of each state is made to precede that of the individual corresponding to it (Tr. 234; 545 A, B, C); the change is generally made in a condition of faction, or with that of the ruler for the time being (Tr. 234; 545 D); it is asked, How do rulers and auxiliaries get at odds with one another? and the Muses are supposed to reply (Tr. 234; 545 E), that there is a difficulty in moving a well-appointed state, yet destruction is the fate, sooner or later, of everything produced, when its cycle, either long or short, is complete (Tr. 235; 546 A); rulers, with all their wisdom, will not contrive that their children may be born under a good horoscope, and neglect the time of mating and ascertaining the perfect number (Tr. 235; 546 B, C, D); hence the children of the guardians fall off from the standard of their fathers, and think less than they ought of music and gymnastics (Tr. 235; 546 D); the gold, silver, brass, and iron in their children not properly discriminated (Tr. 236; 546 E; see also Tr. 98; 415 A, B); and faction is symbolized by undue admixture (Tr. 236; 547 A); a compromise is the result, and one party strives to enslave the other (Tr. 236; 547 B, C); just as the Lacedæmonians hold in thrall their perioeci (ib.); a timarchy will resemble aristocracy in part and oligarchy in part, in the fierce worshiping of gold and silver under cover (Tr. 236; 547 D, E; 548 A); and in the rulers, like children flying from their father, the law, and neglecting the muse of reasoning and philosophy (Tr. 237; 548 B); emulation and ambition are the characteristic features of this polity, which needs not to be sketched at further length (Tr. 237; 548 C, D); the man who resembles this state, though he may be a strict disciplinarian, does not despise the servile class, and he loves the gymnasium and the chase (Tr. 238; 549 A); when young he despises riches, but becomes, as he gets older, avaricious (Tr. 238; 549 B); admirable description of a youth corrupted by his mother's aspiring temper and the fawning of servants (Tr. 238, 239; 549 C, D, E; 550 A, B); the democratic man puts all rules on the same level, and is admired, like the state that corresponds to him, for his variety (Tr. 251; 561 E); the tyranny is, in irony, termed the most noble polity, and is said to originate from the insatiable love of liberty, as democracy did from that of wealth (Tr. 252; 562 A, C); this democratic thirst of liberty is indulged figuratively by bad wine-pourers, who supply the unmixed juice of the grape, and leads to impeaching magistrates who are not indulgent, and to insulting

those who are submissive and yielding, till liberty is pushed to extremes (Tr. 252; 562 D); the democrat treats rulers as slaves of place and nobodies (ib.); this anarchy infects even the brutes, and subverts the order of nature, putting children on a level with parents (Tr. 252; 562 E), the foreigner on a par with the citizen, and the citizen with the guest and sojourner. Pupils take liberties with their teachers, and children with their superiors (Tr. 252; 563 A); young persons assume the airs of their elders, and old men try to be funny and playful, while slaves and women rank themselves on the same level with men and freemen (Tr. 252; 563 B); even the dogs and asses and horses take similar liberties, and move out of the way for no one (Tr. 253; 563 C); thus tyranny springs from utter licence (Tr. 253; 563 E); all excess is sure to conduct to its opposite. This is true in the case of the seasons, in the vegetable world, and in politics, where liberty is the precursor to slavery (Tr. 253; 564 A); the drones with stings (as distinguished from stingless ones, *see above*, Tr. 241; 552 C), and those destitute of them, come into collision, like phlegm and bile in the body, and good bee-breeders are wanted to prevent the entrance of the former into the hive, or to cut them out, combs and all (Tr. 254; 564 B, C); the democratic state is threefold (ib.); first, it has its demagogue agitators, its richer class to be plundered by the drones, and its lower and more numerous class ready for a share of the spoil. This leads to the presidency of one man, from which to tyranny the step is small, and soon made (Tr. 254, 255; 564 D to 565 D); the several state politics are re-enumerated, kingly, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, tyrannic, of which the first and the man who corresponds to it are pronounced happiest, the tyrannic and the tyrant being the most wretched (ib.); another test of happiness is proposed, derived from the mental character itself of the various classes (Tr. 270; 580 D); states are again formed into three principal divisions, corresponding to the three orders of mental power, *viz.*, that by which the man learns, his emotional nature, and his concupiscent or avaricious nature (Tr. 270; 580 E); these are termed respectively the philomathic or philosophic, the philonic or philotimic, and the philochromatic or philocercic (Tr. 271; 581 A, B); each of these has its pleasures, and pronounces its own the best (Tr. 271; 581 C, D, E); but how is this to be decided? (Tr. 272; 582 A); only reason and intelligence can settle the question (ib.); is it possible for the lover of gain to be more skilled in the pleasure of knowing than the philosopher in that of gaining? (Tr. 272; 582 B); the philosopher has had more experience of what all pleasures amount to than the ambitious or avaricious man, whose scope has been more limited (Tr. 272; 582 C, D); reason alone can furnish a rule to meet

the case, and alone will take the lead (Tr. 273; 582 E); the wise man comes first in the enjoyment of happiness, the emulative or philotimic, second, the grasping or philochromatic, last (Tr. 273; 583 A). Stallbaum here refers to Tr. iv. 52, 36; Phileb. 36 *sqq.*; 27 D, *sqq.* Two modes of settling the pre-eminence of the wise man or philosopher have thus been given (Tr. ii. 266 to 270; Rep. 577 B to 580 C; and Tr. 270 to 273; 580 D to 583 A); a third is now to follow, as a libation to Zeus the Saviour (Tr. 273; 583 B); it is only the pleasure of the wise man that is pure and without alloy, as they say (*ib.*); its relation to the kingly constitution, as well as that of low desires to the tyrannic, is made out somewhat at length (Tr. 277; 587 B); and then follows a sort of geometrical numerical scheme of the relative happiness of the king and tyrant, thus: the leading divisions are three—

1st.	1. King.	2nd.	1. Oligarch.
	2. Timarch.		2. Democrat.
	3. Oligarch.		3. Tyrant.

Take the linear unit as 3, the superficial or square will be 9, and the solid unit or cube 27, which is to stand for the happiness of the king. Now invert the ratio of 3 to 1, or take $\frac{1}{3}$ as the linear unit of the subject of comparison, and its cube will be $\frac{1}{27}$. But $\frac{1}{27} : \frac{1}{7} :: 1 : 729$; so that the king is 729 times happier than the tyrant (Tr. 278; 587 D, E; see Art. Pain and Pleasure); the number 729, when one is added to make it even, is the double of 365, the number of days in the year (Tr. 279; 588 A). Socrates admits that his model state exists nowhere on earth, but only on paper (Tr. 283; 592 A); the ideal or pattern of such a state is laid up in heaven for him who wishes to see it, and to dwell in it, and a man's actions may be shaped with reference to it without actually living in it and beholding it (Tr. 283; 592 B).

STATESMAN. See Summary, page 145.

Statesman may deceive only enemies, or those who are the subjects of a state (Tr. ii. 69; Rep. 389 C); he rules the human herd and rulers too (Tr. iii. 209; Statesm. 268 E); statesmen are shepherds (Tr. 219, 222; 275 A, B, C, D; 276 D, E); they cannot teach their sons virtue or wisdom (Tr. iv. 410; Theag. 126 D); Socrates thinks the first duty of a statesman to be looking after the education of youth (Tr. i. 458; Euthyp. 2 C); again the difficulty of statesmen teaching their own virtue is brought up (Tr. iii. 37, 38, 39, 48; Meno. 93 A, B, D, E; 94 A, B, C; 99 E, C); said to be inspired when present to statesmen (Tr. 48; 99 E, C; 100 B).

Statuary in gardens and fanes (Tr. i. 304; Phædr. 230 B).

- Statuaries sometimes attempt too much, and fail from this source (Tr. iii. 254; Statesm. 277 C).
- Statue painting was a probable practice among the ancients, if the allusion is not to figures on a flat surface (Tr. ii. 103; Rep. 420 C); the most beautiful colours are said to be applied to the most beautiful parts, as black to the eyes (ib.); but the artist's aim should never be to make the eyes so beautiful as to destroy their resemblance to eyes, or to detract from the beauty of the other parts, singly or as a whole, by giving too great prominence to one feature. Most persons will recollect the controversy that was kindled at the time of the opening of the Hyde Park Exhibition, when Gibson's tinted statues excited much criticism.
- Stones and corpses happy, if happiness is the need of nothing (Tr. i. 191; Gorg. 492 E); to live like a stone (Tr. 192; 494 B); to boil a stone (Tr. vi. 81; Eryx. 405 E); the sun declared to be a stone by Anaxagoras (Tr. i. 12, 13; Apol. 26 B, C, D, E; 27 A).
- Study is the source of all good, everything should be learnt (Tr. iv. 153; Laches, 182 D, E); studies said to be pursued noiselessly and without hitch, like the flowing of oil (Tr. i. 372; Theæt. 144 B).
- Style is not so much the question; truth is the aim of real oratory (Tr. i. 3; Apol. 18 A).
- Styx and Cocytus, and all such, shuddering horrors, to be expunged from poetry (Tr. ii. 66; Rep. 387 B).
- Substance among shadows, as Homer says of Tiresias (Tr. iii. 47; Meno. 99 E).
- Subtilty of Greek dialectics seen in the Parmenides, Theætetus, Sophist, and Statesman, and their insufficiency (*see* Tr. iii. 468; Parm. 166; Tr. 136; Sophist, 238, and generally).
- Suffering for truth's sake is always glorious, when a man is attempting glorious deeds (Tr. i. 354; Phædr. 274 B).
- Sufficiency of small possessions (Tr. v. 200; Laws, 757 B).
- Sufficient reason, the principle of, employed in explaining why the earth does not fall through space (Tr. i. 117; Phæd. 108 E; 109 A).
- Suicide declared to be unlawful (Tr. i. 58, 59, 60; Phæd. 61 C, D, E; 62 A, B, C).
- Sun spoken of, under the figure of a golden chain, by Homer, sustaining all things (Tr. i. 383; Theæt. 153 D); as still upon the mountains, and not yet set when the hour of Socrates' death is approaching (Tr. 126; Phæd. 116 E); as a stone, *see* above.
- Sun's path a spiral (Tr. vi. 155; Tim. Locr. 97 C); sun, moon, and stars once rose where they now set (Tr. iii. 209; Statesm. 269 A); sun and moon spoken of as gods (Tr. v. 407; Laws, 886 D).

συνίημι, σύνεσις, are used in reference to knowledge and comprehension, and contain the notion of fitting and joining together mentally, or of conference with oneself. In the *Cratylus* (Tr. iii. 338; 412 A), *συνιέναι* is declared to be the same as *ἐπίστασθαι* (so, too, *ib.*; Tr. 387; 437 B); in Tr. iv. 21; *Philebus*, 19 D, we have *νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν*, enumerated together. The *σύν* has much the same force as in *συνειδέναι*, to be conscious, and conveys the notion of reflection and co-operation of the mental faculties, just as *con* in the Latin *consciūs*. See Plato's Etymologies, Tr. iii. 337, 338; *Cratyl.* 411 D, E; 412 A, B.

Supreme cause has a regal soul (Tr. ii. 334; *Tim.* 29 E; 30 A, B, C).

Surface, its relation to the solid (Tr. iii. 11; *Meno.* 76 A).

Swans, their dying strains (Tr. i. 88; *Phæd.* 84 E); Socrates will be inferior to them, if he bears death as a calamity (*ib.*); they are belied when men term these strains a lament (Tr. 88; 85 A); birds never sing when in pain (*ib.*); they are inspired by Apollo, and prescient of bliss in Hades (*ib.*).

Swarm of controversies raised (Tr. ii. 133; *Rep.* 450 B).

Swimming, not great as a science (Tr. i. 214; *Gorg.* 511 C); but yet it saves life (*ib.*); swimming on the back (Tr. 342; *Phædr.* 264 A).

Symmetries, symmetry. Symmetry, beauty, and perfection are said to hold a second place to moderation and fitness, and things which follow an eternal type (Tr. iv. 108; *Phileb.* 66 D); symmetries great and small, of which the latter are more noticed than the former (Tr. ii. 403; *Tim.* 87 C).

Sympathetic effect of good and impassioned recitation (Tr. iv. 298; *Ion*, 535 C).

Sympathy of hearer with speaker (Tr. iv. 298; *Ion*, 535 E).

SYMPOSIUM. See Summary, page 161.

T.

Table to be spread with every luxury by the boy attendants (Tr. iii. 479; *Symp.* 175 B, C).

Tadpole, to be no better than a, said of Protagoras (Tr. i. 393; *Theæt.* 161 C).

Taint of previous transgression may attach to a man and prevent his participation of bliss (Tr. ii. 303; *Rep.* 613 A).

Tali, reference made to tokens or symbols cut in two, to be held by two parties, who are thus to discern the authenticity of a mission (Tr. iii. 514; *Symp.* 193 A).

Talkative disposition of the Athenians hinted at. "All the Greeks regard our city as fond of gossip and given to excessive chattering

but Lacedæmon and Crete, as curt, and exercising much reflection rather than much glibness" (Tr. v. 27; Laws, 641 E).

Tangible, that which is to be handled is all that is allowed to exist by some persons (Tr. i. 386; Theæt. 155 E).

Tantalus, Tityus, and Sisyphus are the principal sufferers in Hades, not Thersites, or men of private station, however ignoble (Tr. i. 230; Gorg. 525 E); his name is derived from the huge rock suspended over his head as it were on the balance (Tr. iii. 305; Cratyl. 395 D).

Tapping or ringing crockery to see if it is flawed (Tr. i. 415; Theæt. 179 D).

Tartarus, the lowest place of doom, assigned to the most unjust and godless (Tr. i. 227, 228; Gorg. 523 A; 524 A); the deepest hell (Tr. 122; Phæd. 113 E). *See* Fable of Er.

Teachableness, or readiness to receive instruction, commended as an excellent quality of soul along with the cardinal virtues (Tr. iii. 31; Meno. 88 A).

Teachers of virtue are not to be found (Tr. iii. 31; Meno. 89 D, E); neither Themistocles, nor Aristides, nor Pericles, nor Thucydides imparted their virtue to their children or others (Tr. 37 to 39; 93 A, B, D, E; 94 A, B, C); the Athenians admire a clever man, so long as he does not profess to teach his wisdom, whether from envy or any other cause (Tr. i. 459; Euthyp. 3 C); good teachers very difficult to be procured. "Whenever I am with you, I am disposed to think that it is madness to make so much ado about children, especially as to marriage and family descent or money, and to be neglectful of their education. When, however, I look to any of those who pretend to instruct mankind, I am struck with astonishment, and to me, reflecting, each seems wholly unfit, if I must tell you the truth" (Tr. iii. 99; Euthyd. 306 D).

Teaching, not punishment, is the remedy for error (Tr. i. 12; Apol. 26 A).

Technical knowledge of poetry (Tr. iv. 294, 308; Ion, 533 D; 541 E); not sufficient without a divine influence (ib.); transport of the rhapsodist under his own recitation (Tr. 298; 535 C).

Temper of mind, or turn (Tr. i. 31; Crito, 43 B).

Temperance (*see* Art. Moderation), one of the cardinal virtues, ever on the lips of Plato, in connection with wisdom, fortitude, and justice. "Well, then, not he who does evil things, but he who does good, is the temperate man. Do you not think so, my friend?" "Never mind what I think, but what you are now saying." Critias will not concede that a man without self-knowledge is temperate, and he thinks that the god at Delphi, in setting up the precept, meant to exhort the worshipper to temperance. Hereupon Socrates asks, is it not know-

ing what we don't know, as well as self-knowledge? (Tr. iv. 127, 128, 131; Charmid. 163 E; 164 D, E; 167 A).

Testing by wisdom and affection (Tr. i. 184; Gorg. 487 A).

Tests of character are alternate exposure to suffering and to pleasure, in order to try if the party is hard to be imposed on and uniformly graceful (Tr. ii. 96; Rep. 413 D); tests of gold (ib.); of young horses, to see whether they will shie in circumstances of sudden surprise or danger (ib.); these tests are to be applied in childhood (Tr. 97; 414 A).

Tethys, mother of the gods (Tr. i. 382; Theæt. 152 E).

Texture of government is to be composed of strong and weak threads (Tr. iii. 276; Statesm. 309 C); requires the moderate and manly mixed (Tr. 279; 310 E; 311 B).

Thales taunted by the Thracian damsel for not looking at the obstacles lying at his feet (Tr. i. 409; Theæt. 174 A, B).

Thaumas parent of Iris (Tr. 393; Theæt. 161 C).

Theætetus like Socrates in the flatness of his nose and staring eyes (Tr. i. 371, 372; Theæt. 143 E; 144 E); the former is described as being pregnant with thought, and not empty, and on that account in labour (Tr. 377; 148 E).

THEÆTETUS. *See* Summary, page 72.

THEAGES. *See* Summary, page 213.

Theatocracy. "Hence the theatres from having been noiseless became obstreperous, as if qualified to decide in music what is and is not beautiful, and in lieu of an aristocracy of criticism there was set up an evil theatocracy. Had only a democracy of freemen existed herein, nothing out of the way would have happened, but now there arose among us, from this treatment of music, an opinion altogether false, of all men's wisdom in all things, and a lax licence ensued. Men were fearless, as if their judgments were correct, and this want of reverence begat impudence, seeing that the not fearing the opinion of a better man through over confidence is pretty much the same as a debasing impudence, the result of a too daring licence" (Tr. v. 117; Laws, 701 A, B). It has been said that we ought to esteem him the cleverest and best, and to adjudge him the victory, who can best gladden us and make us exult (Tr. 51; 657 E); it is clear that you and I would say that they are the victors who are adjudged to be so by their equals, or those of the same tastes and age, habit being of greatest weight in all cities. I concede so much to the many, that music must be tested by the pleasure it affords, not, however, that which pleases ordinary indifferent persons, for surely that is the best music which delights the best and most sufficiently educated, and especially that which delights him who has had the highest training

and made the greatest attainment in virtue. Never should the true judge take his cue from the theatre. The poets pander to this popular abuse, so that the spectators become their own standard, and this has destroyed the pleasure of the theatre (Tr. 54, 55; 659 A, B, C, D, E; 660 A).

Theatre, with its 30,000 spectators (Tr. iii. 480, 517; Symp. 175 E; 194 A, B); full of ditto (ib.). See also what is said above.

Thebes said to be well governed (Tr. i. 43; Crito, 53 B, C).

Themistocles advises the building of docks and walls for the port of Athens (Tr. i. 147; Gorg. 455 E); his answer to the Seriphian (Tr. ii. 5; Rep. 330 A); his inability to make his children good (see Tr. iv. 410; Theages, 126 D; Tr. iii. 37 to 39; Meno. 93 A, B; 94 A, B, C).

Theognis quoted as contradicting himself upon the possibility of communicating virtue (Tr. iii. 42; Meno. 96 A).

Theuth said to have invented the alphabet and letters (Tr. i. 354, 355; Phædr. 274 E; 275 A); also discoverer of alphabetic sounds (Tr. iv. 19; Phileb. 18 C).

Thessaly, its disorder and licence (Tr. i. 43; Crito, 53 D).

Things in themselves distinguished from things relatively (Tr. ii. 123; Rep. 438 B, C, D).

Think, as opposed to know (Tr. ii. 23; Rep. 345 E).

Thinking is diviner than all else; it never loses its power, though it may take a wrong circuit from daylight to the gloom of the cave (Tr. ii. 207; Rep. 518 E).

Thirst is not spoken of as a thirst for hot or cold, or much or little, but is thirst simply, for the quelling the craving from which it springs, and so too of hunger (Tr. ii. 122, 124; Rep. 437 D; 439 A); it has reference to the attainment of a good (Tr. 122; 438 A); nature of specific and absolute thirst (Tr. 124; 439 A); the satisfying the desire for food or drink as a source of great relief is treated of (Tr. ii. 275; Rep. 585 A, B; Tr. iv. 68; Phileb. 45 B; Tr. i. 196; Gorgias, 496 C, D, E).

Thirsty man. If anything pulls him back from satisfying his desire, it will be something else than the animal impulse for drink (Tr. ii. 124; Rep. 439 B); an archer's hands do not at the same time repel and attract the bow (ib.); a person wishing to drink, if resisted, is resisted from within (Tr. 124; 439 C); this inner power is reason, as that animal propensity was a part of a lower nature (ib.).

Thoroughness is the only condition which admits of being rightly estimated (Tr. ii. 39; Rep. 360 E).

Thought distinguishes what the senses will not (Tr. i. 436; Theæt. 195 E); is the principle of thought in the blood, or in air, or fire? (Tr. 102; Phædr. 96 B).

Thrasymachus, graphic description of his fierce onslaught, like a wild beast with ravening jaws, in accordance with his name (Tr. ii. 12; Rep. 336 B); irony of Socrates directed against him (Tr. 13; 337 A); said of him, that he was so mad that he would shave or beard a lion (Tr. 18; 341 C); he tries to run away from the discussion with Socrates (Tr. 22; 345 A); further irony of the latter (Tr. 22; 345 A, B); he is asked to keep to his admissions (ib.); is brought back to the point (Tr. 23; 345 D); concessions dragged from him (Tr. 28; 350 D); referred to as a resource against the difficult and contradictory teaching of Socrates (Tr. iv. 467 to 474; Cleit. 406 A; 410 C); he is represented as blushing for the first time in his life (Tr. ii. 28; Rep. 350 D); he declares his dissent from Socrates, and that he can, when he likes, rebut his arguments (Tr. 28; 350 E); will, in the meantime, not condescend to reply, but nod and say "good," like old wives do when they are telling their fables to one another (ib.).

θυμός, used of the "feelings," not of "anger" (Tr. ii. 125; Rep. 440 A).

Time is the image of eternity (Tr. ii. 341, 342; Tim. 37 D, E; 38 A, B, C, D, E; Tr. vi. 155; Tim. Locr. 97 C); belongs wholly to generation (Tr. ii. 338; Tim. 35 B, C; 36 A); is measured by the movements of the heavenly bodies (*see* references above); time to depart and die (Tr. i. 29; Apol. 42 A); time is short compared with eternity (Tr. ii. 298, 186; Rep. 608 C; 498 D; *see* references in Stallbaum); time is nothing, and is not deserving of the solicitude of an immortal being (Tr. 298; 608 C); time and tune synonymous with good education (Tr. ii. 96; Rep. 413 D).

TIMÆUS. *See* Summary, page 120.

TIMÆUS THE LOCRIAN. *See* Summary, page 247.

Timocratic state is described (Tr. ii. 235 to 237; Rep. 546 A to 548 D); and the person corresponding to it (Tr. 237 to 239; 548 E to 550 B).

Tiresias, what Homer says he was among the dead (Tr. iii. 47; Meno. 99 E).

Tisias, a sophist associated with Gorgias, who asserted that the probable was of more value than the true, and made small appear great and great small by force of words (Tr. i. 345, 346, 353; Phædr. 267 A, B; 273 D).

Top, its gyrations. Motion round an immovable axis is distinguished from transference or libration of the axis (Tr. ii. 121; Rep. 436 C, D; Tr. v. 419; Laws, 893 C, D).

Topsy turvy, life said to be turned, *ἄνω κάτω* (Tr. i. 179; Gorg. 481 C; Tr. 383; Theæt. 153 D; Tr. iii. 142; Sophist, 242 B; Eurip. Bacch. 345).

- Torpedo**, its electrical power, used as an illustration of the effect of the Socratic process of confutation (Tr. iii. 18, 25; *Meno.* 80 A, C; 84 B, C); Socrates defends his method of bringing home conviction of ignorance, which is the first step to acquiring true knowledge (ib.).
- Tortures in the lower world** (Tr. vi. 54; *Axiach.* 371 C, D, E); torture spoken of (Tr. i. 167; *Gorg.* 473 C; Tr. ii. 40, 304; *Rep.* 361 E; 613 E).
- Touch**, its uses and functions (Tr. vi. 161; *Tim. Locr.* 100 D).
- Touchstone for gold and for the soul** (Tr. i. 184; *Gorg.* 486 D).
- Tradesmen.** The lawgiver is freed from speaking of ship-masters, merchants, cooks, innkeepers, publicans, miners, usurers, compound interest lenders, and ten thousand other such, by leaving them to themselves, but he will appoint laws for agriculturists, flock and bee masters, &c. (Tr. v. 336; *Laws*, 842 D); the passion for gain among the trading classes universal and injurious (Tr. 465; 918 C); when an enterprising speculator has built hotels for entertainment in desert and far out of the way places, receiving travellers in desirable quarters, when in need, or driven by stress of bad weather, and affording them rest, pleasant cheer, and refreshment from heat, he does not, in the sequel, play the friendly host in the courtesies which follow this bland reception, but he treats them as captive foes within his grasp, and only lets them off for a ransom most heavy, unrighteous, and inextinguishable. These impositions, and others of the same class, have become a crying scandal (Tr. 465, 466; 918 D, E; 919 A, B); let any one who may be guilty of illiberal huckstering be indicted for disgracing himself, and if he has defiled his ancestral hearth, let him be imprisoned for a year (Tr. 468; 920 A); let the lawgivers settle what is a fair price, and insist upon its being adhered to (Tr. 468; 920 C). Human nature is the same in all ages. The Swiss inns of the olden time, and the butchers' and bakers' bills were no doubt as extortionate as our own.
- Tradition**, its value in religious belief will be guarded by the lawgiver as a sacred thing, and he will make no innovations or prohibit customary rites (Tr. vi. 24; *Epin.* 985 C, D); traditions have been lost through want of letters or cosmical changes (Tr. ii. 325; *Tim.* 22 B, and following; Tr. 416; *Critias*, 109 E); we must believe the ancient traditions and religious dogmas (Tr. iv. 514; *Epist.* vii. 335 A).
- Tragedy**, what it is and is not (Tr. i. 347; *Phædr.* 268 C, D); tragedy and comedy of life (Tr. iv. 78; *Phileb.* 50 B); the tragic is akin to pain, the comic to what is pleasurable (Tr. 74; 48 A); tragedy originated neither with *Thespis* nor *Phrynichus* (Tr. 462; *Minos*, 321 A); the tragic poets traduce *Minos* (Tr. 459 to 462; *Min.* 318 E);

320 E; 321 A); does tragedy aim to give pleasure or to say what is painful though profitable? (Tr. i. 204; Gorg. 502 B); said to be a respectable and admirable art (ib.); tragedy and comedy declared identical in their requirements (Tr. iii. 576; Symp. 223 D); are they to be admitted into the model republic? (Tr. ii. 75; Rep. 394 D); tragedy and comedy, contrary to what is said in the Symposium, cannot be both written successfully by one man (Tr. 75, 76; Rep. 394 E; 395 A, B); this is in accordance with the dictum that one and the same person cannot succeed in different arts. Tragedy said to be a wise or clever thing (Tr. 258; 568 A); the poets of tragedy are to be excluded from the state (Tr. 258; 568 B); it is on a par with comedy, which in its excesses is equally objectionable in the state (Tr. 286 to 298; Rep. 597 to 606 C; 608 A, B; see also Art. Imitation, Grief, Poetry); the tragic style is playfully touched on (Tr. 234; 545 E); the tragic machine, *deus ex machinâ* (Tr. iv. 468; Cleit. 407 A).

Treasure trove, not being derived from the finder's ancestors, is not to be appropriated, nor are magic arts to be used to discover where property has been buried (Tr. v. 455; Laws, 913 A, B); thou shalt not take up that thou layedst not down (Tr. 456; 913 C).

Trees fit for shipbuilding. Clinias remarks of the spot under consideration, "There is neither pine nor pitch tree worth naming, nor abundance of cypress. And, further, you will find little of larch and plane, which are at all times necessary for the internal fittings of ships" (Tr. v. 122; Laws, 705 B, C).

Trespass, laws respecting it, and also obligations to a neighbouring occupier (Tr. v. 338, 339, 340; Laws, 843 B, C, D, E; 844 A, B, C, D).

Triangles, in the philosophy of Plato, perform very much the part of the elements of crystalline form in the modern view. In the Tr. ii. 395, 396; Timæus, 81 B, C, D, they are made to form new combinations with advancing or receding age and vigour in the animal, whether the world or man. The favourite form is one which has its hypothenuse twice the shorter base, two of which will form an equilateral triangle, and into three of which every equilateral triangle may be divided (Tr. ii. 361; Tim. 54 A, B; Tr. vi. 157, 158; Tim. Loc. 98 A, B, C, D); there is a reference also to the relation of the squares on the sides of the right-angled triangle (ib.; Tr. ii. 361; Tim. 54 B); this is the purest of triangles, the squares of whose sides are as 1, 3, 4, and opposite angles as 1, 2, 3 (Tr. 397; 82 D).

Tribunal for criminal charges is not a fit place in which to arraign unintentional errors (Tr. i. 12; Apol. 26 A).

Trifles, the gods care for them, or nothing is beneath their notice or

hidden from them (Tr. v. 433 to 438; Laws, 900 A, B, C, D; 901 C, D, E; 902 A, B), where the argument against their being ignorant, idle, or neglectful is admirably put.

Triptolemus spoken of (Tr. i. 28; Apol. 41 A).

Truly false, if so absurd an expression can be allowed (Tr. ii. 63; Rep. 382 A); the false is abhorred by gods and men (ib.).

Trust is reposed in wisdom (Tr. i. 490; Lys. 210 B).

Truth is the precursor of all good to gods and men, of which truth he who would reckon on being blessed and happy hereafter should be a partaker from the outset, with the intention of continuing true as long as he lives. Such a man is to be trusted; but he is faithless to whom a lie is willingly dear, and he is without understanding to whom it is so unwillingly, neither being to be emulated (Tr. v. 158; Laws, 730 C, D); truth meets the wants of the simple (Tr. i. 355; Phædr. 275 B); the truth of existent things is in the soul (Tr. iii. 28; Meno. 86 B); Socrates says all he seeks in argument is not what a person thinks but what is truth (Tr. i. 474; Euthyp. 14 E); truth is better than fable (Tr. ii. 330; Tim. 26 E); is weightier than authority. Truth is allied to the pure and simple rather than the great or excessive (Tr. iv. 82; Phileb. 52 D); it is nearest allied to intellect and understanding (Tr. 105; 65 C); we do not contend for rivalry, but for truth (Tr. 9; 14 B). How is truth to be elicited by the conflict of opinions, where the false can add nothing to the true? (Tr. vi. 113; Demodoc. 383 C); Protagoras has written a treatise upon truth (Tr. i. 393; Theæt. 161 C); if truth be only what appears such to each individual, why does Protagoras attempt to teach it, and expect people to pay for it? (Tr. 393; 161 D); if truth be only this, how can men be absolutely wicked or good? (Tr. iii. 287; Cratyl. 386 B, C). Truth should be the test of clever speaking or oratory (Tr. i. 3; Apol. 17 B); is *impromptu* rather than studied (ib.); is not in a fine style, but in what is just (Tr. 3; 18 A); it is a purification (Tr. 68; Phæd. 69 C). The value of truth in praising is insisted on by Socrates, and its being well understood by him (Tr. iii. 525; Symp. 198 D); he will not make himself a laughing-stock by overstepping its bounds (Tr. 527; 199 A, B); truth is congenial to wisdom (Tr. ii. 171; Rep. 485 C). Truth is not ascertained by sensation, but by reasoning and comparison (Tr. i. 424; Theæt. 186 D). Truth said to be told by both (Tr. 184; Gorg. 487 A); and not confuted (Tr. 167; 473 B). Is truth to be told at all times to one in a phrensy? (Tr. ii. 6; Rep. 331 C); it is of the first importance, though departure from it is justifiable in some cases (Tr. 69; 389 B); private persons may no more employ untruth than they may tell lies to their physician (Tr. 69; 389 C); nor than one of his crew to a pilot (ib.).

Truth is not to be got at as now pursued in this particular discussion (Tr. 120; 435 D); the undivided pursuit of truth implies fondness for the pleasures of the soul rather than of the body (Tr. 171; 485 D).

Tune, to be in, how defined (Tr. vi. 162; Tim. Loer. 101 B; Tr. ii. 413; Critias, 106 A).

Tyranny, when wielded by a virtuous despot, is the best government.

"Give me a city where the authority is absolute, and let the tyrant be young and of good memory, easily taught, manly, and magnanimous by nature" (Tr. v. 130; Laws, 710 A, D); an oligarchy comes next, then a democracy (Tr. 131; 710 E; see also Tr. 132; 711 E); the advantages of tyranny in its not abstracting other men's property piecemeal and in the dark, but openly and at one fell swoop (Tr. ii. 21; Rep. 344 A); how it grows out of democracy and presidency (Tr. 255; 565 B, C, D); fable of those who taste a portion of human entrails becoming wolves (Tr. 255; 565 E); the president who has tasted a kinsman's blood will be a victim if he does not become a tyrant (Tr. 255; 566 A); dread of assassination leads to his assuming a body guard (Tr. 256; 566 B); he will not succumb to outward force, but spring on the chariot of state (Tr. 256; 566 C); in its earlier aspect tyranny wears a smiling face (Tr. 256; 566 D); and it makes fair speeches and liberal promises (Tr. 256; 566 E). What is said (Tr. 233; 544 C) must be taken as ironical praise, and so, too, his remarks on Euripides (Tr. 258; 568 A, B); which poet, in his Iphig. in Aulid. v. 323 *sqq.*, gives a striking picture of its evils (Tr. 256; Rep. 566 D). The tyrant seeks to involve his subjects in foreign war, to keep their attention occupied (Tr. 257; 566 E; 567 A); and exposes to the worst dangers those who are known to oppose his policy, or whose virtue he dreads (Tr. 257; 567 A); he is hated (Tr. 257; 567 B); he must plot against all that are brave, wise, magnanimous, and rich (Tr. 257; 567 C); he must make a fine clearance (*ib.*); he is involved in the glorious necessity of dwelling with the worthless, and he must import foreign stinging drones for his own safety (Tr. 257; 567 D); he robs the citizens of their slaves, and sets them free (Tr. 258; 567 E); a splendid fellow is the tyrant who gathers round him the young and vicious, while all persons of worth avoid him (Tr. 258; 568 A). According to Euripides tyrants are wise (*ib.*); probably wrongly quoted. Other poets, too, praise tyranny; not so Menelaus in his reproof of Agamemnon, as given by Euripides. How do these tyrants support their vast and varied display? First, by seizing all they can lay hands on, in order to avoid taxing the masses (Tr. 258; 568 D); then comes a reaction of the multitude under the figure of the father refusing to support

the tyrant's (the son's) extravagance (Tr. 259 ; 568 E ; 569 A) ; when the tyrant and his riotous pot companions come to be expelled, the people find what a monstrous beast they have nurtured, and apply force to repel force (Tr. 259 ; 569 B) ; the people flying from the smoke of submission, where freedom was enjoyed, fall into the fire of despotic rule, where they become slaves under a hard and bitter yoke (Tr. 259 ; 569 C) ; description of the change of the democratic man into the tyrannic, and its connection with legality and illegality (Tr. 260 ; 571 A, B) ; the unlawful desires are like those which are entertained in sleep, when the government of reason is withdrawn, and intelligence and modesty no longer exercise a restraining power (Tr. 260 ; 571 C) ; the sensual man runs riot, and commits all sorts of crimes in his sleep (Tr. 261 ; 571 D) ; he who has feasted on beautiful reasons, and is in agreement with himself, and has soothed his concupiscent nature, will in sleep attain to truth and will experience only the harmless phantasy of dreams (Tr. 261 ; 571 E ; 572 A, B) ; a man's nature is declared by his dreams (ib.) ; the democratic man occupies a half-way state of life between his niggard father and the freedom of the class below (Tr. 262 ; 572 D) ; the struggle between opposite influences is well described, and the implanting a passion, like a great winged drone, as the leader of wanton and idle desires (Tr. 262 ; 572 E ; 573 A) ; these desires are represented as buzzing, like a bee swarm, or troop of crowned and mad revellers, with the drone as prefect of the soul, attended by madness for a body guard, rushing on and killing or extirpating the good desires (Tr. 262 ; 573 B) ; the tyrant is like a drunken man (Tr. 262 ; 573 C) ; or one mad with love or melancholy (ib.) ; graphic picture of excesses and waste (Tr. 263 ; 573 D) ; the tyrant has recourse to loans, and force and fraud follow (Tr. 263 ; 573 E) ; sketch of him, under the image of one acting injuriously to his parents, discarding his mother for a worthless mistress, and striking both father and mother, who are his oldest and best friends (Tr. 264 ; 574 A, B, C) ; he is a blessed character (*ironice*), becomes a housebreaker, a spoiler of temples, and casts away all his earlier sentiments of honour (Tr. 264 ; 574 D) ; recurrence is made to the illustration of desires in dreams, compared to the same fulfilled when broad awake (Tr. 264 ; 574 E ; see also Tr. 260 ; 571 C) ; these unbridled acts and propensities described under the figure of a consuming indwelling passion of love (Tr. 264 ; 575 A) ; round such despots the crowd play the subordinate villain's parts, become sacrilegious, informers, false witnesses, bribe-takers, small in comparison with the tyrant's acts (Tr. 265 ; 575 B, C) ; many such tyrannous dispositions, aided by the want of thought in the crowd, aid the development of some one arch-

tyrant (Tr. 265; 575 C, D), who will soon enslave his father and mother, or, what is the same, his native land (*see* Tr. 263; 574 A); the man is a private before he becomes a public tyrant, and through obsequious arts he gets the ascendancy, and casts off those by whose help he rises (Tr. 265; 575 E); the tyrant knows nothing of liberty and true friendship, he is faithless, unjust, and like the sensualist in a dream (Tr. 265; 576 A; *see* Tr. 261, 264; 571 C, D; 574 E); on an entire review, the tyrant state and man are the unhappiest (Tr. 266; 576 C, D, E); and can be only seen through by those who look beneath the tragic pomp of their outward display (Tr. 266; 577 A). Such a state is in a slavish condition with regard to all that is virtuous in it, so, too, must be the man; both least accomplish what they aim at (Tr. 267; 577 C, D); he is impoverished, beggared, unsated (Tr. 267; 577 E); full of fears, cries, groans, and anguish (Tr. 267; 578 A); in a word, most wretched (Tr. 268; 578 B); but the state tyrant is more wretched than the tyrannical private person (Tr. 268, 269; 578 C; 579 B, C, D); the latter, if he has slaves, has the community to back him; the former is like a man placed in a desert with nothing but slaves around him, and in continual fear of being murdered (Tr. 268; 578 D, E); he must remain shut up, envious of the power which others have of going abroad (Tr. 269; 579 A, B); the tyrant is like a sick man, unable to regulate himself, and who has to struggle with other bodies in this state instead of seeking to cure himself in retirement (Tr. 269; 579 B, C); recapitulation of the tyrant's character as envious, unholy, destitute of friends, and the nurse and receptacle of every evil (Tr. 269; 579 E; 580 A); the summing up (Tr. 270; 580 B, C, D).

Tyrants should not be immortal. However good this may be for the just and holy, it would be the greatest of curses to the wicked (Tr. v. 57; Laws, 661 B, C); the tyrant, the king, and the ruler of a house are of the same class (Tr. iii. 192; Statesm. 259 A, C). Enumeration of tyrants (Tr. iv. 404 to 407; Theag. 123 B, C, D, E; 124 A, B, C, D, E); said to be wise by consort with the wise (Tr. 407; 125 B); tyrants and orators do not attain the summit of their wishes (Tr. i. 161; Gorg. 468 D); though Polus thinks that Socrates would envy them their power (Tr. 161; 468 E); and so (Tr. iv. 409; Theag. 126 A), they are to be pitied, not envied (Tr. i. 162; Gorg. 469 A); if they kill any unjustly, they are wretched (Tr. 162; 469 B); more so than the party murdered (*ib.*); are chiefly punished in Hades (Tr. 230; 525 D); the tyrant, fierce and ignorant, dreads the man who is better than himself in the state (Tr. 213; 510 C).

Types to be made use of as laws (Tr. ii. 64; Rep. 383 C).

Typhon and his heads (Tr. i. 303; Phædr. 229 D).

U.

- Ugliness equally objectionable everywhere (Tr. iv. 454; Minos, 316 A).
- Ugly and Beautiful treated of. How do we know which is which until we know what Beauty is? (Tr. iv. 221; Hipp. Maj. 286 C).
- Ulysses, his character in Homer (Tr. 264; Hipp. Minor, 363 C; 364 C); declared to be a better man than Achilles (Tr. 274, 275; 371 A, B, C, D, E).
- Unbelief in future punishments (Tr. i. 412; Theæt. 177 A); common on the part of crafty and smart, clever persons (ib.); that of the Athenians spoken of (Tr. 25; Apol. 37 E; 38 A); who are hard to persuade (ib.).
- Unbidden guests (Tr. iii. 477; Symp. 174 B).
- Unbloody sacrifices. While the custom is still extant among men of sacrificing one another, we hear of the contrary practice prevailing among others, at an age of the world when we neither ventured to eat oxen nor were animals offered in sacrifice to the gods, but cakes and fruits, moistened with honey, and such other chaste offerings, and when men abstained from flesh as unholy to be eaten, and as polluting the altars of the gods with blood, and some lives were styled Orphic (Tr. v. 244; Laws, 782 D), by virtue of their employing only things without life (Tr. 243; 782 A, B, C, D).
- Unconscious sensation is not the same as forgetfulness (Tr. iv. 48; Phileb. 33 E); and it differs also from perception (Tr. 48; 33 D).
- Uncontrolled dispositions are usually the subjects of evil (Tr. 369; Alcib. I. 134 B, E).
- Uncreated, the, is invisible and permanent, and only cognisable by the intellect (Tr. ii. 358, 359; Tim. 52 A, B).
- Undecidedness of Socrates (Tr. iv. 258; Hipp. Maj. 304 C, D); he alleges that he is always trying to learn and knows nothing, but is grateful for being taught (Tr. 275; Hipp. Min. 372 A); again said to wander up and down (Tr. 283; 376 C, D); corroborating what is said above, that he is always wandering and at his wits' end, and displaying his nakedness so that he has to bear the mud peltings of such wise men as his collocutor (Tr. 258; Hipp. Maj. 304 C, D).
- Understanding is, or ought to be, the source of happiness, not worldly possessions. "'Then,' said I, 'as respects the necessity of the good things of which we first spoke, wealth, health, and beauty, is it the science of rightly using all these which conducts to and insures the result we seek, or is it something else?' 'The science,' he replied. 'Science, then, not only affords good fortune, but inspires good action among men in every deed and acquisition.' He agreed. 'By Zeus,

then,' said I, 'is there any advantage accruing from other possessions apart from intelligence and wisdom? Can a man of large possessions or a man of many actions be profited without understanding? or is not the man of little property, if he have sense, the man who profits?' " (Tr. iii. 64; Euthyd. 281 A, B).

Understanding is king of heaven and earth (Tr. iv. 38; Phileb. 28 C); to understanding and intelligence, however, only a third rank is assigned, the first being conferred on measure, moderation, and fitness, the second on symmetry, beauty, and perfection (Tr. 107, 108; 66 A, B, C). Understanding is said to make things profitable (Tr. iii. 31; Meno. 88 B). Are we to follow the understanding of wise men, or that of the crowd? (Tr. i. 36; Crito, 47 D). The man of understanding is spoken of (Tr. ii. 6; Rep. 331 B); is expressed in Greek by *διάνοια* (Tr. 201; Rep. 511 E); distinct from pure reason, *νοῦς* (Tr. 201; 511 D); also from *πίστις*, and *εἰκασία*. To *νοῦς* corresponds *νόησις* (ib.); while *διάνοια*, discourse in thought, is contrasted with *διάλογος*, discourse in words (Tr. iii. 177; Soph. 263 E). See also Tr. ii. 224; Rep. 534 A, where all the relative bearings of these are again spoken of.

Unfairness in argument objected to, as wrong in one who professes virtue (Tr. i. 401; Theæt. 167 E).

Uniformity of human experience the means by which we understand each other (Tr. i. 179; Gorg. 481 C).

Universal science, idea of (Tr. iii. 79; Euthyd. 293 A); the universal king is the cause of all beautiful things (Tr. iv. 482; Epist. ii. 312 E).

Universe. "When the sovereign ruler beheld all actions thus endued with life, and much virtue existing in them, and much debasement, and a being indestructible but not eternal, soul and body, as the gods existing by law, for there could have been no genesis of animals, either of these being destroyed, he considered that what was born always for the advantage of the soul was the Good, and that which was hurtful Evil. Keeping all these ends in view, he contrived how virtue, being victorious in each of the projected parts, and vice defeated, he might contrive a universe as easily and as good as possible. Now he has determined for this universe how it behoves all to happen, and what seat and station each thing is to have as its abode, and what kinds of genetic causes should be left to our individual wills. For we are each of us almost wholly correspondent at different times to the mood and state of desire of our souls" (Tr. v. 441, 442; Laws, 904 A, B, C). What follows is also well worth translating. The universe has not been produced at random (Tr. iv. 38; Phileb. 28 D); it would be impious to suppose so (Tr. 39; 28 E);

has a soul and body, like man (Tr. 40; 29 E; 30 A); is beautiful and pure (Tr. 41, 30 B); is unlimited, and ruled by order and mind (Tr. 42; 30 C). If the universe is bound and at rest, all things are destroyed (Tr. i. 383; Theæt. 153 D); the universe is motion, and nothing else (Tr. 386; 156 A).

Unjust, the, are unhappy. "Perhaps a certain divine kinship to what is implicitly involved in your own nature leads you to honour and acknowledge their existence when you account that there are gods, but the fortunes of evil and unjust men, both in their public and private life, not in truth happy, but only such reputedly, lead you strongly but not purposely to impiety, hearing them improperly hymned by the Muses, or in other writings. Or perchance, seeing impious men growing old and leaving children's children in the highest honours, your judgment becomes confused for the present about all such, while you see or hear or personally witness the many and terrible impieties of some who by these means have from humble condition attained to the highest stretch of arbitrary power (Tr. v. 432, 433; Laws, 899 C, D, E; 900 A, B). Unjust and just, these qualities matters of dispute. Men do not fight about what conduces to health or pleasure, but they do about these moral properties. Half the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are made up of squabbles respecting right and wrong (Tr. iv. 325; Alcib. I. 112 A); does not our argument show that Alcibiades, the beautiful son of Clinias, did not know, but thought he understood the distinction? (Tr. 327; 113 B).

Unjust man cannot be happy (Tr. i. 166; Gorg. 472 D); is more unhappy when not brought to punishment than when punished (Tr. 167; 472 E; 473 B); he is more unhappy than he who is treated unjustly (Tr. 167, 162; 473 A; 469 B); he can have nothing in common with other men or gods, nor know what friendship is (Tr. 210; 507 E); the unjust and godless are condemned to Tartarus (Tr. 227; 523 A); reference made to the opinion of the crowd about what is just or unjust (Tr. 36; Crit. 47 D); the unjust man will hurt both friend and foe (Tr. ii. 11; Rep. 335 D); he is good and wise, according to the reasoning of Thrasymachus, when his injustice is carried out completely (Tr. 26; 348 D); will strive to have more than either the just or unjust (Tr. 27; 349 D); again said to be wise and good, and like them (ib.); on the other hand, he is like the evil and ignorant (Tr. 28; 350 C); in short, he resembles what he is akin to (ib.). Men who are perfectly unjust are incapable of acting in concert (Tr. 31; 352 D); live basely (Tr. 31; 353 A); are wretched, and therefore at a disadvantage compared with the just (Tr. 32; 354 A); he would be, according to Thrasymachus, on a par with the just, if he had on the ring of Gyges (Tr. 38; 360 B); he must be

perfectly unjust, while attaining the highest reputation for righteousness, though committing the deepest wrong, taking care to rectify every mistake and to rebut force by force or fraud (Tr. 39, 40; 361 A, B, C); certain lines of Æschylus are applied to him, and praise conferred upon him (Tr. 41; 362 A, B, C); he must also find persuasive teachers, possessed of popular and forensic wisdom, through whom to escape punishment (Tr. 45; 365 D); he will retain his badly acquired wealth, and evade the penalty of his misdeeds by persuading the gods to wink at them (Tr. 46; 366 A); yet he or his children's children will pay the penalty in Hades (ib.); the poets, however, say that religious mysteries and redeeming deities have great power to avert these mischiefs in the other world (ib.); unjust men are falsely said to be happy by the poets (Tr. 72; 392 A, B); when they do wrong consciously, and are subjected to suffering, their passion receives a check, if they have any good feeling left (Tr. 125; 440 C). The argument of Thrasymachus, that it is advantageous to a man to do wrong, if he only cloaks it, is resumed (Tr. 279; 588 B); Socrates now proposes to model a beast dappled and many-headed, as if we were combining a Chimæra, a Scylla, and Cerberus with a circle of heads of monsters wild and tame (Tr. 279; 588 C). As, he says, it is easier to model in words than in wax, let us fashion the figure of a lion, and of a man much smaller than the lion, and surround all these with an outer casing in human shape (Tr. 280; 588 D). To say that it is right to do wrong is to feed the compound monster and lion and to starve the man, or set them at variance (Tr. 280; 588 E); to assert that the just is advantageous is to strengthen the man, and make him able to tame and to direct the monster aright (Tr. 280; 589 A, B). The unjust man lets loose the monster more than expedient. If he enslaves his divinest part to his most godless and abandoned without compunction, is not he then miserable, and does he not allow himself to be bribed to a worse destruction by far than Eriphyle, who received the necklace or armlet for her husband's life? (Tr. 281; 589 E). Are not self-will and moroseness blamed when the leonine and serpent-like are augmented and inharmoniously rendered tense? and delicacy and effeminacy imputed as blame in the relaxation and slackening of this tension, when they cause cowardice? (Tr. 281; 590 A, B); and fawning and illiberality when the high-spirited is subjected to the brutal nature, and the man allowing it to be degraded by mercenary considerations causes it to become ape in lieu of lion? (ib.). (Note here the position of the negative after the principal subject.) At the end of the race, however well the unjust men may run at first, they are laughed at, become unhappy old men, are insulted by strangers and fellow-citizens, are scourged like

criminals, tortured, and have their eyes burnt out (Tr. 40, 304 361 E; 613 E).

Unknowable, said of things where reason does not exist to take account of them (Tr. i. 443; Theæt. 201 D).

Unlawfulness of evading punishment (Tr. i. 39; Crit. 50 A).

Unlike friendly to unlike (Tr. i. 496; Lys. 215 C); also considered as friendly to like (ib.).

Unlimited and limited (Tr. iv. 30; Phileb. 24 A); its marks are growth, degree, and intensity (Tr. 31, 36, 41; 25 A; 27 C; 30 B); unlimited does not contribute a share of good to pleasure (Tr. 37; 28 A).

Unmusical is a term applicable to men who credit nothing but what the senses teach them, and they are also said to be intractable and contradictory (Tr. i. 386; Theæt. 156 A).

Unnatural vices referred to with reprehension (Tr. v. 18, 21, 326 to 335; Laws, 636 A, B, C, D; 637 A, B, C; 836 A, B, C, D, E; 837 A, B, C, D, E; 838 A, B, C, D, E to 841 D).

Unproductive arts distinguished from productive (Tr. iii. 107; Sophist, 219 C).

Unrestrained hospitality (Tr. iii. 479; Symp. 175 B, C).

Unstable reasonings (Tr. i. 470; Euthyp. 11 C). See Dædalus.

Unwritten laws. "We are to consider that all the matters but now discussed are what are called by many 'unwritten laws,' what are otherwise termed national usages, all of which come under the same category. Moreover, we have properly asserted that we can neither treat these as laws nor pass them by in silence. These are links or pendants of every polity, occupying an intermediate place between all written and positive law and laws yet to be enacted: in a word, natural and altogether primitive institutes, which having been sufficiently well settled and practised, invest the written codes with safety" (Tr. v. 257; Laws, 793 A, B, C).

Up and down, a favourite Greek expression for instability (Tr. i. 95; Phæd. 90 C, and elsewhere abundantly. See also Topsy turvy, Tr. 102; 96 B; Tr. ii. 198; Rep. 508 D).

Urania, a name for heavenly love, to distinguish it from that of Aphrodite (Tr. iii. 492, 499; Symp. 181 B, C, E; 185 B).

Uranus, a name derived from Greek equivalents, signifying "looking up" (Tr. iii. 307; Cratyl. 396 C; Tr. ii. 345; Tim. 40 E).

Useful in speech-making. If the man would write what suited the poor rather than the rich, or the old man rather than the young, and what befits the generality, his speeches would be pithy and of popular utility (Tr. i. 302; Phædr. 227 D); health and goodness are useful, and so of strength and beauty, and their profitableness consists in

their right employment (Tr. iii. 31; Meno. 87 D, E; 88 A); moderation and teachableness, and things with understanding, are useful (Tr. 31; 88 B); when not rightly used things are hurtful (Tr. 31; 88 A); the useful is beautiful, and the injurious ugly (Tr. ii. 141; Rep. 457 B).

Uselessness of wisdom supposed to be urged where a man wants the ordinary means of support. "But," said Erasistratus, "what advantage would it be to a man, O Socrates, should he surpass Nestor in wisdom and not have necessities, the matters pertaining to daily subsistence, meats, drinks, clothes, and everything of this sort? (Tr. vi. 62; Eryx. 394 A, B); what would his wisdom profit him, or how could he be said to be rich whom nothing hindered from being a beggar, destitute of every needful thing?" (Tr. 63; 394 D). "If the people among whom he lived were such as to value the man's wisdom, and the consequences flowing from it, the wise man would have most to dispose of if he wanted anything in return, and should put up his wisdom and its products for sale" (Tr. 63; 394 D, E).

Uses of divine service, does it better the gods? Holiness constitutes this species of service, and this it is which preserves private homes and republics (Tr. i. 473, 474; Euthyp. 13 C, E; 14 B).

Usury prohibited (Tr. v. 180, 470; Laws, 742 C; 921 D).

ὑστερον πρότερον, "cart before the horse" (Tr. ii. 207; Rep. 518 D).

V.

Vacuum, nature abhors it (Tr. ii. 393; Tim. 79 B); is applied to explain the theory of respiration (Tr. 394; 80 A; Tr. vi. 163; Tim. Locr. 101 C, D).

Value of exalted conceptions of God (Tr. vi. 14 to 16; Epin. 980 A, B, C, D, E; 981 A); the value of testimony depends on the character of him who gives it (Tr. 71; Eryx. 399 B, C); value of perseverance (Tr. iii. 190; Statesm. 257 C); value of things of the highest moment often neglected for what is viler (Tr. i. 17; Apol. 29 E); value of the soul and virtue (Tr. 17; 30 A, B); value of pluck and a determined front in keeping foes at bay (Tr. iii. 572; Symp. 221 A, B).

Vase. We do not set boys and apprentices to work first on the costly piece of potter's ware, in order to teach them the art (Tr. i. 218; Gorg. 514 E).

Veins regarded as channels of nutriment (Tr. vi. 163; Tim. Locr. 101 C, D); though also as blood channels.

Vengeance will follow the death of Socrates, whose influence kept in check other less moderate accusers (Tr. i. 27; Apol. 39 C); he will

- leave behind him younger and less bearable persons to occupy his place (Tr. 27; 39 D).
- Ventilated statements, or what is the same, much vaunted (Tr. i. 106; Phæd. 100 B).
- Venus both evening and morning star (Tr. vi. 154; Tim. Locr. 96 E).
- Verbs and nouns are necessary to discourse (Tr. iii. 175; Sophist, 262 C); spoken of disparagingly as equivalent to sound rather than sense (Tr. iii. 525, 527, 573; Symp. 198 B; 199 B; 221 E; Tr. ii. 290; Rep. 601 A).
- Versatile thought of mortals (Tr. ii. 6; Rep. 331 A).
- Versatility and courage of the men who fancy themselves statesmen is admirable. Not so, however, the condition of those who are deceived by their empty pretensions (Tr. ii. 110; Rep. 426 D).
- Versed in divine things (Tr. i. 476; Euthyp. 15 E).
- Vessels of honey and water for the purpose of mixing together, imagined by way of illustration (Tr. iv. 98; Phileb. 61 C).
- Vice, progress in, compared to the result of feeding in bad ground or pasture, and nibbling improper food, till by degrees some great evil is set up in the soul (Tr. ii. 83; Rep. 401 B); vice is a disease, and the ugliness and sickness of the soul (Tr. 130; 444 E); its varieties are infinite (Tr. 131; 445 C).
- Victim of state torture, though unhappy, is less so than the prosperous tyrant who inflicts it (Tr. i. 168; Gorg. 473 C, D).
- Victory is differently adjudged by different parties. Children will award it to the conjuror, the bigger boys to the comic poet, the women, young men, and multitude will be for the tragedy writer, the old men for the rhapsodists or the epic writers (Tr. v. 52; Laws, 658 B, C, D, E); victory over self said to be conquered by and subdued by ourselves (Tr. iv. 198; Menex. 243 D); moderation in victory of the Athenian soldiers when they had captured the Lacedæmonians (Tr. 196; 242 C).
- Vile men plentiful, and of no account, while the earnest are few and invaluable (Tr. iii. 99; Euthyd. 306 D).
- Viper, the bite so severe that he who has been bitten by it will only describe it to one who has experienced the same (Tr. iii. 566; Symp. 218 A).
- VIRTUE. See Summary, page 241.
- Virtue, in what it consists. It is in the soul's concord with reason. The right culture of the soul with reference to pleasure and pain, so that it may hate what it is proper to hate, and love what it ought to love from the very outset of life to its close, is properly education (Tr. v. 43, 44; Laws, 653 A, B, C); virtue is preferable to gold and silver (Tr. ii. 320; Tim. 18 B); virtues of the olden time (Tr. ii.

428; Critias, 120 E; 121 A); virtue is necessary to him who would rule well himself and the state (Tr. iv. 369; Alcib. I. 134 C). "What is that transcendently noble pursuit you have successfully followed?" "Virtue," said he (Tr. iii. 55; Euthyd. 273 D). Is virtue to be taught? This inquiry, pursued in the Meno, is also renewed in the Dialogue on Virtue, which *see* (Tr. vi. 89; 378 E); is neither natural nor acquired, but present by a divine dispensation (Tr. 90; 379 D, E); is it to be taught? (Tr. iii. 3; Meno. 70 A); is it knowledge? (Tr. 30; 87 C), or a good? (Tr. 30; 87 D); it is a capacity for just rule (Tr. 7; 73 D); justice is not virtue in the abstract, but a virtue (Tr. 7; 73 D); described as a joying in beautiful things (Tr. 13; 77 B); teachers of it are not to be met with (Tr. 4; 71 D); we are not talking of the virtue of particular classes, but of virtue in itself considered (Tr. 5; 71 E; 72 A, B, C); is not to be taught (Tr. 29, 40 to 48; 86 D; 94 E; 95 A, B; 96 E; 99 A, B, E); is made beneficial by *φρόνησις*, intelligence (Tr. 32; 88 C, D); what it is is unknown (Tr. 18, 28, 48; 80 C; 86 B; 100 B); is present by inspiration (100 B); virtue described as a goddess (Tr. iv. 103; Phileb. 63 E; 64 A); what it is (Tr. i. 293, 294; Protag. 361 A, B, C, D, E); is knowledge (*ib.*); contradictory statements about it (*ib.*); he who practises virtue will suffer no dire confutation, nor any disgraceful overthrow (Tr. 232; Gorg. 527 D); daily discussions respecting it, the greatest blessings. It should be put to perpetual scrutiny and testing (Tr. 25; Apol. 38 A); it is not the bartering pleasure with pleasure nor pain with pain, for the only true currency is wisdom (Tr. 68; Phæd. 69 A); righteousness, moderation, and courage (justice, temperance, and fortitude) are participant of wisdom (Tr. 68; 69 B); these qualities without wisdom are a feint and shadow destitute of content and truth (*ib.*); virtue is a purification (Tr. 68; 69 C); is health and beauty, and good habit of soul (Tr. ii. 130; Rep. 444 E); is only one, while vice is infinite (Tr. 130; 445 C); if virtue is not in the soul it reverses morals and practice, and puts the cart before the horse (Tr. 207; 518 D); its greatest prizes and rewards in a future state. Virtue can both know itself and depravity, but the latter cannot know the former (Tr. 92; Rep. 409 E); is its own reward, which each shall possess according as he honours or despises her (Tr. 308; 617 E); is to be taught (Tr. iv. 470; Cleit. 408 B); or is this not so? (Tr. iii. 42; Meno. 96 A, B); virtue is not to be taught (Tr. i. 248, 293; Protag. 319 B, D, E; 361 A, B, C, D, E); may be partially taught (Tr. 255; 327 C); may be taught (Tr. 252 to 254; 323 D; 324 A, B; 325 B, D).

Virtuous love its value to a young man is beyond family ties, or

wealth, or honour (Tr. iii. 487; Symp. 178 C); men, when young, are simple, and easily deceived, from want of experience in the ways of vice (Tr. ii. 91; Rep. 409 B).

Visible heavens and motions of the celestial bodies are ruled by mind and an ordaining power (Tr. iv. 38; Phileb. 28 E); visible magnitude depends upon distance (Tr. i. 287; Protag. 356 C).

—— is so called from being seen, and not *vice versâ*, i.e., a thing is not seen because it is visible (Tr. 468; Euthyp. 10 B); the visible is created (Tr. ii. 332; Tim. 27 D; 28 A); the visible and tangible is regarded as alone existent (Tr. iii. 149, 151; Sophist, 246 A, B; 247 B, C); some are too modest to deny the reality of justice and virtue, but others, sprung, as it were, from dragons' teeth, or *αἰτόχθονες*, refuse existence to all that they cannot press with their hands (ib.); the visible and intelligible are the two ruling principles, one in the sphere of thought, the other in that of the sensuous (Tr. ii. 199; Rep. 509 D). See Art. Intelligible.

Vision, theory of (Tr. ii. 355; Tim. 49 D); is not colour the efflux of figure, as in the doctrine of effluxes taught by Empedocles, commensurate with and sensible to sight? (Tr. iii. 11; Meno. 76 C).

Visual perception, physiology of (Tr. i. 387; Theæt. 156 D, E).

Vocabulary of praise exhausted (Tr. iii. 526; Symp. 198 E).

Vocal oaks and rocks (Tr. i. 355; Phædr. 275 B).

Voice said to be one and infinite (Tr. iv. 16; Phileb. 17 B).

Voluntary wickedness. There is no such thing. All persons are evil against their will (Tr. v. 160, 365; Laws, 731 D; 860 D); this is one of Plato's paradoxes. If he only means, with Cicero, that sin is the result of a mind disordered, or with Clement of Alexandria, that it is a want of thought and moral infirmity, he will not be far out of accord with Christian writers, but irresistible impulse and deliberate choice have both been regarded as acts of the will by metaphysicians, though widely separated in popular apprehension (Tr. 365; Laws, 860 D, E); in distinguishing voluntary from involuntary injury he decides that where a thing given with a good intent has turned out pernicious, it does not class with wilful wrong. "This must be looked to by the legislator, and it is to injustice and hurt he must have regard. Injury must be repaired as far as possible by the laws, the lost must be saved, the fallen again erected, the slain or wounded made whole or propitiated with expiatory rites, and both to doers and sufferers we must try to reinstate and rectify all wrongs committed, and to transform them from a state of difference to one of friendship" (Tr. 368; Laws, 862 B, C). The voluntary is a mark of goodness, as involuntariness is of the opposite. People are wily and deceivers by virtue of craft and intelligence, not through

- silliness and want of intellect (Tr. iv. 266; Hipp. Min. 365 E); Achilles does not lie on set purpose, but unwillingly (Tr. 273, 274; 370 A, B, C, D, E); Ulysses is the better man, because he acted voluntarily (Tr. 274, 275; 371 A, B, C, D, E); how can the wilfully unjust be better? (Tr. 275; 372 A); that he is so further illustrated (Tr. 277; 373 C); the better runner is he who willingly runs slow (Tr. 277; 373 D); so, too, the better wrestler is he who falls purposely (Tr. 278; 374 A); it is so with gesture and voice and expression of face (Tr. 279 to 283; 374 B; 374 C, D, E; 375 A; 376 A, B); voluntary evil or ignorance does not exist (Tr. iii. 122; Sophist, 228 C; Tr. iv. 469; Cleit. 407 D, E; Tr. 242; Hipp. Maj. 296 C).
- Vowels are the bond of consonants, without which syllables cannot be formed (Tr. iii. 160; Sophist, 253 A).
- Vows. "To rear temples and statues of the gods is not easy, as it is a matter for deep reflection to do this rightly. But it is the habit of women, and particularly all those who are sick or in danger or in difficulty, wherever the difficulty may arise, or, again, when they receive any accession of fortune, to consecrate of what they have, to vow sacrifices, and to promise dedicatory erections to gods, dæmons, or heroes, starting up in night phantasies from terror, and in dreams, and under the recollection of many visions that have occurred to them, thus erecting altars and sanctuaries as remedial" (Tr. v. 454; Laws, 910 A, B); persons are not to celebrate the rites of the gods in private houses (Tr. 453, 454; 909 D; 910 C).
- Voyage of life likened to that on a raft made up of the best materials that may come to hand (Tr. i. 89; Phæd. 85 D); what it is when not under the convoy of divine reasoning (ib.).
- Vulcan referred to (Tr. iii. 218; Statesm. 274 B, C).

W.

- Wages, laws respecting them (Tr. v. 470; Laws, 921 D); and on usury (ib.; also Tr. 180; 742 C).
- Wakefulness and pain (Tr. i. 31; Crit. 43 B).
- Wallow, to, like a sow in the mire (Tr. ii. 226; Rep. 535 E).
- War, its perpetuity (Tr. v. 2; Laws, 625 E); is man to be regarded in relation to his race as an enemy pitted against an enemy? (Tr. 4; 626 D). For a man to conquer himself is the first and best of conquests, but that he should be worsted by himself is the basest and most ignoble. This implies that a war exists in each of us against ourselves (Tr. 4; 626 E). The lawgiver has a nobler duty to perform than encouraging the petty hostilities of states and factions, or con-

- sulting individual rivalries. No one is a good politician who does not enjoin war for the sake of peace rather than peace for the sake of war (Tr. 7; 628 D, E).
- Warrior class to be trained by music and gymnastics, so that their colours may be indelible by detergents, nitre, or caustic leys, like those of the dyers (Tr. ii. 114; Rep. 430 A, B); importance of their forming right opinions (ib.); right opinion more than mere courage (Tr. 114; 430 B, C).
- Water-works are to be constructed (Tr. v. 206; Laws, 761 A, B, C, D).
- Wave of derision overwhelming a man (Tr. ii. 159; Rep. 473 C). *See* Art. Billow.
- Wax tablet impressed with seal ring as a type of the mind (Tr. i. 433; Theæt. 193 C); a wax, deep, smooth, and not too moist, is adapted to retentive memory and definiteness (Tr. 434; 194 C); when the wax is too hard or too soft, or soiled, or hairy, impressions on it run together (Tr. 435; 194 E); or are jumbled, and overlies one another (ib.).
- Wealth is a blessing to the good and a curse to the evil (Tr. vi. 69; Eryx. 397 E; 398 A); its usefulness (Tr. ii. 6; Rep. 331 B); has many advantages, especially as it allows of making atonement to the gods (ib.).
- Weaver, the, weaves many garments, and dies before completing his last, but he is not therefore inferior to the product of his loom (Tr. i. 91; Phæd. 87 C).
- Web, to weave that of Penelope backward (Tr. i. 87; Phæd. 84 A).
- Weight, what (Tr. ii. 373; Tim. 63 C).
- Welding of iron spoken of, and its flaws and imperfect union understood in Plato's time (Tr. iii. 185; Sophist, 267 E).
- Whims and fancies of every individual, are they a test of truth? (Tr. i. 394; Theæt. 161 E).
- White, the gods are to be dressed in it (Tr. v. 523; Laws, 956 A); the funeral of priests is to be superior to that of other citizens, and all the attendants are to wear white robes, to utter no groans nor lamentations, while a chorus of fifteen boys and girls standing round the bier is to sing by turns, or antiphonally, a hymn composed in praise of the defunct (Tr. 508; 947 B, D); can we speak of white as colour, or of it as a colour? (Tr. iii. 8; Meno. 74 C); white colour, is it anything in the eyes, or not in them? (Tr. i. 383; Theæt. 153 D); is it produced, or is it permanent in nature? (ib.).
- Wicked, their doom in Tartarus, Acheron, Cocytus, Styx, Pyriphlegethon (Tr. i. 120 to 123; Phæd. 111 D, E; 112 A, B, C, D, E; 113 A, B, C, D, E; 114 A, B, C; and *see* Art. Fable of Er).

Clever and wicked people see sharply with their narrow souls, and the more keenly they see the more evil they inflict, but if their excrescences and impediments were lopped or unsparingly punished from childhood up they would see aright (Tr. ii. 207; Rep. 519 A, B).

Wills, laws respecting them, and the right of testators to make whom they please their heirs. This right questioned by the state (Tr. v. 472 to 477; Laws, 922 D, E; 923 A, B, C; other Laws, 922 B; 924 E; 925 A, B, D, E. Hardship of relatives being forced to marry the daughters of deceased persons (ib.).

Wind egg distinguished from real birth (Tr. i. 381, 392, 393, 455; Theæt. 151 E; 160 E; 161 A; 210 B).

Winds, dissipation of the soul by, spoken of (Tr. i. 87; Phæd. 84 B).

Wine is not to be allowed to children under eighteen, prior to exertion in the active duties of life, as we should guard the impulsiveness of youth. Afterwards wine may be taken in moderation up to thirty, provided there is no drunkenness nor excess. At forty, a more liberal indulgence is permitted, and to share in Bacchic solemnities, wine having been given to old age to mitigate its austerity and to soften it, like iron in the fire, so as to render it plastic (Tr. v. 64, 65; Laws, 666 A, B, C). The subject is resumed again (Tr. 230, 231; 775 B, C, D); state officers during their magisterial years and on campaigns, or steersmen at the helm, are also to abstain. See Art. Drunkenness.

——— pourers referred to (Tr. iv. 98; Phileb. 61 C).

Wisdom is the source of good fortune (Tr. iii. 62; Euthyd. 280 A); is to be procured at all cost and by all subserviency (Tr. 65; 282 A, B); it can be taught, and is the only source of happiness (ib.); wisdom is allied to number, and is not the attainment of particular arts and sciences (Tr. vi. 7; Epin. 976 A); its difficulties. The power of calculation only conferred by deity (Tr. 9; 976 D, E); what its characteristic marks are (Tr. 14; 980 A, and following); wisdom is of more value than property (more than rubies, according to Solomon) (Tr. 62; Eryx. 394 A, B, D); wisdom is the test of sufficiency in matters of public and personal trust (Tr. i. 489, 490; Lys. 209 D; 210 B); it is not sought for by the wise nor by the ignorant (Tr. 500; 218 A; Tr. iii. 537; Symp. 204 B, C); lack or drought of wisdom (Tr. iii. 3; Meno 70 C); examples of wisdom exhibited *more Socratico* (Tr. iv. 404 to 407; Theag. 123 B, C, D, E; 124 A, B, C, D, E); how to be got in state affairs (Tr. 409; 126 C). On this subject of the communicableness of wisdom and virtue, see also Tr. i. 222; Gorg. 518 C; Tr. iii. 38 to 40; Meno. 93 D to 94 E. Tr. i. 248; Protag. 319 E; 320 A, B; Tr. iv. 337 Alcib. I. 118 C.

Wisdom is falsely assumed by the multitude (Tr. iv. 76; Phileb. 49 A); wisdom and understanding imply the existence of mind (Tr. 41; 30 C); wisdom is able to test, especially when accompanied by friendship, and to tell the truth (Tr. i. 184; Gorg. 487 A); are wisdom, science, and knowledge the same? (Tr. 373; Theæt. 145 E); this is doubtful (ib.); wisdom is congenial with truth (Tr. ii. 171; Rep. 485 C); each man said to be the measure of his own wisdom (Tr. i. 393; Theæt. 161 D); true opinion (Tr. 404; 170 C); the highest wisdom is to know that we are destitute of it (Tr. 9; Apol. 23 A); human wisdom is of little account according to the oracle (ib.); search for wisdom (ib.); shall the lover of wisdom fear death, when earthly passion will cause men to desire it? (Tr. 66; Phæd. 68 A); wisdom is the only true currency (Tr. 68; 69 A); with which all virtue is bought and sold (Tr. 68; 69 B); without it virtue is a shadow, and neither healthy nor true (ib.; Tr. 68; 69 C); the notion of its being contagious or communicable by touch (Tr. iii. 480; Symp. 175 D; Tr. iv. 415; Theag. 130 A, B, C, D); wisdom is the science that presides over the perfecting of harmony and moderation of soul, in all the public and private relations of life (Tr. ii. 129; Rep. 443 E; 444 A); the opinion that dictates the opposite is ignorance (ib.); wisdom is distinguished from *σωφροσύνη* as *σοφία* (Tr. 193; 504 C); it is only to be rightly estimated through the longer circuit of the "Good" (Tr. 193; 504 D, E; 505 A); the importance of exact search (ib.).

Wise, what is so is beautiful (Tr. i. 237; Protag. 309 C); wise men are self-sufficient, not revellers nor drunkards (Tr. 277; 347 D); wise administration of the state and family spoken of (Tr. iii. 6; Meno. 73 A); Socrates speaks of himself as wise unwillingly (Tr. i. 470; Euthyp. 11 D). The wise men, Pittacus, Bias, and Thales, were not politicians (Tr. iv. 212; Hipp. Maj. 281 C); neither wise men nor fools philosophize (Tr. iii. 536; Symp. 204 A); the wise and good in their several professions keep within the rules of art. They will not aim to get the advantage of others like themselves (Tr. ii. 28; Rep. 350 B); they will be musicians, and not strive after wealth, nor to glorify the multitude, nor to grasp at infinite evils (Tr. 282; 591 D); will look to good government in themselves, and act up to their ability (Tr. 282; 591 E); they aim at what will make them better, and fly the reverse (Tr. 283; 592 A).

Wishing, does it regard what is done, or that for the sake of which a thing is done? (Tr. i. 160; Gorg. 467 C); it looks to the result desired (468 C); it aims at good, and cares not for the evil instrumentality (ib.).

Witnesses. "If a man saw the transaction and is willing to be a

witness, let him give his evidence, but if he says he knows nothing about it, let him swear by Jupiter, Apollo, and Themis that he does not, and be let off" (Tr. v. 495; Laws, 936 E). It is a matter of deep reproach that it should be thought that the machinery of law-suits is only to enable a man to defeat the ends of justice by skill and eloquence or feeing clever counsel (Tr. 497; 937 D, E; 938 A); nor are jurors to be misled (Tr. 498; 938 B).

Wives who have aspiring and ambitious notions for their children are spoken of as carping at the easy temper and philosophic disposition of their husbands (Tr. ii. 238; Rep. 549 E).

Wizards are not to be had recourse to in order to tell where buried treasure lies (Tr. v. 455; Laws, 913 A, B); the case of men's faces lengthened with dismay is referred to when they may see images modelled in wax affixed to their doors, or placed where three roads meet, or at the tombs of parents. We must counsel those who use such arts not to do so. No one can foresee the effect on weak minds, nor ought any one ignorant of physic or drugs to have recourse to sorceries when he is neither prophet nor wizard (Tr. 490; 933 B, C, D).

Women, their inferiority and bad education. "But if, on the other hand, the female race is more retiring and secretive than that of men, by reason of its weakness, yet it should nevertheless be had regard to by the legislator. This ill-ordained treatment of women acts injuriously on nearly half the objects of human improvement. The pursuits of men and women should both be set on a common footing" (Tr. v. 242; Laws, 781 A, B). There is nothing that women would rebel against more than being compelled to live in public, for being accustomed to dwell retired and in the dark, if led into the light by force, they would by their strenuous resistance prove too strong for the legislator (Tr. 242; 781 C). "There is much evil surely to a polity where women are so disgracefully brought up as to be unwilling, like birds, to die fighting for their young against even the strongest brutes. Instead of this, they straightway have recourse to the sanctuaries, and fill all the altars and temples, thus confirming an opinion respecting the human race that it is the most cowardly of all the animal races by nature" (Tr. 294; 814 B). Women are to be trained to arms. They were so in the primitive ages of the world, as is proved by the armed statue of Pallas. The dress and ornaments of the goddess show that men and women engaged in common in warlike pursuits, and were capable of practising in common all that appertains to the virtue of each (Tr. ii. 417; Critias, 110 B); women do not at one time beget real offspring and at another semblances, as is the case in the issue of mental throes (Tr. i. 373; Theæt. 146 A); women are to be held in common

in the so-called community of women and children (Tr. ii. 132 to 134; Rep. 449 C; 450 A, B, C, D, E); sex does not disqualify female dogs from watching the flocks (Tr. 135; 451 D); the females are weaker, it is true, and the males stronger. If, however, both are put to the same use, they must be allowed the same food and education (Tr. 135; 451 E); both will require music, gymnastics, and military training (Tr. 135; 452 A); it is objected that it would be a subject for laughter to see young girls and wrinkled old women with unattractive faces, stripped in the palaestra (ib.); the scheme of Socrates will be exposed to taunts (Tr. 136; 452 B). He will remind objectors how recently this exposure was found fault with in the case of men (Tr. 136; 452 C). The Cretans and Lacedaemonians were made the subjects of the same ridicule (Tr. 136; 452 D). In answer, Socrates says that nothing is ridiculous but what is base (Tr. 136; 452 E). Can women, or can they not, share in the labours of men? (Tr. 136; 453 A); the rule is to be applied that each person must follow the pursuit for which he is adapted (Tr. 137; 453 B, C); out of this sea of difficulty Socrates has to swim (ib.). Women do not differ from men simply because they give birth to children (Tr. 138; 454 E); why need there be any difference as respects the appointments of state? (Tr. 138; 455 A). In this view there is no individual peculiarity that should unfit them for the discharge of duty (Tr. 139; 455 B); natural differences of capacity in men (Tr. 139; 455 C); a man's nature, on the whole, stronger than and superior to woman's (ib.); but there are many women superior to a good many men in some cases, though generally not so (Tr. 139; 455 D); it is merely a question of degree in both (ib.). Should everything be assigned to men, and nothing to women? (Tr. 139; 455 E); women are well disposed towards physic, music, philosophy, high spirit, and the reverse (Tr. 139; 456 A); they are therefore fit for guardians, due allowance being made for inferiority of physique (ib.); they should have the same education with males (Tr. 140; 456 D); study music and gymnastics (Tr. 141; 457 A); be robed with virtue and purity rather than with clothes, with duties less severe (ib.). The man who should laugh at a nude woman would reap but an immature fruit of seeming cleverness in his unseasonable mirth (Tr. 141; 457 B); women to be possessed by the guardians in common (Tr. 141; 457 C); and the children born from them are to be in common and belong to the state (Tr. 141; 457 C); the latter are not to know their actual parents (Tr. 142; 457 D); this, though very well in theory, may not be possible in practice (Tr. 142; 457 E; 458 A); the possibility has been merely assumed for the sake of showing what would follow (Tr. 142; 458 B); women of the nobler

order are to be assigned to guardians and auxiliaries of the same class and stamp as themselves (Tr. 142; 458 C); are to have houses and mess tables in common with the men who will cohabit with them (Tr. 143; 458 D); not by a geometric but erotic necessity (ib.); the intercourse of the sexes is not to be disorderly, and *liaisons* are to be formed under the legislators' appointment, and rendered as sacred as possible with rites and religious sanctions (Tr. 143; 458 E); the selection of pairs is, as in the case of animals, to be made at the period of fullest vigour (Tr. 143; 459 A, B). The best men are to have intercourse with the best women as often as desirable, and the vilest with the vilest, while the children of the first are to be reared, those of the latter, not (Tr. 144; 459 D); unions are to be solemnized and brought about under secret arrangements by the rulers (Tr. 144; 459 E); the number of such unions to be left to their discretion, so as to supply loss by war and disease, and to keep up the stock (Tr. 144; 460 A); this is to be effected by lot in due form, as if fortune decided, not the ruler (Tr. 144; 460 A); young men distinguished for bravery in battle are to have prizes and rewards and freer access to women (Tr. 144; 460 B); female children are to be reared as well as male (Tr. 144; 460 C); no mother is to know her own child, but to be brought, when teeming with milk, to the nursery, and to suckle for a short time only (Tr. 145; 460 D); but all night watching and labour is to be borne by a nursery staff appointed for the purpose, so that the consorts of the guardians may have an easy life of it (ib.); women are to bear children to the state, from twenty to forty years of age, and the men from thirty to fifty-five (Tr. 145; 460 E); it is asked, why should they not hunt with men, like dogs, in couples, and share all their duties? (Tr. 151; 466 C, D); the possibility of all this is again considered (Tr. 152; 466 D; *see back*, Tr. 142; 457 E); the women will bring their vigorous children into battle, that they may acquire some knowledge of war and a taste for it (Tr. 152; 466 E); and these are to assist both fathers and mothers in the field, like boys do their fathers in mechanical arts and at factories (Tr. 152; 467 A); parents will fight better in the presence of their offspring (Tr. 152; 467 B); women are to fill the post of rulers as well as men (Tr. 230; 540 C).

Wonder is the domain of the philosopher (Tr. i. 385; *Theæt.* 155 D).

Wonders of the constitution of the human mind (Tr. vi. 51; *Axioch.* 370 B, C).

Woolwork on the part of women referred to (Tr. i. 488; *Lys.* 208 A, B, C, D, E); as a domestic employment with which children sometimes meddle and get punished.

- Word hunting and looking out for verbal slips discreditable (Tr. i. 187; Gorg. 489 C).
- Words of iron and adamant (Tr. i. 211; Gorg. 508 E); can all that may be expressed in words be realised in action? (Tr. ii. 159; Rep. 473 A).
- Work is honourable as distinguished from mere mechanical performance (Tr. iv. 126; Charm. 163 B).
- World is spherical (Tr. ii. 336, 372; Tim. 33 B; 63 A); is without organs of progression (ib.); it also rotates on its axis (Tr. 337; 34 A, B); the world has more in it good than evil (Tr. iii. 216; Statesm. 273 B, C, D); it has gradually changed for the worse (ib.); world of spirits can supply valuable communion to those who go from this life (Tr. i. 29; Apol. 41 B, C); world is a sphere (Tr. vi. 148; Tim. Loc. 94 D); is indestructible, but by the Maker,—incorruptible, deathless, blessed (ib.).
- Worms, unpleasant to be food for, at death (Tr. vi. 42; Axioch. 365 C, D).
- Worship of the gods not to be held in private houses (Tr. v. 453, 454; Laws, 909 D; 910 C).
- Worthy of the name borne by Thucydides and Aristides the younger (Tr. iv. 148; Laches, 179 D); worthy of mention, though not beautiful (Tr. i. 371; Theæt. 143 E).
- Wrangling and discussion are two different things. Both are parts of disputation, but often verbal, and take no account of what is really said or implied (Tr. ii. 137; Rep. 454 A); the present argument, as it has been pursued, is a case in point (Tr. 138; 454 B).
- Writing-masters (Tr. i. 254; Protag. 326 D); writing lines, like those in copybooks, to enable persons to write straight (Tr. 254; Protag. 326 D).
- Written language is a putting in remembrance (Tr. i. 355; Phædr. 275 D); and has its defects (ib.); it can never answer questions (ib.); requires that the author should explain himself (ib.); is an aid to lost recollection when memory is impaired (Tr. 356; 276 C).
- Wrong. Those who commit it do everything by which to escape punishment. They do not say that if they have done wrong they ought to be punished, but they deny that they have done wrong (Tr. i. 466; Euthyp. 8 C); he who makes a wrong answer is to sit as ass in the game of ball; and he who answers correctly is to be king of the game (Tr. 373; Theæt. 146 A); wrong is made out by Thrasymachus to be a beautiful and strong thing, or equivalent to the just (Tr. ii. 26; Rep. 349 A).

Y.

- Yearning for beauty (Tr. iii. 541; Symp. 206 D).
- Yokefellow, true, as an epithet of hope (Tr. ii. 6; Rep. 331 A); pilot of versatile thought, another expression for the same in Pindar (ib.).

- Young men said to have been corrupted by Socrates (Tr. i. 9; Apol. 23 D); they are happy if only one corrupts them (Tr. 11; 25 B); the charge is denied, or if done, then it is done unintentionally (Tr. 12; 26 A).
- Younger becomes relatively older, and older relatively younger, by equal additions made to both (Tr. iii. 448; Parm. 154 A, B); youngers are to be ruled and punished by elders, and never to strike an older person, unless by command of the rulers (Tr. ii. 150; Rep. 465 A).
- Youth listening to a popular harangue is easily convinced (Tr. i. 395; Theæt. 162 D); youth and a lyre recall one another by the laws of association (Tr. i. 73; Phæd. 73 D); the advantage to youth of a virtuous love is insisted on, when the young man has reached maturity (Tr. iii. 487; Symp. 178 C); youth is equally hard with old age to a man of irregular temper (Tr. ii. 4; Rep. 329 D); this is disputed by some (Tr. 5; 329 E); the youth is corrupted by influences adverse to those of his father, who waters and augments in him the growth of the rational principle, while others promote that of the passionate and concupiscent element (Tr. 239; 550 A); youths require to be watchful and spirited, like noble young dogs (Tr. 55; Rep. 375 A); they are not to imitate the exhibitions made by the poets (Tr. 68; 388 D); they must be silent in the presence of their seniors, give place to them, rise up before them, be attentive to parents, and wear their hair and dress and sandals appropriate (Tr. 108; 425 B); written laws on these points would be of no use (ib.).

Z.

- Zamolxis, king of Thrace (Tr. iv. 117, 120, 144; Charm. 156, 157, 175).
- Zeno the Eleate, referred to under the name of Palamedes (Tr. i. 339; Phædr. 261 D; Tr. 28; Apol. 41 A). He is an interlocutor in the Parmenides, where his name frequently occurs. Also in the Sophist, Statesman, and Theætetus, where the doctrines held by him and his school are not unfrequently hinted at.
- Zeus, a name of the chief deity, derived from ζῆν, "to live" (Tr. iii. 307; Cratyl. 396 A, B).
- Zoroaster and his Magian institutes. He is represented as being the son of Oromasdes (Tr. iv. 344, 345; Alcib. I. 122 A, B. See what is said on this point in vol. iv. of Rawlinson's "Ancient Monarchies").

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